Champaran Sugar Co.Ltd. v. Daha Sahani

Judgment

1. The plaintiff respondent appellant has filed this second appeal against the judgment and decree dated 23.11.1990 passed by the learned District Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in Title Appeal No. 24 of 1986 whereby the learned lower appellate court allowed the appeal and thereby set aside the judgment and decree of the trial court dated 25.1.1986 passed by the learned 4th Additional Subordinate Judge, East Champaran, Motihari in Title Suit No. 65 of 1981/ 5 of Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 2

The plaintiff appellant filed the aforesaid suit praying for declaration of title over the suit land and non-title of the defendants respondents and further prayed for confirmation of possession. According to the plaintiffs the suit land originally belong to Maharaja of Hathua Estate who transferred the same by registered Mokrari Istemari (permanent settlement) lease dated 28.8.1929 in favour of the plaintiff. He continued in possession since then on payment of rent. A sugar factory has been constructed therein and in rest portion of the suit land the residential houses of the employees are there. After vesting the Anchal Adhikari arbitrarily enhanced the rent of the suit land, therefore, the plaintiff filed Title Suit No. 171 of 1965. By terms of judgment dated 17.3.1972 the said suit was decreed in favour of the plaintiff and it was declared that the suit land and other lands did not vest in the State of Bihar and the State of Bihar is not competent to vary the rental stipulated in the lease deed dated

28.8.1929 and therefore, restraint order was passed. The further case is that the defendants for the purpose of grabbing the suit land collusively and fraudulently obtained some receipt from the Amlas of the outgoing landlord. They also manipulated some forged and fraudulent receipt. On the basis of the order passed under Section 144 Cr.P.C. the defendant threatened to dispossess the plaintiff. Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 3

3. The defendant No. 1 to 3 have filed the contesting written statement. Their main case is that the registered lease of the year 1929 was not acted upon and the ex-landlord had settled the land in favour of the father of the defendants in the year 1946 and since after settlement the defendants respondents are coming in possession of the suit property peacefully without any interruption. According to the defendants the lease deed of the year 1929 is invalid and not genuine document.

4. After trial the trial court decreed the plaintiff’s suit recording finding that the plaintiff has got title over the same on the basis of Ext.-2 the rent receipt Ext. D series filed by the defendants are not reliable and are forged document. The trial court also recorded the finding of possession in favour of the plaintiff relying on the Ext. 9 and 9/A.

5. On the date of admission of the second appeal on 16.9.1991 the following substantial question of law was formulated : “whether the learned court below has erred in reversing the judgment and decreed passed by the learned trial court without taking into consideration the deed of lease executed in favour of the appellant in the year 1929 as also the orders passed under Section 5, 6 and 7 of the Land Reforms Act”.

6. The learned counsel Mr. Devendra Prasad Sinha appearing on Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 4 behalf of the appellant submitted that Ext.-2 dated 28.8.1929 is registered document and according to law there is presumption of its genuineness. The State of Bihar after vesting of the estate of ex- intermediaries enhanced the rent of the suit land, therefore, on the basis of the Ext.-2 the appellant had filed Title Suit No. 171 of 1965. In that title, suit the trial court decreed the plaintiff’s suit holding that the suit land did not vest in the State of Bihar and the plaintiff was not the intermediary. The trial court also held that the state of Bihar had no authority to enhance the rent and accordingly injunction order was passed. The State of Bihar has filed appeal before the high Court being First Appeal No. 555 of 1972. In this first appeal the Division Bench of this Court upheld the trial court judgment, appellate court judgment is Ext. 9. The learned counsel for the appellant further submitted that against the said judgment of this court the State of Bihar filed appeal before the Hon’ble Supreme Court which was dismissed by Ext. 9-A dated 24.8.1984. On the strength of these documents the learned counsel for the appellant submitted that Ext. 2 was acted upon and on the basis of that Ext. -2 the plaintiff filed the suit and the trial court recorded the finding that the plaintiff was entitled to a decree for recovery of possession of the land described in Schedule 4 and 7 of the plaint as the State of Bihar had taken its possession without any legal right and that the courts below decreed Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 5 the suit holding that the lands covered by Schedule 1, 2 and 3 of the plaint did not vest in the State of Bihar. In Schedule 2 of that suit the suit land comprised within plot No. 2311 was included. According to the learned counsel in view of these decisions of the High Court as well as of the Supreme Court the lower appellate court without considering the implication thereof could not have held that the Ext. 2 was not acted upon that too at the instance of the defendants respondents who are claiming title on the basis of oral settlement.

7. On the other hand, the learned counsel Mr. Abbas Haider appearing on behalf of the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 submitted that it is not the case that the lower court has not considered the Ext. 2 but the lower appellate court after considering Ext. 2 found that it was never acted upon. The learned counsel further submitted that had the exhibit-2 acted upon there was no question of purchasing plot no. 2308 by the plaintiff by Ext.-H arises. The lower appellate court considering Ext. 2, the register lease deed and Ext.-H found that plot No. 2308 finds place in Ext.-2 which was again purchased by the plaintiff by registered sale deed dated 21.5.1956 (Ext. H). This question was asked to the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant in the lower appellate court but no satisfactory answer was given by the learned counsel and therefore, it can be inferred that the register lease deed was never acted upon. Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 6

8. The learned counsel further submitted that the lower appellate court had found that the ex-landlord has already settled orally in the name of ancestor of the defendant in the year 1946 and therefore, granted rent receipt Ext. D series which are more than 30 years old as such the same could not have been either procured or forged. According to the learned counsel the agricultural land can be settled orally by delivering possession coupled with the grant of rent receipt as has been held by the Full Bench of this Court reported in 1969 BLJ 93. According to the learned counsel the appellants have not filed any rent receipt granted by the ex-landlord. Moreover, the respondent No.4 has died but no substitution has been done so appeal has abated.

9. It appears that the plaintiff appellant M/s Champaran Sugar Company Limited has filed this suit for declaration of title over the suit land. Ext.-2 is the registered lease deed dated 28.8.1929. This is admitted fact that the suit land finds place in this Ext. 2. The lower appellate court regarding this Ext. 2 has found that it was not acted upon and for recording this finding, the reason has been assigned to the effect that some of the lands of plot No. 2308 which also finds place in Ext. 2 has subsequently been purchased by the plaintiff by terms of registered sale deed dated 21.5.1956 Ext.-H. This Ext.-H was produced by the defendant to prove that in fact the exhibit was Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 7 never acted upon therefore, subsequently the plaintiff has again purchased some of the land. It is admitted fact that plot No. 2308 was purchased subsequently by Ext. H. It may be mentioned here that this plot No. 2308 is not the subject matter of the present suit. The subject matter of the present suit is plot No. 2311. Now, therefore, there is registered deed of the year 1929 with regard to the subject matter of the suit land.

10. In the case of Prem Singh vs. Birbal Singh (2006) 5 SCC 353 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that there is a presumption that a registered document is validly executed. A registered document therefore, prima facie would be valid in law. The onus of proof thus, would be on a person who leads evidence to rebut the presumption. In the present case, the defendants have adduced evidences i.e. Ext.-H with a view to prove that subsequently one plot has been purchased by the plaintiff. As has been stated above this plot No. 2308 is not the subject matter of present suit. The defendants have adduced Ext.-D series which are the rent receipt alleged to have been granted by the ex-landlord. The lower appellate court has given much emphasis on these rent receipts and held that if Ext.-2 was valid and it was acted upon there was no question of settlement of the land in favour of the ancestor of the defendants in the year 1946 arises. So far this finding of the lower appellate court is concerned, it may be mentioned here Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 8 that it is settled principles of law that the entry in the record of right or that rent receipt is obtained, will neither create any title in favour of any person nor will extinguish the title of the real owner. Here the case of the defendant is that the lease deed Ext.-2 is forged document.

11. It may be mentioned here that the plaintiff earlier filed Title Suit No. 171 of 1965 on the basis of the Ext. 2 when the State of Bihar enhanced the rent of the leased land along with the others. The said suit was decreed by the trial court against the State of Bihar and the State of Bihar filed First Appeal No. 555 of 1972. The Division Bench of this Court confirmed the judgment of the trial court by which the trial court had given the finding that the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for recovery of the land described in Schedule 4 and Schedule 7 and the land mentioned in Schedule 1, 2 and 3 did not vest in the State of Bihar. It may be mentioned here that this suit plot No. 2311 was mentioned in Schedule 2 in the earlier suit. The division bench dismissed the appeal and the judgment has been filed as Ext. 9. This judgment of this Court has been affirmed by Ext. 9-A by the Hon’ble Supreme Court.

12. The case of the defendant is that the property has been settled in the name of their ancestors in the year 1946. Admittedly no return was filed by the defendant in support of their case that when the Zamindari vested in the State of Bihar the landlord has submitted a Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 9 return in their favour. Their case is based on oral settlement coupled with alleged delivery of possession and the grant of the rent receipt by the ex-landlord. The question is whether in view of registered document Ext. 2 and the decree passed by the trial court which was confirmed by this High Court and the Hon’ble Supreme Court can it be said that the Ext. 2 registered lease deed dated 28.8.1929 was not acted upon merely because the defendants have produced the rent receipt Ext. D series.

13. In the case of State of Kerala vs. M. Kunhikannan Nambiar Manjeri Manikoth Naduvil (dead) and others AIR 1996 SC 906 and Tayabbhai M. Bagasarwalla and another vs. Hind Rubber Industries Pvt. Ltd. AIR 1997 SC 1240 it has been held by the Hon’ble Supreme Court that the party has to approach the appropriate forum for setting aside an order even if void. The same view has been reiterated in AIR 2004 SC 1377 Sultan Sadik vs. Sanjay Raj Subba and others, wherein it has been held that even if an order is void or voidable the same requires to be set aside by the competent court. Again in the case of M. Meenakshi and others vs. Metadin Agrawal (dead) by LRs and others (2006) 7 SCC 470 the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that it is well settled principles of law that even a void order is required to be set aside by a competent Court of law inasmuch as an order may be void in respect of one person but Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 10 may be valid in respect of another. A void order is necessarily not nonest. An order cannot be declared to be void in collateral proceeding and that too in the absence of the parties. Admittedly in the present case at our hand the defendant never challenged the order and decree passed by the trial court or the appellate court or the Supreme Court in Title Suit No. 171 of 1965. Recently, in (2012) 1 BLJ SC 42 Indrajeet Singh Grewal vs. State of Punjab and another the Hon’le Supreme Court considering the above decisions decided the question formulated at paragraph 12 to the effect that the parties has to approach the court for setting it aside. At paragraph 12 the question formulated was that as to whether it is permissible for a party to treat the judgment and order as null and void without getting it set aside from the competent court. In view of the above settled law the defendants cannot be allowed to treat the judgment of the civil court confirmed up to the Supreme Court as null and void. If in fact they had any grievance against the said judgment and decree they could have approached the court for getting it declare as not acted upon or the order is voidale. In Indrajit Grewal (Supra) the Hon’ble Supreme Court at paragraph 14 has held that it is evident that even if a decree is void ab initio declaration to that affect has to be obtained by the person aggrieved from the competent court. More so such a declaration cannot be obtained in collateral proceeding. In the present Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 11 case it may be mentioned that the defendant has not approached the Court rather the plaintiff has filed the suit for declaration of title and possession. The defendants had not even filed a claim for declaration of their title. Now therefore, in this suit which is not filed by the defendants no declaration could have been granted in favor of the defendant to the effect that the decree passed in the previous suit filed by the plaintiff which was confirmed up to the Hon’ble Supreme Court that too on the basis of Ext. D series i.e. the rent receipt and Ext. (H) which do not include the present suit plot No. 2311 to be not binding.

14. The other aspect of the matter is that the lease deed Ext. 2 is of the year 1929. Still today no action has been taken by the defendants. Therefore, the presumption of the genuineness of Ext. 2 is in favour of the plaintiff. Under Article 58 and 59 of the Limitation Act the defendant could have filed the suit for setting it aside within three years but the defendants did not do so. After such a long period in the suit of the plaintiff whether they can be allowed to say that the said deed was not acted upon or that the judgment and decree passed by the civil court in earlier suit is nonest and not binding on them.

15. In the case of Md. Noorul Hoda vs. Bibi Raifunnisha (1996) 7 SCC 767 the Hon’ble Supreme Court considering the right of the plaintiff who filed suit for declaration of title held as follows : Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 12 “when the plaintiff seeks to establish his title to the property which cannot be established without avoiding the decree or an instrument that stands as an insurmountable obstacle in his way which otherwise binds him though not a party, the plaintiff necessarily has to seek a declaration and have that decree, instrument or contract cancel, or set aside or rescinded. Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 regulates suit for cancellation of an instrument which lays down and any person against whom a written instrument is void or voidbale, as a retractable apprehension instrument, long, outstanding, may cause him serious injury, can sue to have it adjudged void or voidable and the Court may in its discretion so adjudged it and order it to be delivered or cancelled”.

16. Admittedly, as stated above in this case although the defendant was not party in the instrument this Ext-2 or the decree i.e. Ext. 9 and 9(b). Certainly these instruments and the decree are standing as an insurmountable obstacle in the way of the defendants which are binding on the defendants although he is not party, therefore, it was necessary for the defendants to have sought a declaration and obtained a decree concerning the said instrument Ext. 2 and the decree Ext. 9 and 9(B) but the defendants did not choose to do so. In my opinion, therefore, in the defence on the basis of the case made Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 13 out of the defendant that the ex-landlord orally settled the land in their favour the instrument and the decree which have already attained finality cannot be set at rest. From perusal of the lower appellate court judgment it appears that the lower appellate court has not at all considered these settled principles of law laid down by the Apex Court.

17. As stated above the lower appellate court has only mentioned that the defendants are not party to the suit therefore, it is not binding on them without considering the settled principles of law as discussed above. After all the lower appellate court has on presumption that because the Ext.-H has been executed subsequently with regard to another plot and Ext. D series produced by the defendants are more than 30 years old those are valid and genuine documents therefore, Ext. 2 as not acted upon.

18. So far the death of respondent No.4 is concerned, the learned counsel submitted that he was defendant no.4 and never contested the suit nor filed written statement so his name may be expunged and he may be exempted to substitute legal representative. Admittedly defendant no.4 neither filed written statement nor contested, therefore, his name is expunged. Appellant’s prayer is allowed.

19. In view of my above discussion, the substantial question of law formulated is answered in favour of the appellant. In the result, this Patna High Court SA No.35 of 1991 dt.26-06-2013 14 second appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment and decree of the lower appellate court is set aside and the judgment and decree of the trial court is restored. The plaintiff appellant’s suit is decreed. No orders as to costs. S.S. (Mungeshwar Sahoo, J)