MANORAMA SHARMA WIFE OF SRI JANARDAN PRASAD SHAHI v. THE STATE OF BIHAR

Judgment

1. 2. 3. 4.

1. 2. 3. 4.

2. .--------------------- Petitioner Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR THE DIRECTOR, PRIMARY EDUCATION, BIHAR, PATNA. THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, PATNA. THE HEAD MISTRES, MIDDLE SCHOOL, MACHHUE TOLI, MAHENDRU, PATNA. ----------------------Respondents WITH CWJC No.10890 OF 1993

NILA KUMARI WIFE OF SHRI NARENDRA KUMAR, ASSISTANT TEACHER BALAK MADHYA VIDYALAYA, ADALATGANJ, PATNA VIDYAWATI WIFE OF SHRI LALIT MOHAN SINHA, ASSISTANT TEACHER, BALAK MADHYA VIDYALAYA, ADALATGANJ, PATNA. ANJALI SINHA WIFE OF SHRI AMAR NATH SINHA, ASSISTANT TEACHER, BALAK MADHYA VIDYALAYA, ADALATGANJ, PATNA. ------------------- Petitioner Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR THE DIRECTOR PRIMARY EDUCATION, BIHAR, PATNA THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, PATNA THE HEAD MISTRESS, BALAK MADHYA VIDYALAYA, ADALATGANJ, PATNA. ----------Respondents CWJC No.10895 OF 1993 NIRMALA KUMARI WIFE OF SHRI MANINDRA SHAHI, ASSISTANT TEACHER IN JAWAHAR KANYA MADHYA VIDYALAYA BALUGHAT NAGAR CHETRA (TOWN AREA), MUZAFFARPUR. SMT. BALA KUMARI WIFE OF SHRI KAMENDRA CHAUDHARY, ASSISTANT TEACHER, INDRA DAMAN MADHYA VIDYALAYA BRAHMIN TOLI, (TOWN (AREA) MUZAFFARPUR. ----------------- petitioners

1. 2. 3. 4. Versus THE STATE OF BIHAR THE DIRECTOR, PRIMARY EDUCATION, BIHAR, PATNA. THE DISTRICT SUPERINTENDENT OF EDUCATION, MUZAFFARPUR. THE HEADMISTRESS, JAWAHAR KANYA MADHYA VIDYALAYA BALUGHAT NAGAR CHETRA (TOWN AREA) MUZAFFARPUR. THE HEAD MISTRESS INDRA DAMAN MADHYA VIDYALAYA BRAHMIN TOLIA (TOWN AREA) MUZAFFARPUR

5. -----------------Respondents 2 For The Petitioner : Mr. Prabhakar Dwivedi, Advocate. For The Respondents : Mr. A.K. Dwivedi, A.C. to G.P. 13 Mr. Rakesh Kumar Sinha, A.C. to A.A.G-7 P R E S E N T THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA THE HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KISHORE KUMAR MANDAL Navin Sinha & Kishore K Mandal, J.J. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and the State. A common question with regard to the Bihar State Employees (House Rent Allowance) Rules, 1980 (hereinafter called the Rules) arises for consideration in this batch of writ applications. They have, therefore, been heard together and are being disposed by this common judgment. The petitioners in all the three writ applications are teachers in government schools. They were drawing House Rent Allowance and are aggrieved by the stoppage of the same. In C.W.J.C. No. 10890 of 1993, the impugned order dated

4.4.1992, is on the premise that her husband was employed in the Patna Municipal Corporation. In C.W.J.C. No. 9864 of 1992, House Rent Allowance has been withheld from June, 1992. There is no formal order on record with regard to the petitioner, but with regard to two others on the premise that both husband and wife were posted at the same station. In C.W.J.C. No. 10895 of 1993, a formal order dated 20.4.1993 has been annexed as Annexure-2 stopping House Rent Allowance on the ground that both husband and wife were posted at the same 3 station with consequential directions to deposit any house rent paid to the petitioner prior to the notice. The challenge is also to the consequential order dated 12.10.1993 directing her to make the necessary deposit of house rent allowance paid. A government notification dated 4.4.1992 provides that where the husband and wife were posted together, only one of them was entitled to House Rent Allowance. No counter affidavit has been filed. The issue involves interpretation of Rule 6 of the aforesaid Rules. The rules contemplate various situations where the husband and wife are in government service or even where one of them is, employed in an autonomous public undertaking and the ineligibility or extent of eligibility for house rent allowance. The husband of the petitioners in all the three cases are stated to be employed in undertakings of the State such as Patna Municipal Corporation, Bihar State Road Transport Corporation and Bihar Text Book Corporation. The petitioners and their husbands are stated to be posted at Patna. The court adjudicates an issue on its individual facts. The law is applied after the foundational facts are established conclusively. The petitioners simply assert that their husbands had not been allotted any separate accommodation by their employers. There is no material on record as to whether the husbands of the petitioners were being paid separate house rent allowance or not 4 by their employers. At this stage, it remains speculative on issues of facts which have to be factually enquired and then only the applicability or interpretation of Rule 6 on these established facts shall arise. The impugned orders contain no discussion, disclosures findings on issues of ineligibility/eligibility. Mere employment of the husbands of the petitioners in other government agencies shall not be sufficient to sustain the impugned orders by raising presumption of facts which have to be otherwise determined on enquiry. This court does not consider it proper at this stage to go into an academic discussion of Rule 6 and its various combination and permutation that may arise to deliver a speculative verdict. The Courts have consistently refrained from deciding academic issues as distinct from actual disputes brought before them. The only appropriate order to be passed is to grant liberty to the petitioners to pursue their claims before the appropriate authority making full disclosures with regard to their stand on facts claiming eligibility to House Rent Allowance when the respondents are required to hold a factual inquiry, furnish materials of such inquiry to the petitioners also, grant them a personal hearing, if they so request and then arrive at a final determination of the question of applicability of Rule 6 or any interpretation thereof based on such foundational facts. 5 Till such time that this exercise is not completed by the respondents, the respondents by reason of the interim order passed by this court, shall not be permitted to recover any House Rent Allowance paid to the petitioners and neither shall the petitioners have any claim for further House Rent Allowance except what may have already paid. Let such exercise be done by the respondents within a maximum period of four months the date of receipt/production of a copy of this order before them provided the petitioners themselves appear before the respondents within a period of one month from today. In the event that the petitioners do not appear before the concerned respondent within the period specified, the interim order passed by this court shall stand vacated when there shall be no impediment for the respondents to recover any amount that may have been paid to the petitioners. The writ applications stand disposed. (Navin Sinha, J) ( Kishore K. Mandal, J. ) PATNA HIGH COURT THE 20th November, 2009 NAFR/pkj