CHILAKA SRIKANTH v. K AROGYARAJU

Order

Criminal Petition has been filed under Section 528 Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita Act, 2023 (for brevity ‘BNSS’) Petitioners/Accused Nos.1 & 2, seeking to quash the proceedings against them in C.C.No.4579 of 2025 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, Guntur.

2. The allegation against the Petitioners is that, on 11.05.2021 at about 19:00 hours, while the Sub Inspector of Police, Nallapadu Police Station, along with his staff, was engaged in enforcing the curfew orders promulgated ‑ by the Government to contain the spread of the COVID 19 pandemic, the

accused persons, namely, Chilaka Srikanth and Duggi Dasu @ Prabhudas, ‑ were found travelling in a car bearing registration No.AP 07 EB 7929 without any lawful pass or authorization, and upon being lawfully intercepted, they not only disobeyed the prohibitory orders but also abused the police officials in vulgar language, threatened them with dire consequences, invoked political influence, and physically obstructed them from discharging their legitimate duties, thereby committing acts amounting to criminal intimidation, obstruction of public servants, violation of epidemic control measures, and disobedience of lawful orders. Their conduct, as recorded in the police proceedings, is alleged to constitute offences punishable under Sections 353, 188, 269, 270, 271 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity ‘the I.P.C.,’) and Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897, and Section 51(1)(b) of the National Disaster Management Act, 2005. 3

3. The factual matrix, as borne out of the complaint lodged by K.Arogyaraju, Sub Inspector of Police, Nallapadu Police Station, Guntur Urban, is that on 11.05.2021 at about 07:00 PM, while he along with his staff ‑ HC 02 and PC 5415 was engaged in patrolling within the jurisdiction of Nallapadu Police Station to enforce the Government promulgated curfew ‑ ‑ orders issued in view of the COVID 19 pandemic, ‑ they intercepted a car ‑ bearing registration No.AP07EB7929 near Mirchi Yard. Upon questioning the occupants regarding their travel and demanding production of a valid pass, the two individuals allegedly descended from the vehicle, quarrelled with the police officials, abused them in filthy language, pushed them aside, and obstructed their lawful duties. Consequently, proceedings were registered in Cr.No.392/2021, culminating in the filing of a charge sheet numbered as C.C.No.4579/2025 before the learned Special Mobile Magistrate, Guntur.

4. Sri Patil Yugandhar Reddy, learned Counsel for the Petitioners submits that the entire prosecution is vitiated by legal infirmities and is a manifest abuse of the process of law. It is contended that the allegations under Section 188 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are unsustainable inasmuch as cognizance of such offence is barred under Section 195(1)(i) of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ which mandates that only a complaint, in writing by the public servant who promulgated the order, or his administrative superior, can form the basis of prosecution. In the present case, the Sub Inspector of Police, being merely an implementing authority, had no competence to lodge the complaint, and therefore the proceedings are void ab ‑ initio. It is further urged that the charge sheet has been filed mechanically 4 without adherence to statutory requirements, thereby rendering the cognizance taken by the learned Magistrate wholly unsustainable in law.

5. It is further argued that the ingredients of Sections 269 and 270 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are conspicuously absent, as there is no allegation that the Petitioners were suffering from COVID 19 or that their conduct was likely to spread infection. Similarly, invocation of Section 271 of ‑ ‘the I.P.C.,’ is wholly misconceived, since the provision pertains to quarantine regulations relating to vessels and intercourse between infected and non infected places, which is not applicable to the facts at hand. The allegation under Section 353 of ‘the ‑ I.P.C.,’ is also untenable, as the complaint itself does not disclose any act of assault or use of criminal force against the police officials, but merely a quarrel and verbal exchange. Moreover, the offences under Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act and Section 51(1)(b) of the National Disaster Management Act cannot be sustained, as cognizance thereof requires a direct complaint by the competent public authority, which is absent in the present case. Thus, the continuation of proceedings against the Petitioners is malicious, instituted with mala fides, and amounts to sheer abuse of the process of Court, and it is urged to quash the charge sheet and all consequential proceedings.

6. Heard the learned Counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor.

7. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record. 5

8. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the proceedings in C.C.No.4579/2025 on the file of the learned Special Mobile Magistrate Court, Guntur is liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’/Section 528 of ‘the BNSS’?"

9. On a careful consideration of the record and the allegations, this Court is of the view that the offences invoked under Sections 269, 270 and 271 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ are not attracted to the facts of the present case. The gravamen of these provisions is the likelihood of spreading infection of a disease dangerous to life, either negligently or malignantly, or by disobedience of quarantine rules. The prosecution material does not disclose that Petitioners were suffering from COVID- 19 or any other contagious disease, nor does it allege that their conduct was capable of transmitting infection. In the absence of such foundational facts, the essential ingredients of these offences are conspicuously lacking, and their application to the present case is wholly misconceived.

10. Turning to the allegation under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ the complaint does not disclose any act of assault or use of criminal force against the police officials. The narration is confined to a quarrel and verbal abuse, which, however reprehensible, does not satisfy the statutory requirement of assault or criminal force as contemplated under Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.’ Mere obstruction or exchange of words, without physical interference amounting to assault, cannot be elevated to the level of an offence under this provision. 6 Hence, the invocation of Section 353 of ‘the I.P.C.,’ against the Petitioners is legally untenable.

11. With respect to Section 3 of the Epidemic Diseases Act, 1897 and Section 51(1)(b) of the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, cognizance of offences under these special enactments requires a direct complaint by the competent authority empowered under the respective statutes. In the present case, no such complaint has been filed by the designated authority, instead, the proceedings have been initiated on the basis of a police report. In the absence of a valid complaint from the competent authority, the prosecution under these provisions cannot be sustained. The continuation of proceedings under these sections, therefore, amounts to a mechanical exercise without adherence to statutory mandate and is liable to be quashed as an abuse of process of law.

12. Further, as per Section 195 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ there is a bar for taking cognizance for the offences punishable under Sections 172 to 188, both inclusive of, ‘the I.P.C.,’ unless there is a complaint in writing by the public servant concerned.

13. In the instant case, there is no ‘complaint’ by the public servant, and there was only chargesheet filed under Section 188 of ‘the Cr.P.C.’ The ‘complaint’ as contemplated under Section 190 read with 200 of ‘the Cr.P.C.,’ was not filed. When such a complaint was not filed, but based on the police report, the learned Magistrate was not authorised to take cognizance of the 7 alleged offences, inasmuch as, under Section 195 of 'the Cr.P.C.,’ there is an embargo for taking cognizance.

14. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon’ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,1 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29, it is held as under: “28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are rather, complied with, take cognizance of an offence described in those sections. (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar [(1971) 3 SCC 329 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 608 : AIR 1971 SC 1708] , Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935] , Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [(1996) 3 SCC 533 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 521] , State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 642] , K. Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [(2005) 7 SCC 352 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1673] and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 1101] .) 29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637 : AIR 1953 SC 293 : 1953 Cri LJ 1232] and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1775 : 1966 Cri LJ 1491] , this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” the court shall not 1 (2010) 9 SCC 567 8

15. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar2, at paragraph No.12 it is held as under: “12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 : (1967) 1 SCR 520 : 1967 Cri LJ 528] . The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non-compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein.”

16. The Hon’ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, at paragraph No.6 it is held as under: “6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences relating to documents produced or given in evidence, public justice demands absolute bar of private prosecution and that power be given to the court to lay complaint under Section 340 of the Code as per the procedure prescribed therein. In Patel Laljibhai case [(1971) 2 SCC 376 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 548 : AIR 1971 SC 1935] the main controversy was as to when the accused had become a party to the proceedings. However, after the Code came into force in 1974 replacing the earlier Code of 1898 it was omitted and so it is no longer of any relevance. It is seen that the appellants therein had filed a civil suit on the basis of a cheque dated 22-11-1963 and the civil suit had come to be dismissed on 30-1- 1965. Thereafter, the private complaint was filed on 16-11-1965. In the light of those facts it was held that the respondent was a party to the