United India Insurance Company Limited Through Its Divisional Manager, Divisional Office- Krishna Complex, Kutchery v. 1
Case Details
-1- Digitally signed by NADIM MOHLE 2025:CGHC:47587 HIGH COURT OF CHHATTISGARH AT BILASPUR NAFR MAC No. 76 of 2025 United India Insurance Company Limited Through Its Divisional Manager, Divisional Office- Krishna Complex, Kutchery Chowk, Raipur, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Appellant)(Non-Applicant No. 3)(Insurer). … Appellant versus 1 - Smt. Pramila Sapre Wd/o Late Shri Mukesh Sapre Aged About 25 Years Resident Of Village- Kurda, P.S.- Bemetara, District- Bemetara, Chhattisgarh, Presently Residing At - Durga Nagar, Birgaon, P.S.- Urla, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 1) (Applicant No. 1)(Claimant). 2 - Smt. Shyama Bai Sapre W/o Shri Chhabil Sapre Aged About 58 Years Resident Of Village- Kurda, P.S.- Bemetara, District- Bemetara, Chhattisgarh, Presently Residing At - Durga Nagar, Birgaon, P.S.- Urla, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 2) (Applicant No. 2)(Claimant). 3 - Chhabil Sapre S/o Late Shri Barati Sapre Aged About 62 Years Resident Of Village- Kurda, P.S.- Bemetara, District- Bemetara, Chhattisgarh, Presently Residing At- Durga Nagar, Birgaon, P.S.- Urla, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 3)(Applicant No. 3)(Claimant). 4 - Premchand Khangar @ Rai S/o Mansingh Khangar @ Rai Aged About 35 Years Resident Of Gaji Nagar, Birgaon, P.S.- Urla, District- Raipur, Chhattisgarh (Respondent No. 6)(Non-Applicant No. 1)(Driver). 5 - Jankiram Saptamaharadhi Pogru S/o P.M. Jaya Rao Resident Of Flat No. 304, 4th Floor, 100 Ft. Ring Road, Agrigold Fortune Gajpati Apartment, Opp. Sun School, Paidalpeta, Vijaynagaram, Andhra Pradesh (Respondent No. 7) (Non-Applicant No. 2) (Owner). ... Respondent(s) -2- (Cause Title is taken from Case Information System) For Appellant
Legal Reasoning
: Mr. Abhishek Vinod Deshmukh, Advocate For Respondents No. 1 to 3 : Ms. Prachi Singh, Advocate Hon'ble Shri Justice Rakesh Mohan Pandey Judgment on Board 16.09. 2025 1) Heard on I.A. No.2/2025, an application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 2) Perusal of the application (I.A. No.2/2025), it is apparent that a copy of the award was sent to the higher office for grant of approval, and thereafter, an appeal was preferred on 30.12.2024. He prays to condone the delay of 68 days. 3) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the claimants would oppose the submission made by counsel for the appellant. 4) Heard. 5) Perused the application moved by the appellant/Insurance company for condonation of delay. 6) In the entire application, only date of award is mentioned. The appellant/Insurance Company has not pleaded as to when the copy of the award was sent to the T.P. Cell Office, when the matter was scrutinized by -3- the said Office, and when approval to file the appeal was granted by the Regional Office. The appellant/Insurance company has not explained period of delay properly. 7) Recently, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (Died) by LRs. & Others vs. The Special Deputy Collector (LA) reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 513 : 2024 4 SCR 241 : 2024 INSC 286 dealt with the object of the law of limitation. In para 10 & 11, the object and import of Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act were considered and it was observed thus:- “10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is reproduced herein-below: 3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation has not been set up as a defence. 11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay in its filing is liable to be condoned.” 8) The Hon’ble Court referred to various judgments in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) in paras 19, 20, 21, 22 and 23, which are reproduced herein-below:- “19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and Ors, A.I.R. 1935 PC 85, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground -4- of hardship. The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on sympathetic grounds alone. 20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors, 2014 (4) SCALE 50, wherein while observing, as above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion. 21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.,[2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363, where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay, this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner. The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice- oriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to jettison the substantial law of limitation. 22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors., AIR 2009 SC 1927, that the merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with the application for condonation of delay in filing the appeal. 23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer, [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81, this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if negligence, inaction or -5- lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed under the statute as the courts no choice but to apply the law as it stands and they no power to condone the delay on equitable grounds.” 9) In para 26, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) summarized the judgments passed in the above stated decisions and the same is reproduced herein-below:- “26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather than the right itself; (ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a fixed period of time; (iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act to be construed differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally; (iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach, justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act; (v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence; (vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar -6- matter, it does not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing the appeal; (vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning the delay; and (viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning the delay for the reason that the conditions been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.” 10)In para 30, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that condonation of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach. Para 30 is reproduced herein-below:- “30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to be condoned merely because some persons been granted relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason that the claimants been deprived of the interest for the delay without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in the case of Basawaraj (supra).” 11) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of Pathapati Subba Reddy (supra) further held that the phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’ and ‘cause for the advancement of substantial justice’ cannot be -7- employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act. 12)Taking into consideration the facts and circumstances of the case and the law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court, this Court is of the view that the appellant could not explain the inordinate delay of 68 days properly in the application moved in this regard. 13) Accordingly, I.A. No.2, the application for condonation of delay, is hereby rejected. Consequently, the appeal, being barred by limitation, also stands dismissed. 14) The claimants have preferred cross appeal under Order 41 Rule 22 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 read with Rule 242(3) of the Chhattisgarh Motor Vehicles Rules, 1994, seeking enhancement of the compensation awarded by the learned Motor Accident Claims Tribunal in Claim Case No. 427/2020. 15) The grievance of the claimants is that the learned Tribunal assessed the income of the deceased on the lower side and just and proper compensation has not been awarded. -8- 16) Ms. Prachi Singh, learned counsel appearing for the claimants submitted that the learned Tribunal committed an error of law in assessing the notional income of the deceased at a much lower figure. She would submit that the deceased was earning 70,000/- per month, ₹ whereas the Tribunal assessed his annual income at 3,72,343/-. ₹ She further submitted that under other heads also, meager amounts have been awarded. 17) On the other hand, learned counsel appearing for the respondent/Insurance Company supported the impugned award and submitted that the Tribunal has awarded just and proper compensation on the basis of the evidence available on record, and there is no scope for enhancement. 18) I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the record. 19) In the present case, the deceased died on account of motor accident on 21.02.2020. On that date, the offending vehicle bearing registration number MP-35-TB-0468 was being driven rashly and negligently by respondent No. 4. He dashed against the vehicle of the deceased, i.e. Ashok Leyland Dost bearing registration number CG-04-HY-0622. Resultantly, the deceased sustained grievous injuries and he was admitted to Balaji Hospital, Raipur, where he succumbed to the injuries during the course of -9- treatment on 24.02.2020. At the time of death, the deceased was 29 years of age and he was owner of the said vehicle (Reg. No. CG-04-HY-0622). The claimants pleaded that the deceased was engaged in transport business and he was earning about 40,000/- per month ₹ . On this basis, the claimants have sought compensation to the tune of 1,16,00,000/- with ₹ interest. 20) With regard to income of the deceased, AW-1 (Pramila Sapre, wife of the deceased) produced ledger accounts issued in the name of her husband by Aarav Enterprises and Supreme Warehousing Agency. She admitted that her husband was earning 40,000/- per month, but no salary ₹ statement, appointment order, or regular income record was produced. AW-3 (Arun Kumar Rathore) and AW-4 (Anurag Bahal) also produced ledger accounts with regard to the online payments made to the deceased along with certain GST accounts. As per the ledger copy and online payment, a total payment of 3,94,160/- ₹ was made to the deceased between November, 2018 to February 2020. 21) In the ledger account, the registration number of the vehicle of the deceased is not mentioned. Further, as per Exhibit P/19, an amount of ₹ 93,432/- was paid to the deceased for transportation of goods between November, 2018 to February, 2020, but even in this document, the -10- registration number of the vehicle is not mentioned. 22) The learned Tribunal, upon appreciation of the above evidence, assessed the annual income of the deceased to the tune of 5,31,918/-. ₹ After deducting 30% towards maintenance of the vehicle, the net annual income was assessed at 3,72,343/-. ₹ Adding 40% towards future prospects and applying the multiplier of 17, considering the age of the deceased at 30 years, the Tribunal awarded compensation under the head of dependency. Appropriate compensation was also awarded under conventional heads such as loss of consortium, loss of estate, and funeral expenses. 23) In absence of salary slips, income tax returns, or reliable evidence substantiating the claim of monthly income of 40,000/- to 70,000/-, the ₹ ₹ Tribunal rightly relied upon the ledger accounts and other documents. 24) Considering the above discussed facts, no ground is made out for enhancement. Accordingly, the cross appeal filed by the claimants stands
Decision
dismissed. No order as to costs. Sd/- (Rakesh Mohan Pandey) Judge Nadim