CASE DETAILS v. UNION OF INDIA & Anr.

department’s inability to present the appeal within time, for the reasons assigned therein, does not suff er from any error warranting interference – An exercise of discretion does, at times, call for a liberal and justice- oriented approach by Courts, where certain leeway could be provided to the State – Hidden forces that are at work in preventing an appeal by the State being presented within the prescribed period of limitation so as not to allow a higher court to pronounce upon the legality and validity of an order of a lower court and thereby secure unholy gains, cannot be ignored – Impediments in the working of the grand scheme of governmental functions have to be removed by taking a pragmatic view on balancing of the competing interests – Thus, the impugned order reasonably condoned the delay caused in presenting the appeal before the High Court. [Para 29, 30, 32, 37, 38] Delay/laches – Condonation of – An ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ off ered for the delay – Diff erence between: Held: Courts must distinguish between an ‘explanation’ and an ‘excuse’ – Care must be taken to distinguish explanation from excuse – An ‘explanation’ is designed to give someone all of the facts and lay out the cause for something – It helps clarify the circumstances of a particular event and allows the person to point out that something that has happened is not his fault, if it is really not his fault – An ‘excuse’ is often off ered by a person to deny responsibility and consequences when under attack.

LIST OF CITATIONS AND OTHER REFERENCES Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors. (2010) 8 SCC 685 : [2010] 8 SCR 597; University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors. (2020) 13 SCC 745 : [2019] 16 SCR 1259; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag & Anr. v. Mst. Katiji & Ors. (1987) 2 SCC 107 : [1987] 2 SCR 387; State of Nagaland v. Lipok AO & Ors. (2005) 3 SCC 752 : [2005] 3 SCR 108; Lanka Venkateswarlu (Dead) v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (2011) 4 SCC 363 : [2011] 3 SCR 217; Postmaster General & Ors. v. Living Media India Limited & Anr. (2012) 3 SCC 563 : [2012] 1 SCR 1045; Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Ors. (2013) 12 SCC 649 : [2013] 9 SCR 782; State of SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. v. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. 745 Manipur & Ors. v. Koting Lamkang (2019) 10 SCC 408 : [2019] 13 SCR 565; G. Ramegowda v. Spl. Land Acquisition Offi cer (1988) 2 SCC 142 : [1988] 3 SCR 198; State of Haryana v.

Chandra Mani (1996) 3 SCC 132 : [1996] 1 SCR 1060; Special Tehsildar, Land Acquisition v. K.V. Ayisumma (1996) 10 SCC 634 : [1996] 3 Suppl. SCR 848; Manjunath Anandappa v. Tammanasa (2003) 10 SCC 390 : [2003] 2 SCR 1068; Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd. v. Gujarat Steel Tubes Mazdoor Sabha (1980) 2 SCC 593 : [1980] 2 SCR 146; State of M.P. v. Bherulal (2020) 10 SCC 654 : [2020] 8 SCR 912 – referred to. OTHER CASE DETAILS INCLUDING IMPUGNED ORDER AND APPEARANCES CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 5867 of 2015. From the Judgment and Order dated 21.12.2011 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in LAA No.655 of 2010 and CM No.11018 of 2010. Appearances: Chinmay Pradeep Sharma, Sr. Adv., Ms. Divya Jyoti Singh, Sultan Chaudhary, Ms. Shobha Gupta, Advs. for the Appellants. Sanjib Sen, Sr. Adv., Ms. Malvika Kapila Kalra, Ms. Anjali Singh, Ms. Radha Gupta, Bhavesh Sharma, Tanwangi Shukla, Advs. for the Respondents. JUDGMENT / ORDER OF THE SUPREME COURT JUDGMENT DIPANKAR DATTA, J. THE CHALLENGE

This appeal, at the instance of certain affected landowners, challenges an order dated 21st December 2011 passed by a learned Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi (“High Court”, hereafter). By the order under challenge, the High Court allowed an application filed by the Union of India (“first respondent”, hereafter) under section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”, hereafter) and thereby condoned the delay of around 479 days in presentation of an appeal 746 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R. from the decision of the Reference Court under section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. THE ISSUE

The limited issue that we are tasked to decide is, whether the High Court was justifi ed in condoning the delay in presentation of the appeal. In the process, we need to necessarily consider whether the fi rst respondent had shown suffi cient cause for which the appeal could not be presented within the prescribed period of limitation. RELEVANT FACTS GIVING RISE TO THE APPEAL

The appeal has its genesis in a proceeding for acquisition of land. It is noticed from the materials on record that the Reference Court in LAC No. 198/08, vide its order dated 31st October 2008, enhanced compensation payable to the landowners. Such order was sought to be challenged by the fi rst respondent in an appeal before the High Court on 2nd June 2010, numbered as LA. App. No. 655/2010. Since the appeal was time barred (delayed by 479 days), the fi rst respondent applied for condonation of delay.

After considering the pleadings as well as the other materials on record, the High Court was satisfi ed that the fi rst respondent, as the appellant, had shown suffi cient cause for which it could not present the appeal within time; hence, vide the impugned order, it proceeded to allow C.M. No. 11018/2010. The delay of 479 days in presentation of the appeal was condoned but not without the High Court imposing costs of Rs. 10,000/- on the fi rst respondent.

The explanation put forth by the fi rst respondent, which ultimately found favour with the High Court, reveals the lamentable institutional ineffi ciency and the deplorable bureaucratic inertia.

The following events in the aftermath of the order of the Reference Court need to be briefl y mentioned. Counsel who represented the fi rst respondent before the Reference Court applied for the certifi ed copy of the Reference Court’s order on 22nd April 2009, despite the same being passed on 31st October 2008. Thereafter, certifi ed copy was received on 30th July 2009. On 10th August 2009, the Deputy Legal Advisor (Land and Building) advised the fi rst respondent to fi le an appeal before the High Court. The SHEO RAJ SINGH (DECEASED) THROUGH LRS. & ORS. V. UNION OF INDIA & ANR. [DIPANKAR DATTA, J.] 747 Principal Secretary (Land and Building) then approved the proposal for fi ling the appeal on 11th August 2009 (erroneously mentioned as 2010 in the application for condonation delay before the High Court). The Deputy Legal Advisor (Land and Building) thereafter sent the certifi ed copy and the approval of the Principal Secretary to the Deputy Commissioner (East) on 26th August 2009, which was received on 28th August 2009, whereupon the case fi le reached the Land Acquisition Collector on 31st August 2009. The case fi le was next forwarded to the counsel for the fi rst respondent for preparation of the appeal on 17th September 2009, and the same was sent back to the fi rst respondent on 7th October 2009. The fi le for payment of the requisite court fee of Rs. 51,36,592/- was put up before the relevant Deputy Commissioner on 12th October 2009. Subsequently, the budget for the same was sanctioned on 15th December 2009. The certifi ed copy of the order of the Reference Court, in the meanwhile, was misplaced necessitating another application for the same which was made on 24th October 2009. Pursuant thereto, certifi ed copy was received on 3rd November 2009; thereafter the Accounts Department, on 12th January 2010, sent the case fi le to the Finance Department for the requisite funds. The Finance Department’s letter dated 15th March 2010 approving the funds was received by the Accounts Department on 25th March 2010. The cheque towards court fees was received sometime in April 2010, after which the same was deposited with the Treasury on 7th May 2010. The Treasury having deposited the court fees on 11th May 2010, fi nally the appeal came to be presented on 2nd June 2010. APPELLANT’S CONTENTIONS

Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, learned senior counsel, contended that the High Court plainly erred in condoning the delay without suffi cient cause being shown therefor. He pointed out that the reasons cited were not reasonable by any measure, and that the same were habitual unacceptable explanations meted out in such land acquisition matters to seek condonation of delay. Adverting to the order granting the prayer for condonation of delay, it was next submitted that the High Court, and this Court, on numerous occasions had refused to condone delays of lesser periods. An attempt was made to impress upon us that it was not even the case of the fi rst respondent that the explanation proff ered by it in the present matter was more cogent 748 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 13 S.C.R. than the ones in the other cases before several fora which were not accepted. He urged that the High Court caused a failure of justice in not appreciating that inter-departmental correspondence, bereft of an attempt to explain the delay, did not amount to showing suffi cient cause warranting condonation of the same. The approach of the High Court was criticised as mechanical and perverse.

Mr. Sharma submitted that the application for condonation of delay before the High Court simply provided a narration of the ‘chain of matters’ post the order of the Reference Court. In the present case, not only was there a delay of almost 6 months in applying for a certifi ed copy of the order of the Reference Court, but also a delay of 10 months thence in fi ling the appeal after receipt of approval from the Principal Secretary (Land and Building) on 11th August 2009. Such an explanation, Mr. Sharma urged, ought not to be construed as a satisfactorily explained delay as per Balwant Singh (Dead) v. Jagdish Singh & Ors.1.

Relying on several other decisions of this Court, more particularly the decision in University of Delhi v. Union of India & Ors2, Mr. Sharma prayed that the appeal be allowed by setting aside the impugned order and dismissing the appeal of the fi rst respondent before the High Court as time barred. RESPONDENTS’ CONTENTIONS

Per contra, Mr. Sanjiv Sen, learned senior counsel, urged this Court not to disturb the fi ndings in the impugned order since the High Court had, in judicious exercise of discretion, condoned the delay after satisfying itself as to the suffi ciency of the reasons for the delay in presentation of the appeal.

Mr. Sen was heard informing us of the negligent conduct of counsel for the fi rst respondent before the Reference Court costing him his empanelment. The delay in applying for the certifi ed copy of the order of the Reference Court, according to him, was mainly due to unprofessional conduct of the concerned counsel and so implored Mr. Sen that such conduct should not have any bearing in the mind of the Court to nip a meritorious 1 2