Raghubir Singh Sehrawal v. State of Haryana) was relevant to the extent that it acquires lands of person
Case Details
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT PATNA Letters Patent Appeal No.696 of 2013 ====================================================== Ram Nandan Singh & Ors .... .... Appellant/s The State Of Bihar & Ors Versus .... .... Respondent/s ====================================================== Appearance : For the Appellant/s : Mr. Sanjay Kumar Giri, Adv. For the Respondent/s : Mr. Ram Balak Mahto ====================================================== CORAM: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA and HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE SHAILESH KUMAR SINHA ORAL ORDER (Per: HONOURABLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA) 4 16-12-2013 I.A. No.4047/13 has been filed to condone delay of one day in filing the appeal. Having considered the submissions and the
Decision
duration of delay, we allow the I.A. The present appeal arises from order dated 11.2.2013 dismissing C.W.J.C. No.1482/13. The learned Single Judge held that objections under Section-3C of the National Highways Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) was limited only to the question of public purpose and not any other issue. He therefore opined that the question of alignment and/or availability of alternative lands was outside the jurisdiction of an objection filed under Section-3C and also that earlier C.W.J.C. No.515/11 on the similar issue had been dismissed on 10.4.2012. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Patna High Court LPA No.696 of 2013 (4) dt.16-12-2013 2 the primary grievance was with regard to availability of alternative government lands for purposes of the Highway notwithstanding which the lands of the appellants were being acquired. Acquisition of the lands renders them landless. Even if the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act be not strictly applicable, yet the ratio laid down in (2012) 1 SCC 792 (Raghubir Singh Sehrawal vs. State of Haryana) was relevant to the extent that it acquires lands of persons taking away their hearth and home. It was next submitted that several persons who had filed objection against the proposed acquisitions pursuant to the order in C.W.J.C. No.515/11 had not been heard by the authority. In M.J.C. No.4526/12 arising out of C.W.J.C. No.12318/11, the Circle Officer had admitted that there were encroachments on the flank of National Highway 83 passing through the Belaganj Market. Learned counsel for the Union of India has opposed the application submitting that the appellants have been filing repeat writ applications on the same issue with no substantive grounds. Matters with regard to construction of a National Highway are highly complex and technical issues including that of alignment with which the Court may not interfere relying on AIR 2011 S.C. 3210 (Union of India Vs. Dr Kushala Shetty). Section-3J of the Act specifically provides that nothing in the Land Acquisition Act shall apply to an Patna High Court LPA No.696 of 2013 (4) dt.16-12-2013 3 acquisition under this Act. The analogy sought to be drawn on behalf of the appellant from the Land Acquisition Act therefore has no relevance. In C.W.J.C. No.515/11, some of the appellants are admitted to have been writ petitioners. It does not appear from the order of the Court that any issues with regard to the validity of the acquisition on the grounds sought to be urged before us was pressed as it finds no reference in the order. There is no pleading in the writ application that the submissions had not been considered and recorded properly except a bald statement that the writ application was disposed without appreciation of facts and evidence. The order-sheet states that the petitioners themselves stated that they had represented which still remained to be disposed. Directions were therefore given to dispose the representation. Such orders are normally passed when the petitioner is unable to persuade the Court to interfere and as a measure of last resort relies on the pending representation or seeks leave to file fresh representation. After the District Magistrate passed final orders on their representation, fresh Public Interest Litigation, C.W.J.C. No.17093/12 was filed in which again some of the present appellants were party petitioners. Some of the writ petitioners giving rise to the present appeal had come before the Court for the first time. The writ application was dismissed on merits. In the order under appeal the learned Single Judge Patna High Court LPA No.696 of 2013 (4) dt.16-12-2013 4 held that under Section-3C of the Act objections could be filed only with regard to the question of the public purpose and no other issue. In (2005) 13 SCC 477 (Competent Authority v. Barangore Jute Factory) it was observed:- “8. …We would, however, like to add that unlike Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 which confers a general right to object to acquisition of land under Section-4 of the said Act, Section-3-C(1) of the National Highways Act gives a very limited right to object. The objection can be only to the use of the land under acquisition for purposes other than those under Section-3-A(1). The Act confers no right to object to acquisition as such…..” Highways are the arteries of a nation. Therefore, the Legislature felt the need for a separate Act, different from the Land Acquisition Act. Highways constitute the basic infrastructure for economic development of the country. But that does not deprive the aggrieved from ventilating his grievances in accordance with law, a right that the constitution vests in him. But, this right cannot be extended to the point of an abuse by filing of repeat applications on the same issue. The fact that the parties in different writ applications filed at different stages with regard to the same Highways may be different, can hardly be a justification. We must keep in mind that every writ application filed Patna High Court LPA No.696 of 2013 (4) dt.16-12-2013 5 questioning the construction of the National Highways undoubtedly delays the project. The right of the individual is to compensation. The national loss that takes place is far higher. Filing of repeat writ applications by such persons, in our opinion, under the garb of the right to have access to legal remedy vexes the Authorities twice over on the same issue and the time of the Courts are consumed unnecessarily in dealing with such frivolous writ applications preventing consideration of genuine applications. No grievances have been raised on behalf of the petitioners with regard to the compensation etc. In the conduct of the appellants we were inclined to impose exemplary costs to discourage such persons from wasting the time of the Court by filing repeat applications in the hope that one gamble or the other would ultimately pay off. But, keeping in mind that their lands have been acquired, we desist from imposing costs at this stage. The appeal is dismissed. (Navin Sinha, J) (Shailesh Kumar Sinha, J) K.C.jha/-