• Chola Mandlam General Insurance Company Limited Through Branch Manager, Chola Mandlam General Insurance v. 1
Case Details
1 Digitally signed by RAMESH KUMAR VATTI 2025:CGHC:2214 NAFR HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR MAC No. 207 of 2023 • Chola Mandlam General Insurance Company Limited Through Branch Manager, Chola Mandlam General Insurance Company Limited, Address Second Floor Simran Tower, Opposite L.I.C. Building Pandri, Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh ... Appellant Versus 1. Smt. Sunti W/o Bharat Lal Yadav Aged About 35 Years R/o Shyamaprasad Mukharjee Ward, Bhatapara, Thana Bhatapara, City District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ...(Claimant) 2. Minor Ku. Jyoti D/o Bharat Lal Yadav Aged About 14 Years Minor And Hence Representing Through Mother Amt. Sunti, R/o Shyamaprasad Mukharjee Ward, Bhatapara, Thana Bhatapara, City District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ...(Claimant)
Legal Reasoning
3. Minor Nikhil S/o Bharat Lal Yadav Aged About 12 Years Minor And Hece Representing Through Mother Smt. Sunti, R/o Shyamaprasad Mukharjee Ward, Bhatapara, Thana Bhatapara, City District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ...(Claimant) 4. Minor Roshan S/o Bharat Lal Yadav Aged About 10 Years Minor And Hece Representing Through Mother Smt. Sunti, R/o Shyamaprasad Mukharjee Ward, Bhatapara, Thana Bhatapara, City District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh ...(Claimant) 5. Sunil Kumar S/o Late Gulabchand Mahto Aged About 37 Years R/o Rajeev Nagar Ward No. 28, Chhawni Bhilai Thana Jamul District Durg Chhattisgarh(Owner And Driver Of Vehicle Truck No. CG 07 C 0968) 6. Manager, Shriram General Insurance Company Limited, 4th Floor, Near Maruti, Sky Automobile, Tatibandh Raipur, District Raipur Chhattisgarh At Present 4th Floor, Near Maruti Sky Automobile, Mahobabazar Raipur, (Insurer Of Truck No. CG 07 C 0968) 7. Pappu Ram S/o Banshiram Yadav Aged About 28 Years R/o Village Bhurvadih, Thana Palari District Balodabazar Bhatapara Chhattisgarh (Driver Of Vehicle Truck No. CG 10 C 4122) 8. Pankaj S/o Madan Lal Arora Aged About 44 Years R/o Park Residency H.No.D1401, Telibandha Raipur District Raipur Chhattisgarh (Owner Of Vehicle Truck No. CG 10 C 4122) ... Respondents 2 For Appellant For Respondent No. 6 : : Mr. Harshmander Rastogi, Advocate Mr. Pravesh Sahu, Advocate Hon’ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 14/01/2025 1. In the present appeal, the appellant has challenged the award passed by the IVth Additional Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Balodabazar, Place Bhatapara (C.G.) in Claim Case No. H-15/2017 dated 19.04.2022, whereby the learned Tribunal has passed an award in favour of the claimants to the tune of Rs.10,78,000/- and the amount of compensation shall carry interest @ 9% per annum. 2. The claimants are the legal representatives of the deceased, namely, Bharatlal Yadav who was a Helper of Truck bearing registration No. CG 10 C 4122. The appellant has moved an application (I.A. No. 01/2023) for condonation of delay as there is a delay of 141 days in filing the instant appeal. In the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that the award was passed by the learned Tribunal on 19.04.2022; an application was moved before the concerned Tribunal to obtain the certified copy of the award on 22.04.2022 and it was supplied on 11.05.2022. It is further pleaded that the counsel for the appellant sent a copy of the award to the Insurance Company on 28.06.2022 and thus, the date of knowledge would be 28.06.2022. It is further pleaded that the opinion of counsel was received and the matter was forwarded to the Regional Office, Indore and thereafter, the appeal was filed on 02.01.2023. 3. Mr. Harshmander Rastogi, learned counsel appearing for the Insurance Company/appellant would submit that the appeal could not be 3 preferred within the period of limitation as the certified copy of the award was supplied on 11.05.2022 and thereafter it was forwarded to the Insurance Company/appellant on 28.06.2022. He would contend that after receiving permission from the Head Office, the appeal was preferred. He would further submit that the court should take a lenient view while dealing with an application for condonation of delay. 4. On the other hand, Mr. Pravesh Sahu, learned counsel appearing for respondent No. 6 would oppose. He would submit that the appellant has not explained the reasons for the cause of delay properly. He would further submit that the application for condonation of delay is liable to be rejected. 5. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the records. 6. Admittedly, the appellant has preferred this appeal against the award passed by the learned Claims Tribunal dated 19.04.2022. In the application for condonation of delay, it is stated that the award was passed on 19.04.2022 and the certified copy was collected on 11.05.2022. From 11.05.2022 till 28.06.2022, no steps were taken either by the counsel for the Insurance Company or by the Insurance Company itself to prefer an appeal before this Court. For a period of 01 month and 15 days, the certified copy of the award was lying with Advocate and there is no explanation in this regard. Thereafter, the matter was forwarded to the Regional Office, but there is no description of the date in this regard. It is also not stated when the permission was granted by the Regional Office to prefer the appeal, thus, in the opinion of this Court, the appellant/Insurance Company has not explained the delay properly. 4 7. Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 8. The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 5 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds. 9. In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; 6 (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 10. In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons have been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when 7 both the above decisions have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 11. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12. Taking into consideration the facts discussed above and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra), in the opinion of this Court, the application for condonation of delay is liable to be and is hereby rejected. 13. Consequently, the appeal is also dismissed. No cost(s). Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge vatti