GADDE BALA YESWANTH v. THE STATE OF AP

Order

(Per Hon‟ble Sri Justice Tuhin Kumar Gedela) Happy are those who have a heart of gold and no one can claim to own this purity except that it can only be seen in children. Children are the supreme assets of the nation and the rightful place of the child in the sizeable fabric is founded on the principle that public could promote proper growth of the children, who are the future of the nation, and are required to be treated as people of today and not people of tomorrow. - - - - - - Heard, Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, learned counsel for the petitioner, learned Assistant Government Pleader attached to the office of the learned Advocate General appearing for respondent Nos.1 to 5, Mr.K.S.Murthy, learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondent Nos.6 and 7 and Mr.Posani Venkateswarlu, learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of Mr.P.Vivek, learned counsel for respondent No.8.

1. The Writ Petition is initially filed seeking a Writ of Habeas Corpus, directing respondent Nos.3 to 5 to produce the minor daughter (hereinafter called as “child”) namely Sitara (British Citizen) aged about 5 years 11 months before this Hon‟ble Court and inter alia direct to set her free from the respondent Nos.6 and 7 and handover the petitioner‟s daughter (child) to the petitioner.

2. Along side the Writ Petition, I.A.No.1 of 2025 is filed seeking interim direction to produce the petitioner‟s daughter, namely Sitara. On

02.09.2025, this Court suo moto impleaded the mother of the child and granted time, to file counter, to the respondent Nos.6 and 8. The respondent 5 No.8 has filed counter affidavit on 08.09.2025. Thereupon, refuting the said contentions, reply affidavit is filed by the petitioner to the counter affidavit filed by the respondent No.8 on 12.09.2025.

3. In the interregnum period, I.A.No.3 of 2025 was filed by the petitioner to amend the main prayer as “direct the respondent authorities 3 to 5 to produce minor child Gadde Sitara (British Citizen) aged about 6 years, who is permanent resident and born citizen of UK before this Court, who is at present in unlawful custody of respondent Nos.6 to 8, in compliance with the orders dated 18.07.2025 passed in case No.1751-3352-6208-7041, order dated 30.09.2025 passed in case No.1756-2297-9027-9698 by the Family Court of England sitting at Kingston upon Hull and order dated 02.10.2025 passed in case No.FD25P00600 by High Court of England and direct to immediately handover the custody of the said minor child to the petitioner- father to enable him to take the minor child back to the jurisdiction of UK”.

4. Instantaneously, the Amendment Petition filed by the petitioner seeking a direction in the nature of Writ of Habeas Corpus to implement the orders of the Family Court of England sitting at Kingston-upon-Hull, and order dated 02.10.2025 in case No.FD25P00600 passed by the High Court of England, is intrinsic.

5. Apropos, counters to the amendment petition were filed by respondent Nos.5 and 8 in the Writ Petition on 05.11.2025. Considering the averments contained in the petition and also the counters, this Court allowed the amendment petition on 11.12.2025. To the main petition, a counter was filed by respondent No.8 on 08.09.2025 and refuting the averments made in the counter, the petitioner filed reply affidavit on 12.09.2025. Additional counter affidavit was filed by respondent No.8 on 22.09.2025 to which again additional reply affidavit was filed by the petitioner on 24.10.2025. 6

6. As the multiplicity of filing petitions gained momentum, both the

counsels appearing on behalf of the parties filed their citations relied upon by them and the same will be discussed at the later point.

7. Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has drawn the Court‟s attention to the pleadings in the Writ Petition, tracing the manner in which the petitions came to be filed before the Family Court, UK, which are capsuled hereunder: (i) The writ petitioner and respondent No.8 got married on 24.11.2017 at Tirupati and respondent Nos.6 and 7 are the parents of respondent No.8. Petitioner contends that he is a British citizen and prior to his marriage, he was staying in UK regarding job purpose and later the respondent No.8 joined him in the month of March, 2018 for leading marital life at UK. They are blessed with the daughter out of the wedlock, namely Sitara, born in UK and is a British citizen, presently aged about 5 years 11 months and thereafter their relationship became strained. (ii) The counsel further placed on record through the arguments and documents that the daughter was admitted in North Cave Pre-School in the month of February, 2024. Thereafter joined the school in the month of September, 2024 for pursuing Early Years Foundation @ Reception, and Sitara completed the same. Regarding the marriage, the petitioner contends that after few months of the marriage, disputes have arisen due to the attitude and behavior of his wife and exhibited cruelty and harassment towards the petitioner and his family members. As the attitude of respondent No.8 is not changed albeit the intervention of elders of both the sides and further that due to his interest on his child and family, was benevolent with a hope that she could change. In the year 2023, respondent No.8 decided to move to Saudi Arabia for job purpose leaving behind the daughter and the petitioner in UK. The respondent No.8 later joined the marital home in the month of November, 2024 at UK and since then there is no change in her attitude and showed spasmodic harassment and the petitioner filed application for divorce on 7

15.01.2025 in the Family Court, United Kingdom, and the case was registered vide reference No.1736-9409-9016-3327, which is sub judice. (iii) Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, learned counsel would submit that because of the intervening school holidays after completion of one year and before joining the new academic year and holidays being six weeks for which the petitioner intended to visit India along with his daughter and live for a period of two weeks and the same was informed to the respondent No.8, who with disposition did not give consent to visit India and having no option, the petitioner approached Family Court at Kingston-upon-Hull combined Court center seeking to visit India along with his daughter vide Case No.1751-3352- 6208-7041. (iv) After hearing, the Family Court of England sitting at Kingston- upon-Hull, on 18.07.2025, passed the ex parte order as follows: “Schedule UPON the Court can only make an order today for the Specific Issue Order whether Applicant Father can take Sitara to India during the school‟s summer holiday. AND UPON the Respondent Mother had agreed previously in an email dated 10th January 2025 allowing Father to take Sitara to India during the Easter Holiday. Father has brought Sitara back safely. AND UPON The Applicant Father to take Sitara to visit maternal grandparents during the holiday in India. AND UPON the Court stating that it is always very important that Sitara have caring extended family AND UPON the Court stating the importance of maintaining cultural connections from Sitara. AND UPON Respondent Mother is worried that Father may not bring Sitara back to UK. Father is in possession of her passport. AND UPON the Applicant Father has informed the court that he is well established in UK and has been in his job for nine years. He has informed he has no job offers or property in India. AND UPON The Applicant Father confirms he has access of a car in India. AND UPON Applicant Father undertake to drive Sitara to the maternal grandparent‟s home for a two-night stay during the summer holiday. AND UPON AND UPON Applicant Father has confirmed he will travel with Sitara on 15th August 2025 and return on 31st August 2025. In time for Sitara to settle back into her routine in the UK before school starts. AND UPON the Court stating that if there are any further orders, the parties would need to make a fresh application to the Court. 8 THE COURT ORDERS

1. Permission is given for the Applicant Father to travel with Sitara from 15th August 2025 to 31st August 2025

2. Applicant Father will drive Sitara to the maternal grandparents‟ home for a two-night stay during the holiday. ___________________________________________________________ ORDERED BY: HONOUR JUDGE WIGIN DATED: 18th JULY 2025” (v) Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, learned counsel would contend that on the strength of the order of the Court, the petitioner visited India on

16.08.2025 for spending two weeks in India and in that pursuit, texted a Whatsapp message to his father-in-law on 16.08.2025 with an intimation that “I will drop off Sitara tomorrow for two night stay at your house”. The father-in- law responded by texting message “OK Please inform time”. In response, the reply message was given as “will be there around 10.30 A.M” i.e., on

17.08.2025. Accordingly, the petitioner‟s daughter was handed over to respondent Nos.6 and 7 at their residence in obedience to the orders passed. Petitioner informed to them that he will pick the daughter on 19.08.2025. As stated, on 19.08.2025, at 10.01 A.M., the petitioner texted a message to his father-in-law that “I‟ll come to pick up Sitara around 4:30 P.M today”, however, there is no response from them. (vi) Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, learned counsel proceeded to submit that on 19.08.2025, he went to the in-law‟s house around 05.00 P.M and found the house locked and later was enlightened by the watchman that they left the residence at around 04.00 P.M along with his daughter and despite several calls, there is no response from them. This persuaded the petitioner to lodge a complaint before the 5th respondent. But the 5th respondent did not show any interest, for which, the petitioner approached the 3rd respondent on 20.08.2025 and submitted a petition. In pursuance to which, the 4th and 5th respondents were directed to enquire and handover the child to the petitioner. As there was no response by the 4th and 5th respondents, the present Habeas 9 Corpus petition was filed, relying on the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in V.Ravi Chandran vs. Union of India and others1.

8. In sequel to the contentions raised in the affidavit by the writ petitioner, the 8th respondent recalcitrant to the contentions filed the counter which addresses as follows: (i) The marriage between the writ petitioner and 8th respondent was accorded on 24.11.2017 and certain facts are not in dispute, such as consummation of marriage at UK and the birth of the child (Sitara) on

29.09.2019 and that she worked for some time in UK and thereafter she was sent by the writ petitioner forcibly to India in the month of December, 2019. the averment advanced by Further learned Senior Counsel, Mr.K.S.Murthy, is that the writ petitioner has not taken any steps to bring 8th respondent or Sitara back to UK and living in India since 2019 and despite several requests, the writ petitioner did not choose to renew the spouse visa and refused to take care of the 8th respondent and Sitara and having no other option, the 8th respondent joined in TCS in the year 2022 and later part admitted Sitara in the Little Steps International School, Guntur, in the year

2022. The writ petitioner did not also care about her or Sitara‟s maintenance. (ii) Countering the contention regarding leaving to Saudi Arabia, 8th respondent stated that she left Sitara with her parents as Sitara is acquainted with her parents since childhood and the period spent was a short duration and retaliated the contentions of the writ petitioner. Further, in the year 2024, she came to know that the writ petitioner went to her parents‟ place and has forcibly taken Sitara to UK without her consent. The 8th respondent further refuted the averments made in the Writ Petition regarding the arrangement of spouse visa to her by the petitioner to reside in UK along with the daughter for which it was necessitated to apply for tourist visa which took considerable time for approval and ultimately 8th respondent reached UK on 08.11.2024. During 1 (2010) 1 SCC 174 10 the brief period, she had to stay in the petitioner‟s house, who treated her in disposition and very cruel manner and having no other option endured all the pain, insult and cruelty owing to Sitara‟s future. (iii) The 8th respondent in her counter further underlined that taking advantage of her jobless position and individual place in a gullible situation in UK, the writ petitioner purposefully filed divorce petition in UK. Knowing that she was not having any permission to go back to India, the writ petitioner wantonly took advantage of the situation, filed the petition to take Sitara to India during the school vacations and that UK Court, on 18.07.2025, granted permission to the writ petitioner to travel to India along with Sitara. The 8th respondent came to know through the 6th respondent that on 16.08.2025, the writ petitioner himself texted a message that he would hand over Sitara for two-night stay at 6th and 7th respondent‟s place to which they have accepted readily and the child was handed over to parents on 17.08.2025, and in the interregnum period, she received permission to travel back to India and so she travelled on 28.08.2025 back to India and taking custody of Sitara and, thereafter, came to know that the Writ Petition was filed. She further stated that she lodged FIR against the writ petitioner and her in-law‟s for harassment, which was registered as Crime No.357 of 2025 under Sections 318(4), 351(2), 79, 85 read with 3(5) of Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (BNS), and Sections 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act. (iv) At paragraph No.9 of the counter, the 8th respondent reiterates her stand that having no financial capacity, she remained in India and took care of Sitara and that she is in a better position than the petitioner, especially, in view of Sitara being a girl child, biological and special needs to be attended. She also adverts that the writ petitioner will not be in a position to take good care of the child since he stays alone in UK and often need to work late nights which may lead to neglecting the child, thereby affects the child, both physically and mentally, and reiterates that the mother will be in a better position to take care of the girl child and finally maintains that the Writ Petition cannot be 11 entertained much less Habeas Corpus, as the custody cannot be tasselled as illegal and unlawful.

9. Concomitant to the counter averments of the 8th respondent, the writ petitioner thereafter filed reply affidavit more or less reiterating the facts/contentions raised in the Writ Petition. In the reply affidavit, he repeated certain contentions that the contention raised by the 8th respondent that return tickets were booked and left India for UK is utterly false.

10. At paragraph D of the reply, the petitioner contends that the company where the 8th respondent was working, granted maternity leave for a period of one year and the 8th respondent chose to stay in India with an intention to return to UK in April, 2020 for which return tickets were also booked before leaving to India. He further states that he was compelled to return back to UK in January, 2020 for the work purpose and due to Covid-19 pandemic, international travels were blocked and return tickets of respondent No.8 and Sitara were cancelled and he, in the month of August, 2020, came to India to join respondent No.8 and Sitara. Again, the petitioner inevitably had to visit UK for the work and personal reasons, which he described as follows: a) 03.04.2021 to 11.09.2021 (British citizenship ceremony and passport) b) 08.02.2022 to 23.06.2022 (work and vacate UK rental property) c) 11.10.2022 to 24.12.2022 (purchasing suitable family home with garden and proximity to a good school)

11. For these purposes narrated, the writ petitioner returned back to UK on 04.03.2023. He further reiterates that the petitioner in order to lead cordial conjugal life with the 8th respondent, he, while travelling to India, visited Saudi Arabia to meet the 8th respondent and convince her that the steps taken by her will be against the interest of the child, for which she has not agreed and having no other option, he travelled to India after intimating the parents of the 8th respondent. 12

12. As could be seen, both the parties filed multiple Interlocutory Applications with the intention to improve their cases. The fact remains that the future of the child, Sitara, is lost in the battle of supremacy over each other. In custody battle, the question of custody of child becomes a “tug-of- war”, and it is the child, who has to bear the cost of unprecedented and unwelcomed situations.

13. On 08.01.2026, upon submissions made by the petitioner to interact with his minor daughter, Sitara, as he could not interact with her daughter for the last three months‟ period, this Court, considering the paramount welfare of the child, permitted the petitioner to talk to her minor daughter and to interact with her once in a week i.e., every Thursday between

06.00 P.M to 09.00 P.M. In pursuit for reconciliation, this Court ventured to directly interact with the petitioner, who was available online on 29.01.2026. The petitioner expressed that all efforts made failed and had no interest for any further relationship with the 8th respondent.

14. Basing on the facts and circumstances of the case and after demystifying, this Court framed the following issues:- i. Whether a Writ of Habeas Corpus can be maintained for implementation of foreign Court orders? ii. Whether this Court dehors the orders of the foreign Court in UK including the High Court of England decide the custody of the child invoking the doctrine of parens patriae, vis-à-vis decide the welfare of the child, which is paramount? ISSUE NO.1:- Contentions of the Petitioner:-

15. Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, learned counsel, in support of his contentions regarding the jurisdiction of this Court and the maintainability of a Writ of Habeas Corpus under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, strongly 13 relied upon the rulings of the Apex Court to substantiate. The law is no more res integra that Habeas Corpus is maintainable under Article 226 of the Constitution of India before this Court to evaluate the paramount consideration and welfare of the child. Autem, according to facts and circumstances of each case, the Courts are more concern with the safety of the child rather than the orders passed by the Foreign Courts, which must yield to the paramount consideration and welfare of the child.

16. It is also an established principle that even in the case where the petitioner who moved the foreign Court is a citizen of that particular country and acquired a citizenship of that country. In the present case, the petitioner acquired British citizenship through a ceremony as admitted by him. In one or two occasions, the petitioner has emphatically pleaded that he is a citizen of UK and so also Sitara, who was born in UK as a permanent citizen of UK and noticing the said fact, the UK Family Court passed the orders.

17. Now, a close scrutiny of the legion arguments advanced by the learned counsel, Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, reveals that the petitioner, being a citizen of UK and necessarily the child, Sitara, need to be handed over to the petitioner to go back to UK in consonance with the directions of the Family Court, UK. A direct judgment on this point is rendered by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Government of Andhra Pradesh vs. Syed Mohammad Khan2 a Constitutional Bench, which, at paragraph No.6, emphasized on citizenship as follows: “That, raises the question about the proper order to be passed in the present appeals. It has been urged before us by Mr. Tatachari for the appellant that the effect of oar decision in the case of Izhar Ahmad Khan is that as soon as it is shown that a person has acquired a passport from a foreign Government, his citizenship of India automatically comes to an end, and he contends that in such a case, it is not necessary that the Central Government should hold any enquiry and make a finding against the person before the appellant can issue an order of deportation against him. In our opinion, this contention is clearly misconceived. In dealing with the question 2 AIR 1962 SC 1778 14 about the validity of the impugned section and the Rule, this Court has, no doubt, stated that "'the proof of the fact that a passport from a foreign country has been obtained on a certain date conclusively determines the other fact that before that date he has voluntarily acquired the citizenship of that country." But in appreciating the effect of this observation, it must be borne in mind that in all the cases with which this Court was then dealing, the question about the citizenship of the petitioners had been expressly referred to the Central Government and the Central Government had made its findings on that question. It was after the Central Government had recorded a finding against the petitioners that they had acquired the citizenship of Pakistan that the said writ petitions came before this Court for final disposal and it is in the light of these facts that this Court proceeded to consider the contention about the validity of the impugned section and the impugned rule. It is plain, therefore, that the observations on which Mr. Tatachari relied were not intended to mean that as soon as it is alleged that a passport has been obtained by a person from a foreign Government, the State Government can immediately proceed to deport him without the necessary enquiry by the Central Government. Indeed it is clear that in the course of the judgment, this Court has emphasised the fact that the question as to whether a person has lost his citizenship of this country and has acquired the citizenship of a foreign country has to be tried by the Central Government and it is only after the Contrul Government has decided the point the State Government can deal with the person as a foreigner. It may be that if a passport from a foreign Government is obtained by a citizen, and the case fall3 under the impugned Rule, the conclusion may follow that he has acquired the citizenship of the foreign country ; but that conclusion can be drawn only by the appropriate authority authorised under the Act to enquire into question. Therefore, there is no doubt that in all cases where action is proposed to be taken against persons residing in this country on the ground that they have acquired the citizenship of a foreign State and have lost in consequence the citizenship of this country, it is essential that that question should be first considered by the Central Government. In dealing with the question, the Central Government would undoubtedly be entitled to give effect to the impugned r. 3 in Sch. III and deal with the matter in accordance with the other relevant Rules framed under the Act. The decision of the Central Government about the status of the person is the basis on which any further action can be taken against him. Therefore, we see no substance in the argument that the orders of deportation passed by the appellant against the respondents should be sustained even without an enquiry by the Central Government about their status. That is why we think,, 15 in substance$ the direction of the High Court is right, though the High Court was in error in holding that the Central Government should hold the enquiry without reference to r.3.”

18. Even otherwise, the law operating the custody of the child, is entirely different and stands on a different footing and the citizenship or nationality will be secondary and the paramount consideration and welfare of the child need to be addressed.

19. Learned Counsel, Mr.V.V.Lakshmi Narayana, has compilation of judgments, supporting his arguments, that Writ of Habeas Corpus is certainly maintainable when it is regarding custody of child. A three- Judge Bench of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Nithya Anand Raghavan Vs State (NCT of Delhi) and Another3, considering the principles laid down in Dhanwanti Joshi vs. Madhav Unde [(1998) 1 SCC 112] discussed elaborately regarding the maintainability of Writ of Habeas Corpus and the same is extracted below: “44. The present appeal emanates from a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus for the production and custody of a minor child. This Court in Kanu Sanyal v. District, has held that habeas corpus was essentially a procedural writ dealing with machinery of justice. The object underlying the writ was to secure the release of a person who is illegally deprived of his liberty. The writ of habeas corpus is a command addressed to the person who is alleged to have another in unlawful custody, requiring him to produce the body of such person before the Court. On production of the person before the Court, the circumstances in which the custody of the person concerned has been detained can be inquired into by the Court and upon due inquiry into the alleged unlawful restraint pass 14 (2001) 5 SCC 247 appropriate direction as may be deemed just and proper. The High Court in such proceedings conducts an inquiry for immediate determination of the right of the person‟s freedom and his release when the detention is found to be unlawful.

45. In a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in relation to the custody of a minor child, this Court in Sayed Saleemuddin v. Dr. Rukhsana & Ors. 15, has held that the principal duty of the Court is to ascertain whether the custody of child is unlawful or illegal and whether the welfare of the child requires that his present custody should be changed and the child be handed over to the care and custody of any other person. While doing so, the paramount consideration must be about the welfare of the child. In the case of Mrs. Elizabeth (supra), it is held that in such cases the matter must be decided not by reference to the legal rights of the parties but on the sole and predominant criterion of what would best serve the interests and welfare of the minor. The role of the High Court in examining the cases of custody of a minor is on the touchstone of principle of parens patriae 3 2017 8 SCC 454 16 jurisdiction, as the minor is within the jurisdiction of the Court (see Paul Mohinder Gahun Vs. State of NCT of Delhi & Ors.16 relied upon by the appellant). It is not necessary to multiply the authorities on this proposition.

46. The High Court while dealing with the petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus concerning a minor child, in a given case, may direct return of the child or decline to change the custody of the child keeping in mind all the attending facts and circumstances including the settled legal position referred to above. Once again, we may hasten to add that the decision of the Court, in each case, must depend on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case brought before it whilst considering the welfare of the child which is of paramount consideration. The order of the foreign Court must yield to the welfare of the child. Further, the remedy of writ of habeas corpus cannot be used for mere enforcement of the directions given by the foreign court against a person within its jurisdiction and convert that jurisdiction into that of an executing court. Indubitably, the writ petitioner can take recourse to such other remedy as may be permissible in law for enforcement of the order passed by the foreign Court or to resort to any other proceedings as may be permissible in law before the Indian Court for the custody of the child, if so advised.

47. In a habeas corpus petition as aforesaid, the High Court must examine at the threshold whether the minor is in lawful or unlawful custody of another person (private respondent named in the writ petition). For considering that issue, in a case such as the present one, it is enough to note that the private respondent was none other than the natural guardian of the minor being her biological mother. Once that fact is ascertained, it can be presumed that the custody of the minor with his/her mother is lawful. In such a case, only in exceptionable situation, the custody of the minor (girl child) may be ordered to be taken away from her mother for being given to any other person including the husband (father of the child), in exercise of writ jurisdiction. Instead, the other parent can be asked to resort to a substantive prescribed remedy for getting custody of the child.

48. The next question to be considered by the High Court would be whether an order passed by the foreign court, directing the mother to produce the child before it, would render the custody of the minor unlawful? Indubitably, merely because such an order is passed by the foreign court, the custody of the minor would not become unlawful per se. As in the present case, the order passed by the High Court of Justice, Family Division London on 8th January, 2016 for obtaining a Wardship order reads thus: “Order made by His Honour Judge Richards sitting as a Deputy High Court Judge sitting at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London WC2A 2LL in chambers on 8 January, 2016 IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILDREN ACT 1989 AND IN THE MATTER OF THE SENIOR COURTS ACT 1981 The Child is Nethra Anand (a girl, born 7/8/09) AFTER HEARING Counsel paul Hepher, on behalf of the applicant father AFTER consideration of the documents lodged by the applicant. IMPORTANT WARNING TO NITHYA ANAND RAGHAVAN If you NITHYA ANAND RAGHAVAN disobey this order you may be held to be in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined or have your assets seized. If any other person who knows of this order and does anything which helps or permits you NITHYA ANAND RAGHAVAN to breach the terms of this order they may be held to be in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined or have their assets seized. You have the following legal rights: a) to seek legal advice. This right does not entitle you to disobey any part to this order until you have sought legal advice; 17 b) to require the applicant‟s solicitors, namely Dawson Cornwell, 15 Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4QT, tel 020 7242 2556 to provide you with a copy of any application form(s), statement(s), note of the hearing; c) to apply, whether by counsel or solicitor or in person, to Judge of the Family Court assigned to hearing urgent applications at the Royal Courts of Justice, Strand, London, if practicable after giving notice to the applicant‟s solicitors and to the court, for an order discharging or varying any part of this order. This right does not entitle you to disobey any part of this order until your application has been heard; d) if you do not speak or understand English adequately, to have an interpreter present in court at public expense in order to assist you at the hearing of any application relating to this order. The parties 1. The Applicant is ANAND RAGHAVAN represented by Dawson Cornwell Solicitors The Respondent is NITHYA ANAND RAGHAVAN Recitals 2. This order was made at a hearing without notice to the respondent. The reason why the order was made without notice to the respondent is because she left England and Wales on or about 2 July 2015 and notice may lead her to take steps to defeat the purpose of the application and fail to return the child.

3. The Judge read the following documents: (a) Position statement (b) C67 application and C1A form (c) Statement of Anand Raghavan with exhibits dated 8.01.2016. 4. The court was satisfied on a provisional basis of the evidence filed (a) NETHRA ANAND (a girl born on 7/8/09) was on 2 July 2015 habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales. (b) NETHRA ANAND (a girl born on 7/8/09) was wrongfully removed from England on 2 July, 2015 and been wrongfully retained in India since. (c) The courts of England and Wales have jurisdiction in matters of parental responsibility over the child pursuant to Articles 8 and 10 of BIIR.

5. The Father has agreed to pay for the cost of the flights for the Mother and child in returning from India to England. He will either purchase the tickets for the Mother and child himself, or put her in funds, or invite her to purchase the tickets on his credit card, as she may wish, in order for her to purchase the tickets herself. Undertakings to the court by the solicitor for the applicant 6. The solicitors for the applicant undertake; (a) To issue these proceedings forthwith and in any event by no later than 4 pm 11 January 2016; (b) To pay the ex parte application fee forthwith and in any event by no later than 4 pm 11 January 2016; AND NOW THEREFORE THIS HONOURABLE COURT RESPECTFULLY REQUESTS:

7. Any person not within the jurisdiction of this Court who is in a position to do so to co-operate in assisting and securing the immediate return to England and Wales of the Ward NETHRA ANAND (a girl born on 7/8/09) IT IS ORDERED THAT: 8. NETHRA ANAND (a girl born on 7/8/09) is and shall remain a Ward of this Court during the minority or until further order.

9. The respondent mother shall return or cause the return of NETHRA ANAND (a girl born on 7/8/09) forthwith to England and Wales, and in any event no later than 23.59 on 22 January 2016.

10.Every person within the jurisdiction of this Honourable Court who is in a position to do so shall co-operate in assisting and securing the immediate return to England and Wales of NETHRA ANAND (a girl born on 7/8/09) a ward of this Court.

11.The applicant‟s solicitor shall fax copies of this order to the Office of the Head of International, Family Justice at the Royal Courts of Justice, the Strand, London WC2A 2LL (DX4550 Strand RCJ: fax 02079476408); and (if appropriate) the Consular Division, Foreign and Commonwealth Office Spring Gardens London SW1A 2PA, Tel: 02070080212, Fax 02070080152. the Head of

12.The matter shall be listed for directions at 10:30 am on 29 January 2016 at the Royal Courts of Justice, the Strand, London Wc2A 2LL, 18 with a time estimate of 30 minutes, when the court shall consider what further orders shall be made. The Court may consider making declarations in the terms of paragraph 4 above.

13.The respondent mother shall attend at the hearing listed pursuant to the preceding paragraph, together with solicitors or counsel if so instructed. She shall file and serve by 4 pm 27 January, 2016 a short statement responding to the application.

14.This order may be served on the respondent, outside of the jurisdiction of England and Wales as may be required, by way of fax, email or personally in order for the court to deem that it constitutes good service.

15. Costs reserved.”

52. An application for grant of U.K. citizenship was made on behalf of Nethra in September 2012 which was subsequently granted in December 2012. The father (respondent no.2) then acquired the citizenship of the U.K. in January, 2013. After grant of citizenship of the U.K., Nethra was admitted to a primary school in the U.K. in September 2013 and studied there only till July, 2015. Since Nethra had acquired British citizenship, the U.K. Court could exercise jurisdiction in respect of her custody issues.”

20. The petitioner moved the Court at Kingston-upon-Hull with case No.KH25P00465/1756-2297-9027-9698 which was heard on 30.09.2025, wherein directions were given for the relief prayed which read as follows: “THE COURT ORDERS IT IS DECLARED THAT:

1. The Court in England and Wales has jurisdiction in relation to the child on the basis that the child was habitually resident in the jurisdiction of England and Wales immediately before they were wrongfully removed or retained, and they have not acquired a new habitual residence in another Member State and satisfied the conditions in Article 7(a) or (b) of the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. Specific issue order

2. Keerthi Gadde must return the child to the Jurisdiction of England and Wales and to the care of Bala Gadde immediately upon service of this order. Service of this order

3. The Court gives permission for this order to be served via email and Whatsapp (to telephone number 07301796231) and dispenses with the need for personal service.

4. The Court directs the father to attempt service by post at the mother‟s last known address in India (provided to the court by the father), via the process described in court through which he effected service in the ongoing (England and Wales) High Court proceedings. Permission to disclose this order

5. The father has permission to share this order with Sitara‟s school and with the police on strict condition that neither agency is to further disclose this order without permission of the court. Liberty to apply

6. The mother has permission to apply on notice to the father to vary or set aside this order. Any application in this regard must be made by no later than seven days after the date on which the court affects service by the means set out in paragraph 3 above. 19 Costs

7. There is no order for costs. Dated 30 September 2025 SCHEDULE TO ORDER

1. The father attended court. The mother did not.

2. The father confirmed that the mother is now in India. She attended at a hearing before the High Court in India on 30 August 2025.

3. The father confirmed that he had attempted service of the current application and papers via email and Whatsapp.

4. The father further confirmed that he has a hearing before the High Court of England and Wales in the Royal Courts of Justice listed on 2 October 2025. That court had directed service on the mother. The father had attempted this by sending all documents via email to his brother who resides in India who had then arranged courier delivery to the mothers known address in the Andhra Pradesh region of India.”

21. Speaking order was issued and the Court made specific direction, which is labelled as Important Warning to Keerthi Gadde, which reads as follows: “If you Keerthi Gadde disobey paragraph 2 of this order, you may be held to be in contempt of court and may be imprisoned, fined or have your assets seized.”

22. Yet again, upon a petition filed by the petitioner before the High Court of Justice, Family Division, sitting at Royal Courts of Justice, the Court passed orders on 31.10.2025. The Court noted as follows: “The parties

1. The applicant is Bala GADDE, the father, who appeared as a litigant in person.

2. The respondent is Keerthi GADDE, the mother, who did not appear. Recitals

3. The applicant was sworn.

4. The court noted that: a. Prior to August 2025 the child was living in England. b. On 7 February 2025 in divorce proceedings between the parents (Case number 1736-9409-9016-3327) the mother confirmed that the courts of England of Wales had jurisdiction in relation to matters relating to child arrangements and financial remedies. c. On 18 July 2025 HIIJ Wigin sitting in the Family Court in Kingston-Upon- Hull in case number KH25P00373/1751-3352-6208-7041 made a specific issue order under the Children Act 2025 permitting the father to take the child to India on holiday for a two-week summer holiday from 15 to 31 August 2025, to include a two-night stay with her maternal grandparents. The mother was represented in those proceedings. 20 d. The father took the child to India and took her to stay with her maternal grandparents as directed by the court order. e. The child was retained by the maternal grandparents in India and not returned to the father. f. The mother is now understood to be in India with the child. g. Orders directing the mother to return the child to England and Wales have previously been made by HHJ Brown sitting in the Family Court in Kingston upon Hull in case number KH25P00645 1756-2297-9027-9686 on 30 September 2025 and by Ms Hannah Markham KC sitting as Deputy High Court Judge in case number FD25P00600 on 2 October 2025. h. The mother has failed to comply with the said return orders. i. The mother remotely attended the hearing before Ms Hannah Markham KC sitting as Deputy High Court Judge in case number FD25P00600 on 2 October 2025. On that occasion the mother was directed to file a statement setting out her case by 16 October 2025. She was aware that the matter was listed for a further hearing on 31 October 2025. j. The mother sent an email to the Court on 16 October 2025 attaching evidence in response. documents relating to a UK visa application but did not attach her evidence in response. k. The father has brought a habeas corpus petition in India in the High Court of Andhra Pradesh (No 22723/2025) seeking the return of the child to his custody. The next hearing in that petition is on 5 November 2025. l. The mother has also issued proceedings in India in relation to the child in the Family Court at Guntur (case GWOP 649 of 2025/FCOP 649 of 2025).

23. As outlined in the earlier paragraphs by this Court, there is no res integra regarding maintainability of Writ Petition. Curiously, both the learned Counsel appearing relied upon the same judgments of the Hon‟ble Apex Court to substantiate that Writs are maintainable and vice versa.

24. Learned counsel for the petitioner, in auxilium, relied upon the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Tejaswini Gaud and Others vs. Shekhar Jagdish Prasad Tewari and Others4, wherein it was held as follows: “14. Writ of habeas corpus is a prerogative process for securing the liberty of the subject by affording an effective means of immediate release from an illegal or improper detention. The writ also extends its influence to restore the custody of a minor to his guardian when wrongfully deprived of it. The detention of a minor by a person who is not entitled to his legal custody is treated as equivalent to illegal detention for the purpose of granting writ, directing custody of the minor child. For restoration of the custody of a minor from a person who according to the personal law, is not his legal or natural guardian, in appropriate cases, the writ court has jurisdiction.” 4 (2019) 7 SCC 42 21

25. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Kanika Goel vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another5, wherein it was held as follows: “34. …… For the purpose of habeas corpus petition, the Court ought to focus on the obtaining circumstances of the minor child having been removed from the native country and taken to a place to encounter alien environment, language, custom, etc. interfering with his/her overall growth and grooming and whether continuance there will be harmful….”

26. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in the case of Lahari Sakhamuri vs. Sobhan Kodali 6 , wherein, at paragraph 38, it was held as follows: “38. …..This Court applied the principles of (i) “the first strike”, i.e the UK Court had passed effective and substantial order declaring the children of the parties as wards of that court, (ii) the comity of courts and (iii) the best interest and welfare of the child. It also held that the “most intimate contact” doctrine and the “closest concern” laid down in Surinder Kaur Sandhu‟s case(supra) are very much alive and their application might be cannot be uncomfortable in certain situations. The Court also reiterated that the best interest and welfare of the child are of paramount importance which shall always be kept in mind by the courts while adjudicating the disputes.” ignored only because

27. Learned counsel further relied upon the judgment of the High Court of Telangana in the case of Sara Bhayaraju vs. State of Telangana and others7, wherein, at paragraph 51, it was held as follows: “51. The sum and substance of the aforesaid judgments is as follows: i. Proceedings in writ of Habeas Corpus are summary in nature. ii. Writ of Habeas Corpus is maintainable in child custody matters. iii. Welfare of minor is the paramount consideration while deciding matters with regard to child custody and it will prevail over Principle of Comity, Principle of First Strike. iv. Since the proceedings in writ of Habeas Corpus are summary in nature, the same have to be decided basing on the affidavits filed by the parties. v. Each case has to be examined basing on its own facts and circumstances and on case to case basis.”