Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:4582 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 192 of 2020 Jagjeet Singh S/o Late Shri Guruchet Singh Aged About 26 Years Resident Of Village Chuhanake Khurd, Police Station Mahalkala, District - Barnana (Punjab), Punjab versus ... Appellant State Of Chhattisgarh Through The District Magistrate, Raipur, District - Raipur Chhattisgarh, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Cause title taken from Case Information System) ... Respondent For Appellant For Respondent/State : : Mr. Syed Afaque Hussain Rizvi, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Lavkush Kumar, Advocate Mr. Shailendra Sharma, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Justice Ravindra Kumar Agrawal Judgment on Board 24/01/2025 1. The appellant has filed the instant appeal under Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 against the impugned judgment of conviction and sentence dated 07.01.2020, passed by learned Special Judge (Atrocities), Raipur, in Special Criminal Case No. 40 of VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Digitally signed by VEDPRAKASH DEWANGAN Date: 2025.04.28 19:00:28 +0530 2 2018, whereby the appellant has been convicted and sentenced as below:- Conviction Sentence U/s. 376(2)(n) of IPC R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for one month. U/s. 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 R.I. for 10 years and fine of Rs. 500/-, in default of payment of fine additional R.I. for one month. 2. The case of the prosecution, in brief, is that the father of the victim (PW-2) lodged a missing report to the police on 16.04.2018 that his minor daughter is missing since 14.04.2018 and her whereabouts could not be traced out. The FIR (exhibit P-24) under Section 363 of IPC was registered by the police against unknown person. During the investigation, the victim recovered on 25.10.2018 from the possession of the appellant from village Chuhankekhurd (Punjab) and recovery panchnama (exhibit P-1) was prepared in presence of the witnesses. She was sent for her medical examination to District Hospital, Gariyaband, where PW-7/Dr. Smt. B. Bara medically examined her and gave report (exhibit P-13). While medically examined the victim, the doctor has not noticed any external injuries on her body and opined that no sign and symptom present about recent sexual intercourse and external injury not seen. Two slides of her vaginal swab were prepared, sealed and handed over to the police for its chemical examination. The underwear of the victim was seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-2). With respect to the age and 3 date of birth of the victim, her 8th class mark-sheet was seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-3). The police have also seized the school register from Govt. Primary School, Bhendri with respect to the date of birth of the victim vide seizure memo (exhibit P-22) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-21C), the original register was returned back to school. The social status certificate of the victim has also been seized vide seizure memo (exhibit P-4). The spot map (exhibit P-8) was prepared by the police and exhibit P-9 was prepared by the Patwari. The appellant was arrested on 25.10.2018 and he too was sent for his medical examination to District Hospital, Gariyaband where he was medically examined by PW-5/Dr. Kirtan Sahu, who after his medical examination opined that the appellant is physically and medically fit for able to sexual activity. The vaginal slides of the victim were sent for its chemical examination to FSL Raipur. The statement of the witnesses under Section 161 of CRPC and statement of the victim under Section 164 of CRPC have been recorded and after completion of usual investigation, charge sheet
Facts
was filed against the appellant before the learned trial Court for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376 of IPC and Section 6 of Protection of Children from Sexual Offences Act, 2012 (in short ‘POCSO Act’) and Section 3(2)(v) of Scheduled Caste and Scheduled Tribe (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (in short ‘SC/ST Act’). 3. The learned trial Court has framed charge against the appellant for the offence under Sections 363, 366, 376(2)(n) of IPC, Section 6 of 4 POCSO Act and Section 3(2)(v) of SC/ST Act. The appellant denied the charge and claimed trial. 4. In order to prove the charge against the appellant, the prosecution has examined as many as 16 witnesses. Statement of the appellant under Section 313 of CRPC has also been recorded in which he denied the circumstances appearing against him, pleaded innocence and has submitted that he has been falsely implicated in the office. 5. After appreciation of oral as well as documentary evidence led by the prosecution, the learned trial Court has convicted the appellant and sentenced him as mentioned in the earlier part of the judgment. Hence this appeal. 6.
Legal Reasoning
"The legal position is not in dispute that mere production and marking of a document as exhibit by the court cannot be held to be a due proof of its contents. Its execution has to be proved by admissible evidence, that is, by the "evidence of those persons who can vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue". 44. In our opinion, the aforesaid burden of proof has not been discharged by the prosecution. The father says nothing about the transfer certificate in his evidence. The Headmaster has not been examined at all. Therefore, the entry in the transfer certificate can not be relied upon to definitely fix the age of the girl. 48. We may further notice that even with reference to Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, a public document has to be tested by applying the same standard in civil as well as criminal proceedings. In 9 this context, it would be appropriate to notice the observations made by this Court in the case of Ravinder Singh Gorkhi Vs. State of U.P.4 held as follows:- "The age of a person as recorded in the school register or otherwise may be used for various purposes, namely, for obtaining admission; for obtaining an appointment; for contesting election; registration of marriage; obtaining a separate unit under the ceiling laws; and even for the purpose of litigating before a civil forum e.g. necessity of being represented in a court of law by a guardian or where a suit is filed on the ground that the plaintiff being a minor he was not appropriately represented therein or any transaction made on his behalf was void as he was a minor. A court of law for the purpose of determining the age of a (2006) 5 SCC 584 party to the lis, having regard to the provisions of Section 35 of the Evidence Act will have to apply the same standard. No different standard can be applied in case of an accused as in a case of abduction or rape, or similar offence where the victim or the prosecutrix although might have consented with the accused, if on the basis of the entries made in the register maintained by the school, a judgment of conviction is recorded, the accused would be deprived of his constitutional right under Article 21 of the Constitution, as in that case the accused may unjustly be convicted." 11. In case of Rishipal Singh Solanki Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Others, 2022 (8) SCC 602, while considering various judgments, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed in para 33 as under: "33. What emerges on a cumulative consideration of the aforesaid catena of judgments is as follows: 10 33.2.2. If an application is filed before the Court claiming juvenility, the provision of sub-section (2) of section 94 of the JJ Act, 2015 would have to be applied or read along with sub-section (2) of section 9 so as to seek evidence for the purpose of recording a finding stating the age of the person as nearly as may be. xxxx xxxx xxxx 33.3. That when a claim for juvenility is raised, the burden is on the person raising the claim to satisfy the Court to discharge the initial burden. However, the documents mentioned in Rule 12(3)(a)(i), (ii), and (iii) of the JJ Rules 2007 made under the 33 Act, 2000 or sub- section (2) of section 94 of JJ Act, 2015, shall be sufficient for prima facie satisfaction of the Court. On the basis of the aforesaid documents a presumption of juvenility may be raised. 33.4. The said presumption is however not conclusive proof of the age of juvenility and the same may be rebutted by contra evidence let in by the opposite side. 33.5. That the procedure of an inquiry by a Court is not the same thing as declaring the age of the person as a juvenile sought before the JJ Board when the case is pending for trial before the concerned criminal court. In case of an inquiry, the Court records a prima facie conclusion but when there is a determination of age as per sub- section (2) of section 94 of 2015 Act, a declaration is made on the basis of evidence. Also the age recorded by the JJ Board shall be deemed to be the true age of the person brought before it. Thus, the standard of 11 proof in an inquiry is different from that required in a proceeding where the determination and declaration of the age of a person has to be made on the basis of evidence scrutinised and accepted only if worthy of such acceptance. 33.6. That it is neither feasible nor desirable to lay down an abstract formula to determine the age of a person. It has to be on the basis of the material on record and on appreciation of evidence adduced by the parties in each case. 33.7 This Court has observed that a hyper. technical approach should not be adopted when evidence is adduced on behalf of the accused in support of the plea that he was a juvenile. 33.8. If two views are possible on the same evidence, the court should lean in favour of holding the accused to be a juvenile in borderline cases. This is in order to ensure that the benefit of the JJ Act, 2015 is made applicable to the juvenile in conflict with law. At the same time, the Court should ensure that the JJ Act, 2015 is not misused by persons to escape punishment after having committed serious offences. 33.9. That when the determination of age is on the basis of evidence such as school records, it is necessary that the same would have to be considered as per Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act, Inasmuch as any public or official document maintained in the discharge of official duty would have greater credibility than private documents. 33.10. Any document which is in consonance 12 with public documents, such as matriculation certificate, could be accepted by the Court or the 33 Board provided such public document is credible and authentic as per the provisions of the Indian Evidence Act viz., section 35 and other provisions. 33.11. Ossification Test cannot be the sole criterion for age determination and a mechanical view regarding the age of a person cannot be adopted solely on the basis of medical opinion by radiological examination. Such evidence is not conclusive evidence but only a very useful guiding factor to be considered in the absence of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) of the JJ Act, 2015." 12. Recently, in case of P. Yuvaprakash Vs. State represented by Inspector of Police, 2023 (SCC Online) SC 846, Hon'ble Supreme Court has held in para 14 to 17 as under: "14, Section 94 (2)(iii) of the 33 Act clearly Indicates that the date of birth certificate from the school or matriculation or equivalent certificate by the concerned examination board has to be firstly preferred in the absence of which the birth certificate issued by the Corporation or Municipal Authority or Panchayat and it is only thereafter in the absence of these such documents the age is to be determined through "an ossification test" or "any other latest medical age determination test" conducted on the orders of the concerned authority, l.e. Committee or Board or Court. In the present case, concededly, only a transfer certificate and not the date of birth certificate or matriculation or equivalent certificate was considered. Ex. C1, i.e., the school transfer certificate showed the date of birth of the victim as 11.07.1997. Significantly, the transfer certificate was produced not by the 13 prosecution but instead by the court summoned witness, i.e., CW-1. The burden is always upon the prosecution to establish what it alleges; therefore, the prosecution could not have been. fallen back upon a document which it had never relied upon. Furthermore, DW-3, the concerned Revenue Official (Deputy Tahsildar) had stated on oath that the records for the year 1997 in respect to the births and deaths were missing. Since it did not answer to the description of any class of documents mentioned in Section 94(2) (i) as it was a mere transfer certificate, Ex C-1 could not have been relied upon to hold that M was below 18 years at the time of commission of the offence. 15. In a recent decision, in Rishipal Singh Solanki vs. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. this court outlined the procedure to be followed in cases where age determination is required. The court was dealing with Rule 12 of the erstwhile Juvenile Justice Rules (which is in pari materia) with Section 94 of the JJ Act, and held as follows: "20. Rule 12 of the JJ Rules, 2007 deals with the procedure to be followed in determination of age. The juvenility of a person in conflict with law had to be decided prima facie on the basis of physical appearance, or documents, if available. But an inquiry into the determination of age by the Court or the JJ Board was by seeking evidence by obtaining: (1) the matriculation or equivalent certificates, if available and in the absence whereof; (ii) the date of birth certificate from the school (other than a play school) first attended; and in the absence whereof; (iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation or a municipal authority or a panchayat. Only in the absence of either (i), (ii) and (iii) above, the medical opinion could be sought from a duly constituted 14 Medical Board to declare the age of the juvenile or child. It was also provided that while determination was being made, benefit could be given to the child or juvenile by considering the age on lower side within the margin of one year." 16. Speaking about provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, especially the various options in Section 94 (2) of the JJ Act, this court held in Sanjeev Kumar Gupta vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors that: "Clause (i) of Section 94 (2) places the date of birth certificate from the school and the matriculation or equivalent certificate from the 2021 (12) SCR 502 [2019] 9 SCR 735 concerned examination board in the same category (namely (i) above). In the absence thereof category (ii) provides for obtaining the birth certificate of the corporation, municipal authority or panchayat. It is only in the absence of (i) and (ii) that age determination by means of medical analysis is provided. Section 94(2) (a)(i) indicates a significant change over the provisions which were contained in Rule 12(3) (a) of the Rules of 2007 made under the Act of 2000. Under Rule 12(3)(a) (i) the matriculation or equivalent certificate was given precedence and it was only in the event of the certificate not being available that the date of birth certificate from the school first attended, could be obtained. In Section 94(2)(1) both the date of birth certificate from the school as well as the matriculation or equivalent certificate are placed in the same category. 17. In Abuzar Hossain Gulam Hossain Vs. State of West Bengal, this court, through a three-judge bench, held that the burden of proving that someone is a juvenile (or below the prescribed age) is upon 15 the person claiming it. Further, in that decision, the court indicated the hierarchy of documents that would be accepted In order of preference." 13. PW-1 who is the victim has stated in her evidence that her date of birth is 14.11.2002. In cross-examination, she stated that she disclosed her date of birth on the basis of her date of birth recorded in the school mark-sheet. She admitted that who has got recorded her date of birth in the school mark-sheet, she did not know. She denied that, her birth certificate is not prepared. She further stated that her younger brother’s age is 13-14 years and he is 5-6 years younger than her. 14. PW-2 who is the father of the victim has not stated her age and date of birth. In cross-examination, he stated that he did not remember the date of his marriage, even he did not know about his own date of birth. He also denied that he has not got prepared the birth certificate of his children. He admitted that at the time of the admission of the victim in the school, she was tested by the traditional method of holding the ear from other side of the head. He further stated that her daughter had studied at Anganbadi Centre at village Bhendri and at the time of recording her name at Anganbadi Centre, he did not produce any document of her birth. He further admitted that on the basis of the progress report card of Anganbadi Centre, she was admitted in the school. 15. PW-10 is the mother of the victim, she stated that her daughter was aged about 15 years, but has not disclosed any date of her birth. In 16 cross-examination, she stated that she did not know the date of birth of her children. Her husband had gone to school for her admission, but she did not know, as to what document he has produced at the time of her admission in the school. 16. Except these evidences, there is no other evidence available on record to determine the age of the victim. From consideration of the evidence produced by the prosecution, it is clear that the school record has not been proved in accordance with law, the oral evidence of the victim/PW-1, her father/PW-2 and her mother/PW-10 are not sufficient to come to conclusion that the prosecution has proved that the victim was minor on the date of incident, yet the learned trial Court has held her minor. 17. So far as the offence of kidnapping and rape are concerned, I again examined the evidence of the victim and other witnesses. 18. The victim/PW-1 has stated in her evidence that she knew the appellant. He came to her village Bhendri to drive the harvester vehicle. He proposed her that he is loving her and after exchanging their mobile numbers, he left the village and they used to talk to each other through mobile phone. Subsequently, they decided to elope together. On the day, when the marriage function was going on in her house, she called the appellant at Rajim. From Rajim bus stand, they came to Raipur railway station by bus and thereafter, they had gone to Ludhiana by train to the sister’s house of the appellant. They stayed there together for a week and the appellant made physical 17 relation with her. The mother of the appellant came there and both of them had gone to his house at village Chuhalkekhurd. She stayed there for about 15 days and thereafter she was being taken by his sister at village Telme, District Barnala. The appellant also came there and taken a house on rent, where she resided with him for about 02 months and both of them were engaged in sexual relation. They again came back to village Chuhalkekhurd and resided for about 02-03 months as husband and wife. On 24.10.2018, her father along with the police persons came there and took her back. She shown her interest to reside with the appellant, but the police persons took her to Chhattisgarh. In cross-examination, she admitted that she and the appellant proposed each other that they are in love and they were talking with each other about their affair. She further admitted that it is she who had proposed to elope and the appellant was not willing to elope with her at that time. She insisted the appellant to elope. She further admitted that she on her own will came from Rajim by bus without informing to any of her family members. She herself had called the appellant at Rajim. In the bus, by which they came to Raipur, was full of passengers, but she has not made any complaint to anyone that she was being kidnapped. They stayed about half an hour at Raipur railway station, even then she has not made any complaint to any person, who present there and has not lodged any report to the police. Further, she has also not made any complaint to any of the passengers in the train, even the police persons, who were patrolling in the train, she has not disclosed about any incident and she on her own will had gone to Ludhiana. The appellant has not 18 used any force against her. While residing at Punjab, she has not made any telephonic call to her family members. She was free in her house while residing with the appellant at Punjab and when the police came there, she disclosed her wish that she wanted to reside with the appellant. 19. From the evidence of the victim, no offence as alleged against the appellant is made out as she was in love affair with the appellant, she herself insisted the appellant to elope and called her at Rajim, both of them had traveled by bus and train up to Ludhiana, Punjab and despite having opportunity, she has not made any complaint throughout her traveling, even when she was residing at Punjab, she has not made any complaint to anyone. When the prosecution has failed to prove that she was minor and from the evidence of the victim, it is came on record that she herself called the appellant and had gone with him to Punjab, where they were residing as husband and wife, no offence against the appellant is made out. 20. In the case of S. Varadarajan Vs. State of Madras, AIR 1965 SC 942, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that: "9. It must, however, be borne in mind that there is a distinction between "taking" and allowing a minor to accompany a person. The two expressions are not synonymous though we would like to guard ourselves from laying down that in no conceivable circumstance can the two be regarded as meaning the same thing for the purposes of of the Indian Penal Code. We would limit ourselves to a case like the present where the minor alleged to have been 19 taken by the accused person left her father's protection knowing and having capacity to know the full import of what she was doing voluntarily joins the accused person. In such a case we do not think that the accused can be said to have taken her away from the keeping of her lawful guardian. Something more has to be shown in a case of this kind and that is some kind of inducement held out by the accused person or an active participation by him in the formation of the intention of the minor to leave the house of the guardian. 10. It would, however, be sufficient if the prosecution establishes that though immediately prior to the minor leaving the father's protection no active part was played by the accused, he had at some earlier stage solicited or persuaded the minor to do so. In our, opinion if evidence to establish one of those things is lacking it would not be legitimate to infer that the accused is guilty of taking the minor out of the keeping of the lawful guardian merely because after she has actually left her guardian's house or a house where her guardian had kept her, joined the accused and the accused helped her in her design not to return to her guardian's house by taking her along with him from place to place. No doubt, the part played by the accused could be regarded as facilitating the fulfillment of the intention of the girl. That part, in our opinion, falls short of an inducement to the minor to slip out of the keeping of her lawful guardian and is, therefore, not tantamount to "taking". 21. From the conduct of the victim and in view of the aforesaid judgment of S. Vardarajan (supra), it cannot be said that the appellant has kidnapped the victim and procured the minor girl, as the victim is not found to be minor and no offence of either kidnapping or procuring a minor girl is made out against the appellant. 20 22. PW-2, father of the victim and PW-10, mother of the victim are the witnesses to whom the victim has disclosed about the incident. When the victim herself stated that she on her own will had eloped with the appellant and resided with him as husband and wife and shown her willingness to reside with the appellant, the evidence of these two witnesses does not have any bearing with the case and no much relevance can be placed from their evidence. 23. PW-3 and PW-4 are the witnesses to the effect that the victim had gone somewhere, who subsequently recovered from Punjab from the possession of the appellant. In view of the evidence of the victim, their evidence would also not have any bearing with the merits of the case. 24. PW-7, Dr. Smt. B. Bara, who medically examined the victim has not noticed any external injuries on her body, even no injuries have been found on her private part and she opined that no definite opinion can be given regarding recent sexual intercourse. 25. From all these evidences available on record, there is no sufficient and cogent evidence to prove the guilt of the appellant beyond reasonable doubt, as the victim was in love affair with the appellant and she herself had gone with the appellant, resided there at Punjab and engaged in making consensual physical relation with the appellant. 21 26. The version of the victim commands great respect and acceptability, but if there are some circumstances which cast some doubt in the mind of the court on the veracity of the victim's evidence, then it will not be safe to rely on the said version of the victim. There is contradiction and omissions in the statement of the victim and her parents. The law is well settled that in case of rape, conviction can be maintained even on the basis of sole testimony of the victim. However, there is an important caveat which is that the testimony of the victim must inspire confidence. Even though the testimony of the victim is not required to be corroborated, if her statement is not believable, then the accused cannot be convicted. The prosecution has to bring home the charges leveled against the appellant beyond any reasonable doubt, which the prosecution has failed to do in the instant case. 27. Considering the aforesaid facts and circumstances of the case and evidence available on record, this Court is of the opinion that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and there is no sufficient cogent and clinching evidence to uphold the conviction of the appellant for the alleged offences and his conviction is liable to be set aside. 28. Accordingly, the appeal filed by the appellant is allowed. The impugned judgment of conviction and sentence is hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted from all the offences. 22 29. The appellant is reported to be in jail since 26.10.2018. He be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. 30. Let a copy of this judgment and the original records be transmitted to the trial Court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- (Ravindra Kumar Agrawal) Judge ved
Arguments
Learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the prosecution has failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. There are material omission and contradiction in the evidence of prosecution witnesses and the same cannot be made basis to convict the appellant in the offence in question. He would also submit that there is no legally admissible evidence with respect to the age and date of birth of the victim. The school record has not been proved in accordance with law. He would also submit that there is no other documentary evidence like; birth certificate, kotwari register or ossification test report to prove her age. He would also submit that the victim was a major girl and having love affair with the appellant. She herself eloped with him on her own sweat will and had gone to Punjab with the appellant without raising any objection or making 5 complaint to anyone and resided with him for a considerable period. He has not made any complaint to anyone of the vicinity also that she was kidnapped by the appellant and subjected to rape by him. No injuries have been found on the body of the victim. Therefore, there is no sufficient and cogent evidence against the appellant to convict him for the offence in question and he is entitled for acquittal. 7. On the other hand, learned counsel for the State supporting the impugned judgment submits that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt. But for minor omissions or contradictions, the evidence of prosecution witnesses is fully reliable and sufficient to hold guilty of the appellant in the offence in question. There is no reason for false implication of the appellant. The age of the victim has been proved by the school register and as per the entries made in the school register, the victim was minor, who was kidnapped by the appellant. She being the minor, cannot consented for eloping or even making physical relation with the appellant. She ultimately found in possession of the appellant and from her evidence it is also established that the appellant has made physical relation with her, and thus, the guilt of the appellant for the alleged offences has duly been proved by the prosecution. 8. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court. 9. The first and foremost question arises for consideration would be the age of the victim, as to whether on the date of incident, she was 6 minor or not. The prosecution has mainly relied upon the school register (exhibit P-21C), which is sought to be proved by PW-13, who is the headmaster of the school. He stated in his evidence that he is the headmaster of the school since 2009. The police have seized the school and admission and discharge register (exhibit P-21) and after retaining its attested true copy (exhibit P-21C), the original register was returned back to the school, which he brought today with him. As per the school register, the date of birth of the victim is recorded as 24.11.2002. In cross-examination, he admitted that the entries with respect to date of birth of the victim in the school register (exhibit P- 21) is not in his handwriting. He further admitted that he did not know as to in whose handwriting the entries have been made. Even, the name and date of the headmaster who made entries in the said school register is not there. It is also admitted by him as to on what basis the entries of the date of birth of the victim is made in the school register, he did not know. From the evidence of this witness, it is quite vivid that he is not the author of the school register nor the basis on which the entries have been made in the school register (exhibit P-21) with respect to the date of birth of the victim is produced. 10. The admissibility and evidentiary value of the school register has been considered by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Alamelu and Another Vs. State, represented by Inspector of Police, 2011(2) SCC 385. In Para 40, 42, 43, 44 and 48 of its judgment, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has observed as under: 7 "40. Undoubtedly, the transfer certificate, Ex.P16 indicates that the girl's date of birth was 15th June, 1977. Therefore, even according to the aforesaid certificate, she would be above 16 years of age (16 years 1 month and 16 days) on the date of the alleged incident, i.e., 31st July, 1993. The transfer certificate has been issued by a Government School and has been duly signed by the Headmaster. Therefore, it would be admissible in evidence under Section 35 of the Indian Evidence Act. However, the admissibility of such a document would be of not much evidentiary value to prove the age of the girl in the absence of the material on the basis of which the age was recorded. The date of birth mentioned in the transfer certificate would have no evidentiary value unless the person, who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined. 42. Considering the manner in which the facts recorded in a document may be proved, this Court in the case of Birad Mal Singhvi Vs. Anand Purohit, observed as follows:- "The date of birth mentioned in the scholars' register has no evidentiary value unless the person who made the entry or who gave the date of birth is examined....Merely because the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12 were proved, it does not mean that the contents of documents were also proved. Mere proof of the documents Exs. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12 would not tantamount to proof of all the contents or the correctness of date of birth stated in the documents. Since the truth of the fact, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and Suraj Prakash Joshi was in Issue, mere proof of the documents as produced by the aforesaid two witnesses does not furnish evidence of the truth of the facts or contents of the documents. The truth or otherwise of the facts 8 in issue, namely, the date of birth of the two candidates as mentioned in the documents could be proved by admissible evidence i.e. by the evidence of those persons who could vouchsafe for the truth of the facts in issue. No evidence of any such kind was produced by the respondent to prove the truth of the facts, namely, the date of birth of Hukmi Chand and of Suraj Prakash Joshi. In the circumstances the dates of birth as mentioned in the aforesaid documents 1988 (Supp) SCC 604 have no probative value and the dates of birth as mentioned therein could not be accepted." 43. The same proposition of law is reiterated by this Court in the case of Narbada Devi Gupta Vs. Birendra Kumar Jaiswal, where this Court observed as follows:-