Champa C.G v. Mahendra Kumar Sahu S
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:10448-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WA No. 146 of 2025 1. State of Chhattisgarh The Chief Secretary, Water Resources Department, Mantralaya New Raipur, Post OfÏce and Police Station Naya Raipur, District - Raipur C.G. 2. The Chief Engineer, Minimata (Hasdeo) Bango Project Korba, District - Korba C.G. 3. The Superintending Engineer, Hasdeo Project Division, Rampur, District - Korba C.G. 4. The Executive Engineer, Hasdeo Canal Water Management Division, Janjgir, District - Janjgir - Champa C.G. 5. The Sub-Divisional OfÏcer Janjgir, Nahar Branch Sub Division No. 1, Janjgir, District - Janjgir-Champa C.G. ... Appellant(s) versus Mahendra Kumar Sahu S/o Hansram Sahu Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Khoksa, Police Station-Janjgir, District Janjgir-Champa, C.G. ...Respondent(s) For Appellants For Respondent BRIJMOHAN MORLE Digitally signed by BRIJMOHAN MORLE Date: 2025.03.04 17:14:17 +0530 : :
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Shashank Thakur, Deputy Advocate General. Mr. Amitesh Kumar Pandey, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey, Advocate. 2 Hon'ble Shri Ramesh Sinha, Chief Justice Hon'ble Shri Ravindra Kumar Agrawal , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 04 .03.2025 1. Heard Mr. Shashank Thakur, learned Deputy Advocate General for the appellants as well as Mr. Amitesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel holding the brief of Mr. Kamlesh Kumar Pandey, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent on I.A. No. 1 of 2025, which is an application for condonation of delay. 2. After hearing the learned counsel for the parties and considering the reasons mentioned in the application, we are of the considered opinion that sufÏcient cause has been shown in the application and accordingly, I.A. No. 1 of 2025 is allowed and delay of 294 days in filing the appeal is condoned. 3. The present intra Court appeal has been filed by the appellants against the order dated 22.02.2024 passed by the learned Single Judge in WPS No. 5321 of 2019 (Mahendra Kumar Sahu vs. State of Chhattisgarh & Others), whereby the learned Single Judge has allowed
Decision
the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner herein. 4. Brief facts of the case are that the respondent/writ petitioner was appointed on compassionate ground vide order dated 20.07.2018 (Annexure P/3 in the writ petition) on the post of Unskilled Helper by appellant No. 2 in the Department of Minimata (Hasdev) Bango Project, 3 Bilaspur (C.G.). In the year 2004, the respondent had caused an accident while driving a Tata Sumo vehicle bearing registration No. CG 11B/3069, therefore, Criminal Case bearing No. 62 of 2008 for the offences punishable under Sections 338 and 279 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) was filed before the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kondagaon, Distt. Kondagaon (C.G.), in which, respondent was in jail from 05.10.2018 to 30.10.2018. Vide judgment dated 30.10.2018 (Annexure P/4 in the writ petition), passed by the learned JMFC, Kondagaon, the respondent was acquitted of the offence under Section 338 of the IPC as there was compromise between him and the injured person, but on the ground of his admission, he has been convicted under Section 279 of the IPC and sentenced to the period already undergone by him i.e. 26 days and also fine of Rs. 1,000/- was imposed on him. Pursuant to that conviction, vide letter dated 01.07.2019 (Annexure P/1 in the writ petition), the appellant No. 4 made recommendation to appellant No. 3 that, since the respondent has been convicted for 26 days, therefore, he may be dismissed from service as per Rule 14-A of the Chhattisgarh Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (for short, ‘Rules of 1966’). Pursuant to that recommendation, vide order dated 03.07.2019 (Annexure P/2 in the writ petition), the appellant No. 5 has removed the respondent from performing government work with immediate effect till final decision is taken by the authority in the case. 5. Learned State counsel for the appellants submits that the learned counsel for the respondent made a submission before the learned Single Judge that he was convicted only for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC for rash and negligent driving of the vehicle, which neither fall under 4 the category of any heinous crime nor involved in any offence of moral turpitude, rather, such offence happened on ground of negligence on the part of driver, that too, without any intention. He further submitted that the respondent was sent behind the bar during pendency of the criminal case between the period from 05.10.2018 to 30.10.2018 and he was sentenced to the period already undergone by him. It was further submitted that, although fine of Rs. 1,000/- was also imposed against him, despite that, since offence under Section 279 of the IPC does not fall under the category of offence involving moral turpitude, therefore, despite aforesaid conviction, proposal for dismissal from service or even removal from government work, cannot be held to be legal. Hence, recommendation letter Annexure P/1 (in the writ petition) for dismissal of respondent from service and Annexure P/2 (in the writ petition) whereby the respondent has been removed from performing government work, may be quashed/set aside and the appellants may be directed to allow the respondent to be continued to work on the post of Unskilled Helper with consequential benefits and salary from January, 2019 with interest. 6. It is further submitted by the learned State counsel for the appellants that writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner was contested the appellants by submitting a detailed return in which it was submitted that the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner is devoid of merit and substance and accordingly is liable to be dismissed at the threshold. It was further submitted that since the respondent/writ petitioner was convicted vide order dated 30.10.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kondagaon in Criminal Case No.62 of 2008 for commission of offence punishable under Section 279 of 5 the IPC and sentenced him for the period already undergone by him i.e. 26 days and also imposed fine of Rs. 1,000/-, therefore, vide Ex.P/1 dated 01.07.2019, recommendation for dismissal of service has rightly been made by appellant No. 4 therein in view of provisions of Rule 14-A of the Rules of 1966. He also submits that vide Annexure P/2 (in the writ petition), the respondent/writ petitioner has only been removed from performing government work, but, he has not been dismissed from service. It was further contested that the criminal case and departmental proceedings are totally different. Even Police verification of respondent/writ petitioner has not been received. Since the respondent/writ petitioner has been convicted, therefore, the department intended to initiate departmental proceeding against him. 7. Learned State counsel for the appellants states that the learned Single Judge failed to consider the submissions made on behalf of the appellants/State and passed the order dated 22.02.2024 and allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner by setting aside the orders impugned holding that the disciplinary action was proposed against the respondent/writ petitioner for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC, which does not fall in the category of offence involving moral turpitude, and therefore, the action was bad. He also states that the learned Single Judge has directed the reinstatement of the respondent/writ petitioner in service with all consequential benefits. 8. It is further contended by the learned State for the appellants that the offence under Section 279 of the IPC being a petty offence does not involve moral turpitude, as held by the Hon'ble High Court of M.P. in Rahul Chaurasia vs. State of M.P. vide order dated 25.11.2024 passed 6 in WP No. 3087 of 2014, yet direction for payment of all consequential benefits does not appear to be justified since the respondent/writ petitioner has not brought on record any cogent evidence or established the fact that he was not gainfully employed during the period he was out of employment, hence, the finding of the learned Single Judge with respect to payment of all consequential benefits is illegal and contrary to law. Hence, the order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 22.02.2024 is untenable in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel, appearing for the respondent submits that the learned Single Judge after considering all the aspects of the matter has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner, in which no interference is called for. 10. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgment and materials available on record. 11. It is an admitted fact that the respondent/writ petitioner has been convicted for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC vide judgment dated 30.10.2018 passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate First Class, Kondagaon in Criminal Case No. 62 of 2008 and he has been sentenced for the period of 26 days, which he has already undergone prior to pronouncement of judgment and he has also imposed fine of Rs. 1,000/-. It is also apparent from aforesaid judgment Annexure P/4 (in the writ petition) that, respondent/writ petitioner has been acquitted from the offence under Section 338 of the IPC on account of compromise. Vide order dated 01.07.2009 (Annexure P/1 in the writ petition), recommendation has been made by appellant No. 4 for dismissal of 7 respondent/writ petitioner from service and on that count, appellant No. 5 has removed the respondent/writ petitioner from performing government work till final decision is taken in respect of the respondent/writ petitioner. 12. Rule 14 of the Rules of 1966 provides procedure for imposing major penalties and in respect of Rule 14, Rule 14-A provides procedure to be adopted in charge of corruption etc., which reads as under: “Rule 14-A- Notwithstanding anything contained in Rule 16, where the charges contain any charge of corruption or conduct involving moral turpitude, the procedure laid down in Rule 14 shall be followed.” 13. Perusal of aforesaid provisions shows that if there is charge of corruption or offence involving moral turpitude, then proper procedure may be adopted against concerned employee under Rule 14 of the Rules of 1966. In the present case, undisputedly, the respondent/writ petitioner has been convicted for the offence under Secrtion 279 of the IPC i.e. offence committed due to negligence, which itself shows that there is no intention or mens rea while committing such offence, rather such offence happened on account of negligence, which does not fall under the offence involving moral turpitude. 14. The learned Single Judge relied upon the judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Pawan Kumar vs. State of Haryana & Another, reported in (1996) 4 SCC 17, wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held in paragraph 12 as under :- “12. “Moral turpitude” is an expression which is used in legal as also societal parlance to describe conduct 8 which is inherently base, vile, depraved or having any connection showing depravity. The Government of Haryana while considering the question of rehabilitation of ex-convicts took a policy decision on 2-2-1973 (Annexure E in the Paper-book), accepting the recommendations of the Government of India, that ex- convicts who were convicted for offences involving moral turpitude should not however be taken in government service. A list of offences which were considered involving moral turpitude was prepared for information and guidance in that connection. Significantly Section 294 IPC is not found enlisted in the list of offences constituting moral turpitude. Later, on further consideration, the Government of Haryana on 17/26-3-1975 explained the policy decision of 2-2-1973 and decided to modify the earlier decision by streamlining determination of moral turpitude as follows: “… The following terms should ordinarily be applied in judging whether a certain offence involves moral turpitude or not; (1) whether the act leading to a conviction was such as could shock the moral conscience of society in general. (2) whether the motive which led to the act was a 9 base one. (3) whether on account of the act having been committed the perpetrator could be considered to be of a depraved character or a person who was to be looked down upon by the society. Decision in each case will, however, depend on the circumstances of the case and the competent authority has to exercise its discretion while taking a decision in accordance with the above-mentioned principles. A list of offences which involve moral turpitude is enclosed for your information and guidance. This list, however, cannot be said to be exhaustive and there might be offences which are not included in it but which in certain situations and circumstances may involve moral turpitude.” 15. In the case of Rahul Chaurasia (supra), where the petitioner was found involved in an offence under Section 279 which relates to rash driving or riding on a public way and also of Section 427 which relates to mischief causing damage to the amount of fifty rupees, the High Court of Madhya Pradesh held that in case of road accident some loss of property is caused, the said offence would not fall within the purview of moral turpitude, it is not an offence committed intentionally depriving the moral by a person, but such an offence has been committed by virtue of an accident without having any mens rea in the mind. 16. While passing the impugned judgment, learned Single Judge held 10 that in the present case also, since the respondent/writ petitioner has been convicted for the offence under Section 279 of the IPC, which relates to rash driving or riding on a public way and has been imposed sentence for the period already undergone and fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in view of the observation made by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pawan Kumar (supra), and view taken by Madhya Pradesh High Court in case of Rahul Chaurasia (supra), the said offence would not fall within the purview of moral turpitude, as, such act does not suppose to shock the moral conscience of society or brake moral value of the society. Therefore, the appellants authorities are not justified in making recommendation for dismissal of respondent/writ petitioner from service vide Annexure P/1 (in the writ petition) and also in removing him from performing government work vide Annexure P/2 (in the writ petition). Therefore, the learned Single Judge has rightly set aside the recommendation vide Annexure P/1 (in the writ petition) dated 01.07.2019 made by appellant No. 5 for dismissal of respondent/writ petitioner from service and order Annexure P/2 (in the writ petition) dated 03.07.2019 issued by the appellant No. 5, whereby, the respondent/writ petitioner has been removed from performing the government work. 17. Learned Single Judge further held that the learned State counsel for the appellants have made submission that the respondent/writ petitioner has not yet been dismissed from service, it is directed that the respondent/writ petitioner be taken back in performing government work, on the post of unskilled helper (work charged), from which, he was removed vide Annexure P/2 (in the writ petition) assuming as he has not been removed from work. It is further directed that the respondent/writ 11 petitioner be given all consequential benefits and salary from the date, to which, he was otherwise entitled. 18. Considering the pleadings made in writ appeal, submissions advanced by the learned counsel appearing for the parties and also considering the findings recorded by the learned Single Judge while allowing the writ petition filed by the respondent/writ petitioner, we are of the considered opinion that the learned Single Judge has not committed any illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court. 19. Accordingly, the present writ appeal being devoid of merit is liable to be and is hereby dismissed. Sd/- Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) (Ramesh Sinha) Chief Justice Judge Brijmohan