VODAFONE IDEA CELLULAR LTD v. AJAY KUMAR AGARWAL

Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. The definition of the expression ‘service’ is couched in wide terms. The width of statutory language emerges from the manner in which the definition is cast. Parliament has used the expression “service of any description which is made available to potential users”. The definition employs the ‘means and includes formula’. The means part of the definition incorporates service of “any” description. The inclusive part incorporates services by way of illustration, such as facilities in connection with banking, finance, insurance, transport, processing, supply of electrical and other energy, board or lodging and housing construction. The inclusive part is prefaced by the clarification that the services which are specified are not exhaustive. This is apparent from the expression “but not limited to”. The last part of the definition excludes (i) the rendering of any service free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of personal service. Parliament has confined the exclusion only to two specified categories. The initial part of the definition however makes it abundantly clear that the expression ‘service’ is defined to mean service of any description. In other words, a service of every description would fall within the ambit of the statutory provision. [Para 9][756-A-D] A B C D E F G H 750 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R.

2. The definition of the expression ‘service’ is embodied in wide terms. The District Forum is entrusted with the jurisdiction to entertain all complaints where the value of goods or services and the compensation claimed do not exceed the stipulated threshold. Under Section 14, where the District Forum is satisfied that the allegations in the complaint about the services are proved, it is empowered to pass remedial orders in terms of the provisions of sub-section (1). While the Act of 1885 can be construed to be a special enactment for regulating telegraphs, the Act of 1986 is a special (and later) enactment intended to protect the interest and welfare of consumers Though the present case relates to the period before the enactment of the Consumer Protection Act 2019, an important aspect of the matter is that the definition of the expression ‘service’ in Section 2(42) of the later Act specifically incorporates telecom services. [Para 13][757-G; 758-A-C]

3. The specification of services in Section 2(s) of the erstwhile Act was therefore not intended to be an exhaustive enumeration of the services which are comprehended within the definition. On the contrary, by adopting language which provides that the expression ‘service’ would mean service of any description which is made available to potential users, Parliament indicated in unambiguous terms that all services would fall within the ambit of the definition. The only exception was in the case of (i) services rendered free of charge; and (ii) services under a contract of personal service. [Para 14][758-D-F]

4. The fact that the remedy of arbitration under the Act 1885 is of a statutory nature, would not oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. The Act of 1986 and its successor, the Act of 2019 are subsequent enactments which have been enacted by Parliament to protect the interest of consumers. Hence, an ouster of jurisdiction cannot be lightly assumed unless express words are used or such a consequence follows by necessary implication. [Para 16][760-B-C]

5. The decision in M Krishnan is incorrect on two grounds. First, it failed to recognize that the Act of 1986 is not a general law but a special law that has been enacted by Parliament A B C D E F G H VODAFONE IDEA CELLULAR LTD. v. AJAY KUMAR AGARWAL 751 specifically to protect the interest of consumers. Second, even if it is assumed that the Act of 1986 is a general law, it is a settled position of law that if there is any inconsistency between two legislations, the later law, even if general in nature would override an earlier special law. The decision in M Krishnan also fails to note that the Act of 1986 is a special law providing protection to consumers. Crucially, M Krishnan fails to notice that Section 3 of the Act of 1986 clearly provides that the remedies available under the Act are in addition to the remedies available in other statutes and the availability of additional remedies would not bar a consumer from filing a complaint under the Act of 1986. [Paras 18 & 19][760-G-H; 761-G-H; 762-A] General Manager, Telecom v. M Krishnan and Another (2009) 8 SCC 481 : [2009] 14 SCR 86 – Not correct law.

6. The existence of an arbitral remedy will not, therefore, oust the jurisdiction of the consumer forum. It would be open to a consumer to opt for the remedy of arbitration, but there is no compulsion in law to do so and it would be open to a consumer to seek recourse to the remedies which are provided under the Act of 1986, now replaced by the Act of 2019. The insertion of the expression ‘telecom services’ in the definition which is contained in Section 2(42) of the Act of 2019 cannot be construed to mean that telecom services were excluded from the jurisdiction of the consumer forum under the Act of 1986. On the contrary, the definition of the expression ‘service’ in Section 2(o) of the Act of 1986 was wide enough to comprehend services of every description including telecom services. [Para 20][762-F-G; 763-A] Ajoy Kumar Banerjee v. Union of India (1984) 3 SCC 127 : [1984] 3 SCR 252; IREO Grace Realtech (P) Ltd. v. Abhishek Khanna 2021 SCC OnLine SC 277 – relied on. Bharthi Hexacom Ltd. v. Komal Prakash Misc Application No. 204/2014 in Revision Petition Application No. 12; Emaar MGF Land Ltd. v. Aftab A B C D E F G H 752 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2022] 2 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H