A'F^ v. Municipal Corporation, Raipur, tibirough fhe
Case at a glance
Provisions considered
Judgment
Deepak Kuinar Shrivastava, s/o Late Shrl Roop Kishore Shrivastava, R/o L.I.O. 498 & 499, Taubandh, Raipur (C.G) Shivnaadaxi Yadav, s/o Chandulal Yadav, R/o L.I.G. 498 & 499, Tatibandh, Raipur (C.G.) Rajesh Upadhyay, Raipiir Chhattisgarh, appointed u/s 387 (2) of Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Dmesfa 'Ilwad, Paach, Kaipur Chhattisgarh appomted u/s 387(2} of Chliattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956. Sarpaachj, WRIT P&TITION UNDER ARTICLE 226/227 OFTH_E CON^TITUTION OF INDIA (SB: Hon'ble Shri Satish K. Agnihotri J.) Shri Saojay K. Agarwal, Advocate for fhe petitioner. O R DE R (Passed on this 8tfa Day of September, 2008) The petitioner, Municipal Coiporation Raipur, has filed this petition challenguig tiie vaMdity aad legaUty ofthe award dated
18.5.2008 (Anuexiire P/l), passed by the Arbitral Tribunal ia Case No. 01/2008 (Deepak Stuivastava Vs. Magar Palik Nigatn). /Phe brief facts, ia nutshell, are fhat earMer ttie respondent
No.l ffled a Writ Petition (C) No. 257 of 2007 (Deepak Kumar Shrivastava Vs. Municipal Corporation & anofher), chaUengiag the notice dated 1.2.2007 regardiag eviction of the shop, issued by the Muuicipal Corporation, Raipur. The petitlon was disposed of by order dated 29.3.2007 (Annexure P/4), graatmg 2 liberty to tfae petoitioner to iavoke fhe provisions of Sectlon 387 of ftie Chhattisgarh Municipal Corporation Act, 1956 (for short 'the Act, 1956"), tbr appoiatment ofarbitrator. Accordiagly, the respondent No. 1 tiled aa appMcation dated 1.9.2007 before the District Judge, Raipur for appoiatment of Arbitrator, which was registered as Miscellaneous Civil Suit No. 90/2007. By order dated 4.3.2008 (Annexurc P/15), the Distaict Judge, Kaipiir, allowed fhat appMcaUon aad appoiated Shii Rajesh Upadiiyaya, Advocate as Sarpaach to determiae compensation or damages. Beiag aggrieved, by ffae order dated
4.3.2008, the petitioner med Cwil Revision No. 88 of 2008, which is pending betbre this Couil.
Accordmgly, the Arbitral 1'ribunal, comprismg Sarpaach aad one Paach passed the award dated 18.5.2U08 (Aanexure P/ 1). The petitioner seeks quashiag ofthis award.
Shri Saajay K. Agarwal, leamed counsel appearing for fhe petitioner submits that th.erc is no provision under fhe Act 1956 chatlenge award of this nature where compensation has notbeen determmed ia respect ofthe laad and bulldiag but ia respect of coiapensation for renioval offbie tenaat Section 387(4) of fhe Act, 1956 provides that ia aay case wherc the compensation is claimed in respect oflaad aad the Paachayat has given decision, eifher party, if dissatisfied with fhe award raay apply to the District Coiirt and fhe niatter shall be determined by fh.e Distiict Court ia accordance with the provisions of sub-section (3). Sub-section (5) of Section 387 of the Act, 1956 provides for reference to fhe District Court ia respect of building, In fhe present case compensation ® awarded to fhe respondent No. 1 was not ia respect oflaad aad buildiag but for iaconvenience caused to him by reiaoval froin fhe old place to the new place. Thus, the petitioner has no other alteniative reiaedy except to approach fhis Court for the reMef to set-aside the award passed by titie Arbitral Tribiinal.
I have heard learaed counsel appearing fbr the petitioner and perased fhe docuinents appended fhereto.
It is tme ftiat sub-sections (4) & (5) of Section 387 of the Act, 1956 uiakes a reierence that a coinpensation in respect oflaad aad buildiag. In fhe present case, fhe tenao.t was possession of the building which has been reinoved aad ia. consequence thereto the tenaat has been paid compensation by tiie Arbitral Tribunal. Even ofherwise, zinder fhe provisions of The Arbitration and ConciUation Act, 1996 (for short 'fhe Act, 19961, Section 7 (2) deals with other arbitration also which are not provided ia fhe contract or ia the fbrmL of a separate agreenient Section 34 of fhe Act, 1996 provides for xnakmg an application for setting aside the arbitral award.
A constitution Bench of ftie Honl^le Supreme Court in fhe matter of Saurabh Chaudri and others Vs. Union of ladia and others1, as per niajorily, observed as under:- "36. ......... A statute or any enacting provision fhereia niust be so construed as to inake it effective aad operative "on the principle expressed ia fhe inaxini: ut res raagis valeat quam perear. (See CIT v. S. Teja Singh10 and Tiasukhia Electdc Supply Co. Ltd. v. State of Assam11). ^ (2003) 11 SCC 146} '^ ^.^^^^.,. ^^sr'"%... yy^ ^
lt is well setfled pnnciples of interpretation that the statute must be read as a whole, as the words are to be understood in their context. If com.pensation of any other nature is not inentioned under the provisions of Uie Act, 1956, and th.ere is no specific exclusion to that extent, sub-section (4) and (5) of Section 387 of the Act, 1956 woidd be applicable wifh fuU fbrce. If a contrar^ staiid is taken, that niay lead to chaos. If cliallenge to the award of couipensation in respect of the laad and building, aa appMcation/appeal can be niade to the Distdct Judge, ia respect of other type of conipensation, arisiag out of renioval of a buiicLmg, fhe respondent No. 1 was ia possession thereon, the same reinedy is available.
After haviag exaniiaed all the facets of the case, the High Court is iiot appropnate fonun to chatlenge the iinpugned award wluch iavolves disputed question of facts. The petitioner inay seek appropriate reniedy under the provisions of the Act, 1956 as well as under the provisions of the Act, 1996 before fhe appropriate fonmi, it so advised.
Without expressiag any opioion on the inerits of the case, fbr the reasons stated hereiaabove, fhis petition is disinissed as not inaiataiaable ia Unmie. However, Uberty is reser^ed to the petitioner to take recourse to the alternative statutory fonun that inay be available, under fhe provisions of law, if so adtvised. Satish K. Agnihotri Judge Thakur
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
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