.ANNAPU REDDY BALA VENKAT v. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH

Counsel for the Respondent/complainant(S):

1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR The Court made the following: COMMON ORDER: These two Criminal Petitions are heard and disposed of by way of this common order, as the facts and circumstances in these two cases are identical, but, of course, the Petitioners are same, albeit they arise out of two different cases.

2. The Criminal Petition have been filed under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity „the Cr.P.C.,‟)/Section 528 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity „the BNSS‟) seeking to quash the proceedings against the Petitioner/Accused No.1 in C.C.Nos.629 and 627 of 2020 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nandikotkur, registered for the alleged offence punishable under Section 188 3 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for brevity „the I.P.C‟) and Section 32 of the Andhra Pradesh Police Act, 1861 (for brevity „the Act‟).

3. The allegation against the petitioner in is that on 05.03.2019, at about 11:30 hours, at Thudicherla village within the jurisdiction of the Court, he, in utter disregard of the prohibitory orders duly promulgated under Section 30 of the Police Act, 1861, which were in force during the General Elections, convened and participated in a roadshow and public assembly without obtaining prior sanction from the competent authority/Returning Officer. Such conduct amounts to a manifest violation of the Model Code of Conduct. Based on the report submitted, a case in Crime No. 59/2019 was registered for the offences punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code and Section 32 of the A.P. Police Act. The said acts constitute prima facie wilful disobedience of lawful orders promulgated by a public servant, thereby attracting penal consequences under the aforesaid provisions.

4. The facts and circumstances of the case in disclose that on 02.04.2019, at about 12:00 noon, at W. Prathakota village, within the limits of Muchumarri Police Station and within the jurisdiction of the Hon‟ble Court at Kurnool, the accused conducted a roadshow and organised a public meeting without obtaining prior permission from the competent authority, despite prohibitory orders being in force during the General Elections. It is further alleged that an unregistered vehicle was used for the said purpose without authorization. These acts were noticed by officials on election duty and were reported to the 4 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 police. Based on the said report, a case in Crime No. 28/2019 was registered for the offence punishable under Section 188 of the Indian Penal Code, and upon completion of the investigation, a charge sheet was filed against the accused.

5. Heard the learned counsel for the Petitioners and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor.

6. Thoughtful consideration is bestowed on the arguments advanced by the learned Counsel for both sides. I have perused the entire record.

7. In the light of the case of the prosecution and the contentions of the learned Counsel for both the sides, now the point for consideration is: “Whether the proceedings in C.C.Nos.627 and 629/2020 on the file of the learned Judicial First Class Magistrate, Nandikotkur, Kurnool District are liable to be quashed in exercise of the inherent powers of the High Court under Section 482 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟/Section 528 of „the BNSS‟?"

8. It is submitted that, as per the charge sheets, the alleged offences against the petitioner fall under Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ and Section 188 of „the I.P.C‟. Learned counsel for the petitioner contends that the petitioner neither called for nor organized any rally on 05.03.2019, and that any gathering which took place was due to supporters voluntarily assembling during the course of his election campaign. It is further submitted that a perusal of the complaint discloses no specific or distinct allegations attributing any overt act to the petitioner. According to learned counsel, the petitioner was merely interacting with members of the public in small groups during his campaign, and such 5 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 interaction cannot, by any stretch of the imagination, be construed as conducting a roadshow or public meeting in violation of the law.

9. It is respectfully submitted that the invocation of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ against the petitioner is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable, inasmuch as the foundational ingredients required for the constitution of the said offence are conspicuously absent. A plain and contextual reading of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ indicates that it contemplates the regulation of assemblies, processions, and public meetings, and presupposes existence of a deliberate act of organizing, convening, or conducting such an assembly in contravention of a duly promulgated order of the competent authority. To attract the rigour of the said provision, it is incumbent upon the prosecution to demonstrate, with cogent and specific material, that the accused had a determinative role in organizing or facilitating the alleged gathering. However, in the present case, a careful and scrupulous perusal of the complaint and the charge sheet does not disclose any such material implicating the petitioner in the organization or conduct of any roadshow or public meeting. The allegations, being vague, omnibus, and bereft of particulars, merely allude to the presence of a congregation of individuals during the course of electioneering activity, which, in the absence of any demonstrable nexus to the petitioner‟s volitional act, cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 32 of „the Act‟. Consequently, the continuation of 6 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 proceedings on such tenuous and unsubstantiated allegations would amount to a manifest abuse of the process of law.

10. It is respectfully submitted that the invocation of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ against the petitioner is wholly misconceived and legally unsustainable, inasmuch as the foundational ingredients necessary to constitute the said offence are conspicuously absent. A plain and purposive interpretation of Section 32 reveals it pertains the regulation of assemblies, processions, and public meetings, and presupposes a deliberate and conscious act of organizing, convening, or conducting such an assembly in contravention of a duly promulgated order of the competent authority. It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish, through cogent and credible material, that the accused had a determinative role in orchestrating or facilitating the alleged gathering so as to attract the rigour of the provision.

11. However, in the present case, a careful and scrupulous perusal of the complaint and the charge sheet does not disclose any material whatsoever to indicate that the petitioner either organized or conducted any roadshow or public meeting. The allegations, being vague, omnibus, and bereft of specific particulars, merely allude to the presence of a gathering during the course of electioneering activity, which, in the absence of any demonstrable nexus to the petitioner‟s volitional act, cannot be brought within the ambit of Section 32 of „the Act‟. In such circumstances, the continuation of criminal proceedings 7 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 against the petitioner, founded on such tenuous and unsubstantiated allegations, would amount to a clear abuse of the process of law.

12. It is to be noted that, in the present cases, no complaint as contemplated under Sections 190 and 200 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ has been filed by the competent public servant, and the proceedings are founded solely on a police report under Section 173 of „the Cr.P.C‟. In view of the statutory bar under Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the learned Magistrate was not legally empowered to take cognizance of the offence under Section 188 of „the I.P.C.,‟ thereby vitiating the very cognizance in law.

13. It is further submitted that the invocation of Section 32 of „the Act.,‟ is equally unsustainable, as the material on record does not disclose any deliberate act on the part of the petitioner in organizing or conducting any assembly or procession in violation of a lawful order. The allegations are vague and omnibus, lacking any specific overt acts or credible material establishing the petitioner‟s role, and merely refer to a general gathering during election campaigning. In the absence of foundational facts and a demonstrable nexus to the alleged offence, the continuation of proceedings would amount to a manifest abuse of the process of law.

14. In this regard it is apposite to refer to the judgment of the Hon‟ble Apex Court in C. Muniappan v. State of T.N.,1 wherein at paragraph Nos.28 & 29, it is held as under: 1 (2010) 9 SCC 567 8 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026 “28. Section 195(1)(a)(i) CrPC bars the court from taking cognizance of any offence punishable under Section 188 IPC or abetment or attempt to commit the same, unless, there is a written complaint by the public servant concerned for contempt of his lawful order. The object of this provision is to provide for a particular procedure in a case of contempt of the lawful authority of the public servant. The court lacks competence to take cognizance in certain types of offences enumerated therein. The legislative intent behind such a provision has been that an individual should not face criminal prosecution instituted upon insufficient grounds by persons actuated by malice, ill will or frivolity of disposition and to save the time of the criminal courts being wasted by endless prosecutions. This provision has been carved out as an exception to the general rule contained under Section 190 CrPC that any person can set the law in motion by making a complaint, as it prohibits the court from taking cognizance of certain offences until and unless a complaint has been made by some particular authority or person. Other provisions in CrPC like Sections 196 and 198 do not lay down any rule of procedure, rather, they only create a bar that unless some requirements are complied with, the court shall not take cognizance of an offence described (Vide Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar [(1971) 3 SCC 329, Patel Laljibhai Somabhai v. State of Gujarat [(1971) 2 SCC 376, Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh [(1996) 3 SCC 533 : K. : State of Punjab v. Raj Singh [(1998) 2 SCC 391 Vengadachalam v. K.C. Palanisamy [(2005) 7 SCC 352 : and Iqbal Singh Marwah v. Meenakshi Marwah [(2005) 4 SCC 370) 29. The test of whether there is evasion or non-compliance with Section 195 CrPC or not, is whether the facts disclose primarily and essentially an offence for which a complaint of the court or of a public servant is required. In Basir-ul-Haq v. State of W.B. [(1953) 1 SCC 637 and Durgacharan Naik v. State of Orissa [AIR 1966 SC 1775 : this Court held that the provisions of this section cannot be evaded by describing the offence as one being punishable under some other sections of IPC, though in truth and substance, the offence falls in a category mentioned in Section 195 CrPC. Thus, cognizance of such an offence cannot be taken by misdescribing it or by putting a wrong label on it.” those sections.

15. Thus, in C. Muniappan supra, it is held that Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ bars courts from taking cognizance of offences like Section 188 of „the IPC‟ unless there is a written complaint by the concerned public servant, in order to prevent frivolous or malicious prosecutions and to ensure adherence to the prescribed procedure. This bar cannot be circumvented by misdescribing the offence under other provisions, as the true nature of the offence determines the applicability of Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C‟. 9 Dr.YLR,J Crl.P.Nos.5115 and 5116 of 2024 Dated 23.03.2026

16. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Govind Mehta v. State of Bihar 2 , at paragraph No.12 it is held as under: “12. According to Mr Jyoti Narayan, the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken by the Magistrate to be adjudged, is the time when cognizance is actually taken under Section 190 of the Code and applying that test in the present case, it will be seen that there has been a breach of Section 195(1)(b) and (c) and Section 476 of the Code. The proposition that the point of time at which the legality of the cognizance taken is to be adjudged is the time when cognizance is actually taken is laid down by this Court in M.L. Sethi v. R.P. Kapur [AIR 1967 SC 528 :. The Magistrate has normally got jurisdiction to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code in the circumstances enumerated therein. Section 195 is in fact a limitation on the unfettered powers of a Magistrate to take cognizance under Section 190 of the Code. Therefore, at the stage when the Magistrate is taking cognizance under Section 190, he must examine the facts of the complaint before him and determine whether his power of taking cognizance under Section 190 has or has not been taken away by any of the clauses (a) to (c) of Section 195(1). Therefore, it is needless to state that if there is a non- compliance with the provisions of Section 195, the Magistrate will have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of any of the offences enumerated therein.”

17. Therefore, in Govind Mehta supra, it is held that the legality of cognizance must be assessed at the time the Magistrate takes cognizance under Section 190 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ and Section 195 operates as a limitation on such power. If there is non-compliance with Section 195 of „the Cr.P.C.,‟ the Magistrate lacks jurisdiction to take cognizance of the specified offences.

18. The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Surjit Singh v. Balbir Singh3, at paragraph No.6 it is held as under: “6. The object thereby is to protect persons from needless harassment by prosecution for private vendetta; to preserve purity of the judicial process and unsullied administration of justice; to prevent the parties of the temptation to pre-empt the proceedings pending in a court and to pressurise and desist parties from proceeding with the case. Equally when the act complained of relates to an offence, i.e., contempt of lawful authority of public servant, or against public justice or for offences