Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.

Held: Both the trial Court and the High Court held that the appellants failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation or documentary justification for possession of cement bags – These findings are essentially factual and are supported by the evidence on record– In the absence of any subsisting statutory order u/s.3 of the E.C. Act on the date of the alleged occurrence, a conviction u/s.7 thereof is legally impermissible – This was a case where the investigating Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 146 [2026] 3 S.C.R. agency ought to have invoked appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code, having regard to the nature of the allegations and the evidence collected – In a given case, where the facts proved disclose commission of a minor offence, the trial Court is empowered u/s.222 of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 245 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) to record a conviction for such minor offence even in the absence of a specific charge, provided the essential ingredients thereof are established beyond reasonable doubt and no prejudice is caused to the accused – The prosecution, however, did not culminate in any such exercise, nor can the High Court, in an appeal against conviction under a distinct statutory offence, substitute the conviction by invoking provisions of the Indian Penal Code for the first time – The lapse, therefore, lies squarely at the door of the investigating agency. [Paras 25, 26, 27] Case Law Cited Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India [2000] 1 SCR 518 : (2000) 2 SCC 536 – relied on. ORDER New Dehi, the 1st March, 1989 S.O. 168€. – whereas the Central Government has decided for the removal of price and distribution control of cement with effect from the first day of March, 1989: Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by sections 18G and 25 of the Industries (Development and Regulation) Act, 1951 (65 of 1951), the Central Government hereby makes the following amendment in the Cement Control Order, 1967, namely:- Supreme Court Reports [2026] 3 S.C.R. 155

1.(1) This Order may be called the Cement Control (Amendment) Order, 1989; (2) It shall come into force on the First day of March, 1989.

2. Paragraph 1 to the Preamble, Paragraph -1A, clauses (d) and (e) of paragraph 2, paragraph 3, 3A, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 12 and Schedule to the Cement Control Order, 1987, shall be omitted: Provided that such deletion shall not affect – (a) the previous operation of the said paragraphs or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the said paragraphs; (c) any penalty, forfeiture or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against the said paragraphs; or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture or punishment as aforesaid, and (e) any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued, or enforced, and any such penalty, forfeiture or punishment may be imposed as if the said paragraph had not been omitted. [No. 1-5|89-Cem.] R. K. SINHA, Jt. Secy. Note: The principal order was notified vide S.O. 4590-IDRA|18G|67 dt. 23rd December 1967.”

15.5. Further, by notification dated 07.08.1990, the delegation of powers to the State Government to regulate retail distribution of cement through licenses or permit was expressly rescinded. As a result, State-level licensing and regulatory controls Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 156 [2026] 3 S.C.R. over cement distribution also stood withdrawn. For ease of reference, the same reads as under: “MINISTRY OF FOOD AND CIVIL SUPPLIES (Department of Civil Supplies) ORDER New Delhi, the 7th August, 1990 S.O. 624(E). – In exercise of the powers conferred by Section 5 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 (10 of 1955), the Central Government makes the following Order to amend Order No. S.O. 681(E) dated the 30th November 1974 issued by the erstwhile Ministry of Industry and Civil Supplies (Department of Civil Supplies and Cooperation), as follows: - (i) that the delegation of powers under clause (d) of sub-section (2) of section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 in so far as it relates to the regulation of retail cement distribution by licences or permits shall stand rescinded with immediate effect; (ii) that all orders (hereinafter referred to as the said orders) issued by a State Government or a Union Territory Administration in exercise of the powers delegated to them by the aforesaid Order shall stand modified to the extent specified in (i) above. Provided that such modification shall not affect- the previous operation of the said Order or anything duly done or suffered thereunder; (a) (or) (b) any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued or incurred under the said Order; or (c) any penalty or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against the said order; or (d) any investigation, legal proceeding or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty or punishment as aforesaid, Supreme Court Reports [2026] 3 S.C.R. 157 And any such investigation, legal proceeding or remedy may be instituted, continued or enforced and any such penalty or punishment may be imposed as if the said Order has not been modified. [F.No. 26(3)/90-ECR&E] B.N. BAHADUR, Jt. Secy.”

16. In the present case, the alleged offence is stated to have occurred on 24.03.1994. On that date, neither the Cement Control Order, 1967 nor the Maharashtra State licensing regime under the 1973 Order operated so as to attract penal consequences under Section 7 of the E.C. Act. Significantly, the prosecution has failed to place on record any subsisting control order, notification, or statutory restriction in force on the relevant date, violation of which could constitute an offence under Section 3 of the E.C. Act.

17. Therefore, the prosecution launched against the appellants under the E.C. Act was wholly misconceived. Both the trial Court and the High Court failed to examine the legal effect of decontrol and proceeded solely on an appreciation of evidence, ignoring the absence of a statutory foundation for the offence. Such an approach strikes at the root of the conviction and renders the same unsustainable in law.

18. The legal position is no longer res integra. In Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India9, this Court authoritatively held that where a statutory provision is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause, all proceedings founded upon such provision must lapse. The relevant observation reads as under: “The position is well known that at common law, the normal effect of repealing a statute or deleting a provision is to obliterate it from the statute book as completely as if it had never been passed, and the statute must be considered as a law that never existed. To this rule, an exception is engrafted by the provisions of Section 6(1). If a provision of a statute is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings, all actions must stop where the omission finds them, and if final relief has not been granted before the omission goes into effect, it cannot 9 (2000) 2 SCC 536 Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr. 158 [2026] 3 S.C.R. be granted afterwards. Savings of the nature contained in Section 6 or in special Acts may modify the position. Thus the operation of repeal or deletion as to the future and the past largely depends on the savings applicable. In a case where a particular provision in a statute is omitted and in its place another provision dealing with the same contingency is introduced without a saving clause in favour of pending proceedings then it can be reasonably inferred that the intention of the Legislature is that the pending proceeding shall not continue but a fresh proceeding for the same purpose may be initiated under the new provision.”

19. Applying the aforesaid principle, in the absence of any subsisting statutory control or saving provision operative on the date of the alleged incident, the prosecution of the appellants under the E.C. Act is legally untenable. On this ground alone, the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellants are liable to be set aside.

20. In view of the foregoing conclusion, it is unnecessary for this Court to examine the remaining contentions raised on behalf of the appellants.

21. Before parting with the matter, we deem it appropriate to record certain observations. This case is illustrative of a prosecution founded on an incorrect appreciation of the statutory framework. The gravamen of the allegation against the appellants was unauthorised purchase, possession and storage of cement allegedly procured through Government or controlled supply channels meant exclusively for public works.

22. It must however be clarified that although regulatory control over cement stood rescinded at the time of the alleged offence, and the appellants could not, therefore, be prosecuted under the provisions of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, acts such as diversion of Government-supplied cement meant for public works, dishonest retention thereof, or unauthorised dealing in such Government property may still attract penal consequences under the Indian Penal Code, depending upon the nature of the evidence led and the specific ingredients of the offences that are established.

23. In the present case, the prosecution examined seventeen witnesses including truck drivers, officers of the Public Works Department, and police officials forming part of the raiding party. The Courts below have concurrently recorded findings that cement earmarked for Supreme Court Reports [2026] 3 S.C.R. 159 Government work and supplied at concessional rates was diverted from the Government godown and found stored in premises connected with the appellants, without any lawful authority.

24. Both the trial Court and the High Court further held that the appellants failed to furnish any satisfactory explanation or documentary justification for such possession. These findings are essentially factual and are supported by the evidence on record.

25. Nevertheless, in the absence of any subsisting statutory order under Section 3 of the E.C. Act on the date of the alleged occurrence, a conviction under Section 7 thereof is legally impermissible. That said, this was a case where the investigating agency ought to have invoked appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code, having regard to the nature of the allegations and the evidence collected.

26. In a given case, where the facts proved disclose commission of a minor offence, the trial Court is empowered under Section 222 of the CrPC (corresponding to Section 245 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) to record a conviction for such minor offence even in the absence of a specific charge, provided the essential ingredients thereof are established beyond reasonable doubt and no prejudice is caused to the accused.

27. The prosecution, however, did not culminate in any such exercise, nor can the High Court, in an appeal against conviction under a distinct statutory offence, substitute the conviction by invoking provisions of the Indian Penal Code for the first time. The lapse, therefore, lies squarely at the door of the investigating agency.

28. With the above observations, the Criminal Appeals are allowed. The judgment of conviction and sentence passed by the Courts below are set aside. The bail bonds, if any, executed by the appellants shall stand cancelled and the fine amount, if paid, shall be refunded to them.

29. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of. Result of the case: Appeals allowed. †Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Manoj v. State of Maharashtra & Anr.