High Court of Chhattisgarh
Case Details
-1- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2025:CGHC:31253 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR NAFR MAC No. 123 of 2022 1 - Fool Das Bande S/o Late Shyamlal Bande Aged About 60 Years By Caste Satnami, R/o Village Saket Parsiya, Police Station Pathariya, Tahsil Lormi, District Mungeli Chhattisgarh Present Address Jarhabhatha, Majhwa Para Bilaspur Civil Line Bilaspur Chhattisgarh District Bilaspur 2 - Sabad Bai W/o Fool Das Bande Aged About 55 Years By Caste Satnami, R/o Village Saket Parsiya, Police Station Pathariya, Tahsil Lormi, District Mungeli Chhattisgarh Present Address Jarhabhatha, Majhwa Para Bilaspur Civil Line Bilaspur District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh 3 - Ku. Nidhi Bande D/o Late Kaushal Kumar Bande Aged About 4 Years Appellant No. 03, Through Legal Guardian Appellant No. 01, Food Das Bande S/o Late Shyam Lal Bande, By Caste Satnami, R/o Village Saket Parsiya, Police Station Pathariya, Tahsil Lormi, District Mungeli Chhattisgarh Present Address Jarhabhatha, Majhwa Para Bilaspur Civil Line Bilaspur District Bilaspur Chhattisgarh ... Appellant(s) versus 1 - Ganesh Ram Yadu S/o Pusau Ram Yadu Aged About 32 Years R/o Village Tandwa, Chhattisgarh Police District Nevra, Station Raipur Tilda 2 - Dharmendra Das Manikpuri S/o Jagdish Prasad Manikpuri R/o New Railway Station Chhattisgarh Baikunth, House No. Bilaspur District Tilda, 634, 3 - Megma Hdi General Insurance Company Limited, Megma House, 24 Park Place Kolkata (West Bengal) ... Respondent(s) -2- (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System)
Legal Reasoning
For Appellants For Respondents No.1 & 2 : Mr. A. D. Kuldeep, Advocate Mr. C. K. Sahu, Advocate : For Respondent No.3 : Mr. Sourabh Sharma, Advocate Ms. Harneet Kaur, Advocate, holding the brief of Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 08.07.2025 1. This appeal under Section 173 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 has been preferred by the appellants seeking enhancement of compensation, against the award passed by the learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Bilaspur, dated 15.06.2016 in Claim Case No. 173/2015. 2. The appellants have filed an application (I.A. No.1) seeking condonation of delay of 1893 days in filing the appeal. 3. In the said application, in para 02, it is pleaded that the appellants collected all the relevant documents along with the certified copy of the impugned award from the learned MACT, Bilaspur, and they were unaware of the legal procedure and hence could not approach their counsel immediately. 4. In para 03, it is further pleaded that due to the COVID-19 pandemic outburst, the appellants could not contact their local counsel. It is also stated that being an injured person with no knowledge of the court procedure, they could not initiate legal steps for filing the appeal within the prescribed limitation period. 5. In para 04, it is also stated that once the appellants were in a position to -3- approach their local counsel, all relevant documents were handed over, and the counsel prepared the case for filing the appeal. 6. In para 05, the appellants reiterate the circumstances of the lack of awareness and injuries suffered as grounds for 1893 days delay in filing the appeal. 7. In para 06, it is pleaded that after overcoming aforesaid constraints, the appellants approached their local counsel, who then collected the documents and took necessary steps to prepare the case to file the appeal. In para 08, it is pleaded that the delay in filing the appeal is neither deliberate nor due to any malafide intention. 8. Mr. C.K. Sahu, learned counsel for the appellants would submit that the appellants are poor persons and on account of the outburst of the Covid-19 pandemic, they could not prefer the appeal within limitation. He would contend that appellant No.1 is the injured, therefore, he could not collect documents and failed to approach the local counsel to prefer the appeal. He would also submit that the appellants have a good case on merits; thus, he would pray that the delay of 1893 days may be condoned. 9. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents opposed the prayer and submitted that the appellants have failed to explain the delay properly. It is contended that the reasons assigned are vague and inconsistent, and no specific dates or supporting documents have been furnished to justify such an inordinate delay. 10.I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the application for -4- condonation of delay along with the record. 11. From a perusal of the application (I.A. No.1), it is apparent that the appellants have not stated the date of the award, the date on which the certified copy was applied for, and the date of its delivery. It is also not mentioned when the appellants first approached a counsel for legal advice. The application contains vague and general assertions without any specific pleading. 12.Further, there is inconsistency in the pleadings. In some places, it is stated that appellant No.1 was injured, whereas in other paragraphs, it is stated that the appellants were injured. No medical documents have been placed to substantiate the claim of the injury and its impact on filing the appeal. It is pertinent to note that the award was passed in the year 2016, whereas the Covid-19 pandemic spread in 2020. Therefore, the delay prior to 2020 has not been explained at all. The explanation given for the delay is vague, insufficient, and lacks material particulars. 13.Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal -5- only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 14. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the -6- application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 15.In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that -7- exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 16.In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 17. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and -8- ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 18.Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the appellants could not explain the inordinate delay of 1893 days properly in the application moved in this regard. 19. Accordingly, I.A. No.1, the application for condonation of delay, is hereby rejected. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by limitation, also stands dismissed. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nadim