Nafr High Court
Case Details
1 Digitally signed by RAMESH KUMAR VATTI 2025:CGHC:17690 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR WPS No. 6570 of 2017 • Satyendra Singh Verma S/o Shri Hem Singh Verma Aged About 28 Years R/o Maharana Pratap Ward Near Water Tank In Front Of Kasturba School Mungeli Police Station And District Mungeli, Chhattisgarh Versus ... Petitioner 1. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Its Secretary Department Of Home (Police) Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya Police Station And Post Rakhi New Raipur District Raipur, Chhattisgarh 2. Director General Of Police DGP, Police Headquarters (PHQ) Near Mahanadi Bhawan Mantralaya Police Station And Post Rakhi New Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 3. Inspector General Of Police (IGP), Office Of Inspector General Of Police, Shankar Nagar, Raipur, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh 4. Superintendent Of Police , Office Of Superintendent Of Police, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh. ... Respondents For Petitioner For Respondents/State : :
Legal Reasoning
Mr. Shobhit Koshta, Advocate Mr. R.S. Marhas, Additional Advocate General Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Order on Board 17/04/2025 1. The petitioner has filed this petition seeking the following relief(s):- “10.1 To allow the instant petition and issue appropriate writ / order / judgment / direction for setting-aside / quashing the impugned order dated 01.08.2017 passed by DGP – Police Deptt. (ANNEXURE P-1) and order dated 29.03.2017 passed by the IG – Police Deptt. (ANNEXURE P-2) 10.2 To allow the instant petition and issue appropriate writ / order / judgment / direction for setting-aside / quashing the departmental enquiry report dated 19.01.2017 (ANNEXURE P- 3) made by SP – Police Deptt. 2 10.3 To grant any other relief(s) / orders (s) / direction(s) in favour of petitioner, which may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case, in the interest of justice.” 2. The facts of the case are that the petitioner was working as a Sub- Inspector at Police Station Abhanpur, District Raipur (C.G.). In 2015, one Shailendra Kumar Sinha made a complaint against Nakul Sahu and others at Police Station Abhanpur, Raipur, and the complaint was investigated by the petitioner. It is stated that the accused persons of that case made a false complaint before the Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) alleging that the petitioner was demanding a bribe of Rs.50,000/- and therefore the ACB conducted a raid. The petitioner was arrested on 05.12.2015 and Crime No. 57/2015 was registered against him. Thereafter, the petitioner was released on bail. The investigating agency filed the charge sheet against the petitioner and the criminal trial is still pending. It is further stated that on 26.05.2016, a departmental inquiry was initiated against the petitioner and in the said inquiry, the petitioner was found guilty of misconduct of demand for bribe. Based on the inquiry report dated 19.01.2017, the order of removal from the services of the petitioner was passed by the Inspector General of Police on 29.03.2017 according to the provisions of Regulations 223, 224, 225 and 228 of the Police Regulations. The said order of removal was assailed by the petitioner in WPS No.
Decision
1890/2017 which was disposed of vide order dated 05.05.2017 with a direction to prefer an appeal against the order of removal before the competent authority. Thereafter, the petitioner preferred an appeal and the same was dismissed vide order dated 01.08.2017 by the Director 3 General of Police upholding the penalty inflicted by the Inspector General of Police. 3. Mr. Shobhit Koshta, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner would submit that the Inspector General of Police exercising the power of Disciplinary Authority inflicted a penalty of termination from the services. He would further submit that criminal proceedings as well as departmental proceedings were going on simultaneously. He would also submit that the petitioner moved an application before the Inquiry Officer / Disciplinary Authority to stay the further proceedings of the departmental inquiry till the disposal of the criminal case, but it was not considered and thus it affected the merits of the departmental inquiry. He would contend that the article of charge was issued by the Superintendent of Police, whereas the penalty was inflicted by the Inspector General of Police which is not permissible according to Regulation 228 of the Police Regulations. He would pray to quash the order passed by the Disciplinary Authority and affirmed by the Appellate Authority. 4. On the other hand, Mr. R.S. Marhas, learned Additional Advocate General appearing for the State/respondents would oppose the submissions made by Mr. Shobhit Koshta. He would submit that as per service rules, the Disciplinary Authority of the petitioner was the Superintendent of Police / Inspector General of Police. He would contend that the article of charge was issued by the Superintendent of Police. He would further submit that the power of the Disciplinary Authority was exercised by the Inspector General of Police and there was no deviation from rules. He would also submit that the departmental inquiry and the criminal proceeding may go on 4 simultaneously. He would also contend that the parameters to prove the guilt of a government servant in both proceedings are entirely different. He further argued that in the criminal case, the prosecution has to prove the guilt of an accused beyond reasonable doubt, whereas in the departmental inquiry on the principles of preponderance of the probability. He submits that the petition deserves to be dismissed. 5. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the documents. 6. Police Regulation 223 which defines disciplinary authority reads as under:- 223- iqfyl egkfujh{kd n.M dh fuEufyf[kr 'kfDr;ksa dk iz;ksx dj ldrk gS & ¼d½ mlds vkpj.k ds laca/k esa gks jgh tkap ds xfr'khy jgus rd fdlh vjktif=r vf/kdkjh dks fuyfEcr djus dh 'kfDr A ¼[k½ fofu;e dzekad 216 ,oa 217 esa of.kZr dksbZ n.M eq[; vkj{kdksa rFkk vkj{kdksa ij vf/kjksfir djus dh 'kfDr A ¼x½ lHkh Js.kh ds vjktif=r iqfyl vf/kdkfj;ksa ij fofu;e 214 vkSj 215 esa of.kZr dksbZ Hkh n.M vf/kjksfir djus dh 'kfDr A A bare reading of the above-quoted provision would make it clear that the Inspector General of Police may exercise powers of the disciplinary authority. The article of charge was issued by the Superintendent of Police, but according to the provisions of Regulation 223 of Police Regulations the powers of the Disciplinary Authority were exercised by the Inspector General of Police, therefore, I do not find any illegality in the approach of the authority concerned. 5 7. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the scope of judicial review in matter of Departmental Equiry in case of Union of India and Others Vs. P. Gunasekaran, reported in (2015) 2 SCC 610 in paras- 12 and 13 held as under:- “12. Despite the well-settled position, it is painfully disturbing to note that the High Court has acted as an appellate authority in the disciplinary proceedings, reappreciating even the evidence before the enquiry officer. The finding on Charge I was accepted by the disciplinary authority and was also endorsed by the Central Administrative Tribunal. In disciplinary proceedings, the High Court is not and cannot act as a second court of first appeal. The High Court, in exercise of its powers under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, shall not venture into reappreciation of the evidence. The High Court can only see whether: (a) the enquiry is held by a competent authority; (b) the enquiry is held according to the procedure prescribed in that behalf; (c) there is violation of the principles of natural justice in conducting the proceedings; (d) the authorities have disabled themselves from reaching a fair conclusion by some considerations extraneous to the evidence and merits of the case; (e) the authorities have allowed themselves to be extraneous irrelevant or influenced by considerations; (f) the conclusion, on the very face of it, is so wholly arbitrary and capricious that no reasonable person could ever have arrived at such conclusion; (g) the disciplinary authority had erroneously failed to admit the admissible and material evidence; (h) the disciplinary authority had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence which influenced the finding; (i) the finding of fact is based on no evidence. 13. Under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution of India, the High Court shall not: 6 (i) reappreciate the evidence; (ii) interfere with the conclusions in the enquiry, in case the same has been conducted in accordance with law; (iii) go into the adequacy of the evidence; (iv) go into the reliability of the evidence; (v) interfere, if there be some legal evidence on which findings can be based; (vi) correct the error of fact however grave it may appear to be; (vii) go into the proportionality of punishment unless it shocks its conscience.” 8. The Hon'ble Supreme Court dealing with the similar issue in case of State Bank of Bikaner and Jaipur Vs. Nemi Chand Nalwaya, reported in (2011) 4 SCC 584 in para- 7 held as under:- “7. It is now well settled that the courts will not act as an appellate court and reassess the evidence led in the domestic enquiry, nor interfere on the ground that another view is possible on the material on record. If the enquiry has been fairly and properly held and the findings are based on evidence, the question of adequacy of the evidence or the reliable nature of the evidence will not be grounds for interfering with the findings in departmental enquiries. Therefore, courts will not interfere with findings of fact recorded in departmental enquiries, except where such findings are based on no evidence or where they are clearly perverse. The test to find out perversity is to see whether a tribunal acting reasonably could have arrived at such conclusion or finding, on the material on record. The courts will however interfere with the findings in disciplinary matters, if principles of natural justice or statutory regulations have been violated or if the order is found to be arbitrary, capricious, mala fide or based on extraneous considerations. (Vide B.C. Chaturvedi v. Union of India, (1995) 6 SCC 749; Union of India v. G. Ganayutham, (1997) 7 SCC 463; Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana, (1999) 5 SCC 762 and High Court of Judicature at Bombay v. Shashikat S. Patil, (2000) 1 SCC 416)” 7 9. In the present case, the petitioner has not challenged the procedure followed in the departmental inquiry. He has also not raised the violation of the principles of natural justice, therefore, there is no need to deal with those issues. 10. Taking into consideration the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters P. Gunasekaran (supra) and Nemi Chand Nalwaya (supra), no case is made out for interference. 11. Consequently, the petition fails and is hereby dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge vatti