CASE DETAILS v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD & Anr.

Order Affi rmative Affi rmative W h e t h e r a c c i d e n t occurred during course of employment? If yes, then deceased died due to injuries in accident? Whether age is proved at the time of accident? and monthly income of ₹4,000/- is proved? Affi rmative 3 5 y e a r s & salary ₹4,000/- Affi rmative Whether opponents are liable to compensation amount? If yes, then what amount? Reasoning Claimants are dependants a n d L e g a l h e i r s o f deceased. FIR in question reveals name of the deceased as a driver performing duty of Employer. No document contrary shown by Employer. Age affi rmed by Driving License indicating date of birth as 01-05-74. Also no adverse evidence shown by Insurer. On salary being ₹4,000/- p.m. reliance was placed on deposition of Ex-19. Awarded compensation of ₹3,94,120/- on the ground that deceased died during the course and out of employment a s o w n e r s hi p t r u c k was also insured by the insurer as per documents placed by the claimant. 378 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

What is the responsibility of insurance co.? Affi rmative Affi rmative W h e t h e r o p p o n e n t s are negligent to pay compensation? If yes, then are they liable to pay penalty and interest?

What is fi nal order? Affi rmative Deceased was employed as a driver with the employer on vehicle no. GJ-12w7670. The vehicle being insured, the insurer was to pay 9% interest from date of accident. Employer while being in knowledge of accident did not pay compensation to claimant within 30 days of the accident as per the Workmen Compensation Act hence Penalty @ 50% was imposed amounting to ₹1,97,060/-. ₹3000/- for expenses and ₹5000/- for funeral expenses to be paid to the claimant.

7. In terms of the above, the Insurer-New India Assurance Co. Ltd.4 was directed to pay as compensation₹3,94,120/-with interest accruing thereupon from the date of the death of the deceased @9%. The same was to be paid within 30 days of the order. The employer was directed to pay ₹1,97,060/-, i.e., 50% of the compensation amount as penalty. Further, it was directed that the latter would pay ₹8000/- (with breakup of ₹3,000/- and ₹5,000/-) for expenses and funeral expenses, particularly.

8. Only the Insurer appealed against this order. First Appeal-Impugned Judgement

It may be noted that during the pendency of the First Appeal, vide an order dated 25th June, 2014 passed in Civil Application No. 2822 of 2013 the Commissioner was directed to invest 80% of the amount that was 4 Hereinafter referred to as “Insurer” FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL J.] 379 deposited with such authority in cumulative fi xed deposits for an initial period of three years, to be renewed from time to time and the remaining 20% to be disbursed to the claimants.

Having considered the evidence on record such as an abstract of the accidental death register of the Gandhigram “A” division police station, and the cross-examination of the claimant i.e., wife of the deceased, as well as the other documents produced, which, the learned Court concluded that the deceased was neither working with the employer nor on the date of the occurrence of the incident, received injuries and died, as a result thereof.

Hence, the order of the Commissioner was set aside.

Thus, the present appeal.

By way of the special leave petition it has been urged amongst other grounds, that the Court in First Appeal has transgressed the confi nes of Section 30 of the Workmen Compensation Act, 19235; the vehicle in which the logs were stored and thus were being untied, was insured and therefore, the accident having taken place is within the ambit of the insurance company’s responsibilities; that the impugned judgement has left the Claimants remediless and sans any support since the sole breadwinner of the family had passed away. Analysis and Consideration

The act governing the present dispute, i.e., the Workmen Compensation Act, 1923, has been, vide The Workmen’s Compensation (Amendment) Act, 2009, amended, by which the word “workmen” has been substituted by “employees” rechristened as the Employees Compensation Act, 1923.

What this Court must consider is whether the impugned judgement is sustainable in law? On merits, the consideration would be whether the order of the Commissioner, in light of the materials on record, can stand or not? In other words, the impugned judgement must stand true on two grounds, (i) statutory text; and (ii) whether the materials on record support the conclusion drawn therein or not? 5 Hereafter, the Act 380 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R.

Appeals within the act are governed by Section 30 which is extracted below for reference: –

30. Appeals. — (1) An appeal shall lie to the High Court from the following orders of a Commissioner, namely :— an order awarding as compensation a lump sum whether by way of redemption of a half monthly payment or otherwise or disallowing a claim in full or in part for a lump sum; 1 [(aa) an order awarding interest or penalty under section 4A;] (b) an order refusing to allow redemption of a half-monthly payment; (c) an order providing for the distribution of compensation among the dependants of a deceased 6 [employee], or disallowing any claim of a person alleging himself to be such dependant; (d) an order allowing or disallowing any claim for the amount of an indemnity under the provisions of sub-section (2) of section 12; or (e) an order refusing to register a memorandum of agreement or registering the same or providing for the registration of the same subject to conditions: Provided that no appeal shall lie against any order unless a substantial question of law is involved in the appeal and, in the case of an order other than an order such as is referred to in clause (b), unless the amount in dispute in the appeal is not less than 2 [ten thousand rupees or such higher amount as the Central Government may, by notifi cation in the Offi cial Gazette, specify]: Provided, further, that no appeal shall lie in any case in which the parties have agreed to abide by the decision of the Commissioner, or in which the order of the Commissioner gives eff ect to an agreement come to by the parties: 3[Provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompanied by a certifi cate by the Commissioner to the eff ect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against.] FULMATI DHRAMDEV YADAV & ANR. v. NEW INDIA ASSURANCE CO. LTD. & ANR. [SANJAY KAROL J.] 381 (2) The period of limitation for an appeal under this section shall be sixty days. (3) The provisions of section 5 of 4 [the Indian Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963)] shall be applicable to appeals under this section.

(Emphasis Supplied)

The Act is unequivocal in stating that an appeal from an order of Commissioner can be entertained only if there exists a substantial question of law to be considered. It has been observed by this Court that the phrase “substantial question of law” within this Act shall be understood by its general meaning.6 When considering the general meaning of this phrase, naturally, the reference is to the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC). The rule therein is that framing of a substantial question of law is of cardinal importance.

A bare perusal of the impugned judgement shows that the Court did not frame any such question.

The wording of the Act indicates that the existence of such a question is a prerequisite to the appeal being entertained.

Illustratively, in North – East Karnataka Road Transport Corporation v. Sujatha7 (Two-Judge Bench) amongst numerous other cases, this Court has observed:

12. In other words, the appeal provided under Section 30 of the Act to the High Court against the order of the Commissioner is not like a regular fi rst appeal akin to Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 which can be heard both on facts and law. The appellate jurisdiction of the High Court to decide the appeal is confi ned only to examine the substantial questions of law arising in the case.

The other ground making the order under challenge, amenable to interference when the scope of jurisdiction is circumscribed by it being exercised only in cases of “substantial question of law”, is perversity in the fi ndings. Here, the impugned judgement does not, even remotely, 6 Om Prakash Batish v. Ranjit (2008) 12 SCC 212 (2 judge-bench) 7 (2019) 11 SCC 514 382 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 14 S.C.R. refl ect the observation that the fi ndings arrived at by the Commissioner are perverse. The diff erence, between the two judgements, i.e., the order of the Commissioner and the judgment in First Appeal, was on the point of the employer-employee relationship having been established. The Commissioner held such relationship to have been established however, the appeal Court observed that “claimants have clearly failed to prove this aspect”

It may here only be noted that the Commissioner had not returned any fi ndings in respect of the validity of non-availability of the license of the deceased nor was it one of the questions framed by the Commissioner for consideration. In such a situation, while exercising powers within the limited purview allowed by section 30 of the Act, the learned Court below erred in making observations and giving a holding in that regard.

It has also been observed by this Court that the Commissioner is the last authority on facts involved in a case. In Golla Rajamma & Ors. v. Divisional Manager & Anr.8 (2-Judge Bench) it was observed that

under the scheme of the Act, the Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner is the last authority on facts. Parliament has thought it fi t to restrict the scope of the appeal only to substantial questions of law, being a welfare legislation. Unfortunately, the High Court has missed this crucial question of limited jurisdiction and has ventured to reappreciate the evidence and recorded its own fi ndings on percentage of disability for which also there is no basis. The whole exercise made by the High Court is not within the competence of the High Court under Section 30 of the Act.

Keeping in view the said principles, the impugned judgement, ex-facie, appears to be in contravention thereto.

On merits too, we fi nd that the conclusions arrived at by the Commissioner, were undoubtedly “a possible view”, therefore extinguishing the possibility of perversity in fi ndings.

A Bench of two learned Judges observed in C. Manjamma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd.9 8 9