Milind & Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.02.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRLA No. 506 of 2023. Appearances for Parties Advs. for the Appellant(s): Amol B. Karande, Vishal Jogdand, Ashutosh Srivastava, Ms. Akshada, B. Lakshmi Pallesh, Rajiv Agnihotri. Advs. for the Respondent(s): Ms. Rukhmini Bobde, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Shrirang B. Varma, Vinayak Aren, Jatin Dhamija, Ms. Aiswharya Nigam. Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court Judgment J.K. Maheshwari, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Present appeal is against the final judgment and order dated 26.02.2024 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at Supreme Court Reports [2026] 4 S.C.R. 569

3. Aurangabad (hereinafter, ‘High Court’), in Criminal Appeal No. 506 of 2023. The High Court upheld the conviction and sentence for the charge of Sections 323 and 324 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (hereinafter, ‘IPC’), as determined by the Special Judge (POCSO), Beed. The Trial Court, as affirmed by the High Court, imposed sentences, whereby Appellant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 (hereinafter, ‘A-1, A-2 and A-3’ respectively) were each directed to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- under Section 323, with default stipulation of 15 days’ simple imprisonment; and a fine of Rs. 2000/- under Section 324, with default stipulation of one-month simple imprisonment, both read with Section 34 of IPC. Appellant No. 4 (hereinafter, ‘A-4’) was directed to pay a fine of Rs. 500/- under Section 323 read with Section 34 of IPC, with a default stipulation of 15 days’ simple imprisonment. The present appeal has been preferred assailing the aforesaid findings. FACTS IN BRIEF It is the case of prosecution that the victim, a 17-year-old girl, was at her home during Diwali vacation. On 02.11.2019, at around 8.30 A.M. while she was standing outside her house, the accused persons approached her. A-1 grabbed her hand, pressurized her for relationship and gave proposal of marriage since her father wasn’t agreeing. Upon which she screamed and her grandmother as well as sister came out and confronted the Appellants. At that moment, A-2 assaulted the sister, and A-3 pushed the grandmother. Thereafter, the victim informed about the incident to her father at his nearby garage. At about 9:30 A.M, all five accused (including one accused who was acquitted by the Trial Court) arrived in a white Sumo vehicle and attacked the father of the victim. A-2 struck on the head by iron tambi, A-1 hit on leg with an iron rod, A-3 beat with a wooden stick, A-4 assaulted with fists and kicks, while co-accused Dayabai instigated them. During the incident, ₹2,000 fell from the father’s pocket. Bystanders rescued him and took the family to the police station. The injured father was referred to a Government Hospital. An FIR of the incident was registered on 02.11.2019 as Crime No. 190/2019 under sections 143, 147, 148, 149, 324, 323, 354-A, 504, 506 of IPC and sections 8 and 12 of POCSO, 2012. Learned Trial Court acquitted accused Dayabai for all the charges while other accused persons, who are Appellants before us, were acquitted for all the charges except as specified in paragraph (2) above. Upon Milind S/o Ashruba Dhanve and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra 570 [2026] 4 S.C.R. filing appeal, the High Court vide the impugned order dismissed the same, hence, the present appeal.

4. In this Criminal Appeal, notice was issued vide order dated 17.05.2024, however, when it was listed on 11.12.2024, learned counsel for the Appellants submitted that they do not wish to press the appeal on merits and urged to consider benefit of Sections 3 and 4 read with Sections 12 of the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 (hereinafter, ‘1958 Act’). ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

5. Mr. Amol B. Karande, learned counsel for the Appellants, has contended that present is a fit case to grant benefit of Sections 3 and 4 read with Section 12 of 1958 Act. In support, reliance was placed on Rattan Lal v. State of Punjab1, submitting that 1958 Act recognizes the reformative theory of punishment and object of the penal law is more to reform the individual offender than to punish. It has also been said that it is the duty of the sentencing court to be activist enough to collect such facts bearing in mind the rehabilitative approach, as has been observed in Ved Prakash v. State of Haryana2.

6. In reference to the fact and looking at the nature of offences, i.e., voluntarily causing hurt and voluntarily causing hurt by dangerous weapons, it is contended that the Appellants may be released after admonition or on probation of good conduct. Placing reliance upon the decision of this Court in Mohd. Hasim v. State of Uttar Pradesh3, it has been argued that Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act vests discretionary power on Court to release a convict on probation of good conduct on bond with or without sureties, even at the appellate or revisional stage. It is further argued that the word ‘expedient’ used in Sections 3 and 4 ought to be construed in its widest amplitude to mean what is apt, suitable, and appropriate to the end in view. In the facts and circumstances of the present case, releasing the Appellants on a bond of good conduct would be entirely consistent with the letter and the spirit of the enactment. As such Appellants 1 2 3 1964 SCC OnLine SC 40 (1981) 1 SCC 447 (2017) 2 SCC 198 Supreme Court Reports [2026] 4 S.C.R. 571 may be released after admonition or on probation on bond with or without sureties as may be deemed fit.

7. Per contra, learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the conviction and sentence imposed by the Trial Court, as confirmed up to the High Court vide impugned judgment does not warrant interference. The benefit of the 1958 Act is being sought mainly on the ground that it may cause prejudice in employment to A-1 and A-4 who are in government service, rather than on any genuine merits warranting probation.

8. It has further been contended with respect to applicability of Section 3 that the A-4, who has been sentenced under Section 323 IPC only may be benefitted. A-1, A-2 and A-3, who stand convicted under Section 324 IPC fall outside the scope of benefit under Section 3, as claimed. It has been vehemently argued that the true import and object of Section 4 is to spare an offender from incarceration and shield them from the deleterious effects of jail life, postponing the receiving of sentence for a period not exceeding three years; unlike Section 3, which expunges the imprisonment itself. Since A-1, A-2 and A-3 have been sentenced only for payment of fine and not to any term of imprisonment, the very premise underlying Section 4 is absent in this case. Therefore, it has been urged, the prayer for probation qua A-1, A-2 and A-3 is wholly unjustified and liable to be rejected at threshold. ANALYSIS

9. In light of the arguments advanced and, in the facts of the present case, issues that fall for our consideration are - (i) Whether the Appellants are entitled to the benefit of Sections 3 and 4 of the 1958 Act, and if so, to what extent?; (ii) Whether the benefit of Section 4 of the 1958 Act is available to an offender who has been sentenced only with payment of fine, and not to any term of imprisonment?

10. Since the Appellants have pressed this appeal limited to the grant of benefit under the 1958 Act, therefore, to understand the intent of the provisions of the said Act and the extent to which it may be allowed to an offender who requires to be punished, including by way of fine only, both the issues are dealt with simultaneously and in reference to the provisions of the 1958 Act, the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter, ‘CrPC’), the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, Milind S/o Ashruba Dhanve and Ors. v. The State of Maharashtra 572 [2026] 4 S.C.R. 2023 (hereinafter, ‘BNSS’), the IPC and the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023 (hereinafter, ‘BNS’).

11. At the outset, it is required to be noted that 1958 Act is a beneficial legislation, therefore, keeping the legislative intent in mind, its provisions ought to be interpreted in a purposive manner. It is trite law that if two or more views are possible vis-a-vis interpretation of a beneficial legislation, it must be interpreted in favour of beneficiaries.4 The objects clause of the 1958 Act declares the act to provide for the release of offenders on probation or after due admonition and the matters connected therewith. While introducing the Probation of Offenders Bill, 1957 to the Lok Sabha on 14.11.1957, the then Minister of State for Home Affairs remarked as follows – “On a number of occasions, the Inspector-General of Prisons in the various States have met. From 1925 onwards there were a number of meetings and the Inspectors- General who are in close touch with the life of the convict behind the prison bars found that oftentimes the particular rigour to which the convict has been subjected or the life that he leads there produces certain results other than those expected. The expected result would be that the man must reform himself, and that after he comes out of the jail, he ought to lead a reformed life, he ought to return to the proper or social life to which every citizen has to confine himself. But oftentimes on account of the long period behind the prison bars, the man does not improve; on the other hand, he shows certain sign of deterioration or worse results. That was the reason why it was considered necessary that the question of prison reform or the question of the reform of the convict or the prisoner ought to be considered not only from the point of view of the administration as such, not only from the point of view of its having a deterrent effect upon him, but also from the point of view of improving this particular man, namely the convict. 4