Gurudas Raikar v. National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors
Case Details
1 AVINASH SHARMA Digitally signed by AVINASH SHARMA Date: 2025.02.10 11:16:19 +0530 2025:CGHC:6729 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CR No. 26 of 2025 • Shriram General Insurance Company Limited Through Branch Manager, C 8-9, C.G Plaza, Agrasen Chowk, Near Telephone Exchange, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur (C.G.). ...Applicant. 1 - Samar Singh S/o Late Dewan Singh Aged About 76 Years. versus 2 - Rati Bai W/o Samar Singh Aged About 72 Years. Both above R/o Village Kowatal Binjhara, Thana Katghora, District Korba (C.G.).
Legal Reasoning
3 - Jaswinder Singh S/o Shridhar Pal Singh, 27 Kholi, Vikas Nagar, Bilaspur, Thana Civil Lines, District Bilaspur (C.G.). ... Respondent(s). For Applicant : Shri Utsav Mahiswar, Advocate. Hon'ble Shri Justice Deepak Kumar Tiwari Order On Board 06/02/2025 1. Heard on I.A. No.2/2025, an application for condonation of delay in filing revision. 2 2. There is delay of 17 days in filing the instant civil revision. 3. On due consideration, aforesaid application is allowed and delay is condoned. 4. Applicant, through this revision, seeks to assail the order dated 04.10.2024 passed by the 10th Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh in Claims Case No.699/2023, whereby objection raised by applicant-Insurance Company that the claim petition is time barred was disallowed and the application was dismissed accordingly. 5. Learned counsel for the applicant would submit that Respondent No.1 and 2/claimants herein had filed a claim petition under Section 163A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 on account of death of their son in an accident occurred on 18.08.2013 and the claim petition was filed on 17.05.2023. He would further submit that the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Act, 2019 was notified w.e.f. 01.04.2022 whereby, a new sub-section (3) was inserted to Section 166 which clearly stipulates that no application for compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within 6 months of the occurrence of accident. He would further submit that in the new amendment act, there is no provision for condonation of delay and the said matter is still sub-judice before Hon’ble Supreme Court. He further submits that the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad while dealing with the interlocutory applications filed in WP Nos.1395 and 1396/2023 passed an order on 06.03.2023 observing that Section 5 of Limitation Act, 1963 would be attracted and the said order was also challenged before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and effect and operation of the said order was stayed by the Apex Court in SLP(C) No.8412- 8413/2023. 6. Learned counsel for the applicant also submits that in the matter of Vinod 3 Gurudas Raikar vs National Insurance Co. Ltd. And Ors {AIR 1991 SC 2156}, it has been categorically observed that the right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. If the claimant actually initiated the proceeding when the old act was in operation, a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing the petition could not be taken away. It is observed in the said judgment that even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. So the benefit of the repealed law could not therefore be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repealing the old act. Relevant para 11 read as under:- 11. In the case before us the period of limitation for lodging the claim under the old as well as the new Act was same six months which expired three weeks after coming in force of the new Act. It was open to the appellant to file his claim within this period or even later by 22.7.1989 with a prayer to condone the delay. His right to claim compensation was not affected at all by the substitution of one Act with another. Since the period of limitation remained the same there was no question of the appellant being taken by surprise. So far the question of condonation of six months delay was concerned, there was no change in the position under the new Act. In this background the appellant's further default has to be considered. If in a given case the accident had taken place more than a year before the new Act coming in force and the claimant had actually filed his petition while the old Act was in force but after a period of one year, the position could be different. Having actually initiated the proceeding when the old Act covered the field a claimant could say that his right which had accrued on filing of the petition could not be taken away. The present case is different. The right or privilege to claim benefit of a provision for 4 condonation of delay can be governed only by the law in force at the time of delay. Even the hope or expectation of getting the benefit of an enactment presupposes applicability of the enactment when the need arises to take its benefit. In the present case the occasion to take the benefit of the provision for condonation of delay in filing the claim arose only after repeal of the old law. Obviously the ground for condonation set up as 'sufficient cause' also relates to the time after the repeal. The benefit of the repealed law could not, therefore, be available simply because the cause of action for the claim arose before repeal. 'Sufficient cause' as a ground of condonation of delay in filing the claim is distinct from 'cause of action' for the claim itself. The question of condonation of
Decision
delay must, therefore, be governed by the new law. We accordingly hold that the High Court was right in its view that the case was covered by the new Act, and delay for a longer period than six months could not be condoned. The appeal is dismissed, but in the circumstances, without costs. 7. Learned counsel for the applicant submits that this revision may be disposed of as the issue relating to condonability of delay in filing claim application under Section 166(3) of the Motor Vehicle Act is pending consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court and in the present case, deceased himself was driving the offending vehicle and he was not third party. 8. In the matter of Ramkhiladi & Anr. v. The United India Insurance Company & Anr. {(2020) 2 SCC 550}, it has been categorically observed, placing reliance on various earlier judgments, that a person cannot be both, a claimant as also a recipient and the deceased is not a third party. 9. In view of the aforesaid, this Revision is disposed of directing the concerned Claims Tribunal not to pass final award in the claim application pending before the tribunal till the issue relating to condonability of delay 5 in filing claim application under Section 166(3) of the amended Motor Vehicle Act is decided conclusively by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Sd/- (Deepak Kumar Tiwari) Judge Avinash