RAVI KHANDELWAL v. M/S. TALUKA STORES

From the Judgment and Order dated 20.04.2020 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in DBCR No. 4 of 2020. Anuj Bhandari, Mrs. Disha Bhandari, Mrs. Anjali Doshi, Advs. for the Appellant. Sushil Kumar Jain, Sr. Adv., Harsh Jain, Umang Mehta, Yogit Kamat, Ms. Shruti Singh, Ms. Akriti Sharma, Mann Arora, Ms. Pratibha Jain, Advs. for the Respondent. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. Leave granted. Procedural History:

2. The respondent is the tenant of a shop situated at Plot E-2, Kamani Mansion, Paanch Batti, MI Road, Jaipur, with the appellant as the landlord. The appellant purchased the property from its erstwhile owner, M/s Jaipur Metal Electric Co., on 30.01.1985. At the time, the tenanted premises were already under the tenancy of the respondent. RAVI KHANDELWAL v. M/S. TALUKA STORES [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.] 589

3. The appellant filed a suit for eviction on grounds of bona fide necessity before the Additional Civil Judge-I, Jaipur, on 21.05.1985. The suit was dismissed on 30.10.2002, inter alia, on a finding that the plaint was not laid in accordance with Section 14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the said Act’), which proscribed the filing of a suit for eviction within five years from the date on which the premises were let out to the tenant. The Trial Court found that the premises were leased only on 08.06.1982 by the predecessor in interest of the appellant.

4. The appellant thereafter succeeded in the first appeal before the Additional District Judge, Jaipur, in terms of the judgment dated 18.03.2004. This was based on a stated admission of the respondent that he had initially leased the shop from one Udai Lal in 1958 and, thus, the suit could not be said to be hit by the restriction under Section 14(3) of the said Act. The Court disagreed with the respondent’s claim that the premises had been leased on 08.06.1982, finding that the original lease deed dated 08.06.1982 had not even been adduced before the trial court.

5. On the second appeal being preferred by the respondent, learned Single Judge of the High Court framed a preliminary question of maintainability on 04.10.2018.1 This was on account of what was stated to be conflicting views on the interpretation of Section 14(3) of the said Act by Coordinate Benches of the High Court. Thus, the Single Judge referred the matter to a Larger Bench. The question of law framed was as under: “Whether the limitation of five years specified in Section 14(3) of the Rajasthan Premises (Control of Rent and Eviction) Act, 1950 bars the institution of the suit itself or whether it has only the consideration of the suit and passing of a decree therein?” (sic).

6. The aforesaid question of law is answered by the impugned judgment dated 20.04.2020. The Division Bench of the High Court noted the divergent views on the interpretation of Section 14(3) of the said Act. The first view was that Section 14(3) of the said Act created a 1 Although Section 22 of the Act proscribes the filing of a second appeal from a decree, it does not prohibit second appeals from suits for eviction filed before an ordinary court of competent jurisdiction. This was elaborated in Gyan Chand v. Kunjbeharilal & Ors., (1977) 3 SCC 317. A B C D E F G H 590 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2023] 10 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H complete prohibition on filing of a suit within five years of the tenancy. This was endorsed by the Court in Ashok Kumar v. Suresh Chand & Ors.2 and Kahtoon Begum (deceased) through LRs v. Bhagwan Das & Ors.3. The second view reflected in Late Mahadev & Ors. v. Babu Lal & Ors.4 and M/s. Vadhumal Kanhaiyalal & Ors. v. Hemchand & Ors.5 was that irregularity of a petition filed within five years of tenancy would get cured by the decree of eviction being made after the expiry of such period. The Division Bench agreed with the former interpretation, finding that there was no ambiguity in the language of Section 14(3) of the said Act, which created a complete bar to the filing of the suit. The provision is as under: “14. Restriction on eviction: - (3) Notwithstanding anything contained in any law or contract, no suit for eviction from the premises let out for commercial or business purposes shall lie against a tenant on the ground set forth in clause (h) of sub-section (1) of section 13 before the expiry of five years from the date the premises were let out to the tenant.” Appellant’s Contention before this Court:

7. It is canvassed by the appellant that a literal interpretation of Section 14(3) of the said Act would lead to absurdity. Instead, a purposive interpretation of the rule should be applied. The intent behind Section 14(3) of the said Act is to grant protection to the tenant against eviction for five years. However, a literal interpretation of the rule in the present case would amount to granting protection to the respondent after 38 years of filing of the suit in 1985.

8. To buttress his case, support was taken from a judgment of this Court in B. Banerjee v. Smt. Anita Pan6, where a similar clause under the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, 1956 was considered. In the said case, the clause proscribed the filing of a suit for eviction for three years from the date on which the landlord acquired an interest in the premises. This Court had opined that the spirit of the protection is fulfilled 2 RLW 1996 (1) Raj. 380. 3 RLW 2004 (1) Raj. 502. 4 (2006) 4 RDD 1868 Raj. 5 WLC (Raj.) UC 2007 (270). 6 (1975) 1 SCC 166. RAVI KHANDELWAL v. M/S. TALUKA STORES [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.] 591 with the passage of three years and filing a fresh suit would lead to unnecessary multiplicity of litigation. The relevant provision is as under: A “13. (3A) Where a landlord has acquired his interest in the premises by transfer, no suit for the recovery of possession of the premises on any of the grounds mentioned in clause (f) or clause (ff) of sub-section (1) shall be instituted by the landlord before the expiration of a period of three years from the date of his acquisition of such interest: Provided that a suit for the recovery of possession of the premises may be instituted on the ground mentioned in clause (f) of sub-section (1) before the expiration of the said period of three years if the Controller, on the application of the landlord and after giving the tenant an opportunity of being heard, permits, by order, the institution of the suit on the ground that the building or re-building, or the additions or alterations, as the case may be, are necessary to make the premises safe for human habitation.”

9. It may be noticed that there is a slight difference in Section 14(3) of the said Act, which uses the term ‘shall lie’ as against the aforesaid statutory provision where the expression used is ‘shall be instituted’. Further, the relevant provision in B. Banerjee’s7 case was introduced by amendment retrospectively.

10. Appellant contended that ‘shall lie’, which is the expression used in Section 14(3) of the said Act, implies that the suit would lie defective for five years and thereafter stand cured. In this regard, the appellant relied on Martin & Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional Distt. Judge and Ors.8, where it was noticed in the context of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, that the bar was only on deciding the suit and not filing it. A suit could thus be entertained after expiry of three years. In Vithalbhai (P) Ltd. v. Union Bank of India,9 it was opined that a premature suit does not affect the jurisdiction of the Court, and the suit can be entertained after maturity, particularly if it does not prejudice the other side.