Shanti Devi v. The Union of India, Through Secretary, Ministry Of Finance, North

and submissions of the parties the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT) by order dated 04.12.2012 directed for issuance of certificate for realization of the loan amount. The Tribunal directed as under:- “Hence, it is ordered that the Bank may recover the money from the borrower at first instant and if it is found insufficient then the bank may proceed against defendant as both the defendants are one family members and wants to grab public money by this way which is not allowed by this Court.” Aggrieved by the said order the petitioner filed the present application. Dr. Prasad learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the signature said to have been affixed by the petitioner on the guarantee paper/agreement has not tallied. The Respondent Tribunal did not appreciate the aforesaid fact in right perspective. According to him, the agreement itself is void. Counsel for the Respondent UCO Bank on the other hand referring to and relying on the case of UBI vs. Satyawati Tondon (AIR 2010 SC 3413) submitted that the Act itself provides an 3 Patna High Court CWJC No.1219 of 2013 (2) dt.16-07-2013 efficacious and alternative remedy by filing appeal thereagainst under section 20 of the Act. In UBI (supra) the Apex Court held as under in para 17 and 22:- “17. There is another reason why the impugned order should beset aside. If respondent NO.1 had any tangible grievance against the notice issued under Section 13(4) or action taken under Section 14, then she could have availed remedy by filing an application under Section 17(1). The expression „any person‟ used in Section 17(1) is of wide import. It takes within its fold, not only the borrower but also guarantor or any other person who may be affected by the action taken under Section 13(4)7 or Section 14. Both, the Tribunal and the Appellate Tribunal are empowered to pass interim orders under Sections 17 and 18 and are required to decide the matters within a fixed time schedule. It is thus evident that the remedies available to an aggrieved person under the SARFAESI Act are both expeditious and effective. Unfortunately, the High Court overlooked the settled law that the High Court will ordinarily not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and that this rule applies with greater rigour in 4 Patna High Court CWJC No.1219 of 2013 (2) dt.16-07-2013 matters involving recovery of taxes, cess, fees, other types of public money and the dues of banks and other financial institutions. In our view, while dealing with the petitions involving challenge to the action taken for recovery of the public dues. Etc., the High Court must keep in mind that the legislations enacted by Parliament and State Legislatures for recovery of such dues are code unto themselves inasmuch as they not only contain comprehensive procedure recovery of the dues but also envisage constitution of quasi-judicial bodies for redressal of the grievance of any aggrieved person. Therefore, in all such cases, High Court must insist that before availing remedy under Article 226 of the Constitution, a person must exhaust the remedies available under the relevant statute.

22. In Punjab National Bank vs. O.C. Krishnan and others(2001) 6 SCC 569 (AIR 2001 SC 3208: 2001 AIR SCW 2993), this Court considered the question whether a petition under Article 227 of the Constitution was maintainable against an order passed by the Tribunal under Section 19 of the DRT Act and observed: „5. In our opinion, the order which was passed by the Tribunal directing sale of mortgaged property was appealable under Section 20 of the Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993 (for 5 Patna High Court CWJC No.1219 of 2013 (2) dt.16-07-2013 shot „the Act‟). The High Court ought not to have exercised its jurisdiction under Article 227 in view of the provision for alternative remedy contained in the Act. We do not propose to go into the correctness of the decision of the High Court and whether the order passed by the Tribunal was correct or not has to be decided before an appropriate forum.

6. The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due the banks and the financial institutions. There is a hierarchy or appeal provided in the Act, namely, filing of an appeal under Section 20 and this fasttrack procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution or by filing a civil suit, is expressly barred. Even tough a provision under an Act cannot expressly oust the jurisdiction of the court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, nevertheless, when there is an alternative remedy available, judicial prudence demands that the Court refrains from exercising jurisdiction the said constitutional provisions. This was a case where the High Court should not have entertained the petition under Article 227 of the Constitution and should have directed the respondent to take recourse to the appeal mechanism provided by 6 Patna High Court CWJC No.1219 of 2013 (2) dt.16-07-2013 the Act.” Section 20 and 21 of the Act read as under:- “20. Appeal the Appellate Tribunal.__ (1) |Save as provided in sub-section (2), any person aggrieved by an order made, or deemed to have been made, by a Tribunal under this Act, may prefer an appeal to an Appellate Tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter. (2) No appeal shall lie to the Appellate Tribunal from an order made by a Tribunal with the consent of the parties. (3) Every appeal under sub-section (1) shall be fled within a period of forty five days from the date on which a copy of the order made, or deemed to have been made, by the Tribunal is received by him and it shall be in such form and accompanied by such fee as may be prescribed: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may entertain an appeal after the expiry of the said period of forty-five days if it is satisfied that there was sufficient cause for not filing it with in that period. (4) On receipt of an appeal under sub section (1), the Appellate Tribunal may, after giving the parties to the appeal, an opportunity of being heard, pass such orders thereon as it things fit, confirming, modifying, or setting 7 Patna High Court CWJC No.1219 of 2013 (2) dt.16-07-2013 aside the order appealed against. (5) The appellate Tribunal shall send a copy of every order made by it to the parties to the appeal and to the concerned Tribunal. (6) The appeal filed before the Appellate Tribunal under sub-section (1) shall be dealt with by it as expeditiously as possible and endeavour shall be made by it to dispose of the appeal finally within six months from the date of receipt of the appeal.”

21. Deposit of amount of debt due, on fling appeal.__ where an appeal is preferred by any person from whom the amount of debt is due to a bank or a financial institution or a consortium of banks or financial institutions, such appeal shall not be entertained by the Appellate Tribunal unless such person has deposited with the Appellate Tribunal seventy- five per cent of the amount of debt so due from him as determined by the Tribunal under section 19: Provided that the Appellate Tribunal may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, waive or reduce the amount to be deposited under this section.” It is, therefore, more than apparent that the petitioner has efficacious and statutory remedy of filing appeal against the 8 Patna High Court CWJC No.1219 of 2013 (2) dt.16-07-2013 impugned order. The Act further provides for reduction/waiver of the amount for filing such appeal. Mr. Pandey has rightly submitted that there is adequate provision in the Act which can be invoked for condoning the delay in filing the appeal. In view of aforesaid, this Court declines interference with the impugned order. The petitioner is at liberty to invoke the alternative remedy available to her in accordance with the Act. The application is disposed of. (Kishore Kumar Mandal, J) HR/-