Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh v. State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Magarlod, District Dh
Case Details
1 MANPREET KAUR Digitally signed by MANPREET KAUR Date: 2025.07.30 10:39:45 +0530 2025:CGHC:36743-DB NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR CRA No. 199 of 2022 Shobharam Yadav S/o Banshiram Yadav Aged About 24 Years R/o Village Sonarindaihan Thana Magarlod, District-Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh. ... Appellant(s) versus State Of Chhattisgarh Through Police Station Magarlod, District Dhamtari, Chhattisgarh. ... Respondent(s) For Appellant(s) : Mr. Gagan Tiwari, Advocate For Respondent(s) : Mr. Swajeet Ubeja, Panel Lawyer Hon'ble Shri Hon'ble Ramesh Sinha, Shri Bibhu Datta Guru Chief Justice , Judge Judgment on Board Per Ramesh Sinha , Chief Justice 29.07.2025 1. Heard Mr. Gagan Tiwari, learned counsel for the appellant as well as Mr. Swajeet Ubeja, learned Panel Lawyer, appearing for the respondent / State. 2. This criminal appeal filed by the appellant under Section 374(2) of 2 the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘Cr.P.C.’) is directed against the impugned judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated 13.04.2018 passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Dhamtari, District- Dhamtari (C.G.) in Session Trial No. 34/2017, whereby the appellant have been convicted for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life and fine of Rs.1000/-, in default of payment of fine, additional R.I. for 06 months. 3. Case of the prosecution, in brief, is that after the marriage of the deceased Smt. Bhuneswari Yadav was solemnized with the accused 11 months before the incident, thereafter she was living in her in-laws' house and about 15 days before the date of incident, due to the birth of her child, she had gone to her aunt's house in village Purur to get health benefits. The accused went to village Purur and brought her to his house before the date of incident and after eating dinner they slept in his room. When the deceased said that she would not live with the accused and there was an argument between them regarding doubt on the character of the deceased, the accused hit her on the head with an iron shovel kept at the scene of incident several times and injured her due to which the deceased became unconscious. When the parents and brother of the accused came to know about this, she was admitted to Mekahra Hospital, Raipur for treatment. On receiving the memo of her death during treatment on 19.05.2017, 3 Case No. 0/17 was registered in Police Station Maudhapara, Raipur and the Panchnama of the dead body was done. Since the place of incident was Magarlod Police Station, on receiving the case diary from Maudhapara police station, Raipur, a numbered case was registered and investigation was started as the crime under section 302 of IPC was found against the accused. 4. During the investigation, spot map, site map, property seizure sheet of the place were prepared and statements of witnesses were recorded and after investigation, charge-sheet was presented against the accused before the concerned Court. 5. After examining the charge-sheet and the attached documents and hearing the arguments of the prosecution and defence, the charges were framed against the accused. When the charge under Section 302 of the IPC was found to be made out, a charge was framed against the accused under Section 302 of the IPC and when the charge was read out and explained to him, the accused denied having committed the alleged offence and sought trial. 6. To prove the case by the prosecution, 14 witnesses were examined (PW-1 to PW-14) and 43 documents were exhibited. When the accused was asked for clarification by preparing a statement of charges under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in relation to the facts revealed in the evidence of the witnesses examined in the case, he expressed ignorance about 4 the circumstances proved by the prosecution and stated that he has been falsely implicated in the case but expressed his desire to give no evidence in his defence. 7. The trial Court upon appreciation of oral and documentary evidence available on record, by its judgment dated 13.04.2018, convicted the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC and sentenced him as aforementioned, against which, this criminal appeal has been preferred by the accused / appellant. 8.
Legal Reasoning
exceptions are pleaded or prima facie established on the evidence on record, the prosecution must still be required under the law to bring the case under any of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC to sustain the charge of murder. If the prosecution fails to discharge this onus in establishing any one of the four clauses of Section 300 of the IPC, namely, 1stly to 4thly, the charge of murder would not be made out and the case may be one of culpable homicide not amounting to murder as described under Section 299 of the IPC. (8) The court must address itself to the question of mens rea. If Clause thirdly of Section 300 is to be applied, the assailant must intend the particular injury inflicted on the deceased. This ingredient could rarely be proved by direct evidence. Inevitably, it is a matter of inference to be drawn from the proved circumstances of the case. The court must necessarily have regard to the nature of the weapon used, part of the body injured, extent of the injury, degree of force used in causing the injury, the manner of attack, the circumstances preceding and attendant on the attack. (9) Intention to kill is not the only intention that makes a culpable homicide a murder. The intention to cause injury or injuries sufficient in the ordinary cause of 25 nature to cause death also makes a culpable homicide a murder if death has actually been caused and intention to cause such injury or injuries is to be inferred from the act or acts resulting in the injury or injuries. (10) When single injury inflicted by the accused results in the death of the victim, no inference, as a general principle, can be drawn that the accused did not have the intention to cause the death or that particular injury which resulted in the death of the victim. Whether an accused had the required guilty intention or not, is a question of fact which has to be determined on the facts of each case. (11) Where the prosecution proves that the accused had the intention to cause death of any person or to cause bodily injury to him and the intended injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, then, even if he inflicts a single injury which results in the death of the victim, the offence squarely falls under Clause thirdly of Section 300 of the IPC unless one of the exceptions applies. (12) In determining the question, whether an accused had guilty intention or guilty knowledge in a case where only a single injury is inflicted by him and that injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the fact that the act is done without premeditation in a sudden fight or quarrel, or that the circumstances justify that the injury was accidental or unintentional, or that he only intended a simple injury, would lead to the inference of guilty knowledge, and 26 the offence would be one under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.” 42. Reverting to the facts of the present case in light of principles of law laid down by their Lordships of the Supreme Court in the above-stated judgments (supra), it is quite vivid that on the date of incident, after eating dinner, the appellant and deceased slept in their room and when the deceased said that she would not live with the accused, an argument raised between them regarding doubt on the character of the deceased and in heat of passion, he hit the deceased with an iron shovel, due to which the deceased suffered multiple injuries on her person and succumbed to those injuries. Thus with the intention to cause death of deceased, the appellant caused such injuries and by doing so, he must have had the knowledge that such injuries inflicted by him would likely cause death of the deceased, as such, his case would falls within the purview of Exception 4 of Section 300 of IPC, as the act of appellant herein completely satisfies the four necessary ingredients of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC i.e. (i) there must be a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was committed in a heat of passion and (iv) the appellant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner. 43. Considering the above-stated facts, further considering the evidence of statements of Smt. Ishwari Bai (PW-1), Makhan Lal 27 Yadav (PW-2), Mannu Ram Yadav (PW-3), Laxman Singh (PW-5), Banshi Ram Yadav (PW-4), Dilip Kumar (PW-6), Ramesh Mehta (PW-07), A.K. Dwivedi (PW-10), Bhupendra Chandra (PW-12) and Dr. M. Nirala's (PW-14) allegations and post mortem report (Ex.P.-41) and FSL report (Ex.P-43) and the material available on record, it would meet the end of justice that if the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is altered/converted to Section 304 Part-I of the IPC. 44. Accordingly, conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC is set aside, however, he is convicted under Section 304 Part- I of the IPC and sentenced to undergo RI for 10 years. 45. The appellant is stated to be in jail since 22.05.2017 being the date of arrest. He is directed to serve out the sentence as modified above. 46. The criminal appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated herein-above. 47. Registry is directed to send a copy of this judgment to the concerned Superintendent of Jail where the Appellant is undergoing the jail term, to serve the same on the Appellant informing him that he is at liberty to assail the present judgment passed by this Court by preferring an appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court with the assistance of High Court Legal Services Committee or the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee. 28 48. Let a copy of this judgment and the original record be transmitted to the trial court concerned forthwith for necessary information and compliance. Sd/- Sd/- (Bibhu Datta Guru) (Ramesh Sinha) Judge Chief Justice Manpreet
Arguments
Mr. Gagan Tiwai, learned counsel appearing for the appellant submits that the learned trial Court is absolutely unjustified in convicting the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC, as the prosecution has failed to prove the offence beyond reasonable doubt. He further submits that if the case of the prosecution is accepted as it is, then also the appellant is said to have caused injuries to the deceased in spur of moment. There was no motive or intention on the part of the appellant to cause death of the deceased and only on account of sudden quarrel, under heat of passion and in anger, the appellant caused injuries to the deceased, which caused his death. Therefore, the case of the present appellant falls within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC and the act of the appellant is culpable homicide not amounting to murder and, therefore, it is a fit case where the conviction of the appellant for offence under Section 302 of the IPC can be converted/altered to an offence under 5 Section 304 (Part-I or Part-II) of the IPC. Hence, the present appeal deserves to be allowed in full or in part. 9. On the other hand, Mr. Swajeet Ubeja, learned Panel Lawyer appearing for the respondent/State supports the impugned judgment and submits that the appellant has caused murder of deceased by deadly attacking her with iron shovel due to which, she succumbed to her injuries, therefore, the learned trial Court has rightly convicted the appellant under Section 302 of the IPC and it is not a case where the appellant’s conviction under Section 302 of the IPC can be altered/converted under Section 304 Part-I or Part-II IPC and as such, the instant criminal appeal deserves to be dismissed. 10. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the parties, considered their rival submissions made hereinabove and also went through the records with utmost circumspection. 11. The first question for consideration would be whether the deceased died under unnatural circumstances ? 12. With regard to this question, statement of PW-14 Dr. M. Nirala, who conducted the postmortem of the deceased Smt. Bhuneshwari Yadav is taken into consideration. 13. Dr. M. Nirala, Medical Officer (PW-14) deposed that on 20.05.2017, the postmortem of the deceased Smt. Bhuneshwari Yadav was presented for examination by constable Lalit Dewangan. In the external examination of the dead body, he 6 found that the dead body was of a normal height woman who was wrapped in a pink, red bed-sheet and was wearing a diaper, the body was cold and there was stiffness in the body after death, both eyes and mouth were closed and tongue was inside the mouth, a white hospital bandage was tied on the head of the deceased and a plastic drainage tube was attached to the occipital part of the head. There was hematoma (blood accumulation) in the right eye of the dead body, a wound stitched with staples of 28 cm length was present from the middle frontal part of the head to the left temporal part, there was more than one stitched wound in the left frontoparietal part of the head in which there was a stitched wound of 01 cm, 04 cm, 05 cm in the left frontal part and a 3 cm length in the left parietal part. A 4 cm long depressed fracture was present in the left frontal bone, on the left side of the head. The midbrain along with the parietal lobe, lateral and third ventricle were torn measuring 10 x 8 cm. The left hemisphere and right hemisphere of the brain were torn Subdural bleeding was present in the parietal lobe. The anterior and middle canine fossa of the head were ruptured. The medical officer deposed that on internal examination he found that the membranes, ribs, soft tissues, larynx and trachea were intact, right and left lungs were intact and swollen, pericardium, heart and heart vessels were intact, right ventricle was filled with blood, membrane of the membranes, mouth and pharynx were intact and healthy, stomach contained 7 100 ml of black coloured fluid, small and large intestines were filled with gas and faecal matter, liver, spleen and both kidneys were intact and healthy, urinary bladder was intact and empty, internal and external genitals were intact and healthy. All the injuries had black-brown coloured ecchymosis and were antemortem. The injuries were inflicted by hard and blunt objects and were sufficient to cause death. 14. The said medical witness, while attesting to the postmortem report (Ex.P-41), has given the opinion that the deceased Smt. Bhuneshwari Yadav died due to cardiac and respiratory failure caused by head injuries. The nature of death was homicidal. 15. Thus, there is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the medical witnesses Dr. M. Nirala, Medical Officer (PW-14), who conducted the postmortem of the deceased Smt. Bhuneshwari Yadav. Hence, the trial Court after appreciating oral and documentary evidence available on record particularly relying upon the statement of Dr. M. Nirala (PW-14), and PM report (Ex.P-41) has come to the conclusion that the deceased died under unnatural circumstances and the nature of death of deceased was homicidal. 16. After hearing learned counsel for the parties and after considering the submissions advanced by them, we are of the considered opinion that the finding recorded by the trial Court that the deceased Smt. Bhuneshwari Yadav died under unnatural 8 circumstances is the finding of fact based on evidence available on record. It is neither perverse nor contrary to record. We hereby affirm that finding. 17. Now, the question for consideration would be whether the accused-appellant herein is the perpetrator of the crime in question? 18. In this regard, statements of Smt. Ishwari Bai (PW-1), Makhan Lal Yadav (PW-2), Mannu Ram Yadav (PW-3), Laxman Singh (PW-5), Banshi Ram Yadav (PW-4), Dilip Kumar (PW-6), Ramesh Mehta (PW-07), A.K. Dwivedi (PW-10), Bhupendra Chandra (PW-12) and Dr. M. Nirala's (PW-14) allegations and notice of body panchanama (Ex.P.-1), body panchanama (Ex.P.-2), death intimation (Ex.P.-21), First Information Report (Ex.-24) and post mortem report (Ex.P.-41) is taken into consideration. 19. Banshi Yadav (PW-4) has deposed that the accused is his son and the deceased is his daughter-in-law. His daughter-in-law, deceased Smt. Bhuneshwari Yadav had gone to her aunt's house for rest after delivery, from where his son Shobharam / accused brought her back at about 8 pm on the date of the incident and all were sleeping after having dinner when at about 3-4 AM, he heard the sound of the child crying and went to the accused's room to see. The accused was running away from there. When he went inside and saw, his daughter-in-law Bhuneshwari was lying unconscious, seeing which he fainted. In cross-examination, the 9 witness has accepted that he did not see the accused being killed, but the statement made by the witness that when he went to the accused's room to see at about 3-4 AM on hearing the sound of the child crying, the accused was running away from there, has not been denied by the accused. Therefore, the accused was last seen with the deceased at the time of the incident. 20. Smt. Ishwari Bai (PW-1) and Makhan Lal Yadav (PW-2), who are the mother and maternal uncle of the deceased, have deposed that on receiving information over phone that Smt. Bhuneshwari Yadav's health is not well and they should come to District Hospital Dhamtari, they came to District Hospital Dhamtari where Bhuneshwari Yadav had a head injury. On asking about this, the mother and elder brother of the accused Bhagwat told that the accused Shobharam had hit Bhuneshwari with some object and fled. The said witnesses have admitted in cross-examination that they did not see the incident taking place. Hence, the above witnesses are hearsay evidences who are giving statements as per the statement of the elder brother and mother of the accused. 21. Mannu Ram Yadav (PW-3) deposed that on the date of incident, accused's elder brother Bhagwat told him that Shobha Ram's wife was unwell, then he went and saw that the deceased was lying unconscious, he shook the deceased and when he touched her head, his hand got stained with blood and there was a big cut on the deceased's head. During cross-examination, he admitted that 10 the accused had told that the deceased had an illicit relationship with some other person and when she refused, there was a dispute between the two and he hit Bhuneshwari on the head with a shovel, due to which, she died. Therefore, it is clear from the statement of the witness that the accused had told this witness that when there was a dispute between the two regarding the illicit relationship with some other person of the village, he hit Bhuneshwari on the head with a shovel, due to which she died. 22. Laxman Singh (PW-5) has deposed that during the summer of this year the accused had told him that he had hit his wife on the head with a shovel due to a quarrel. The police had given him notice under Section 160 Cr.P.C. (Ex.P-10) and when the accused confessed killing his wife in front of him on being questioned by the police, confession panchnama (Ex.P.-11) was prepared. 23. Nirbhay Singh Rajput (PW-13) deposed that on 22.05.2017, when accused Shobharam Yadav was questioned in custody in front of witnesses, he gave a disclosure statement (Ex.P-13) that he had kept the shovel used in the incident in his house and had recovered it. On the basis of the disclosure statement, the accused had taken out an iron rod from his house. Since the shovel was seized in front of witnesses, seizure memo (Ex.P-14) was prepared. 24. Dilip Kumar (PW-6) deposed that when the accused Shobharam Yadav was questioned by the police, he gave a disclosure 11 statement (Ex.P-13) that he had hidden the iron shovel used in the incident in his house and had got it recovered. The accused had got an iron shovel seized from his house in his presence as per the seizure memo (Ex.P-14). 25. Smt. Ishwari Bai (PW-1) and Makhan Lal Yadav (PW-02) have supported the seizure of green colour blouse of deceased Bhuneshwari Yadav by Nirbhay Singh Rajput (PW-13), which had black, pink and golden coloured strips on both the sleeves, on which blood was present on the right sleeve and the back portion and blood stains were also present at other places. 26. Banshi Yadav (PW-4) has clearly stated that he saw the accused running away from the room and that he saw the deceased Bhuneshwari Yadav lying unconscious and covered in blood in the room. On being asked suggestive questions, he himself stated that the accused himself had told the police that he had killed the deceased Bhuneshwari with a shovel. Therefore, it is clear that the said witness went to the scene of incident immediately after the incident and has stated seeing the accused running away from the room and seeing the deceased unconscious. 27. It is clear from the facts revealed in the statements of Smt. Ishwari Bai (PW-1), Makhan Lal Yadav (PW-02) that the accused Shobharam Yadav was not seen killing the deceased Bhuneshwari Yadav. Rather, on the basis of the information given by the elder brother of the accused Bhagwat and his mother after 12 the incident, they have said that the accused Shobharam Yadav killed the deceased Bhuneshwari Yadav. 28. It is also clear from the facts revealed in the statement of Dilip Kumar (PW-6) that accused Shobharam Yadav had given a disclosure statement (Ex.P-13) to the police in his presence that he had caused the death of deceased Bhuneshwari Yadav by hitting her with an iron shovel and had got the shovel used in the incident recovered from his house and the accused had given the iron shovel from his house to the policemen. 29. According to the report (Ex.P-43) presented by the Office of Director, State Forensic Science Laboratory, Raipur, human blood was found in the seized shovel article 'A', blanket lying at the scene article-B, blouse worn by the deceased article-D and the blood in the seized shovel article 'A' was found to be blood group-'A'. 30. Considering the aforesaid oral and documentary evidence, the learned trial Court has rightly held that it is the appellant-accused who has caused injuries over the body of the deceased due to which he died. Accordingly, we hereby affirm the said finding. 31. The aforesaid finding brings us to the next question for consideration, whether the case of the appellant is covered within Exception 4 to Section 300 of the IPC vis-a-vis culpable homicide not amounting to murder and his conviction can be converted to Section 304 Part-I or Part-II of the IPC, as contended by learned 13 counsel for the appellant ? 32. The cause of death assigned in the post-mortem report of both the deceased as already noticed are ‘shock on account of consequential trauma’. It is a trite law that “culpable homicide” is a genus and “murder” is its species and all “murders” are “culpable homicides, but all “culpable homicides are not “murders” as held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Rampal Singh Vs. State of Uttar Pradesh1. The intention of the accused must be judged not in the light of actual circumstances, but in the light of what is supposed to be the circumstances. 33. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Basdev Vs. State of Pepsu2 has made the following observations : “Of course, we have to distinguish between motive, intention and knowledge. Motive is something which prompts a man to form an intention and knowledge is an awareness of the consequences of the act. In many cases intention and knowledge merge into each other and mean the same thing more or less and intention can be presumed from knowledge. The demarcating line between knowledge and intention is no doubt thin but it is not difficult to perceive that they connote different things. Even in some English decisions, the three ideas are used interchangeably and this has led to a certain amount of confusion.” 34. It requires to be borne in mind that the test suggested in the 1 (2012) 8 SCC 289 2 AIR 1956 SC 488 14 aforesaid decision and the fact that the legislature has used two different terminologies, ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ and separate punishments are provided for an act committed with an intent to cause bodily injury which is likely to cause death and for an act committed with a knowledge that his act is likely to cause death without intent to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death, it would be unsafe to treat ‘intent’ and ‘knowledge’ in equal terms. They are not different things. Knowledge would be one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration while determining or inferring the requisite intent. Where the evidence would not disclose that there was any intention to cause death of the deceased but it was clear that the accused had knowledge that his acts were likely to cause death, the accused can be held guilty under second part of Section 304 IPC. It is in this background that the expression used in Indian Penal Code namely “intention” and “knowledge” has to be seen as there being a thin line of distinction between these two expressions. The act to constitute murder, if in given facts and circumstances, would disclose that the ingredients of Section 300 are not satisfied and such act is one of extreme recklessness, it would not attract the said Section. In order to bring a case within Part 3 of Section 300 IPC, it must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury which in the ordinary course of nature was sufficient to cause death. In other words, that the injury found to be present was the injury that was intended to be inflicted. 15 35. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Sukhbir Singh v. State of Haryana3 has observed as under:- “21. Keeping in view the facts and circumstances of the case, we are of the opinion that in the absence of the existence of common object Sukhbir Singh is proved to have committed the offence of culpable homicide without premeditation in a sudden fight in the heat of passion upon a sudden quarrel and did not act in a cruel or unusual manner and his case is covered by Exception 4 of Section 300 IPC which is punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC. The finding of the courts below holding the aforesaid appellant guilty of offence of murder punishable under Section 302 IPC is set aside and he is held guilty for the commission of offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder punishable under Section 304 (Part I) IPC and sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and to pay a fine of Rs.5000. In default of payment of fine, he shall undergo further rigorous imprisonment for one year.” 36. The Supreme Court in the matter of Gurmukh Singh v. State of Haryana4 has laid down certain factors which are to be taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused with reference to Section 302 or Section 304 Part II of the IPC, which state as under :- “23. These are some factors which are required to be 3 (2002) 3 SCC 327 4 (2009) 15 SCC 635 16 taken into consideration before awarding appropriate sentence to the accused. These factors are only illustrative in character and not exhaustive. Each case has to be seen fro its special perspective. The relevant factors are as under : (a) Motive or previous enmity; (b) Whether the incident had taken place on the spur of the moment; (c) The intention/knowledge of the accused while inflicting the blow or injury; (d) Whether the death ensued instantaneously or the victim died after several days; (e) The gravity, dimension and nature of injury; (f) The age and general health condition of the accused; (g) Whether the injury was caused without premeditation in a sudden fight; (h) The nature and size of weapon used for inflicting the injury and the force with which the blow was inflicted; (i) The criminal background and adverse history of the accused; (j) Whether the injury inflicted was not sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death but the death was because of shock; (k) Number of other criminal cases pending against the accused; (l) Incident occurred within the family members or close relations; (m) The conduct and behaviour of the accused after the incident. Whether the accused had taken the injured/the deceased to the hospital 17 immediately to ensure that he/she gets proper medical treatment ? These are some of the factors which can be taken into consideration while granting an appropriate sentence to the accused. 24. The list of circumstances enumerated above is only illustrative and not exhaustive. In our considered view, proper and appropriate sentence to the accused is the bounded obligation and duty of the court. The endeavour of the court must be to ensure that the accused receives appropriate sentence, in other words, sentence should be according to the gravity of the offence. These are some of the relevant factors which are required to be kept in view while convicting and sentencing the accused.” 37. Likewise, in the matter of State v. Sanjeev Nanda5, their Lordships of the Supreme Court have held that once knowledge that it is likely to cause death is established but without any intention to cause death, then jail sentence may be for a term which may extend to 10 years or with fine or with both. It has further been held that to make out an offence punishable under Section 304 Part II of the IPC, the prosecution has to prove the death of the person in question and such death was caused by the act of the accused and that he knew that such act of his is likely to cause death. 38. Further, the Supreme Court in the matter of Arjun v. State of Chhattisgarh6 has elaborately dealt with the issue and observed 5 (2012) 8 SCC 450 6 (2017) 3 SCC 247 18 in paragraphs 20 and 21, which reads as under :- “20. To invoke this Exception 4, the requirements that are to be fulfilled have been laid down by this Court in Surinder Kumar v. UT, Chandigarh [(1989) 2 SCC 217 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 348], it has been explained as under :(SCC p. 220, para 7) “7. To invoke this exception four requirements must be satisfied, namely, (I) it was a sudden fight; (ii) there was no premeditation; (iii) the act was done in a heat of passion; and (iv) the assailant had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. The cause of the quarrel is not relevant nor its I relevant who offered the provocation or started the assault. The number of wounds caused during the occurrence is not a decisive factor but what is important is that the occurrence must have been sudden and unpremeditated and the offender must have acted in a fit of anger. Of course, the offender must not have taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel manner. Where, on a sudden quarrel, a person in the heat of the moment picks up a weapon which is handy and causes injuries, one of which proves fatal, he would be entitled to the benefit of this exception provided he has not acted cruelly.” 21. Further in Arumugam v. State [(2008) 15 SCC 590 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 1130], in support of the proposition of law that under what circumstances Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC can be invoked if death is caused, it has been explained as under : (SCC p. 596, para 9) “9. …. The help of exception 4 can be invoked if death is caused (a) without premeditation; (b) in a sudden fight; (c) without the offender's having taken undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner; and (d) the fight must have been with the person killed. To bring a case within Exception 4 all the ingredients mentioned in it must be found. It is to be noted that the “fight” occurring in Exception 19 4 to Section 300 IPC is not defined in the Penal Code, 1860. It takes two to make a fight. Heat of passion requires that there must be no time for the passions to cool down and in this case, the parties had worked themselves into a fury on account of the verbal altercation in the beginning. A fight is a combat between two or more persons whether with or without weapons. It is not possible to enunciate any general rule as to what shall be deemed to be a sudden quarrel. It is a question of fact and whether a quarrel is sudden or not must necessarily depend upon the proved facts of each case. For the application of Exception 4, it is not sufficient to show that there was a sudden quarrel and there was no premeditation. It must further be shown that the offender has not taken undue advantage or acted in cruel or unusual manner. “undue The expression advantage” as used in the provisions means “unfair advantage”. 39. In the matter of Arjun (supra), the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that if there is intent and knowledge, the same would be case of Section 304 Part-I of the IPC and if it is only a case of knowledge and not the intention to cause murder and bodily injury, then same would be a case of Section 304 Part-II of the IPC. 40. Further, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Rambir v. State (NCT of Delhi)7 has laid down four ingredients which should be tested to bring a case within the purview of Exception 4 to Section 300 of IPC, which reads as under: “16. A plain reading of Exception 4 to Section 300 IPC shows that the following four ingredients are required: 7 (2019) 6 SCC 122 20 (i) There must be a sudden fight; (ii) There was no premeditation; (iii) The act was committed in a heat of passion; and (iv) The offender had not taken any undue advantage or acted in a cruel or unusual manner.” 41. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in a recent judgment in the case of Anbazhagan vs. The State represented by the Inspector of Police in Criminal Appeal No.2043 of 2023 disposed of on 20.07.2023 has defined the context of the true test to be adopted to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act as under: “60. Few important principles of law discernible from the aforesaid discussion may be summed up thus: (1) When the court is confronted with the question, what offence the accused could be said to have committed, the true test is to find out the intention or knowledge of the accused in doing the act. If the intention or knowledge was such as is described in Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act will be murder even though only a single injury was caused. To illustrate: ‘A’ is bound hand and foot. ‘B’ comes and placing his revolver against the head of ‘A’, shoots ‘A’ in his head killing him instantaneously. Here, there will be no difficulty in holding that the intention of ‘B’ in shooting ‘A’ was to kill him, though only single injury was caused. The case would, therefore, be of murder falling within Clause (1) of 21 Section 300 of the IPC. Taking another instance, ‘B’ sneaks into the bed room of his enemy ‘A’ while the latter is asleep on his bed. Taking aim at the left chest of ‘A’, ‘B’ forcibly plunges a sword in the left chest of ‘A’ and runs away. ‘A’ dies shortly thereafter. The injury to ‘A’ was found to be sufficient in ordinary course of nature to cause death. There may be no difficulty in holding that ‘B’ intentionally inflicted the particular injury found to be caused and that the said injury was objectively sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This would bring the act of ‘B’ within Clause (3) of Section 300 of the IPC and render him guilty of the offence of murder although only single injury was caused. (2) Even when the intention or knowledge of the accused may fall within Clauses (1) to (4) of Section 300 of the IPC, the act of the accused which would otherwise be murder, will be taken out of the purview of murder, if the accused's case attracts any one of the five exceptions enumerated in that section. In the event of the case falling within any of those exceptions, the offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder, falling within Part 1 of Section 304 of the IPC, if the case of the accused is such as to fall within Clauses (1) to (3) of Section 300 of the IPC. It would be offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case is such as to fall within Clause (4) of Section 300 of the IPC. Again, the intention or knowledge of the accused may be such that only 2nd or 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC, may be attracted but not any of the clauses of Section 300 of the IPC. In that situation also, the 22 offence would be culpable homicide not amounting to murder under Section 304 of the IPC. It would be an offence under Part I of that section, if the case fall within 2nd part of Section 299, while it would be an offence under Part II of Section 304 if the case fall within 3rd part of Section 299 of the IPC. (3) To put it in other words, if the act of an accused person falls within the first two clauses of cases of culpable homicide as described in Section 299 of the IPC it is punishable under the first part of Section 304. If, however, it falls within the third clause, it is punishable under the second part of Section 304. In effect, therefore, the first part of this section would apply when there is ‘guilty intention,’ whereas the second part would apply when there is no such intention, but there is ‘guilty knowledge’. (4) Even if single injury is inflicted, if that particular injury was intended, and objectively that injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death, the requirements of Clause 3rdly to Section 300 of the IPC, are fulfilled and the offence would be murder. (5) Section 304 of the IPC will apply to the following classes of cases : (i) when the case falls under one or the other of the clauses of Section 300, but it is covered by one of the exceptions to that Section, (ii) when the injury caused is not of the higher degree of likelihood which is covered by the expression ‘sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death’ but is of a lower degree of likelihood which is 23 generally spoken of as an injury ‘likely to cause death’ and the case does not fall under Clause (2) of Section 300 of the IPC, (iii) when the act is done with the knowledge that death is likely to ensue but without intention to cause death or an injury likely to cause death. To put it more succinctly, the difference between the two parts of Section 304 of the IPC is that under the first part, the crime of murder is first established and the accused is then given the benefit of one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC, while under the second part, the crime of murder is never established at all. Therefore, for the purpose of holding an accused guilty of the offence punishable under the second part of Section 304 of the IPC, the accused need not bring his case within one of the exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. (6) The word ‘likely’ means probably and it is distinguished from more ‘possibly’. When chances of happening are even or greater than its not happening, we may say that the thing will ‘probably happen’. In reaching the conclusion, the court has to place itself in the situation of the accused and then judge whether the accused had the knowledge that by the act he was likely to cause death. (7) The distinction between culpable homicide (Section 299 of the IPC) and murder (Section 300 of the IPC) has always to be carefully borne in mind while dealing with a charge under Section 302 of the IPC. Under the category of unlawful homicides, both, 24 the cases of culpable homicide amounting to murder and those not amounting to murder would fall. Culpable homicide is not murder when the case is brought within the five exceptions to Section 300 of the IPC. But, even though none of the said five