S. Jyothi v. S. Sathish Chakravarthi

Judgment

#1. S. Sathish Chakravarthi, S/o Damodaram, Aged 40,

#2. S.Manga Rajamma, W/o Damodaram, Aged 58 Both R/o Raju Nilayam, Shram Nagar Colony, Srikalahasthi, Chittoor District.

#3. The State of Andhra Pradesh, rep. by its Public Prosecutor, High Court of A.P., at Amaravathi. ...Respondent/Complainant ...Respondents/A-1 &2 Counsel for the Petitioner: Sri Challa Srinivasa Reddy Counsel for the Respondent No.3: Sri K.Sandeep, Assistant Public Prosecutor The Court made the following: r Between HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI **** CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.589 OF 2010 S.JYOTHI, W/0 SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI, R/0 NEAR VEERABHADRASWAMY TEMPLE,

SRIKALAHASTI VILLAGE & MANDAL, CHITTOORDISTRICT. ...PETITIONER Versus

#1. S SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI 2 OTHERS, S/0 DAMODARAM, R/0 RAJU NILAYAM, SRIRAM NAGAR COLONY, SRIKALAHASTHI,

#2. S MANGA RAJAMMA, W/0 DAMODARAM, R/0 RAJU NILAYAM SRIRAM NAGAR COLONY, SRIKALAHASTHI,

#3. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AT HYDERABAD. ...RESPONDENT DATE OF ORDER PRONOUNCED

17.02.2025 ***★ 2 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLRJ SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL: THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO

#1. Whether Reporters of Local Newspapers may be allowed to see the Judgment?

#2. Whether the copy of Judgment may be marked to Law Reporters/Journals?

#3. Whether His Lordship wish to see the fair copy of the Judgment? / Yes/No / Yes/No / Yes/No J r 3 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLR,J * THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO + CRIMINAL REVISION CASE No.589 OF 2010 % 17.02.2025 # Between: S.JYOTHI, W/0 SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI, R/0 NEAR VEERABHADRASWAMY TEMPLE, SRIKALAHASTI VILLAGE & MANDAL, CHITTOOR DISTRICT. ...PETITIONER Versus

#1. S SATHISH CHAKRAVARTHI 2 OTHERS, f/0 DAMODARAM R/0 RAJU NILAYAM, SRI RAM NAGAR COLONTV, SRIKALAHASTHI,

#2. S MANGA RAJAMMA, W/0 DAMODARAM, R/0 RAJU NILAYAM SRIRAM NAGAR COLONY, SRIKALAHASTHI,

#3. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, REP. BY ITS PUBLIC PROSECUTOR, HIGH COURT OF A.P., AT HYDERABAD. ...RESPONDENT ! Counsel for the Petitioners : Sri Challa Srinivasa Reddy ^ Counsel for the Respondent : Sri K.Sandeep, Assistant Public Prosecutor < Gist: > Head Note: 4 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLR,J ? Cases referred: 1) (2002) 6 see 650 2) AIR 1951 Se 196 3) AIR 1962 se 1788 4) AIR 1968 se 707 5) AIR 1972 se 468 6) AIR 1973 se 1274 7) AIR 1973 se 2145 8) AIR 1973 se 84 9) AIR 1973 se 799 10) AIR 1975 se 580 11) AIR 1986 se 1436 12) AIR 1993 se 1126 13) AIR 2002 se 2229 \ % r 5 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLR,J THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINALREVISIONCASE NO: 589 of 2010 ORDER: The Revision was filed under Sections 397 and 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity ‘the Cr.P.C.,’) acquitting Revisionist for the alleged offence under Sections 498-A, 323, 342 read with 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the I.P.C.,’) by the learned Additional Judicial Magistrate of First Class, Srikalahasti in C.C.No.94 of 2005 vide judgment dated 08.12.2009.

#2. Sri Challa Srinivasa Reddy, the learned Counsel for the Revisionist while reiterating the grounds of the Revision, argued that even though the prosecution could prove the guilt of the Respondent Nos.1 & 2, being A1 and A2, before the learned Magistrate, beyond all reasonable doubt, the learned Magistrate did not believe the version of the prosecution and acquit them.

#3. The learned Counsel for the Revisionist further argued that P.Ws.1 & 2 had supported the case of the prosecution. P.W.1 was harassed by Respondent No.1 by maintaining illegal intimacy with one woman, who was working in his office and he got illegal contact with some other woman; Respondent No.1 indiscriminately had beat on P.W.1 and locked the door from outside by keeping P.W.1 inside; Respondent Nos.1 & 2 demanded for additional dowry from the parents of P.W.1. 6 Crl.R.C.No.589of2010 Dr.YLRJ

#4. Mr.K.Sandeep, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor would argue that the learned Magistrate had rightly appreciated the evidence of all prosecution witnesses and acquitted the Respondent Nos.1 and 2 as the guilt was not proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

#5. Now the point for consideration is: “Whether the judgment in C.C..No.94 of 2005 dated 08.12.2009, passed by the learned Additional Judicial I Class Magistrate, Srikalahasti, is correct, legal, and proper with respect to its finding, or judgment, and there are any material irregularities? And to what relief?” sentence,

#6. It is apposite to refer the Hon’ble Apex Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh v State of Bihar^ wherein at Paragraph Nos. 12 & 13 it is held as under: “12. ...We have carefully considered the material on record and we are satisfied that the High Court was not justified in re appreciating the evidence on record and coming to a different conclusion in a revision preferred by the information under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, Sub-section (3) of Section 401 in terms provides that nothing in Section 401 shall be deemed to authorize a High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction. The aforesaid sub-section, which pieces a limitation on the powers of the revisional Court, prohibiting it from convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, is itself indicative of the nature and extent of the revisional power conferred by Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. If the High Court could not convert a finding of acquittal into one of the conviction directly, it could not do so indirectly by the method of ordering a re-trial. It is well settled by a catena of decisions of this Court that the High Court will ordinarily not interfere in revision with an order of acquittal except in exceptional cases where the interest of public correction of a manifest justice requires interference for the illeqalitv or the prevention of qross miscarriaqe of justice. The Hiqh Court will not be justified in interferinq with an order of acquittal merely because the trial Court has taken a wronq view of the law or has erred in appreciation of evidence. It is neither possible nor ^^jidvisable to make an exhaustive list of circumstances in which ^(2002) 6 see 650 c 7 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLRJ exercise of revisional jurisdiction may be justified, but decisions of this Court have iaid down the parameters of exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court under Section 401 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in an appeal against acquittal by a private party. ...

#13. In the absence of any legal infirmity either in the procedure or in the conduct of the trial, there was no justification for the High Court to in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction. It has repeatedly been held that the Hiah Court should not re-appreciate the evidence to reach a finding different from the trial Court. In the absence of manifest illegality resulting in grave miscarriage of justice, exercise of revisional jurisdiction in such cases is not warranted. ” interfere

#7. The Hon’ble Supreme Court in D Stephens v Nosibolla^ at Paragraph No. 10 held as under: “The revisional jurisdiction conferred on the High Court under S. 439, Cr.P.C., is not to be lightly exercised, when it is invoked by a private complainant against an order of acquittal, against which the Govt, has o right of appeal under S. 417. It could be exercised only in exceptional cases where the interests of public justice require interference for the correction of a manifest Illegality, or the prevention of a gross miscarriage of justice. This jurisdiction is not ordinarily invoked or used merely because the lower court has taken a wrong view of the law or mis-appreciated the evidence on record. ”

#8. The Hon’ble Apex Court in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v State of AP^, at Paragraph No.7 held as under; u

#7. It is true that it is open to a High Court in revision to set aside an order of acquittal even at the instance of private parties, though the State may not have thought fit to appeal; but this jurisdiction should in our opinion be exercised by the High Court only in exceptional cases, when there is some glaring defect in the procedure or there is a manifest error on a point of law and consequently there has been a flagrant miscarriage of justice. Sub-section (4) of S. 439 forbids a High Court from converting a finding of acquittal Into one of conviction and that makes it all the more incumbent on the High Court to see that it does not, convert the finding of acquittal into one of conviction by the indirect method ^AIR 1954.5^196 ^AIR 1962 SC 1788 8 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLRJ It is not possible to lay down the criteria of ordering retrial when it cannot itself directly convert a finding of acquittal into a finding of conviction. This places limitations on the power of the High Court to set aside a finding of acquittal in revision and it is only in exceptional cases that this power should be exercised. would cover all determining such exceptional cases which contingencies. We may, however, indicate some cases of this kind which would in our opinion justify the High Court in interfering with a finding of acquittal in revision. These cases may be: where the trial court has no jurisdiction to try the case but has still acquitted the accused, or where the trial court has wrongly shut out evidence which the prosecution wished to produce, or where the appeal court has wrongly held evidence which was admitted by the trial court to be inadmissible, or where material evidence has been overlooked either by the trial court or by the appeal court, or where the acquittal is based on a compounding of the offence, which is invalid under the law. These and other cases of similar nature can properly be held to be cases of exceptional nature, where the High Court can justifiably interfere with an order of acquittal; an in such a case it is obvious that it cannot be said that the High Court was doing indirectly what it could not do directly in view of the provisions of S. 439 (4). We have, therefore, to see whether the order of the High Court setting aside the order of acquittal in this case can be upheld on these principles. ”

#9. In Mahendra Pratap Singh v Sarju Singh'*, at paragraph Nos.7 and 8 it is held as under; villagers the position from a “1. In revision, the learned Judge in the High Court went into the evidence very minutely. He questioned every single finding of the learned Sessions Judge and gave his own interpretation of the evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it. He discounted the theory that the weapon of attack was a revolver and suggested that it might have been a shot gun or country made pistol which of Kuldip and Sarju could not distinguish took up each single circumstance on which the learned Sessions Judge had found some doubt and interpreting the evidence de novo held, contrary to the opinion of the Sessions Judge that they were acceptable. All the time he appeared to give the benefit of the doubt to the prosecution. The only error of law which the learned Judge found in the Sessions Judge's judgment was a remark by the Sessions Judge that the defence witnesses who were examined by the police before they were brought as defence witness ought to have been cross-examined with reference to their previous statemer^ts revolver. He then '‘air 1968 SC 707 c 9 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLR,J recorded by the police, which obviously is against the provisions of the Code. Except for this error, no defect of procedure or of law i^as discovered by the learned judge of the High Court in his appraisal of the Judgment of the Sessions Judge. As stated already by us, he seems to have gone into the matter as if an appeal against acquittal was before him making no distinction between the appellate and the revisional powers exercisable by the High Court in matters of acquittal except to the extent that instead of convicting the appellant he only ordered his retrial. In our opinion, the learned judge ivas clearly in error in proceeding as he did in a revision filed by a private party against the acquittal reached in the Court of Session.

#8. The practice on the subject has been stated by this Court on more than one occasion. In D. Stephens v. Nosibolla, 1951 SCR 254 = (AIR 1951 SC 196), only two grounds are mentioned by this Court as entitling the High Court to set aside an acquittal In a revision and to order a retrial. They are that there must exist a manifest illegality in the judgment of the Court of Session ordering the acquittal or there must be a gross miscarriage of justice. In explaining these two propositions, this Court further states that the High Court is not entitled to interfere even if a wrong view of law is taken by the Court of Session or if even there is mis-appreciation of evidence. Again, in Logendranath Jha v. Polailal Biswas, 1951 SCR 676 = (AIR 1951 SC 316), this Court points out that the High Court is entitled in revision to set aside an acquittal if there is an error on a point of law or no appraisal of the evidence at all. This Court observes that it is not sufficient to say that the judgment under revision is "perverse" or "lacking in true correct perspective". It is pointed out further that by ordering a retrial, the dice is loaded against the accused, because however much the High Court may caution the Subordinate Court, it is always difficult to re-weigh the evidence ignoring the opinion of the High Court. Again in K Chinnaswamy Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh, 1963 (3) SCR 412 = (AIR 1962 SC 1788), it is pointed out that an interference in revision with an order of acquittal can only take place if there is a glaring defect of procedure such as that the Court had no jurisdiction to try the case or the Court had shut out some material evidence which was admissible or attempted to take into account evidence which was not admissible or had overlooked some evidence. Although the list given by this Court is not exhaustive of all the circumstances in which the High Court may interfere with an acquittal in revision it is obvious that the defect in the judgment under revision must be analogous to those actually indicated by this Court. As stated not one of these points which have been laid down by this Court was covered in the present case. In fact on reading the judgment of the High Court it is apparent to us that the learned judge has re-weighed the evidence from his own point of view and reached inferences contrary to those of the Sessions 10 Crl.R.C.No.589 of 2010 Dr.YLRJ judge on almost every point. This we do not conceive to be his duty in dealing in revision with an acquittal when Government has not chosen to file an appeal against it. In other words, the learned Judge in the High Court has not attended to the rules laid down by this Court and has acted in breach of them. ”

#10. In Ram Kishan v. Harmit Kaur®, at paragraph No.9 it is held as under: “9. It Is true that the High Court as an appellate Court can set aside an order of acquittal. In doing so, the High Court has to review the evidence upon which the order of acquittal is founded. The High Court is to consider the views of the trial Judge as to credibility of the witnesses. The High Court is also to keep in view the presumption of innocence in favour of the accused and the right of the accused to the benefit of doubt. Finally the High Court is to give reasons that the acquittal was not justified. The acquittal by the Sessions Judge cannot be said to be against the evidence or in disregard of evidence. Nor can the acquittal be said to be in violation of the principles of criminal jurisdiction. ”

#11. In Kotaiah v. G. Venkateshwara^, at paragraph Nos.19, 20 & 21 it is held as under: “19. We are of the opinion that the entire approach made by the High Court in dealing with the Criminal Revision filed against acquittal by the private party is contrary to the principles laid down in the decisions referred to above. Notwithstanding the fact that sub-section (4) of Section 439 does not authorise the High Court to convert a finding of acquittal into one of conviction, it has in fact contravened this provision by recording a finding of guilt against the accused and directing the Trial Court to convict them after a retrial. There is no question of lack of jurisdiction in the Trial Court to try the case; nor was any attack made that any evidence has been shut out at the trial. Whether the dying declaration. Ext. P. 15, by Ratnababu can be taken into account regarding the attack on Koteswara Rao, is a matter which the Trial Court was entitled to decide one way or the other. If its view u/as wrong, the High Court could have gone into that aspect and differed from this opinion of the Sessions Court if the State had filed an appeal against acquittal. Further the mere fact that the learned Trial Judge held that this piece of evidence is not relevant, while considering the attack on Koteswara Rao, does not amount to In fact that evidence had shutting out of evidence at the trial. ORDER CRLRC.No.589 of 2010 4* 21 MAR 2025'- ^ . Current Section DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL REVISION CASE