Afr High Court
Case Details
1 2025:CGHC:39478 AFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR FA No. 165 of 2008 Judgment Reserved on 16.06.2025 Judgment delivered on 07.08.2025 1 - Harivansh (Dead) Through Lrs. Nil 1.1 - (A). Karamdayal S/o Late Harivansh Aged About 41 Years R/o Village - Purandih, P.S. Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 1.2 - (B). Ramdayal S/o Late Harivansh Aged About 38 Years R/o Village - Purandih, P.S. Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 1.3 - (C). Ramjatan S/o Late Harivansh Aged About 35 Years R/o Village - Purandih, P.S. Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj Chhattisgarh., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh --- APPELLANT(s) versus 1 - Motilal (Dead) Through Collector, Distt. Sarguja C.G., Chhattisgarh 1.2 - Vimla Devi Wd/o Late Motilal Aged About 65 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir Ramanujganj Distt.- Balrampur (C.G.) 1.3 - Raman Agrawal S/o Late Motilal Aged About 47 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir Ramanujganj Distt.- Balrampur (C.G.) 1.4 - Prakash Agrawal S/o Late Motilal Aged About 44 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir Ramanujganj Distt.- Balrampur (C.G.) 1.5 - Viash Agrawal S/o Late Motilal Aged About 42 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir Ramanujganj Distt.- Balrampur (C.G.) 1.6 - Monika Agrawal W/o Deepak Agrawal D/o Govid Bhawan Ashok Nagar Street No. 1 Kankad Bag Patna (Bihar) SANTOSH KUMAR SHARMA Digitally signed by SANTOSH KUMAR SHARMA Date: 2025.08.07 16:16:40 +0530 2 1.7 - Archana Agrawal W/o Ratan Bansal Aged About 43 Years D/o Late Motilal R/o Mg Road, Shriram Marbel Opposite Holly Cross College, Ambikapur Distt.- Surguja (C.G.) 2 - (A) Jagwa ( Dead ) Through Lrs., As Per Court Order Dt. 15.01-2020. 2.1 - (1) Rojan Manjhi S/o Late Jagwa Aged About 40 Years R/o Village - Bardaritola, Handighat Police Station - Ranka District - Garhwa ( Jharkhand ), District : Garhwa, Jharkhand 2.2 - 2(B) Udit Manjhi (Dead) Through- Lrs. As Per Hon'ble Court Order Dated 09-03-2022, District : Garhwa, Jharkhand 2.2.1 - Kameshwar Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 35 Years R/o Village- Bardaritola, Handighat P.S. Ranka, Distt. Garhwa (Jharkhand) 2.2.2 - Pintu Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 26 Years R/o Village- Bardaritola, Handighat P.S. Ranka, Distt. Garhwa (Jharkhand) 2.2.3 - Umesh Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 22 Years R/o Village- Bardaritola, Handighat P.S. Ranka, Distt. Garhwa (Jharkhand) 2.3 - (B) Gangwa ( Dead ) Through Lrs., As Per Court Order Dt. 15.01-2020. 2.3.1 - (1) Kameshwar Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 26 Years R/o Village - Bardaritola, Handighat Police Station - Ranka District - Garhwa ( Jharkhand ), District : Garhwa, Jharkhand 2.3.2 - (2) Pintu Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 22 Years R/o Village Bardaritola, Handighat Police Station - Ranka District - Garhwa ( Jharkhand ), District : Garhwa, Jharkhand 2.3.3 - (3) Umesh Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 22 Years R/o Village- Bardaritola, Handighat Police Station - Ranka District - Garhwa ( Jharkhand ), District : Garhwa, Jharkhand 2.4 - (C) (Deleted ) Kameshwar (Dead ) As Per Court Order Dt. 15.01-2020. 2.4.1- (D) Dukhan S/o Tilai Aged About 40 Years Caste - Bhuihar, R/o Village- Bardaritola, Handighat, Police Station - Ranka, District - Garhwa ( Jharkhand ), District : Garhwa, Jharkhand 3 3 - State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, District - Sarguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) FA No. 205 of 2008 1 - Motilal (Died) Through His Legal Heirs As Per The Hon'ble Court Order Dated 09-03-2022 2 - Vimla Devi Wd/o Late Motilal Aged About 65 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Chhattisgarh. 3 - Raman Agrawal S/o Late Motilal Aged About 47 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Chhattisgarh. 4 - Prakash Agrawal S/o Late Motilal Aged About 44 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Chhattisgarh. 5 - Vikas Agrawal S/o Late Motilal Aged About 42 Years R/o Near Pahadi Mandir, Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Chhattisgarh. 6 - Monika Agrawal W/o Deepak Agrawal , D/o Late Motilal Aged About 48 Years R/o Govind Bhavan, Ashok Nagar, Street No. 01, Kankad Bag, Patna Bihar. 7 - Archana Bansal W/o Ratan Bansal , D/o Late Motilal Aged About 43
Legal Reasoning
Years R/o Mg Road, Shriram Marbel, Opposite Holy Cross College , Ambikapur , Sarguja Chhattisgarh. ---Appellants (s) Versus 1 - Hariwansh (Dead) Through Lrs. Through Collector, Amibikapur, Surguja 1.1 - (A). Karamdayal S/o Late Hariwansh Aged About 41 Years R/o Village Purandih, Police Station Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 1.2 - (B). Ramdayal S/o Late Hariwansh Aged About 38 Years R/o Village Purandih, Police Station Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 1.3 - (C). Ramjatan S/o Late Hariwansh Aged About 35 Years R/o Village Purandih, Police Station Ramanujganj, District Balrampur Ramanujganj., District : Balrampur, Chhattisgarh 4 2 - (A). Jagwa (Dead) Through Lrs. Nil 2.1 - (A)(1). Rojan Manjhi S/o Late Jagwa Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Bardaritola, Handighat, Police Station Ranka, District Gandhawa, (Jharkhand)., Jharkhand 2.1 - (A)(2). Udit Manjhi S/o Late Jagwa Aged About 25 Years R/o Village Bardaritola, Handighat, Police Station Ranka, District Gandhawa, (Jharkhand)., Jharkhand 2.2 - (B). Gangwa W/o Tilai Aged About 22 Years Nil 2.2.1 - (B)(1). Kameshwar Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 35 Years R/o Village - Bardaritola, Handighat, Police Station Ranka, District Gandhawa (Jharkhand)., Jharkhand 2.2.2 - (B)(2). Pintu Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 26 Years R/o Village - Bardaritola, Handighat, Police Station Ranka, District Gandhawa (Jharkhand)., Jharkhand 2.2.3 - (B)(3). Umesh Manjhi S/o Late Gangwa Aged About 2 Years R/o Village - Bardaritola, Handighat, Police Station Ranka, District Gandhawa (Jharkhand)., Jharkhand 2.3 - (Deleted) (C). Kameshwar As Per Honble Court Order Dated 08.10.2018. 2.4 - (D). Dukhan S/o Tilai Aged About 40 Years R/o Village Bardaritola, Handighat, Police Station Ranka, District Gadhwa (Jharkhand)., Jharkhand 3- State Of Chhattisgarh Through Collector, Surguja Ambikapur, District Surguja Chhattisgarh., District : Surguja (Ambikapur), Chhattisgarh --- Respondent(s) For Appellant (s) : Mr. A.N. Pandey, Advocate in FA No. 165 of 2008 and for Respondent No. 1(a),1(b) and 1(c) in FA No. 205 of 2008 For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sandeep Patel, Advocate on behalf of Mr. Manoj Paranjpe, Advocate for Respondent No. 1 in FA No. 165 of 2008 and for Appellants in FA No. 205 of 2008. For the State : Mr. Praveeen Shrivastava, Dy. Govt. Advocate 5 Hon’ble Justice Shri Narendra Kumar Vyas C A V Judgment 1. Since the issue involved in these two appeals are identical and arise from the same judgment and decree dated 04.09.2008 passed by 1st Additional District Judge (FTC), Ramanujganj, District Sarguja (CG) in Civil suit No. 12-A/2002, they are heard analogously and are being 2. 3.
Decision
disposed of by this common judgment. The parties have been described as per their description in the Civil Suit No.12-A/2002. The brief facts as reflected from the record are that plaintiff has filed a civil suit before the learned trial Court for declaration of title, possession and permanent injunction of khasra No. 311/2 area 4.275 hectares and khasra No. 203/2 area 5.268 hectare total area 9.543 hectare situated at village Purandih, Tahsil Ramanujganj, District Sarguja (hereinafter referred to as suit property) and also for declaration of order dated 19.03.1982 passed by Sub Divisional Officer (Revenue) Ramanujganj as null and void mainly contending that:- (a) The plaintiff is permanent resident of Ramanujganj, District Sarguja and defendants No. 1 and 2 are temporary residents of Bardari, Police Station Ranka, District Palamu (Bihar). It is the case of the plaintiff that the property described in schedule A of the plaint is self acquired property of Bhukhan S/o. Agar Bhuihar as lease was granted to him in the year 1956 by the Settlement Officer, Ramanujganj. It is also case of the plaintiff that the Bhukhan was resident of Bihar which is 08-10 KM away from village Bardari, Ramanujganj, District Sarguja, as such he was doing agricultural work on the suit land. 6 (b) It is also the case of the plaintiff that after two years, Bhukhan handed over possession of suit land to father and uncle of plaintiff and went to village Bardari and thereafter he returned back to village and sold the land to the plaintiff’s father and uncle through agreement dated 09.011961 for sale consideration of Rs. 800/- wherein it has been mentioned that Bhuihar belongs to Scheduled Tribe and it will take some time to obtain permission, therefore, he has handed over possession to the plaintiff. Subsequently, in the year 1975 Bhukhan died in Village Ranka and as per the mutual settlement between the plaintiff and his uncle, the suit property falls in the share of plaintiff and since than he is in possession of the suit property and also obtained title on the basis of adverse possession as he is in possession of the suit property for the last 12 years without any objection from anyone. (c) It is also pleaded that defendant No.1 Harvansh came to village in the year 1982 and sought information from Halka Patwari and thereafter, he filed an application before Sub Divisional Officer, Ramanujganj to the effect that he belongs to the tribe Community, as such he is entitled to get back land under Section 170 (A) and (B) of the MP Land Revenue Code 1959. On the application filed by an aboriginal tribe, Sub Divisional Officer allowed the application filed by defendant No.1 on 19.03.1982 and directed to revert the land in favour of defendant being successor of Ramkalya and no permission was obtained from Collector before transfer of the suit land, as such the plaintiff will not get any legal right over the suit land. Accordingly, the defendant No.1 started threatening the plaintiff to take possession of the suit property which has necessitated the plaintiff to file a Civil suit. 4. The defendant No.1 has filed his written statement denying the allegation 7 made in the plaint mainly contending that defendant No. 1 is permanent resident of village Puranadih, Tehsil Ramanujganj, District Surguja and they belong to Bhuihar caste which is tribal. It is empathically denied that the defendants belong to general category. Apart from this, defendant has also stated that late Bhukhan was Bhuihar tribal and he was a resident of village Puranadih, Tahsil Pal, therefore, suit property cannot be transferred to non tribal without permission of Collector as such Sub Divisional Officer has rightly returned back the suit land to the successor of Bhukhan as he was aboriginal tribe and the plaintiff is not a member of aboriginal tribe as per Section 170 (A) and (B) of the Land Revenue Code. It has been further contended that Civil Court does not have jurisdiction under Section 257 of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code to adjudicate the suit. The defendant No.1 has filed counter claim for declaration of title over suit property on the count that they are sons of late Ramkaliya Bai who was daughter of late Bhukhan, as such he is entitled to inherit the suit property and would pray for dismissal of the suit. 5. The defendant No. 2 (A) and 2(D) have filed their written statement supporting the case of the plaintiff and have contended that they have no objection if suit is allowed in favour of the plaintiff. Defendant No.1 and 2 have filed the counter claim denying the claim that the defendant No. 1 is nephew of late Bhukhan. It is also pleaded that when the case was filed before SDO, Ramanujganj, at that time defendants No. 2A to 2D were residing with their mother in village Bardari and defendant No.1 taking illegal advantage of their absence and defendant No.1 has got the order 8 in his favour and would pray for dismissal of counter claim filed by the defendant No.1. 6. On the pleading of the parties, learned trial Court has framed as many as eleven issues out of which issue No. 1, 2, 4 and 6 are relevant therefore, they are extracted below:- वाद्ቚ’न निनष्क्ቧ(cid:10) ss 1. भूखन भूईहर म.्ቚ. भूराजस्व संनिहता की धारा 170 (ख) के परिरपेቌኚय में आनिदम जन जातित इस वाद, ्ቚ’न " नहीं निकया जा सका है।" को निवतिध अनुसार सानि’त का सदस्य नहीं है ? 2. क्या अनुनिवभागीय अतिधकारी के ्ቛारा म.्ቚ. भूराजस्व संनिहता की धारा 170 (ख) के अंतग(cid:10)त पारिरत आदेश निदनांक 19.03. 82 निवतिध निवरु्ቍ है ? ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅं . No1 " संनिहता की धारा 170 (£) आदेश पारिरत Çd सम्म r नहीं है।? के प्ቌ में भू-राजस्व के अंतग(cid:10)त जो या गया है, वह निवतिध 4. क्या वादी ्ቚतितकू ल कब्जे के आधार पर य्ቕनिप ्ቚतितकू ल कब्जा का आधार नहीं अतिधकार ्ቚा् कर लिलया है ? माना जा सकता है तथा ्ቚतितवादी ्ቅं . 2 अ से २ द के अभिभवचन एवं साቌኚय के आधार पर वादी motilal का वाद्ቇस्त भूनिम पर आतिधपत्य दቦኌशत हुआ है। " सिसनिवल न्यायालय को इस ्ቚकरण में सुन ok ई का ्ቌे्ቔातिधकार ्ቚा् है।" 6 क्या म.्ቚ. भूराजस्व संनिहता की धारा 257 के अंतग(cid:10)त इस न्यायालय को सुनवाई का ्ቌे्ቔातिधकार नहीं है ? 7. The plaintiff to substantiate his claim has examined himself as (PW-1), Ramlal Kashyap (PW-2), Soti Mahto (PW-3) and exhibited documents namely Lagan Kayam (Ex.P-1), copy of revenue proceedings (Ex.P-2), Order of SDO (Ex.P-3), copy of B-1 and khatuni (Ex.P-4), Khasra Panchashala (Ex.P-5), Agreement to sell (Ex.P-6), Affidavit (Ex.P-7). 9 8. The defendant No.2 examined himself as DW-1, Durg (DW-2), Dharman (DW-3), Ganga (DW-4), Ratan Bhuihar (DW-5), Radhe (DW-6) but has not exhibited any document in their support. Defendant No. 2 (a) and 2(d) have not examined any witnesses and has not exhibited any document. 9. Learned trial Court after appreciating the oral and documentary evidence has declared the order passed by Sub Divisional Officer, Ramanujganj on 19.03.1982 as null and void but has not granted decree of declaration and title in favour of the plaintiff with regard to the suit property. Being aggrieved by the judgment and decree passed by the trial court to the extent that decree of declaration has not been granted to the plaintiff, he has preferred First Appeal No. 205 of 2008 and the defendant No.1 has preferred First Appeal No. 165 of 2008 by which the trial Court has set aside the order of SDO, Ramanujganj dated 19.03.1982. 10. Learned counsel for the appellant in First Appeal No. 165 of 2008 would submit that the finding recorded by trial Court is bad-in-law and against the provision of land revenue code Section 170(b) of the Code, as it is mandatory before transfer of agricultural land belongs to aboriginal tribe, permission of Collector is obtained but in the case no permission was sought still learned trial Court has committed illegality in partial decreeing the suit in favour of the plaintiff by setting aside the order of SDO, Ramanujganj dated 19.03.1982 and thus he would pray for allowing First Appeal No. 165 of 2008 by setting a side the judgment and decree of trial Court to the extent it has set aside the order dated 19.03.1982. So far as non-declaration of title in favour of the plaintiff, he would submit that on the basis of agreement dated 09.01.1991 no right can be transferred of 10 immovable property in absence of registered sale deed and as per provision of law no immovable property valued more than Rs. 100 can be transferred. Thus he would submit that judgment and decree so far as denial of declaration in favour of the plaintiff is justified and would pray for dismissal of the First Appeal No. 205 of 2008. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of Dhanajiram and another vs. Praveen Kumar and others reported 2014(2) CGLJ 334, Tribhuwan Pandeya vs State of MP (Now CG and others) reported 2011(3) CGLJ 503, Bharat vs. State of MP (Now CG) reported in 2011(3) CGLJ 511 and Premroshan Beck and Another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others in WP (227) No. 373 of 2018. 11. Learned counsel for appellant in FA No. 205 of 2008 would submit that learned trial Court despite quashing of the order of Sub Divisional Officer dated 19.03.1982 has committed illegality in not declaring the title in favour of the plaintiff as he is in possession of the suit property since 1961 without any objection of the defendants, therefore, he is entitled to get decree of title on the basis of adverse possession. To substantiate his submission, he would refer to the judgment of this Court in the case of South Delhi Municipal Corporation and another vs. Today Homes and Infrastructure Private Limited and others reported 2020 (12) SCC 680. 12. 13. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record of the trial Court with utmost satisfaction. From the above submissions made by the parties, the points emerged for determination by this Court are as under:- 11 (1) Whether the suit filed by plaintiff Motilal with prayer for declaration of order dated 12.03.1982 passed by the Sub Divisional Officer in the proceeding under Section 170(b) of the Land Revenue Code to be null and void is maintainable or not? (2) Whether the plaintiff Motilal is entitled to get decree of declaration of title, possession and injunction on the basis of adverse possession? Discussion and finding on point No.1. 14. To appreciate point No.1, it is expedient for this Court, to extract provisions of Section 170(A) and Section 257 (I) of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code as well as Section 9 of CPC. "170-A. Certain transfer to be set aside.-(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Limitation Act, 1963 (No.36 of 1968), the Sub-Divisional Officer may, on his own motion or on an application made by a transfer of agricultural land belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of Section 165 on or before the 31st December, 1978, enquire into a transfer effected by way of sale, or in pursuance of a decree of a court to such land to a person not belonging to such tribe or transfer effected by way of accrual of right of occupancy tenant under section 169 or of Bhumiswami under sub- section (2-A) of section 190 at any time during the period commencing on the 2nd October, 1959 and ending on the date of commencement of the Madhya Pradesh Land Revenue Code (Third Amendment) Act, 1976 to satisfy himself as to the bonafide nature of such transfer. (2) If the Sub-Divisional Officer on an enquiry and after giving a reasonable opportunity to the persons owning any interest in such land, is satisfied that such transfer was not bona fide, he may notwithstanding anything contained in this Code or any other enactment for the time being in force,- 2[(a) subject to the provisions of clause (b), set aside such transfer if made by a holder belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of section 165 and restore the land to the transfer; or] 1[(a) subject to the provisions of clause (b), set aside such transfer if made by a holder belonging to a tribe which has been declared to be an aboriginal tribe under sub-section (6) of section 165 and 2 [restore the land to the transferor by putting him in possession of the land forthwith]; or 12 (b) where such land has been diverted for non-agricultural purposes, he shall fix the price of such land which it would have fetched at the time of transfer and order the transferee to pay the difference, if any, between the price so fixed and the price actually paid to the transferor within a period of six months.] 15. Section 9. Courts to try all civil suits unless barred:- The Courts shall (subject to the provisions herein contained) have jurisdiction to try all suits of a civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance is either expressly or impliedly barred. Explanation [I].-A suit in which the right to property or to an office is contested is a suit of a civil nature, notwithstanding that such right may depend entirely on the decision of questions as to religious rites or ceremonies.[Explanation II .-For the purposes of this section, it is immaterial whether or not any fees are attached to the office referred to in Explanation I or whether or not such office is attached to a particular place.] [Inserted by the Code of Civil Procedure (Amendment) Act, 1976, Section 5 (w.e.f. 1.2.1977).] 16. Section 9 of Civil Procedure Code provides that whenever a question arises before the civil Court whether its jurisdiction is excluded expressly or by necessary implication, the Court normally feels incline to consider whether the remedy afforded by alternative provisions prescribed by any special statute is sufficient or adequate. In case where exclusion of the civil Court’s jurisdiction is specially provided for the considerable as to scheme of the statute in question and the adequate or sufficiency of the remedy provided for by it may be relevant but cannot be decisive. Where exclusion is pleaded as a matter of necessary implication and consideration would be very much important and it is conceivable circumstances might become even decisive. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in case of Dhulabhai & Ors. v. State of M.P. & Anr. reported in (1968) 3 SCR 662, a Constitution Bench reviewed the entire case law on the 13 question of maintainability of civil suit and laid down seven propositions. Propositions 1 and 2 are relevant, which read thus: “(1) Where the statute gives a finality to the orders of the special tribunals the Civil Court's jurisdiction must be held to be excluded if there is adequate remedy to do what the Civil Courts normally do in a suit. Such provision, however, does not exclude those cases where the provisions of the particular Act have not been complied with or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental principles of judicial procedure. (2) Where there is an express bar of the jurisdiction of the Court, an examination of the scheme of the particular Act to find the adequacy or the sufficiency of the remedies provided may be relevant but is not decisive to sustain the jurisdiction of the civil court. Where there is no express exclusion the examination of the remedies and the scheme of the particular act to find out the intendment becomes necessary and the result of the inquiry may be decisive. In the latter case it is necessary to see if the statute creates a special right or a liability and provides for the determination of the right or liability and further lays down that all questions about the said right and liability shall be determined by the tribunals so constituted, and whether remedies normally associated with actions in Civil Courts are prescribed by the said statute or not. 17. The plain reading of the provision referred to above would indicate that when anything in the CPC is in conflict with anything in the special or local law or with any special jurisdiction or power conferred or in the special form of procedure prescribed by or under any other law, the Code will not (in the absence of any specific provision to the contrary) prevail so as to override such inconsistent provisions. When there is no conflict between the special or local law and the Code, the Code will apply. 18. In light of above provisions of law and law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and the provisions of Section 257 (l) and (l-1) of Land Revenue Code, it will be quite vivid that any decision regarding claim to set aside transfer by Bhumiswami under sub-Section 1 of Section 170 and clause (a) and (b) of sub Section 170 (A), any matter covered under 14 Section 170(b) of Land Revenue Code the suit is not maintainable. The relevant provisions of Section 257 of Land Revenue Code are reproduced below as under: “257. Exclusive jurisdiction of revenue authorities- Except as otherwise provided in this Code, or in any other enactment for the time being in force, no Civil Court shall entertain any suit instituted or application made to obtain a decision or order on any matter which the State Government, the Board, or any Revenue Officer is by this Code, empowered to determine, decide or dispose of, and in particular and without prejudice to the generality of this provision, no Civil Court shall exercise jurisdiction over any of the following matters. 19. 257 (L) of Chhattisgarh Land Revenue Code reads as under:-. (L) Any claim to set aside transfer by a Bhumiswami under Sub Section (1) of Section 170 and clauses (a) and (b) of sub section (2) of Section 170-A) (L-1) Any matter covered under Section 170-B. 20. From the perusal of the above stated provisions of Section 257 as well as Section 257(l) and (l-1 ) of the Land Revenue Code, it is quite vivid that the civil Court has been expressly barred to entertain any suit with regard to set aside transfer by Bhumiswami as well as any matter covered under Section 170(B) of the Code. Thus, in view of the above stated position of law, it is quite vivid that the suit was not maintainable before the trial Court. This issue has come up for consideration before this Court in the cases of Dhanajiram and another vs. Praveen Kumar and others reported 2014(2) CGLJ 334, Tribhuwan Pandeya vs State of MP (Now CG and others) reported 2011(3) CGLJ 503, Bharat vs. State of MP (Now CG) reported in 2011(3) CGLJ 511 and Premroshan Beck and Another vs. State of Chhattisgarh and others in WP (227) No. 373 of 2018. 21. Thus, it is quite vivid that the plaintiff’s suit to set aside the order dated 15 19.03.1982 passed by Sub Divisional Officer, Ramanujganj declaring transfer of the suit property to aboriginal tribe was not maintainable before the Civil Court. Even otherwise, the finding recorded by the learned trial Court in paragraph 75 of the judgment defendant No. 2 (a) to 2(d) though they are interested persons but in their written statement they have contended that they are not aboriginal tribes, as such the suit was maintainable is contrary to the evidence, material on record as in the order passed by SDO, Ramanujganj it has specifically recorded its finding that defendant No.1 Harvash was aboriginal tribe and in the agreement dated 09.01.1991 (Ex.P-6), also it has been clearly mentioned that the Bhukhan belongs to aboriginal tribe and to obtain permission from the competent authority for transferring the suit property it takes time therefore, he has given the possession to Nagarmal Agrawal. It is pertinent to mention here, that defendant No. 2(a) and 2(d) have not examined any witnesses to substantial their pleadings and on 20.08.2008 they have decided not to lead evidence, still the trial Court has relied upon the pleading of the defendant No. 2(a) to 2(d) which is nothing but non-application of mind and suffers from surmises and conjuncture, therefore, the same is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, point No.1 framed by this Court is answered against the plaintiff and in favour of defendant No.1. Resultantly, the suit filed by the plaintiff bearing civil Suit No. 12-A/2002 before the learned Additional District Judge (FTC) Ramanujganj is dismissed and order dated 19.03.1982 passed by SDO, Ramanujganj is restored. 16 Discussion and finding on point No.2 22. So far as point No.2 is concerned, it has been contended by the appellant in FA No. 205 of 2008 that the plaintiff has taken plea of adverse possession by contending that he is possession of the suit property for the last 12 years uninterruptedly, therefore, he is entitled to obtain decree of declaration. It has also been contended that learned trial Court has committed illegality in not granting declaration of title though it has recorded its finding that plaintiff Motilal is in possession of the suit property in view of the pleading and evidence of defendant No. 2(a) to 2(d), thus he would submit that the plaintiff was entitled to get decree of title, possession and permanent injunction. This was vehemently objected by learned counsel for the defendant No.1 that the plaintiff has initially taken plea of adverse possession but he failed to establish the plea of adverse possession has rightly been held by the learned trial Court and no registered sale deed transferring the right in favour of the plaintiff has been placed on record by him, therefore, he would pray for answering point No. 2 against the plaintiff and in favour of the defendant No.1. 23. Considering the rival submissions, it is quite vivid that the plaintiff has initially taken plea of adverse possession which has not been accepted by the learned trial Court, as it has recorded its finding that there was no uninterrupted possession of the plaintiff but as per pleading and evidence of defendant No. 2(a) to 2(d) it has recorded its finding that possession of the plaintiff is proved. The finding recorded by the trial Court that plea of adverse possession has not been proved by the plaintiff is affirmed but for other reason as it has not been able to 17 establish the parameters required to obtain the decree of adverse possession i.e. a person who claims adverse possession should show (a) on what date he came into possession (b) what was the nature of his possession (c) whether the factum of possession was known to other party (d) how long his possession has continued and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. It is also well settled position of law that a person pleading adverse possession has no equity in his favour since he is trying to defeat right of true owner, as such it is for him to clearly 9plead and establish all facts necessary to prove his adverse possession. This issue with regard to adverse possession has come up for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Vasantha (dead) through Legal Representative vs. Rajalakshmi Alias Rajam (dead) through Legal Representatives 2024 (5) SCC 282 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 40. In Saroop Singh v. Banto (Two Judge Bench) 2005(8) SCC 330 this Court observed that Article 65 states that the starting point of limitation does not commence from the date when the right of ownership arises to the plaintiff but commences from the date the defendant's possession becomes adverse. Further relying on Karnataka Board of Wakf v. Govt. of India 2004(10) SCC 779 (2-Judge Bench), it observed that the physical fact of exclusive possession and the animus possidendi to hold as owner in exclusion to the actual owner are the most important factors that are to be accounted in cases related to adverse possession. Plea of adverse possession is not a pure question of law but a blend of fact and law. Therefore, a person who claims adverse possession should show (a) on what date he came into possession; (b) what was the nature of his possession; (c) whether the factum of possession was known to the other party; (d) how long his possession has continued; and (e) his possession was open and undisturbed. A person pleading adverse possession has no equities in his favour. Since he is trying to defeat the rights of the true owner, it is for him to clearly plead and establish all facts necessary to prove his adverse possession. 18 24. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case reported in the case of Neelam Gupta and Others vs. Rajendra Kumar Gupta and Another reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 2824 wherein the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held as under:- 44. In M. Siddiq’s case (supra) paragraphs 1142 and 1143 assume relevance and they, in so far as relevant to this case, run as under: - “1142. A plea of adverse possession is founded on the acceptance that ownership of the property vests in another against whom the claimant asserts a possession adverse to the title of the other. Possession is adverse in the sense that it is contrary to the acknowledged title in the other person against whom it is claimed. Evidently, therefore, the plaintiffs in Suit 4 ought to be cognizant of the fact that any claim of adverse possession against the Hindus or the temple would amount to an acceptance of a title in the latter. Dr Dhavan has submitted that this plea is a subsidiary or alternate plea upon which it is not necessary for the plaintiffs to stand in the event that their main plea on title is held to be established on evidence. It becomes then necessary to assess as to whether the claim of adverse possession has been established. 1143. A person who sets up a plea of adverse possession must establish both possession which is peaceful, open and continuous possession which meets the requirement of being nec vi nec claim and nec precario. To substantiate a plea of adverse possession, the character of the possession must be adequate in continuity and in the public because the possession has to be to the knowledge of the true owner in order for it to be adverse. These requirements have to be duly established first by adequate pleadings and second by leading sufficient evidence. Evidence, it is well settled, can only be adduced with reference to matters which are pleaded in a civil suit and in the absence of an adequate pleading, evidence by itself cannot supply the deficiency of a pleaded case.” 25. So far as the finding recorded by the trial Court that the plaintiff has been able to prove that he is in possession of the suit property as per pleading and evidence of defendant No. 2(a) to 2(d) is liable to be rejected in absence of any evidence lead by the defendants to substantiate this pleadings. Even if it is held that the plaintiff was in possession of the suit 19 property still he is not entitled to get decree of declaration of title, as no registered sale deed which is required for valid transfer of property valued more than Rs 100 as per Section 17 of the Registration Act, 1908 has been placed on record and also that the alleged agreement has also been nullified by the Sub Divisional Officer, Ramanujganj vide its order dated 19.03.1982. 26. Thus the point No.2 is answered in favour of defendant No.1 and against the plaintiff in view of setting aside judgment and decree of the trial Court while answering the point No.1 and affirming the order of dated 19.03.1982 by this Court. 27. Consequentially the appeal filed by the plaintiff in FA No. 205 of 2008 is liable to be dismissed and it is dismissed. So far as First Appeal 165 of 2008 is concerned, the same deserves to be allowed by setting aside judgment and decree of the trial Court dated 04.09.2008 and restoring the order of Sub Divisional Officer, Ramanujganj dated 19.03.1982. 28. Interim order passed in FA No. 205 of 2008 on 10.12.2008 is vacated and interim order granted in FA No. 165 of 2008 is made absolute. 29. A decree be drawn up accordingly. Sd/- (Narendra Kumar Vyas) Judge Santosh