High Court of Chhattisgarh
Case Details
1 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR NAFR Reserved for orders on : 07.03.2025 Order passed on 08.05.2025 WPS No. 911 of 2024 1 - Priyanka Dubey D/o V.K. Dubey Aged About 38 Years Advocate, Occupation Service Ex-Manager Personnel And Administration Officer In Cpsu, Bilaspur, District- Bilaspur, Chhattisgarh. versus ... Petitioner(s) 1 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Chief Secretary, Mantralaya, Mahanadi Bhawan, Atal Nagar, Nawa Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Chhattisgarh Railway Corporation Limited Through Its Managing Director, Csidc Bhawan, Mahadev Ghat Road, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Managing Director In-Charge, Chhattisgarh Railway Corporation Limited, Csidc Bhawan, Mahadev Ghat Road, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 4 - Union Of India Through Secretary, Ministry Of Railways, Rail Bhavan, Raisina Road, New Delhi, 110001 ... Respondent(s) (Cause Title is taken from CIS System) For Petitioner
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Rajeev Shrivastava, Sr. Advocate assisted by Ms. Ritika Dubey, Advocate For State : Ms. Akanksha Verma, Panel Lawyer For Respondent No. 2 & 3 : Ms. Surya Kawalkar Dangi, Advocate Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Digitally signed by SHAYNA KADRI C.A.V. Order 1. By way of this writ petition, petitioner is challenging the order 2 dated 17.01.2024 by which, services of the petitioner has been terminated while giving two months notice to her. Through this writ petition, the petitioner seeks the following reliefs : - “10.1 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the order dated 17/01/2024, bearing No. CR.C.L / HR / 2024 / 520, passed by Respondent No.2 10.2 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to quash the impugned termination Letter dated 18/09/2020, bearing No.CRCL/2020-21/827, Issued by Respondent No.2. 10.3 That, this Hon'ble Court may kindly be pleased to command and direct the respondent no.2 to reinstate the petitioner back into the service with all the consequential benefits. 10.4 Any other relief, which this Hon'ble Court deems fit and proper, may also kindly be granted to the petitioner, in the interest of justice.” 2. The brief facts of the case are that the petitioner was appointed as Manager (Personnel and Administration) Officer in the Chhattisgarh Railway Corporation Limited, a joint venture of the Ministry of Railways and the Government of Chhattisgarh, on a contractual basis on 09.03.2018. As per the terms of the appointment letter, the services of petitioner were extended from time to time based on performance. The petitioner was transferred from Raipur headquarters to Bilaspur headquarters vide order dated 04.06.2020, and continued working through virtual mode due to the nationwide lock-down imposed by the Government of 3 India during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, respondent No. 2 abruptly terminated the services of petitioner vide order dated 18.09.2020, citing sufficient manpower and the reduced need of company for the services of petitioner. Challenging the termination order, the petitioner filed Writ Petition (S) No. 9067/2023 before this Court, alleging that the termination was without sufficient
Decision
reason and due process. This Court disposed of the petition vide order dated 22.11.2023, directing respondent No. 2 to consider and decide the representation of petitioner in accordance with relevant rules and law within 60 days. In compliance with the order of this Court, respondent No. 2 rejected the representation of petitioner vide order dated 17.01.2024. 3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that order of termination is per se illegal on the face of it as it is without assigning any reason. Even in the first instance, termination order was set-aside by this Court with a direction to respondents to decide the representation in accordance with law, however, in the second round also, while deciding the representation and passing termination order no reason has been stated. Representation of the petitioner has been rejected by respondent No. 2 in a mechanical manner without considering the fact that petitioner was not given any opportunity of hearing before her termination. It is further contention of learned counsel for the petitioner that before termination, petitioner was not served with any show cause notice or given any reason for the order passed by the respondent 4 which is violation of the Chhattisgarh Civil Service (Classification, Contral and Appeal) Rules, 1966 (in short “the Rules, 1966”). Services of petitioner comes within the ambit of Article 311 (2) and the appointment and termination of the petitioner should be governed under the Rules, 1966. In support of his contention, he placed reliance upon decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Kranti Associates Private Limited and Another vs. Masood Ahmed Khan and Others, reported in (2010) 9 SCC 496 and judgment of this Court in case of Gopi Sao and Others vs. State of Chhattisgarh and Others passed in Writ Appeal No. 14 of 2017. 4. On the other hand, learned State counsel opposes the submission made by learned counsel for the petitioner and would submit that the petitioner was appointed purely on a contractual basis for a specific role, with no right to permanent absorption or continuation beyond the tenure as extended from time to time. The termination of the petitioner’s contract was carried out in accordance with the terms of the appointment, due to operational restructuring, availability of sufficient manpower, and reduced requirement of services, especially in light of the pandemic-related downsizing. There was no violation of any statutory or contractual obligation, and the decision was taken in the interest of administrative efficiency and financial prudence. Pursuant to the direction of this Hon’ble Court, respondent No. 2 duly considered the representation of the petitioner and passed an order dated 5 17.01.2024, communicating the rationale for rejection, which falls within the scope of employer’s discretion under contract law. The petitioner cannot claim a vested right to continuation of service, and the writ remedy cannot be invoked to enforce terms of a contract that has lawfully come to an end. There is no illegality or procedural impropriety in the rejection order warranting interference by this Hon’ble Court, and the writ petition is liable to be dismissed. In support of her contention, she placed reliance upon decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in case the Ravi Shivendra Bahadur vs. the Governing Body of Nalanda College, reported in 1962 AIR 2010, in case of State of Karnataka and Others vs. G. V. Chandrashekhar, reported in (2009) 4 SCC 342 and the judgment of this Court in case of Jeevmantgal Singh Tandan vs. Union of India, passed in W.P.S. No. 1352 of 2017. 5. I have heard the learned counsel for the parties at length and carefully perused the documents placed on record with utmost circumspection. 6. The petitioner challenges the order dated 17.01.2024 (Annexure P/1) by which her representation was rejected, as well as the original termination order dated 18.09.2020 (Annexure P/2) issued by respondent No. 2, whereby her services were brought to an end. 7. On careful perusal of the record and submissions made, it appears that although the petitioner was appointed on a 6 contractual basis, her services were continued for a substantial duration of over two years and terminated in the backdrop of pandemic-related restructuring. The original termination order, as well as the subsequent order rejecting her representation, suffer from the absence of adequate reasoning and lack of observance of the principles laid down in the case of Kranti Associates (Supra) by the Hon’ble Supreme Court. Relevant paras are quoted below :- “12. The necessity of giving reason by a body or authority in support of its decision came up for consideration before this Court in several cases. Initially this Court recognised a sort of demarcation between administrative orders and quasi-judicial orders but with the passage of time the distinction between the two got blurred and thinned out and virtually reached a vanishing point in the judgment of this Court in A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India [(1969) 2 SCC 262 : AIR 1970 SC 150] . xxx xxx xxx xxx 14. The expression “speaking order” was first coined by Lord Chancellor Earl Cairns in a rather strange context. The Lord Chancellor, while explaining the ambit of the writ of certiorari, referred to orders with errors on the face of the record and pointed out that an order with errors on its face, is a speaking order. (See pp. 1878-97, Vol. 4, Appeal Cases 30 at 40 of the Report). 15. This Court always opined that the face of an order passed by a quasi- judicial authority or even an administrative authority affecting the 7 rights of parties, must speak. It must not be like the “inscrutable face of a sphinx”.” 8. In the aforesaid judgement, it was held that a quasi-judicial or even an administrative authority exercising public power must record reasons, especially when dealing with valuable civil consequences. 9. Even though the petitioner does not have a vested right for continued appointment, and her engagement was contractual in nature, the authority is not absolved from acting fairly, reasonably, and in accordance with principles of natural justice. 10. In the instant case, this Court had earlier directed respondent No. 2 to consider the representation of the petitioner in accordance with law. However, the order dated 17.01.2024 does not disclose any substantial consideration of the grounds raised by the petitioner nor does it reflect independent reasoning. It appears to be a perfunctory rejection, rendering it unsustainable in the eyes of law. 11. Accordingly, the impugned order dated 17.01.2024 is quashed. The matter is remanded back to respondent No. 2 for fresh consideration of the representation of petitioner. Respondent No. 2 shall pass a reasoned and speaking order, after affording a reasonable opportunity of hearing to the petitioner, preferably within a period of 60 days from the date of receipt of a copy of this order. 8 12. It is made clear that this Court has not expressed any opinion on the merits of the claim of petitioner for reinstatement. All contentions of the parties are left open. 13. With the above direction, the writ petition is disposed of. Shayna Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge