Raipur, Chhattisgarh v. 1 - Tulsi Ram Sahu S/o S/o Devi Lal Sahu Aged About 74 Years
Case Details
1 Digitally signed by RAGHVENDRA JAT 2025:CGHC:41551 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 1476 of 2018 1 - Sumesh Parakh S/o S/o Santosh Chand Jain (Parakh) Aged About 42 Years R/o Sadar Road, Nawapara, Rajeem, Tahsil Abhanpur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh. (Wrongly Written As R/o Sandeep Auto Rajeem, P. S. And Tahsil Gariyaband, District Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh. ............Owner Sandeep Auto Rajeem. ...........Non Applicant No. 2., District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. --- Appellant(s) versus 1 - Tulsi Ram Sahu S/o S/o Devi Lal Sahu Aged About 74 Years R/o Mela Maidan, Infront Of Government Hospital, Rajeem Tahsil And P. S. Rajeem District Gariyaband, Chhattdistisgarh. ..........Claimant., District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh. 2 - Ashutosh Sharma S/o S/o Sheetal Prasad Sharma Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Jawaibandha, P. S. Abhanpur, District Raipur, 2 Chhattisgarh. ...........Non Applicant No. 1, District : Raipur, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Durgesh Kumar Yadav S/o S/o Ghanshyam Lal Yadav Aged About 35 Years R/o Hasda No. 1, P. S. Magarlod, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh. ..............Non Applicant No. 3, District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Ms. Prachi Singh, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Shikhar Sharma, Advocate. For Respondent No. 1 : Mr. Rajesh Tiwari, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 2 : Mr. K.K. Dewangan, Advocate. & 3 MAC No. 1205 of 2017 1 - Tulsi Ram Sahu S/o S/o Devilal Sahu Aged About 74 Years R/o Village Mela Maidan, In Front Of Government Hospital Rajim, Tahsil And Police Station Rajim, District Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh. Claimant, Chhattisgarh. ---Appellant(s) Versus 1 - Asutosh Sharma S/o S/o Shital Prasad Sharma, Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Javaibandha, Police Station Abhanpur, District Raipur, Chhattisgarh., Chhattisgarh. 2 - Sumesh Parkash S/o S/o Santosh Chand Jain (Parakh), Aged About 42 Years R/o Sandip Auto Rajim, Police Station And Tahsil 3 Rajim, District Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh. Owner Sandip Auto Rajim, District : Gariyabandh, Chhattisgarh. 3 - Durgesh Kumar Yadav, S/o S/o Ghanshyam Lal Yadav, Aged About 35 Years R/o Hasda No. 1, Police Station Magarlod, Tahsil Kurud, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh., District : Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh. --- Respondent(s) For Appellant(s)
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Rajesh Tiwari, Advocate. For Respondent(s) No. 1 : Mr. K.K. Dewangan, Advocate. & 3 For Respondent No. 2 : Ms. Prachi Singh, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Shikhar Sharma, Advocate. Hon’ble Mr. Justice Amitendra Kishore Prasad Order on Board 18/08/2025 1. These two appeals are arising out of one accident which was occurred on 11.11.2015 in which an award dated 8.5.2017 was passed by the learned Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Gariyaband, Chhattisgarh in Claim Case No. 8/2016 as such they are being decided by this common order. 2. In MAC No. 1476/2017 has been filed by the owner of the offending vehicle inter alia challenging the liability fastened upon the owner and driver of the offending vehicle to indemnify the amount of compensation awarded by the tribunal. 4 3. MAC No. 1205/2017 has been filed by the claimant for enhancement of award passed by the tribunal. 4. Brief facts of the case, is that, on 11/11/2015 at around 4:00 P.M., in the village of Rajim near Raja Hotel, the appellant, Tulsi Ram Sahu, was riding his bicycle towards his house when the respondent No.1, driving his motorcycle bearing registration No. C.G.04-CQ-1243, drove rashly and negligently, colliding with the appellant. As a result, the appellant sustained grievous injuries to his right knee, chest, hand, waist, and other parts of his body. His leg bone was broken, causing permanent damage. Tulsi Ram Sahu was admitted to Balaji Hospital, Raipur, for medical treatment. The accident left him permanently disabled, preventing him from performing routine work. The matter was reported to the Rajim Police Station, District Rajim (C.G.), and the concerned police registered a case under Sections 279, 337, and 338 of the Indian Penal Code, as well as Sections 3/181 and 5/180 of the Motor Vehicle Act. At the time of the incident, Tulsi Ram Sahu was approximately 73 years old. Respondent No.2 filed a written statement before the Claim Tribunal, Gariyaband, contesting the claim on the grounds that there was no negligence on the part of the respondents, while respondents No.1 and No.3 did not file any written statements, resulting in the proceedings being conducted ex parte against them. After framing the issues and 5 appreciating the evidence and materials on record, the learned Claim Tribunal, Gariyaband, awarded Rs. 2,01,000/- as compensation to the appellant, Tulsi Ram Sahu. MAC No. 1205/2017 5. Learned counsel for the appellant/claimant submits that it is a case of injury in which the claimant suffered 70% of permanent disability and due to the injury sustained by him, he is unable to work, however, the tribunal has not considered this aspect and has awarded a very meager amount towards compensation a sum of Rs. 2,01,000/- has been awarded which is too meager looking to the injury sustained by the appellant/claimant. He further submits that in respect of pain and suffering only Rs. 5,000/- amount has been awarded which is very much meager looking to the injuries as the appellant/claimant has sustained fracture in his vest as well as in the knee in which after operation a rod has been inserted. He further submits that a disability certificate has been issued by the District Medical Board has been issued in which disability to the tune of 70% has been stated to be suffered by the injured as such he is required to be given adequate amount in respect of pain and suffering, loss of amenities, for taking assistance of other person and for special diet. As of now, he is not in a position to work, the injured was aged about 73 years and as such he is required to be given 6 appropriate amount in respect of future treatment also which has not been granted to him as such the amount is required to be enhanced. 6. On the other hand, learned counsel for appearing for respondent No. 2/owner has opposed the submission made by the claimant. She further submits that looking to the injury sustained by the claimant/appellant as well as looking to the age of the appellant/claimant appropriate amount of compensation has been awarded which is not required to be enhanced. 7. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the material available on record. 8. Upon a careful perusal of the records, as well as a detailed consideration of the nature and extent of the injuries sustained by the appellant/claimant, it is evident that the appellant/claimant suffered two fractures affecting vital organs essential for movement. These injuries have undoubtedly caused significant pain, suffering, and functional limitation, thereby impacting the appellant/claimant’s day-to-day life and overall well-being. In view of the severity of these injuries and the consequent hardships endured, this Court is of the considered opinion that the compensation previously awarded to the appellant/claimant is insufficient and, therefore, merits enhancement to adequately reflect the gravity of the loss and suffering endured. 7 9. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Hare Krushna Mahanta vs. Himadari Sahu & Another reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 262 has observed as under:- “9. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties. It is borne from the record that the Claimant-Appellant had agreed on the additional consolidated sum granted by the High Court. It is imperative for this Court, however, to reiterate that despite such consent, the objective when granting compensation under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is to ensure just and fair compensation is paid to the aggrieved party. This came to be reiterated by this Court recently in Meena Devi v. Nunu Chand Mahto reported in (2023) 1 SCC 204, wherein it was observed:” "17. The Tribunal/Court ought to award "just" compensation which is reasonable in the facts relying upon the evidence produced on record. Therefore, less valuation, if any, made in the claim petition would not be impediment to award just compensation exceeding the claimed amount." 10. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering the fact that very meager amount has been awarded in other heads a sum of Rs. 50,000/- towards pain and suffering, Rs. 50,000/- towards loss of amenities, Rs. 30,000/- towards special diet and Rs. 30,000/- towards taking assistance of other 8 person are hereby granted while enhancing the amount awarded in the same heads. 11.
Decision
In the result, the appeal is partly allowed. The appellant/claimant shall be entitled to Rs. 1,60,000/- in addition to what is already awarded by the claims Tribunal. The enhanced amount will carry interest @ 6% from the date of enhancement of the award till its realization. The impugned award stands modified to the above extent and rest of the conditions shall remain intact. MAC No. 1476/2018 12. Learned counsel for the appellant/owner submits that the vehicle was not transferred in his name and it was still in the name of original owner, namely, Ashutosh Sharma as such the appellant cannot be held liable to pay compensation. He was an auto dealer and being auto dealer he has received the said vehicle in exchange of new vehicle which has been purchased by non- applicant No. 3, namely, Durgesh Kumar Yadav as such in any case, the registered owner would be held liable to pay compensation. 13. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents opposes the same. 14. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the 9 material available on record. 15. From a careful perusal of the evidence on record, as well as the documents annexed to the appeal, it clearly emerges that the appellant, being a dealer of motorcycles, had received the vehicle in question in exchange from non-applicant No. 3, namely, Durgesh Kumar Yadav, who had purchased a new vehicle from the appellant. Although the formalities of registration transfer were not completed and the registration in the official records remained unchanged, the vehicle in question was at all relevant times under the control and in the possession of the appellant. During the period when the appellant maintained control and possession of the said vehicle, one of his employees, non-applicant No. 1, namely, Ashutosh Sharma, was operating the vehicle. It was during the course of such operation that the unfortunate accident occurred, thereby implicating the appellant in the circumstances surrounding the incident. 16. In a recent judgment passed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Prabhavati & Ors. vs. Managing Director, Banglore Metropolitan, Transport Corporation reported in 2025 SCC Online SC 455 this similar issue has been dealt with by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and it has been held that the person who is in command and control of the vehicle could be 10 treated as its owner for the purpose of fixing tortious liability. 17. Likewise, in the matter of Vaibhav Jain vs. Hindustan Motors Pvt Ltd reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2337 the said view has been expressed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the issue, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 12. Having noticed the rival submissions, in our view, following issues fall for our consideration: - (i) Whether, as a mere dealer of M/s Hindustan Motors, the appellant could be considered owner of the vehicle and as such liable, jointly and severally with M/s Hindustan Motors, to pay the compensation as directed by the Tribunal/ High Court? (ii) Whether clauses 3 (b) and 4 of the Dealership Agreement absolved M/s Hindustan Motors of its liability to pay compensation as an owner? (iii) Whether M/s Hindustan Motors, even without preferring an appeal against the award of the Tribunal, could question its liability under the award by relying on the provisions of Order 41 Rule 33 of the CPC? Issue No.(i) 11 13. Before we delve into the afore-stated issues, we must have a look at the concept of 'ownership' of a vehicle as obtaining under the M.V. Act for fixing liability in respect of compensation. Section 166 of the M.V. Act enumerates the persons who may file an application for compensation before the Claims Tribunal whereas Section 168(1) of the M.V. Act speaks about the award of the Tribunal. Interestingly. Section 166, though specifies the persons who may file an application for compensation, omits to specify person(s) against whom the application is to be filed. However, sub-section (1) of Section 168 by providing that the Claims Tribunal shall specify the amount which shall be paid by the insurer or owner or driver of the vehicle involved in the accident, gives sufficient indication on whom the liability for compensation would fall. 14. In v. Godavari Finance Satyanarayanamma & Ors." a question arose whether a Company Degala financier would be an owner of a motor vehicle within the meaning of Section 2(30) of the M. V. Act, 1988. In that case, the accident took place on 29.5.1995 and. admittedly, the vehicle was not in control of the financier though its name was entered in the registration book of the vehicle. The 12 extract of the registration book, however, revealed that the vehicle was registered in the name of fourth respondent therein (1.e.. not the financier) and that the hire-purchase agreement with the financier had also been cancelled on 10.11.1995. In that context, while holding that financier was not liable, interpreting the definition of 'owner', as provided in Section 2(30), this Court observed: "12. Section 2 of the Act provides for interpretation of various terms enumerated therein. It starts with the phrase unless the context otherwise requires. The definition of owner is a comprehensive one. The interpretation clause itself states that the vehicle which is the subject matter of a hire purchase agreement. the person in possession of vehicle under that agreement shall be the owner. Thus, the name of financier in the registration certificate would not be decisive for determination as to who was the owner of the vehicle. We are not unmindful of the fact that ordinarily the person in whose name the registration certificate stands should be presumed to be the owner, but such a presumption. can be drawn only in the absence of 13 any other material brought on record or unless the context otherwise requires. 13. In case of a motor vehicle which is subjected to a hire purchase agreement, the financier cannot ordinarily be treated to be the owner. The person who is in possession of the vehicle, and not the financier being the owner would be liable to pay damages for the motor accident. 15. An application for payment of compensation is filed before the Tribunal constituted under Section 165 of the Act for adjudicating upon the claim for compensation in respect of accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles. or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both. Use of the motor vehicle is a sine qua non for entertaining a claim for compensation. Ordinarily if driver of the vehicle would use the same, he remains in possession or control thereof. Owner of the vehicle, although may not have anything to do with the use of vehicle at the time of the accident, actually he may be held to be constructively liable 14 as the employer of the driver. What is, therefore, essential for passing an award is to find out the liabilities of the persons who are involved in the use of the vehicle or the persons who are vicariously liable. The insurance company becomes a necessary party to such claims as in the event the owner of the vehicle is found to be liable, it would have to reimburse the owner in as much as a vehicle is compulsorily insurable so far as the third party is concerned, as contemplated under section 147 thereof. Therefore, there cannot be any doubt whatsoever that the possession or control of a vehicle plays a vital role. 15. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation (In short RSRTC) (supra), the vehicle along with services of the driver were hired by RSRTC from its registered owner. The issue which arose for consideration by this Court was whether RSRTC, which had htred the vehicle along with services of the driver from the registered owner of the vehicle, could be held vicariously liable for the accident caused by use of that vehicle. Answering the question in the affirmative, this Court, on the principle of vicarious liability of RSRTC for the tort committed by a person under its control and command, held: 15 17. The general proposition of law and the presumption arising therefrom that an employer, that is the person who has the right to hire and Bre the employee, is generally responsible vicariously for the tort committed by the employee concerned during the course of his employment and within the scope of his authority. is a rebuttable presumption. If the original employer is able to establish that when the servant was lent, the effective control over him was also transferred to the hirer, the original owner can avoid his liability and the temporary employer or the hirer, as the case may be. must be held vicariously liable for the tort committed by the employee concerned in the course of his employment while under the command and control of the hirer notwithstanding the fact that the driver would continue to be on the payroll of the original owner............" 16. In that backdrop, this Court while construing the definition of "owner", as provided in Section 2(19) of the old Motor Vehicles Act, 1939", held that (a) the definition of "owner" under section 2 (19) of the Act is not exhaustive; (b) it has to be construed in a wider sense based on the acts and 16 circumstances of a given case; and (c) it must include, in a given case, the person who has the actual possession and control of the vehicle and under whose direction and command the driver is obliged to operate the same. It was also observed that to confine the meaning of owner to the registered owner only would not be proper where the vehicle is in the actual possession and control of the hirer at the time of the accident. 17. In National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Deepa Devi & Ors, the question was as to who would be liable to pay compensation if the offending vehicle at the time of accident is under requisition for election. claimant's side, by relying on the decision of this Court in From the Guru Govekar v. Filomena F. Lobo, it was argued that regardless of the vehicle being in possession of some other person, the owner would be liable. Negativing this argument, this Court held that when a vehicle is requisitioned for State duty, the owner of the vehicle has no other alternative but to hand over the possession to the statutory authority and, therefore, the case would be distinguishable from the one where the owner gives the vehicle to someone else on his own free will. Holding so, it was observed: "10. While the vehicle remains under requisition, the owner 17 does not exercise any control there over. The driver may still be the employee of the owner of the vehicle but he has to drive it as per the direction of the officer of the State, who is put in charge thereof. Save and except for legal ownership, for all intent and purport, the registered owner of the vehicle loses entire control thereover. He has no say as to whether the vehicle should be driven at a given point of time or not. He cannot ask the driver not to drive a vehicle on a bad road. He or the driver could not possibly say that the vehicle would not be driven in the night. The purpose of requisition is to use the vehicle. For the period the vehicle remains under the control of the State and/or its officers, the owner is only entitled to payment of compensation therefor in terms of the Act. but he cannot exercise any control thereupon. In a situation of this nature, this court must proceed on the presumption that Parliament while enacting the 1988 Act did not envisage such a situation. If in a given situation. the statutory definitions contained in the 1988 Act cannot be given effect to in letter and spirit, the same should be understood from the common sense point of view." 18. While observing as above, this Court noticed that the clause defining "owner" is prefaced with the expression "unless the context otherwise requires and, therefore, in the light of an 18 earlier decision of this Court in Ramesh Mehta v. Sanwal Chand Singhvi & Ors.". It was held that where the context makes the definition given in the Interpretation clause inapplicable. the same meaning cannot be assigned. 19. What is clear from the decisions noticed above, is that 'owner' of a vehicle is not limited to the categories specified in Section 2(30) of the M.V. Act. If the context so requires. even a person at whose command or control the vehicle is could be treated as its owner for the purposes of fixing tortious liability for payment of compensation. In this light. we shall now examine whether at the time of accident the vehicle in question was under the command and control of the appellant (1.e., the dealer). 18. In view of the aforementioned judicial pronouncements and the principles enunciated therein, this Court finds no ground for interference in the liability which has fastened upon the owner and is having no hesitation in affirming the imposition of liability. Given that the vehicle was in the appellant’s possession and under his control at the relevant time, the liability rightly attaches to him, as the legal and factual circumstances clearly establish his connection to the incident. It is evident that the Claims Tribunal has, in a lawful and judicious manner, rightly fastened 19 the liability upon the appellant, namely, Sumesh Parakh, and this Court sees no reason to interfere with the same. 19. Accordingly, having considered the submissions and the relevant facts of the case, it is held that the appeal filed by the owner is without merit and is therefore liable to be dismissed. In view of the same, the appeal is hereby dismissed in its entirety. Furthermore, the owner remains obligated to pay the compensation as has been duly determined and awarded by the learned Claims Tribunal and enhanced by this Court. 20. Accordingly, both these appeals are disposed of. Sd/- (Amitendra Kishore Prasad) Judge Raghu Jat