RAMESH CHANDRA SHARMA & Ors. v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH & Ors.

3. Whether the classification made by the Full-Bench of the High Court between Pushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners is in contravention to the law laid down by this Hon’ble Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and another vs. Vithal Rao and others (1973) 1 SCC 500? The classification made by the GNOIDA authority for the purposes of awarding differential compensation is bad in law, and it is precisely this kind of classification that has been barred. When the purpose of the acquisition of the land is for the benefit of the public at large, then the nature of the owner of the said land is inconsequential to the purpose. If such a classification on the basis of the nature of owner is allowed, then on the same grounds, there might be a possibility of future classifications where powerholding members of the society may get away with a larger compensation, and the marginalized may get lesser compensation. This is precisely what this Court in the abovementioned judgment predicted, and to preempt such arbitrary classification, clarified the position in law. The Land Acquisition Act does not distinguish between classes of owners, and uniformly provides compensation to all class of landowners. The classification made between Pushtaini landowners and Gair-pushtaini landowners, on the basis of the reasoning mentioned above, is violative of the law laid down in the Nagpur Trust case and Article 14 of the Constitution. [Para 59, 60][468-B-F] A B C D E F G H RAMESH CHANDRA SHARMA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 427 Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another Vs. Vithal Rao and Ors. (1973) 1 SCC 500 : [1973] 3 SCR 39 – relied on.

4.1 The classification made by both the executive actions is bad in law, and is liable to be set aside. The Land Acquisition Act does not envisage any differential compensation on the basis of such classification, and hence, this Court must infer the compensation to be provided by the executive actions within the confines of Section 23 of the Act. Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act states out the grounds for granting compensation in cases of acquisition of land under the Act. One such reason for the grant of compensation is rehabilitation, and it is this need for granting compensation for rehabilitation under the Act that is echoed by the impugned notification. A bare reading of both the executive actions in consonance with the Act would show that the need for giving compensation for rehabilitation is valid in law and is backed by the parent statute. The mischief then, is only limited to the arbitrary classification made by such actions. In such a case, since the mischief lies only within the classification, it can be severed, and the remaining part of the executive actions that sets out to grant compensation for the purpose of rehabilitation remains valid in law. Once the classification is removed, and the executive actions are read in consonance with the parent act, it would be seen that since the Act, and now even the executive actions do not discriminate in terms of compensation, the ex gratia payment and the increased base amount, as enunciated by the executive actions, must be given to all landowners in the subject area. [Paras 62, 63][468-H; 469- A-C]

4.2 Further, in cases of administrative action, even if the classification has a rational nexus to the objective of the notification, the classification must also be legitimized by the parent statute. If the parent statute does not allow for a classification, then, even if the classification vis-à-vis the notification is able to pass the tests of Article 14, it would still be liable to struck down if the parent statute does not allow for the same. The impugned judgment passed by the Full Bench of the High Court is not liable to be sustained and stands set aside. As A B C D E F G H 428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R. A B C a consequence, the Writ Petition filed by the appellants before the High Court stands allowed and the appellants are held entitled to the reliefs claimed in the said Writ Petition. [Paras 65, 67][469- F-H; 470-A-B] Om Kumar & Ors. Vs. Union Of India (2001) 2 SCC 386 : [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693; Smt. Madhuri Srivasatava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2016) 6 SCC OnLine AII 2832; Gajraj Vs. State of U.P (2011) SCC OnLine AII 1711; Radheyshyam (Dead) through L.Rs & Ors. Vs. State Of UP & Ors. (2011) 5 SCC 553 : [2011] 8 SCR 359; Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar & Ors. (2011) 12 SCC 375; Savitri Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors. (2015) 7 SCC 21 : [2015] 7 SCR 512 – referred to. Case Law Reference D [1973] 3 SCR 39 [2011] 8 SCR 359 [2015] 7 SCR 512 [1952] SCR 284 [1970] 3 SCR 530 [2018] 7 SCR 379 referred to referred to referred to followed followed followed [2000] 4 Suppl. SCR 693 referred to [2017] 10 SCR 569 followed CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.8819 of 2022. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.03.2018 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in WC No.49326 of 2009. With Civil Appeal Nos. 8820 And 8821 of 2022. Salman Khurshid, S.G. Hasnain, Pradeep Kant, Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Ravindra Kumar, Sr. Advs., Prashant Kanha, Gaurav Srivastava, Aftab Ali Khan, Syed Mohd. Fazal, M.Z. Chaudhary, Ms. Azra Rehman, Ms. Aadya Mishra, Ms. Saba Baby Khan, Rohit Kumar Singh, Simranjeet Para 4 Para 10 Para 10 Para 34 Para 35 Para 36 Para 43 Para 48 E F G H RAMESH CHANDRA SHARMA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH 429 Singh Rekhi, Harsh Jain, Anuvrat Sharma, Arun Kumar Singh, Ms. Alka Sinha, Binay Kumar Das, Ms. Priyanka Das, Ms. Neha Das, Ajai Kumar, Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, Omanakuttan K. K., Advs. for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KRISHNA MURARI, J. 1. These appeals are directed against the judgment and order dated 30.03.2018 passed by a Full Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘the High Court’), The reference to Full Bench came to be made under the following circumstances: -

1.1 Writ Petition No. 61449 of 2009, Smt. Madhuri Srivasatava Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.1 along with other connected petitions were filed by certain landholders whose land was acquired by NOIDA challenging the decision of the Board of Directors of NOIDA dated 07.01.1998 as also the approval granted to the said resolution by the State Government dated 02.03.2009 whereby a distinction was carved out in the matter of payment of compensation by creating a classification between “Pushtaini” and “Gair-pushtaini” landholders. The ‘Pushtaini’ landholders whose lands were acquired, were given additional compensation @ Rs.3 per sq. yard along with 15% as rehabilitation bonus on the compensation already awarded, as also the 10% area of the acquired land, whereas those who were declared as ‘Gair-pusht xcaini’ were denied this additional benefit. A Division Bench of the High Court vide Judgment and order dated 10.05.2016 dismissed the Writ Petition holding the classification to be reasonable having direct nexus with the object sought to be achieved i.e., rehabilitation of the original residents who are likely to become landless due to the acquisition of their land.

2. Another bunch of Writ Petitions were filed by the present appellants challenging a similar classification made by the Greater Noida Authority (hereinafter referred to as ‘G Noida’) in payment of compensation on the basis of the landholder being ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair- Pushtaini’.

3. While considering the Writ Petitions, another Division Bench disagreed with the views expressed in the case of Smt. Madhuri (Supra) and vide order dated 07.07.2017 referred the matter to be decided by a larger Bench. 1 (2016) 6 SCC OnLine AII 2832 A B C D E F G H 430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R. A

4. The Full Bench constituted in pursuance to the reference framed the following questions for adjudication :- B C D E F G (i) Whether the law laid down by a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Smt. Madhuri Srivastava reported in (2016) 6 ADJ 1 is in conflict to the law laid down by the Supreme Court in the case of Nagpur Improvement Trust and Another Vs. Vithal Rao and Ors.2 and also with the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894? (ii) Whether the classification made under the U.P. Land Acquisition (determination of compensation and declaration of award by agreement) Rules, 1997, the distinction made among ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ farmers, is a classification having reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved?

5. Vide impugned judgment and order dated 30.03.2018, the Full Bench answered question No. 1 in negative and question No. 2 in affirmative and upheld the view taken by the Division Bench in the case of Smt. Madhuri Srivastava (Supra). As a consequence of the answers to the questions framed, the Full Bench held that nothing remains to be decided in the Writ Petitions filed by the present appellants and the same were dismissed.

6. Before we enter into the factual matrix of the case, we find it expedient to first trace out the etymology of the words “Pushtaini” and “Gair Pushtaini” used in the impugned classification, for language, once adopted inside the realm of law, materializes itself a much more powerful being, one which must be understood in the right historical context.

7. The word ‘Pushtaini’ is a Persian word and finds its origin from the word ‘Pusht’, which means ‘back’. The said word has been historically used in the context of ancestry. Any possession, tale or legend, that has roots to a particular ancestry, to denote it’s significance to the said ancestry, the word ‘Pushtaini’ is used. As is obvious, since the word ‘Gair’ which finds its origin in Urdu language means ‘other than’, thus, ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ would mean one which is not ‘Pushtaini’.

8. What we find most interesting however, is that ancestry as a concept, especially before times of modern private property ownership, H 2 (1973) 1 SCC 500 RAMESH CHANDRA SHARMA v. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [KRISHNA MURARI, J.] 431 had remained to be a tool for inclusivity and not exclusion. In such a context, the use of the word “Pushtaini” by the Authority, to exclude compensation might be a historically inaccurate interpretation. While this is not consequential to the merits of the case, it is in our opinion a worthwhile observation, for law has to power to legitimize the meaning of words and can change the context in which a word used, and in turn can change the course of history itself. Background Facts

9. Since the early 1970s, Liberalization took over India by storm, and it brought with it the promise of massive economic growth. A huge amount of money was infused in the Indian Economy with the purpose of developing Indian cities into massive global hubs of capital and business. In line with this, Delhi began its journey of becoming a global city. This influx of capital into the city also brought with it massive employment opportunities, and people from all over the country started migrating to Delhi. To contain such influx of migrants and ensure dignified living for all who came to the city with the hopes of improving their lives, the government of India planned to develop residential and industrial areas around the capital. For this, Gurgaon was developed across the border of Haryana, and New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) was developed by the Uttar Pradesh Government in the adjoining district of Gautam Budh Nagar. In this period, the city enjoyed massive growth, both in terms of influx of capital and migration. This growth was so unprecedented, that it even exceeded the planning estimates as envisaged by the authorities. As a measure to accommodate such growth, the Uttar Pradesh Government, exercising its powers under Section 3 of the U.P. Industrial Area Development Act, 1976, by notification dated 28.01.1991 created the township of Greater Noida, in an area of 38000 hectare, comprising of 124 villages of Gautam Budh Nagar.

10. For its planned development, the Respondent- G. Noida started acquisition of land within its territorial area of operation under the provisions of Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter referred to as ‘1894 Act’). In the same connection, notifications dated 03.10.2005 and 05.01.2006 were issued under Sections 4(1) and Section 6(1) of 1894 Act for acquisition of total area of 580.1734 hectares of the land for plan development situate in different villages falling within the jurisdiction of G. Noida. The said notifications, which also included the land of the A B C D E F G H 432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 2 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H present appellants, were subject matter of challenge before the High Court in a bunch of Writ Petitions challenging the acquisition proceedings mainly on the ground of arbitrarily invoking urgency clause under Sections 17(1) read with Section 17 (4) of the 1894 Act. The bunch of the said Writ Petitions came to be decided by the another Full Bench of the High Court titled as Gajraj Vs. State of U.P3. The High Court concluded that the urgency clause was wrongly invoked, but saved the acquisition for the reason that much development had already taken place over the said land and the nature of land stands completely changed. The Full Bench further in order to compensate the landholders directed an additional compensation to be paid to the landholders at the rate of 64.70% of the already paid compensation and a further direction was issued to allot developed Abadi land to the extent of 10% of their acquired land, subject to a cap of Rs.2,500/- square meter. The Full Bench never made any distinction between ‘Pushtaini’ and ‘Gair-Pushtaini’ farmers for payment of the additional compensation or allotment of land. The Full Bench also relying upon the decisions rendered in the case of Radheyshyam (Dead) through L.Rs & Ors. Vs. State Of UP & Ors.4, Greater Noida Industrial Development Authority Vs. Devendra Kumar & Ors.5, further held that merely because the farmers had received compensation under an agreement, it cannot be said that they have waived off the right to challenge the same. The Full Bench judgment in Gajraj (Supra) came to be affirmed by this Court in Savitri Devi Vs. State of U.P. & Ors.6

11. The present appellants had also filed a Writ Petition being Writ Petition No. 62056 of 2011 challenged the notification issued under Sections 4 and 6 read with Section 17 of the Act. The said Writ Petition came to be disposed of in terms of the directions issued by the Full Bench in the case of Gajraj (Supra) vide judgment and order dated 01.11.2011.

12. It is also pertinent to mention at this stage that even before the land acquisition proceedings were initiated and notification under Sections 4 and 6 of the 1894 Act, were issued, the Respondent-Greater Noida in its 26th Board meeting dated 28.10.1997 decided to classify the landholders for the purposes of payment of compensation for acquisition