M/s Gorfesh Automobiles v. State of ChhattigQarh & Ors.

Judgment

1. State of Chhattisqarh, Throuqh the Secretary, Department of Food, c-ivi! Suppiies Wetn'"' .Bi^*'^' Sm-'f t i •t.rfiu' ) i >u?t < \/ i laya,' bKS Bhawan, Raipu'r (CS) Coliector ', BEiaspur (CG} A.E. Dameron Aaed about 60 years, S/o Late Shri C.A. Dameron, R/o Krishnc ApartrTient, vidya Ncigu", Bituspur' (CG) Shri AAanjeet Sinah Sumber 5/0 Late 5hri 'Sumber, nt» .Age 50 Sinyh years, R/o ik, uayaibund, Biiaspur, District BilasDur fC&j Pr-esent; Mr. PS Kosiw with Mr. ParuQ Kotecha, Advocates for the oetitione". mr. AS Kachchawahc, resoondents No. 1 d 2/State. tw. Monlndro. Shr'ivusto.ya, ParaniDe, Advocate for the respondent No. 3. Mr. Sanjav K. Aarawal with I'A". Sourabh Sharma, Advocates fcr the Intervener-Hindusl-an Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. uy. Advocate ©enerai -Sr- Advoco.te with "A.i''. .AA.ar'c-j ^' ^ 'Siae^"^ ln^ ?'' ^- "^i^ '•ss ~:W1SSEES3S!"' ^/e' f k ii} (Passed on^JuJy, 2008) This petition is directed aqainst the order dated 25 Januarv, 2008 (Annexure P/15) passed by the State Minister (Tndependent Charge), Food Civil Supplies and Consumer Protection [)epartmeni', whereby th.e appeo.i preferred by the- petitioner' o.9ain3t the- order dated 10/14.5.2007 passed by the Collector (Food Branch), Bilaspur, hc's bee-n di-smissed.

2. Briefiy stated, case of the petitioner is that the Coiiector, Bilaspur, th.e licensing authority, under Chhattisgarh motor Spirit and High Speed uiesel (Licence & Controi) Order, 1980 (in shor't 'the Contro! Ordsr, 1980') gronted Iscence to the petitioner w.e.f. 14 nAay^ 1977. The petitioner obtained deQiership fro.i'n fA/s .Hindusta" Petroleum Corporation Ltd. (for brevity 'the Corporat'ori') w.e.f.

28.6.1977 for establishing a petrol/diesel pump. The premi-ias, on

which the pump of the petitior.dr is situated, was taken on psrinanent lease by the Corporation from one 1-1. KOSS (hereinafter referre" to as Isssori somewhere in the vear 19'7. It was dulv rsnewed for o. )eriod UD to 30T" SeDtember. 1990. The lesso" died somewhere in the year 1985 after executing a Will in favour of his brother and sisters. four in number - the beneficicries. The beneficiaries of ths Vv'i!! did not coilect ieo.se re-nt from the Coi"poi''o.tion. The respondert No. 3 ciaiming himself to be the power of attorney holder of the beneficiaries, cpproached the Corpor'ation "fter 20 year's and ciaJFned 'ne th.at ho.s o. right to -seii the !and Jn question on the ba-sis of power of o.ttorney. The application of the Cor'poration under Section 25 c'! the. .Accommodo.tion Contro! Ac-t, 1961 to deposit the e-ntire leo.se rent, was "ejected by the Rent controlling Authority^ Bilaspur on the ^^ ground of limitation. The first appeal preferred by the Corporation has also been dismissed and second appeal of the Corporation against the order of dismissat, is pending in the High Couri- as S.A.No.216/07. In the meanwhile, the petitipner filed an objection before the Sub Registrar, Bilaspur requesting not to register the so.Ie deed executed by the respondent No. 3 of the disputed premises on the basis of fake and forged power of attorney. He aiso filed a writ petition i.e. W.P.(C) No.3282/07 and the High Court- directed maintenance of status-quo with regcrd to possession of the property by way of interim relief. The petitioner applied for renewal of the licence of his petrof pump, which was to expire on 31 September, 2006, however, the Collector terminated the licence vide ordsr dated 14 AAay, 2007. The petitioner's appeal against the order of the Collector was also dismissed by the impu9ned order dated 25 January, 2008 by the State ©ovt. without affording o" oppor'tunity of h.eoiring to the petitioner.

3. The respondent-s No. 1 <& 2 in their reply have stated that the answering respondents exercising their rights under Clause 9 and Cl.ause 16 of the Control Order, 1980, h.aye passe-d the afore-said order whereby licence issued to the petitioner was cancelled, the order passed by them is quasi judicial in nature and the same does not r'equire ony comm.ent. However, records of bot.h the forums haye been produced.

4. Respondent No. 3, in hi.s fxsrowise reply, ha-s stated th.at the lessor died on 21 June, 1985, the lease agreement executed between the parties has already expired; no rent has been paid by the Corporation as per agreement for the last 16 years and \e.asewas 'v.s^ 'SF.'^wTE-:^'1""' rsnewed after 30 September, 1990 and thsrefope, Corporation has no right to use the site for storing petrol. Sub-rule (1) of Ru!e 151 of the Petroleum Rules, 1976 (for brevity 'the Rutes, 1976) proyides that 'no objection cert'ifico.te' gron+ed under Rule 144 of the Rules, 1976 con be cancelled whenever the licensee ceases to hove any right to use the site for storing petrol. Since the leo.se was not rene'A'ed after 30 Septembe", 1990 and there is no document to evidence the renewa! of lease thereafter, the lease could not be r'enewe-d autoiTio.tically. The resDonde-nt No. 3 moyed an aDDiico+ion be.fore the Collector, Bilaspur for cance-llo+ion of iice-nce of the. petitioner and also raised objection o.gainst renewal of the licence. The Co!!ector issued notice to the Corporation ond also issued show- cause notice to the petitioner. The saidnotice was duly replied by the petitioner ond only after obtaining reply, the licence was canceied on 10 May, 2007. Ths original owner has executsd registered power of attorney in favour of respondent No. 3 (Annexure R-3/6). Eariier order of the Coilector canceling the licence of the petitioner, wo.s stayed by th.e State (5ovt. 6n the ground that the Corporation was not given proper opportunity of hearing, howe-ver, subsequently after dismissal of the appeal by the appellate authority, the petitioner's pump hds been sealed. It has been further submitted that if the bis+rict .Authoritv or the State ©ovt.is satisfied tho.t the licensee has ceased to have o"y right to use the site for storing petro!, they can cancel the 'no objection cert'ificate' granted under Rule 144 of the Rules, 1976. The impugned order passed by the Collector, which was subsequently confirmed in appeal, was, in fact, passed after giying full opport'unity of hearing to the Corporation as wel! as the petitioner. -—-———

5. The respondent No. 4, in its separate reply, has stated that the disputed premises has been purchased by him from its erstwhiie owner. He has reiterated the objections raised by the respondent No. 3.

6. Shri P.5. Kosh.y with Shri Parag Kotecha, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner contended that the petitioner was isgjed licence to operate the petro! pump in the year 1977 ond the gome wa-s periodically renewed till 31 becember, 2006 by the licensing authority even o.fter expiry of the lease deed in favour of Corporation. The license to run petrol pump is granted under the Control Order 1980. After- receiving the letter of Annexure P/2 from the re-spondent No. 3 for renewo.l of leo.se, paymerit of rent and other matters, the Corporation had demanded death certificate of the lessor and o. fresh power of attorney duly executed and authenticated. H.owever, the afore-so.id letter was never rep!ied to and forged and fake document was submitted by the respondent No. 3 as power of ottorney. The respondent No. 3 on the basis of forged and fake power of attorney, transferred the property to the respondent No. 4. The legal heirs of the lessor have sworn affidavits in which they have categorically denied that the power of at+omey in favour of respondent No. 3 bea.rs their signatures and the above document is false and fabricated. The affidavits of legal heirs of the !essor ho.ve been filed o.iong with reply to the application for impleadment filed by the respondent No.4. Neither the Control Order, 1980 nor the conditions mentiQhed in the licence shows that requirement of a lease dee-d of the premi-ses, whe-re petrol pump is to be installed, is necessary for grcmt of llcence. The licen°ing cujthgrity cance!!ed the !icen<;e rejying i.ipo" the decision of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the mat^eT'M^yogesh Kumor cmd ol-hersj/s, M/s. Bharat Petroleum Corpn. Lfd. and o+hers report'ed in AIR 1990 SC 2216. However, the above decision was not applicable to the facts of the pre-sent case as in the aboye- decision, the iicence wo.-s gron+ed under Petroleum Rules, 1976 which are not applicable in the State of Chhattisqarh where l.icence is gronted unde-r the C'ontro! Grder, 1980.

7. The appelto.te- author-ity dismissed the appeal of the petitioner without affording proper and reasono.ble opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and the order was pas-sed behind his back. Clause 11 of the Control Order, 1980 deo.ls with corscellation and syspension of the licence. It envisages that coince!!ation of the licence can be done only if there is o"y contro.ve.nt ion of o-ny of thp- te-rms and conditions of the licence or Control Order, 1980. The orders passed by the Collector and the o.ppellate .Authority do not mention as to for which contravention of the terms ond conditions of the licence or provigions of the Contro! Order, 1980, the licence has been canceiled. First proviso to C!o.use 11 of the C'ontrol Order, 1980 mandate-s that no order shall be made under this Ciause unless the licensing authority has obtoined the opinion of the oil company with whom the agreement has been made by the licensee. However, in the instant case, the impugned order has been passed without giving notice or without calling any opinion from the Corporation. The Collec-tor h.ad no power to enquire into the ownership of the land as per Control Order, 1980 and therefore, the order of the Collector is without jurisdiction. The lessor has not initiated any eviction proceedings against petitioner before any Court of law and there is no order of eviction in favour of the priyate respondents, therefore, the occupation of the petitioner oyer the land in question, cannot be assumed to be illegal or uriauthorized. ,S!f'

8. It has been further contended that Section 12 of Chhattisgarh Accommodation Control Act, 1961 protects the petitioner against eviction. The grant of licence under the Controt Orde-r, 1980 is a mo.tter between the licensee and the licensing fluthority. Respondent No. 3 or re-sponde-nt No. 4 do not ho.ve o-ny locus standi to file a complaint for cancellation of licence of the oetitioner.

9. The Hindustan Petro!eum Corporation Ltd. Has been permitted to intervene in the instant petition. In thejntervention application i+ has been stated that the Corporation is iessee of the disputed land and t-he petitioner was appointed deater vide Dealership Agreement dated 4.7.1977. .After th.e death of lessor, the Corporo.tion requested the legal representatiyes tosubmit indemnity bond and declaro.tion. Dealership of the petitioner had alreo.dy been extended for a period of 16 years w.e.f, 16 Novsmber 2004. The Corporation submjtted an applicdtion before th®Rent Controlling Authority for deposing the rent, howeyer, th.e- so.id application was rejected by the Rent Controlling Authority. The appeal preferred by the Corporation wa.s furl'her dismissed by the .Additiona! District Judge and the Corporation preferred second appeai bearing No.216/07 in the High Court. Since the Corporation is the lessee of the suit land, the petitioner is deojer of the Corporo+ion, which is also licensee of the petrol pump, the licence of the petitioner could not be cance!!ed without notice to the Corporation as envisaged in proviso to Clause 11 of th.e Control Order, 1980. It has been furt-her submitted that in the appeal preferred by the petitioner before the State Sovt., the Corpor-ation has also submitted an affidavit stating therein that the disputed land, where the pe-trol pump i.s loc-ated, was token on leo.se by the Corporation from Shri H. Ross, who died on 21.6.1985 leaving Will in favour of AArs. AAargaret Kesilany <& AAr. Fedrick Stuart. AAr. Fedrick also died on 18.7.1989 and thereafter, AAr. G.C. Stuart was directed to produce indemnity bond, declaration <& auth.orization from the legal representatives; Mr. A.E. Damer'on/respondent No. 3 contacted the Corporation and filed authori2ation; he was directed to produce power of attorney duly executed in accordance with-law for payment of rent of lease premises. However, it was not replied to. Before cance!in9 th.e licence,the Co!!ector'/licensing author'ity hasnot sought opinion of the Corpor-ation and the order impugned has been passed without notice to the Corporation,

10. Shri Sanjay K. Agrawal, iearned counsel appear-ing for the intervener contended that the licence granted to the petitioner has been cancelled under the provisions of the Control Order, 1980 on the ground possession of the petitioner become unauthorized, which could not be cancelled without obtaining opinion of the Corporation and without affording a reasonable opport'uni+y of hearing o.gainst the proposed cancellation or suspension of licence. The Corporation was inducted in the premise-s in question under a valid lease deed ond continued to be a lo.wful lessee. The o.ccomn'odo.tion in question is located in the are-o. where provisions of Chhat+isgarh .Accommodation Contro! .Act are appiicable and therRfore, the Corporation cou!d not be evicted ignoring the proyisions of the Rent Contro! Act o.s it-s posse-ssion i.s du!y protected as statutory tenant. The appellate authority fixed the case for hearing on two interim applications, however, instead of hearing the parties'on th.ose applications, final order was passed dismissing the appeal itself. The petitioner and the Corporation were not afforded opport'unity of hearing by the appellate authority and thus, the very object of providing remedy of appeal, is defeated. i----—-- ^

11. It was further argued that where the order passed by the statutory authority, porticularly the reasons whereof, a citizen of India would be visited with civil or evil consequences, must meet the test of reasonableness. It was submitted that judgment in the matter of Yogesh Kumar an.d others Vs. Bharat Petroleutn Corpn. Ltd, cmd others, AIR 1990 SC 2216, reiied upon by the Collector/licensing au+hority as o.lso by th.e o.ppelloj-e author'ity, is distinguishoAle as in the aforesaid case, 'no objection certificate' granted under Rule 144 of the Ruies, 1976, was cancelled on the ground that licensee ceased to have any right to use the site for storing petroleum. However, in the instant co.se, the licence issued to the petitioner under the Control Order, 1980 has been cancelled.

12. On the other hand, Shri AAonindra Shrivastaya, Sr. Advocate with -Shri AAanoj Paronjpe, leorned counse-1 o.ppearin9 for respondents No. 3 <& 4 vehemently argued that the petitioner has impu9ned the order of the appellate authority mainly on the ground of vioio+ion of principles of natura! justice o.s the order has been passed without affording opportunity of hearing to the petitioner. The !egality of the order of thg iicensing auth.ority ahs atso be-en questioned on the ground that the same has been passed without notice to the Corporation and without seeking its opinion. However, from perusa! of the record of the Collec-tpr, it wou!d be evident that the licensing authority issued notice dated 10 AAay, 2006 to the Corporation, which followed by anothsr notice dated 23 AAay, 2006. The Corporqtion replied to the aforesaid two notices o" 31 AAay,

2006. Thereoftep, the petitioner was served with the notices dated 28th February, 2007 and 6th AAarch, 2007. From perusal of the obove notic-e, it wou!d be eyident that the proceedings were initiated under Clause 9 of the Control Order, 1980. The interim order was obtained ^- 10 Q^ from the appetlate authority by distorl-ion of facts as complete records were not produced. When the respondent No. 3 co-me to knpw obout the passing of the interim order, he apptied for vacating the stay order. However, the appellate authority instead of passing any order on the apptication for vo.cating the stay, dismissed the appeal itself. It was argued that keeping in view the overo.Il facts of the case, the impugned order passed by the appeltate authority does not ca!l for- any interference mere-ly on the ground that the petitioner was not afforded atTyopportunity of hearing. The principle of natural justice is applied having regard to the facts, situation obtaining in each case.

13. In the present co.se, the- lice-nsing author'ity ho.s CGncelied the licence of the petitioner on the ground that the petitioner's right to the site to store petroleum, has extinguished with the expiry of the leo.se in the year 1990. Relying upon the judgment in the matter of Yogesh Kumar, the licence has been cancelled by both the Courts below. The orders passed by both the Courts beiow are strictly in accordance with the principles of law laid down in the matter of C. Albert MaTis Vs. K. Chandrasekaran and others. (2006)1 SCC

228. Since the licensing au+hority initiated proceedings under Clause- 9 of the Control Order, 1980 for renewal of the licence, there was no lego.1 requirement of obto.ining fresh opinion of the oil company in terms of Clause 11 of the Control Order, 1980 as the said proceedings cannot be termed as proceedings for canceitation of licence. Since the penod of iic.ence has already expired on 31s becember 2006, the question of canceilation of licence, does not anse. r-—' 11 w:

14. I have heard leamed counsel for the parties, gone through the material available on record as also the orders passed by the Courts below.

15. From perusal of the record of the licensing authority, it is observed that the pood Controller registered a case for canceliation of licence of the petrol pump of the petitioner on the basis of letter dated 1 Februapy, 2007 of one A.E. bameron/pespondent No. 3. Said A.E. Demrom claiming himself to be the power of attomey holder of AArs.. AA.argaret Kesilany and other owners of the land in Que-stion. informed thot the suit Dre-n'ise-s wa-s leose-d to th.e Corporation for a period up to 30 September, 1990, the same has not been renewed; monthiy re-nts ho.ve also not been paid from July, 1989; the leo.se has been terminated and since the licensee does not possess the.required title deed of the land, he has no permission to / run the business; therefore, the- licence i-ssued to him be suspended/cancelted. The Coilector, Bilaspur directed issuance of notice on 26 February, 2007 and accordingly, show-causenotice dated 28th February, 2007 was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner submitted his reply on 12 AAarch, 2007 and informed that he is doing his business from the so.id premisesas adeaier of the Corporation, the matter relating to renewa! of lease deed between the Corporation and said A.E. Dameron, is pending in the Court and information can be obtained from the Corporation. Along with reply, copy of the two letters vuritten by the Corporation to A.E. Dameron /respondent No. 3, was also annexed. The licensing authority vide order- datsd 10/14th AAay, 2007 cancelled the diesel-petrol iicence of the petitioner with an observation that the petitioner does not have the le-90.! posse-ssion oye-r the disputed iand in absence of rene-wa! of the lease deed. ' 12 rI 1-,,

16. The petitiorier preferred an appeal under Clause 16 of the ContrQl Order, 1980 before the State Govt. and the appelldte ciuthor'ity vide orde" dated 25 June, 2007 aiiowed the appiicatior, for stay of the petitioner and stoyed.execution of the order of Go!lsctor. On 22 Qctober/SC®7the appea! WGS dismissed on ths ground of absence of the parties. However, it was resfored on 27t October, 200,7 andthestayorder was alsodir'ectedto be continued and the matter was fixedfor^inal arguments. Uitimately,the motter wos tc^enupon4 j(muary/2008 and the drgumsFrt-sweFe heard^^o^ •t-he two interiH' applicoition^ —one under Or'der' 41 Ru!e 27 read with Section 151 of CPG and another under Order 19 IS.u!e 2 of GPC-for permission to cross-examine the respondent No. 3 and the matter was fixedfwor'der's.on the above applications. However, the yingl order W(K passed on 25 Jo&ary/ 2008 where appeal of the petitioner it^lf was dismissed with the following findings: (i) that the lease ogreement has expired on 4T Ssptember,

1990. The land owners, Smt. Margcret Kesilany and \-"' otherg thpough their Advocate, have sent anotice to the Corporation terminating the lease agreerrient directed it to deposjt balance of rent The Cof^nrcri'ion's Itas been applicort'ion for permission to deposit rejected by •t'he Rent Controiling jAuthority and the order rent, of the Rerit Controlling Authority has been conflrmed by the Acfclitional District <& Sessions Judge, Bilaspuif, (ii) thaf possessioh of the licensee over the leasehQld land is not legal after termination^of the |lease. VI 13 ^

17. It is not in dispute that the petitipner was granted licence under C!ause 6 of the Control Order, 1980. The application for issuance of iicence is to be made in Form-A under Clause 5 whereas licence is issued in Form-B under Clause 6 of the Control Order, 1980. Clo.use 7 provides for period of licence and fees chargeable whereas Clause 9 empowers the licensing authority to refuse, issue or renew a lice-nce. Clause 11 deojs with calcellation or suspension of licence, which reads as under: "11 Cancelhtion or Suspension of Licence. - No holder of a licence issued under fhis order or his aaenf or servant or any other person acting on his behalf shall contravene any of the terms and conditionsof the licence or any provision of this order and if any such holder or h/s agent or servant or any person acfing on his behalf the said terms or conditions or contravenes any of provisions then withQut prejudice to any ofher action that may be taken against him his licence may be cancelted or suspended by order licensing authority. in writing of \, ^. Provided Provided that no order shall be made under fhis clause unless the licensing authority has obtained the opinion of the Oil Company with whom the agreement has been made by the licensee and the licensee has been given a reasonable opportunity of stating his case against the proposed cancetlafion or suspension; further communication containing the opinion of ihe Oil Company is received svithin thirty days of the date of receipt of a lettep to that effect under the foregoing proviso by the District Manageror an offtcerequivalent rank of that company, it shall be presumed that the Oil Company agrees with the proposed action and the li'censing authority shatl be free to passsuch order as may be deem fit.

18. Any person aggrieved by the order of the licensing authority refusing to gro.nt, reissue or renew a licence or canceling, suspending the licence or forfeiting the security deposit, can prefer appeat 14 under Clause 16 of the Control Order, 1980 within 30 days before the oippellate authority.

19. An applicant desirous of obtaining licence, is required to submit his application in the Form-A detailing the information such as, part-iculars of the person/firm, locatiQn of premises where the business is to be conducted and oit is to be stored, nome of the oil for which licence is required, experience in trading in oil along with quontity of the oil handled; deto.i!s of municipal licence, if any,name of the oil company of which the petitioner is dealer etc. There is no coloum in the application whereby applicant is required to state abou't' the tit!e of the accomiTtodflition/premises from where he intends to conduct the business. \ Form-B in which the licence is to be issued under Clause 6 of

20. the Control Order, 1980 authorizes the licensee to purchase, sale, storage for sale of oil subject to provisions of the Control Order, 1980 and the terms and conditions of the licence. None of the conditions mentioned in Forir-6 pertains to the title of ownership of the premises from where business is to be conducted. Condition No.5 stipulates that the licensee sho.Il not contravene any of the provisions of the law relating to Petroieum Products for the time being in force.

21. In the mat+er of Yogesh Kumar, it appears that "no objection cert-ificate" granted to licensee under Rule 144 of the Rules, 1976 was cancelled by the District Authority under Rule 151 on the ground that the licensee ceased +o ho.ye. any right to u-se the site for s+oring petro!, which wa-s subsequently, upheid by the C'ommissioner. The Division Bench of Allahabad High Court- set aside the order of the Commissioner. However, expressing di-sapproval with cert'o.in '^7) 15 obseryations made in the Judgment of the Division Bench, th.e- SLP was dismissed with the following observations: "On a reading of -suh-rule (1) of R, 151 if i-s c/ear thaf No Objection Certificate granted under R. 144 can be cancelled wherever the licensee ceases to have any right to use the site for storing petrol and that right could be lost by licensee either by his tenancy or right to the use of the site coming to an end or for any oi'her reason whereby, in law, the right to use the sife for stor'ing petrol ceases.

22. In the matter of C. Aibert Morris^e appellant was ten.ant of the first respondent yide leo.se deed for a period of ten years culminating in the year 1966. He was also dealer of the Hindustan Petrole.um Corporation Ltd. The deo.lersh.ip wos being carried on in the tease site beionging to the first respondent. The ©overnmentof Pondicherry granted no-objection cert-ificate under Rule 144(1) of the Ru!es, 1976 for instdlation of reto.il outlet of petrol ond HSD. The landlord issued notice to the appellant for possession of the property and subsequently, filed o. suit for a decree of eyiction and possession. The said suit was dismissed for default and non- prosecution. During pendnecy of the applico+ion for restoration of the so.id suit, the landlord issued notice of termination of lease. In reply to the said notice the appellant raised the defence that during the renewal of the lease deed, there were superstructures on the same and h.ence, the appellant is a statutory tenant governed by the Rent Control Act and as such, the notice is wholly illegal. The lon.dlord approached the third respondent i.e. the Joint Chief Controller of Explosiyes seeking to cwicel the permission granted to the appelto.nt for the storage of petroleum. The landlord also approache-d the authorities o.t Pondicherry +o reyoke the no-objection certificate granted to the appellant. - ^-- 16

23. The landlord soyght a writ of mondomus before the High Court' seeking direction thoit the licence of the appeljant to carry on petrol pump be not renewed as the appellant has lost his right to the site and hence, the licence was liable to be cancelled under Rule 153(1) of the Rules, 1976. The writ petition was allowed by the learned Single Judge with an observation that a "right" only meant a "iegal right to continue in occupotion or pos.se-ssion without interruption" and possession of the site did not entitle him to renewal. However, it was -^ i. also he!d that the appellant could be dispossessed only under due process of !aw.

24. In appeal the Division Bench of the 1-ligh Court upheld the order of the leorned Single Judge with a finding that the appellant is not a lawful teno-nt, his possession was not legal possession, the earlier suit filed by the landlord would not in ony manner prevent him from seeking a writ remedy and that the prov'isions of Rule 144 of the Rules, 1976 does contemplate any enquiry in+o.the right of the lessee to hold the propert-y and the some is not a bar to the writ petition. With the aforesaid observation, the Division Bench dismis-sed the appeat.

25. The Hon'ble Supreme Court- dismissing the appeal of "any right sf"hich the dea'er has over appella"t/dea!er has held that his si+e was the right which he had acquired in te-rms of th.e lease. When that lease expired and when the [andlord declined to renew the so.me and al-so calle-d uDon the erstwhi!e te-nont to surrender possession, the erstwhile lessee could no longer assert that he had ony right to the site. 1-lis continued occupo+ion of something which he had no right tooccupy cannot be regarded o.s source of a right to the 17 ^ land of which he himseif was not in lawfui possession. Litigious possession cannot be regarded as iawful possession.

26. Referring to ftule 153 and Rule 144 of the Rules, 1976, it was observed that the words "right to the site" in ii.ule 153(1 )(i) must, therefore, in our opinion, be giyen their fuil meaning and the effect that unless the person seeking a licence is in a position to establish a right to the site, he would not be entitled to hold or haye his !icence renewed. It has been also held that while granting NOC, Collector is not concerned about the owner'ship of the land. He is concemed about the location of the land and its suitability as a place for storage of petroleum. Rute 144 which deals with the grant of NOC doe-s not contemplate an enquiry into the ownership of the land nor does it require the Collector to enquire into the nature of the right claimed by the person who has apptied for NOC. Repelling the contention of the appellant that he wa-s a statutory tenant o.s per provisions of the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1969 and therefore, his possession was protected by the Rent Contro! Act, it was he!d that the instant case is based on lease deed dated 7 October, 1986, from the recitals in the tease deed it is c!ear tho.t what was leased out was a yacant lond and the lessee was given a right to construct a compressor room, storeroom, a bathroom and latrine together with a septic tank. Therefore, the provisions of Pondhicheery Bui!dings (L-ease and Rent Contro!) Ac-t, 1969 connot be invoked. In paragraph 40 of the above judgment it has been heid thus: "40. We have already referred to the argumenl-s advanced by both fhe parl-ies in regard to fhe naturs of It is abundantty tenancy and the statutory protection. clear ffom the recitals in the plaint, the Schedule to the notice and to the plaint and also of the lease deed that out" was only a vacant site i-o put upa what was "leased '">- 1 18 petrol bunk with accessory constructions thereon. The menfion of a sma.It shed in the current lease undoubtedly beiongedto the tenant himself and, therefore, thebuilding put up by the tenant ss'tuated in the vacant site betonging to the landtord cannot be said to be the building of the laidlord in order to affract fhe statufory protection of the Rent Confrol Act. This issus is, therefore, answered aminst the tenant.

27. From the facts in the above two judgments, as reproduced is clear that the licence was granted under the Petroleum Ruies, 1976 on the basis of no-objection cert'ificate isaied hereinabove, under Rule 144. No objection cert-ificate was cancelled under Rule 150 as the lease agreement was terminated by the iondlord after due notice. In the^ circumstonces, the lessee could no longer assert that he has ony right to the site. Since the lessee looses the right to the site for storing petroleum, his licence stands cancelled under Rule 153(l)(i) of the Rules, 1976. The argument of the appellant that he was a statutory tenant and as such, entitled for protection of the Rent Contr-ol Act, was also rejected on the basis of the facts of that case. From perusal of the tease deed it is clear that what was ieased land and therefore, proyisions of Pondicherry out was a vacant Buildings (Lease and Control) Act, 1969, which are applicable for tenancy of building, are not applicable.

28. It is not in dispute that in the instant case, the petitioner applied for licence under Clause 5 of the Control Order, 1980 fronied bythe State in exer'cise of powers conferred under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955. Thelicence has also been canceled invoking the powers under the Control Order, 1980. There is nothing on record to suggest that no-objection cerl-ificate, as enviso.ged under Rule 144, was obto.ined by the petitioner before grant of licence or the said no-objection certificate was ever cancelled by the 19 ^61 competent authority. The Control Order, 1980 is o. complete code for issuance, renewal, suspension and concellation of licence granted for business of purchase, sale, storage for sale of motor spirit or high speed die-sel oil on the ba-sis of o.greement with the oi! company. Whereas the Petroleum Rules, 1976 which were made in exerciseof powers cnnferr'ed under the Petroleum .Act, 1934, which wo.s subsequently repealed vide Suie 202 of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 w.e.f. 13th March, 2002 were made to regulate the import, transport, storo.ge, production, refining and blending of petroleum. Chapter- VII of the Petroleum Rules, 2002 deals with thelicences. Rule 141 refers to grant of licence under these rules and the licensing authority competent to gront licence, have been mentioned in the first schedule. From perusal of the first schedule it is clear that the licence under the Petroleum Rules are granted by different o.uthor'itie-s depending upon cla-ss and quantity of the petroieum. Rule 142 prescribed th.e period for which licence may be granted or renewed whereas Ru!e 143 envisages application for gront of licence to the author'ity empowered to gro.nt such licence. I5.u!e 144 deals with no-objection certificate by the District Authority where the licensing authority is the Chief Controller or the Gontroller. Rule 148 envisages of iicences whereas Rule 150 deals with concetlation of no-obj'ection certifico.te granted under Rule 144 by the District Authority. Rule 151 empowers the iicensing authority to refuse, grant, amend, renew or transfer a licence and Rule 152 provides for suspension o-nd cancel!o.tion of licence. Rute 154 provide-s foro.ppeo.ls and the appellate authority is the Centra! ©ovt.where the order is po.ssed by the Chief Controller; the Chief Controller where the orde-r is passe-d by a ControHer; and the- imm.ediate official superior to the bistrict Authority where the order is passed by the District Authoritv. ^ 20

29. Thus, from bare perusat of the Control Order, 1980 and the Petroleum Ruies, 2002, which are i" force at prese-nt, it is inanife-stly clear that a separate procedure has been prescribed under both the provisions. Since in the instant case, the licence has been indisputo.bly granted under the Controi Order, 1980, the judgments relied upon by the licensing authority and the appellate authority, which o-re based on co.nce!!ation of no-obiection certifico.te unde-r |S-u!e 150 of th.e Petroleum Rules, 2002, couldnot be applied.

30. Even otherwise. in C. Albert Moms^e, Hon'b'e- SuDre-m.e C.ourt considering the- 'stipulation in the leose agreement, in the co.se in hand, and also considering the definition of the "building" given in the Pondicherry Buildings (Lease and Control) Act, 1969, rejected the argument of +he appellant that he was entitled for protection. under the Rent Control Act with on observation tho.t the premises in ques+ion was a vacant land, ond ther'efore, the provisions of Rent Control Act of Pondicherry Stote wer-e not applicable. i-lowever, in the present co.se, no such factuo.l scenario has bee" pointed out by the iicensing authority or the appellate authority. There is no '.,< r'eference to the lease agreement in both the orders.

31. Undoubtedly, the original lease was entered between the Corporation and the landlord, who died in the year 1985 when the agreement of lease was in force, Fr-om the documents availabie on record it is also evident the petitioner and the intervener Corporation have seriously disputed the right of the respondent No. 3 based on a power of attorney, so.id to have been executed by legal heirs of the landlord, who had executed a Witl in their favour. Proceedings for suspension or canc-ellation of licence were registered on a written complaint of respondent No. 3 in the year 2007 and ^ssaBi-c"<»~" 21 7/^ show-cause notice was issued to the petitioner. The petitioner brought to the notice of the licensing authority that the lease is, iri fact, between the landlord and the Corporation and information can be furnished by the Corporation. 1-lowever, without issuing any notice to the Corporation after the reply was filed by the petitioner, the licence hce been concelled in violation of proviso to Clause 11 of the Control Order, 1980.

32. In view of the admitted fact the lease agreement between the Corporation and the landlord, the petitioner is in possession of the said premises being a dealer of its lessee, canceilation of his licence under Clause 6 of the Control Order, 1980 on the ground that the lease was not extended after 1990 in favour of the Corporation without affording an oppor-tunity of hearing to the Corporation, is contrary to the principles of natural justice.

33. As o.lready pointed out in the foregoing paragraphs and not disputed by learned counsel for the respondents, the appellate authority-State Govt. firstly stayed the effect and operation of the order of the licensing authority whereby licence of the petitioner was cancelled, and thereafter, the order of stay was again revived after regtoring the appeal, which was dismissed in default and non- prosecution. The matter was fixed for orders on two interim applications fited by the-appellant, however, in place of deciding the above interim applications, the appeal itself was dismissed without affording an opportunity of hearing to the appellant. The arguments advanced on behalf of respondents no. 3 & 4

34. based on the doctrine of "uselegs formality" as held by the Hon'ble Apex Court in Afiaarh Musliin University and others Vs. Mansoor M_Khffli, f2000)7 SCC 529 <S Shekhar Shosh Vs. Union of India ^^ and amthep. 2006 AIR SCW 627-1, are not appiicable in the facts of the present case as various important legal and factual questions such as; grounds on which the licence has been canceiled, are not the grounds ayailable in the Contro! Order, 1980 or conditions of ticence; the order hds been passed without notice to the Corporation and without seeking its opinion in vioiation of Ciause 11 of the Control Order, 1980; the Corporation was a statutory tenant and a.s such, it enjoys protection under CG Accommodation Control Act and cannot be evicted without adopting due process of iaw; the provisions of Petroleum Rules, 2002 are not applicable as the licence issued to the petitione-r is governed by the Control Order, 1980; factuai dispute regarding right of the respondent No, 3 to ro.ise any objection on the basis of power of attorney, are required to be answered.

35. In the matters of Rajesh Kumw and others Vs. Dy. CTT and others reported in (2007) 2 SCC 181, in paragraph 26 it has been thus:- "26. Effect of civil consequences arising out of determination of tis under a statute is stated in State of Orissa v. Dr. Binapani Dei. It is an authority for the proposition when by reason of an action on the part of a statutory authority, civil or evil consequerices ensue, principles of natural justice are required to be In such an event, although no foilowed. express provision is laid down in this behalf, compliance with principles of natural justice In case of denial of wouid be implicit. justice in a statute, the principles of naturol same may atso be held ultra vires Article 14 of theConstitution. Principie-s of no.tura! ju-stice ha-s been re.stated in paragro.ph 20 of theabove judgment asunder: ;—~~^^ 23 ^

20. Principies of natural justice are based on two bdsic pillars: (i) (ii) Nobody shall be condemned unheard (audi alteram partem). Nobody shall be judge of his own cause (nemo debet esse judex in propria sua causa). Relying upon the above principles of law laid dowh an3 considering the fact th-at the impugned orcler pa-ssed by the appeilate authopity causes serious ciyi! cojisequences to the petitioner, the samecarinot be sustained.

36. In the pesult, th& petition is aliowed. Impugned order dated

25.1.2008 (Annexure P/15) passed by the appelldte cujthority is set aside and the matter is r'emitted to the appellate authority wi+h a direction to decide the appeal expeditiously after affopding dye opport'unityof hearingto boththe part'ies, in accordcincewith law. No order as to costs. Sd/- Dhirendra Mishra Judge r 'h-' a ••r- '^