SATYENDRA SINHA @ CHHOTU v. THE STATE OF BIHAR & Ors.

the writ petition may be indicated. The petitioner was in custody at the relevant point of time for his involvement in criminal cases pending against him. The impugned order of detention which incorporates the grounds of detention was served on the petitioner on 29.11.2008, through the Assistant Jailor, Camp Phulwarisharif Jail, Patna. The same was affirmed by the State Government on 8.12.2008. The Advisory Board of the Patna High Court approved the order of detention on 23.12.2008. The same was received by the State - 2 - Government on 24.12.2008, and was directed to be continued by order dated 6.1.2009, passed by the State Government, in the Department of Home (Police). The petitioner continues to be in preventive detention.

3. While assailing the validity of the impugned order, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, in view of the provisions of the Act, opportunity for representation is imperative. The same has been denied to the petitioner. He relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Binod Yadav vs. State of Bihar, reported in 2007 (Supp) PLJR 936. He next submits that prospect of the petitioner’s release on bail in the criminal cases cannot be a ground for detention. He relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar, reported in 2007(4) PLJR 388. He next submits that no circumstance or ground for detention has been indicated to show that the petitioner’s detention is imperative in the interest of the public order. He relies on the case of Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar (supra). In his submission, the circumstances and the grounds and/or the grounds indicated in the impugned order may have a bearing on the question of law and order, and not on public order. He relies on the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in Arun Yadav v State of Bihar, reported in 2007(1) PLJR 715.

4. Learned counsel for the respondents has supported the impugned order and has relied on his counter affidavit.

5. We have perused the materials on record and considered the submissions of learned counsel for the parties. It is manifest on a - 3 - perusal of the impugned order that the petitioner was informed that he is free to submit a representation through the Superintendent of Jail. The following portion of the impugned order is relevant:- “ fu:) dq[;kr vijk/kdehZ ,oa yqVsjk lR;sUnz flUgk mQZ NksVq firk & f=Hkqou izlkn flUgk] lk0 & jk’Vªh;xat] Fkkuk & Qqyokjh”kjhQ] ftyk & iVuk pkgsa rks bl vkns”k ds fo:) dkjk v/kh{kd ds ek/;e ls viuk vH;kosnu ns ldrs gSA(cid:222) (Emphasis added) It is thus manifest that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to submit his representation against the order of detention. It is stated in paragraph -8 of the writ petition that he had submitted his representation against the impugned order through the Jail Superintendent, Beur, Patna. We must state that respondent no.2 has, on the contrary, stated in paragraph-5 of his counter affidavit that no such representation has been filed. Be that as it may, we are satisfied that the petitioner was afforded adequate opportunity to represent before the appropriate authority against the impugned order of detention. The contention is rejected.

6. As to the petitioner’s second grievance, it appears to us on a perusal of the impugned order that the petitioner was in custody on the date of the impugned order, and was trying to obtain bail by lawful process. It is evident that this is a bare statement of fact stated in the preamble of the order and is not a ground for detention. The grounds for detention are stated thereafter and are under the heading “fu:)kns’k dk vk/kkj(cid:222) . On a perusal of the grounds of detention, we are convinced that the same have really a bearing on the question of public order because the kind of person the petitioner is, he has unleashed a reign of terror in Phulwarisharif, Kankarbagh, Gandhi - 4 - Maidan, Kadam Kuan, and Gardani Bagh areas of Patna. The people are living in a state of terror. The shop-keepers and businessmen are too terrified to carry on their normal business, and the common populace is moving in those areas in a state of horror. Examples are also given that the petitioner has been hatching conspiracies to loot the cash of different businessmen. We are convinced that the grounds indicated in the impugned order do not have bearing on routine law and order issues alone, and have really a heavy and very disconcerting bearing on the question of public order in a major part of the township of Patna. We are convinced that the petitioner’s detention is in public interest and public order. In that view of the matter, the judgments in Shankar Singh v. State of Bihar (supra), and Arun Yadav v. State of Bihar (supra), are not applicable in the facts and circumstances of the present case.

7. The writ petition is dismissed. ( S K Katriar ) (Kishore K. Mandal) - 5 -