Nand Kishore Prasad, son of Late Lachhan Prasad v. The State of Bihar

Heard Mr. Arun Kumar Prasad for the ----- petitioners, and Mr. Rajnish Kant, learned assistant counsel to Standing Counsel No.3 (Ceiling.). This writ petition is directed against the order dated 25.7.2007 (Annexure-2), passed by respondent no.2, in Land Ceiling 2 Appeal Case No.33 of 2005 (Nand Kishore Prasad and others Vs. Deokali Devi and others), whereby he has rejected the appeal of the petitioners, and has upheld the order dated

9.9.2005 (Annexure-1), passed by respondent no.3. The learned first authority (respondent no.3) has rejected the application of the petitioners to be substituted them in place of their late father, on the ground of unexplained delay.

2. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. Lachhan Prasad, late father of the petitioners had filed an application under section-16(3) of the Bihar Land Reforms (Fixation of Ceiling Area and Acquisition of Surplus Land) Act, 1961 (hereinafter referred to as the „Act‟), claiming right of pre-emption with respect to the land in question. One Chirkut Sah had transferred a piece of land measuring 1 katha 2 dhurs appertaining to Khata No.84, Plot No.527, of village- Durgauli, P.S. Mashrakh, in the district of Saran. The pre-emption application was registered as Land Ceiling Case No.15 of 1991-92, which was allowed by 3 order dated 22.9.1992, and the pre-emptor‟s claim for pre-emption was upheld. It further appears that no appeal was filed against the order and the same attained finality. Lachhan Prasad did not take any step for execution of sale-deed ultimately

24.11.1999. The present petitioner filed an application on 28.6.2003, in the nature of substitution application, praying therein to expunge the name of their late father and with further prayer to substitute their names. The same has been rejected by the order dated

9.9.2005 on the ground of unexplained delay, passed in Land Ceiling Case No.15 of 1991-92. Aggrieved by this order, the petitioners preferred appeal which has been rejected by the impugned order on identical grounds.

3. It appears that the petitioners‟ application claiming right of pre-emption was upheld by the order dated 22.9.1992. The pre- emptor did not take any step for execution of sale-deed ultimately

24.11.1999. The delay from 22.9.1992 to

24.11.1999 is absolutely unexplained. There is no material on record to show that the appeal was filed, and the order dated 22.9.1992 seems 4 to have attained finality. The substitution application has been filed on 28.6.2003. The delay from 24.11.1999 to 28.6.2003, the date on which the substitution application was filed, is equally unexplained. I venture to reproduce the following portion of the judgment dated 7.1.2009, passed in Civil Review No.127 of 2007 (Vidya Prasad Singh Vs. The State of Bihar and others): “It is difficult to recall the judgment in question also in view of growing pendency in courts in India. I am reminded of the conclusion arrived at by Mr. Bibek Debroy in his book entitled „In the Dock: Absurdities of Indian pending litigations in this country without any addition thereto, will take 324 years for disposal. The following portion of the book by Fali S. Nariman, entitled Law‟, „India‟s legal system: Can it be saved”, are relevant in the present context: “More than one hundred years ago, a law member in the Government of India (Hobhouse) recorded in a minute dated 5 September 1872 (on the Bill leading to the Privy Council Appeal Act, 1874) the following observation: In considering what limit should be assigned to the power of appealing, our leading maxim is, that it is the interest of the commonwealth to have and end of law suits. No man has a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wishes. discharged when it has provided such a reasonable amount of attention and state‟s The 5 skill and honesty as will satisfy reasonable men that their causes have been decided, erroneously or otherwise, on the merits, and according to the best ability of the judge, and so will prevent them from feeling that resentment of sheer injustice which drives people to take the law into their hands and to principle all laws place some limits to litigation. And so have we placed limits to the power of appealing. Pithily put, and elegantly phrased. private war. Upon The portion about no man having a right to unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in order to get his private affairs settled as he wished was quoted by Justice Gajendragadkar (who later became Chief Justice of India) in one of the early reports of the Law Commission of India, but despite what was so wisely said by Mr. Hobhouse and again by Chief Justice Gajendragadkar, our laws continue to provide (by way of appeals, reviews and revisions) unlimited draughts on the time and money of the public in affairs ultimately settled. For instance, we have now abolished second appeals and yet lawyers go on arguing endlessly about the maintainability of intra-court appeals under special laws” private The writ petition suffers from unexplained delay, laches, negligence and acquiescence. The late pre-emptor and his heirs who are the present petitioners have really abused the process of the Court by their failure to act in time, and thereby 6 approaching the authorities under the Act and this Court, which was clearly avoidable.

4. It is a frivolous writ petition and is accordingly dismissed. S.K.Pathak/ (S K Katriar, J.)