M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKA AND ORS.

ABCDEFGH594SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.Disposing of the matters, the CourtHELD : A. Environmental Clearance.1. On record environmental clearance has been given on23.09.2016 by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, copy of which has been filed along with I.A.in the appeal of MSPL. Prior to it, the Ministry itself videNotification dated 14.09.2006 provided that no EnvironmentClearance from MOEF was required for securing land. KSPCBhad given its clearance and no objection much earlier for settingup the plant vide communication dated 02.08.2008. Further, theEcology and Environmental Department of Government ofKarnataka had given clearance on 01.10.2010. Further, theMinistry of MOEF had issued an order dated 08.09.2014providing that the plant may be continued to operate. Thereafter, the KSPCB issued an order dated 16.10.2014 requiring MSPLto apply for Terms of Reference by 07.12.2014 and to obtainenvironment clearance from MOEF within one year. The MSPLaccordingly applied as per the Terms of Reference and wasgranted the environment clearance by MOEF vide communicationdated 23.09.2016. In view of the said facts, as of date, no objectioncan be raised that there is no environmental clearance certificatefrom the Ministry of Environment and Forest as the same hasalready been issued on 23.09.2016. [Para 25][624-H; 625-A-D]B. Non–-application of mind and undue haste.2.1 The SHLCC after considering all aspects of the matterhad resolved to approve the project and had maderecommendations accordingly. Thereafter, the KIADB acceptedthe recommendations of the SHLCC and the same also had dueapproval of the Government at the highest level. The divisionmade by MSPL (the initial applicant) for setting up the twoindustries by two different entities also had due approval of theKIADB and the Government. [Para 26][625-D-E]2.2 The original writ petitioners (land owners) hadchallenged the notifications under Section 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) ofthe 1966 Act on the ground of non-application of mind and undue ABCDEFGH595haste. No grounds were raised nor any foundation laid in thepetitions alleging mala fide. The object of the 2002 Act wasprimarily to provide a Single Window Clearance by the High LevelCommittees constituted under the 2002 Act. The Court has gonethrough the reports and recommendations of the differentCommittees as also the State Government and found that allaspects of the matter have been considered and a consciousdecision has been taken on the overall conspectus of the projectand the proposals submitted. [Para 27][625-F-H]2.3 The meeting of the SHLCC dated 06.06.2005 waschaired by the Chief Minister, State of Karnataka, the concernedMinisters and Secretaries were also present in the meeting. Thecomplete project was discussed under different heads includingthe background of the promoters, background of the company, means of finance, infrastructure facilities, environment andpollution control clearances, local employment, waterconsumption, electricity consumption and incentives &concessions. The Government Order, thereafter, was issued on22.12.2005 detailing the different facets of the proposal andgranting due approval for establishment of the palletization plantas also the integrated steel plant with a total investment of2292.26 crores and generating employment to one thousandpersons. Thereafter, under the provisions of 1966 Act, the LandAudit Committee in its meeting of 28th January, 2006, which waschaired by the Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce &Industries and Secretaries of other relevant Departments withspecial invitees also took a conscious decision with respect tothe project submitted by MSPL for both the plants at subjectItem No.2.5 and recommended for acquisition of 1034 acres ofland and to intimate the same to the KIADB. It was thereafterthat the Nodal Agency of the State level i.e. Karnataka UdyogMitra in its meeting dated 15.02.2006 after considering theproceedings of the SHLCC dated 6th June, 2005 and that of theLand Audit Committee dated 28.01.2006 accepted therecommendation for acquisition of 1034 acres of land.[Paras 28-30][626-A-E]2.4 In view thereof, the finding in the impugned judgmentregarding non-application of mind and the submission to the saideffect cannot be sustained. [Para 32][628-A]M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. ABCDEFGH596SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.2.5 Insofar as the notifications under Section 1(3), 3(1) and28(1) of 1966 Act being issued on the same date, it may be notedthat there is no embargo on the same. [Para 33][628-B]C. Procedure Prescribed under the 1966 Act duly followed:3.1 The due procedure had been followed. It is also to benoticed that the objections were invited under the procedureprescribed in Section 28 of the 1966 Act and the same were dulyconsidered and disposed of, as such, it cannot be alleged that theobjections have not been considered vitiating the acquisitions. The Land Audit Committee approved the grant of 1034 acres ofland in its meeting dated 28.01.2006, which was duly acceptedand approved by the State Nodal Agency, Karnataka Udyog Mitrain its meeting dated 15.02.2006 and duly communicated vide letterof even date to the KIADB to start the process for acquisition. Itwas thereafter that the notifications were issued under Section3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act, on 09.11.2006. Simultaneouspublication of the said notifications has already been upheld tobe not suffering from any illegality or irregularity. [Para 35][628-G-H; 629-A-B]3.2 Pursuant to the notification under Section 28(1) of the1966 Act, further steps were taken and after inviting objectionsand disposing of the same, final declaration was made, compensation was determined and thereafter possession taken. From the material on record, it is apparent that the land wasacquired in the name of the State, thereafter transferred to theKIADB, which proceeded to allot the same to MSPL and AISLrespectively and, accordingly, lease deeds were executed. Theentire process as provided under the Act has been strictlyfollowed. The Division Bench in the impugned judgmentapparently was swayed by its own personal views based onassumptions and having no material backing which led to thequashing of the notifications. [Para 36][629-B-D]D. Acquisition for a Single Company4. The words for the purpose of development by the Board, and or for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of thisAct make it amply clear that the intention to acquire land in the ABCDEFGH597opinion of the State Government could be not only for the purposeof development by the Board but for any other purpose infurtherance of the objects of this Act. This gives power to acquireland beyond development by KIADB. Further, the regulationsframed by the Board under Section 41 particularly deal with thisaspect in Regulation 13. Under the above regulations, the Boardis empowered to allot any plot or area to any individual or companyfor establishment of an industry in consultation with the StateGovernment. This provision also contemplates acquiring land forthe purpose of allotment to a single company to set up an industry.In the instant case, the allotment by the Board is duly approvedby the State Government. Therefore, the view expressed by theDivision Bench that no acquisition could be made for a singlecompany cannot be sustained. [Paras 37, 38, 40][629-F-G; 630-B-C; 632-F-G]E. Acquisition for a non-–applicant (AISL).5. It is not disputed that AISL (non-applicant) is fully ownedsubsidiary of MSPL (applicant). In effect, AISL is a new Companypromoted by the same promoters. The State Governmentexamined the request of MSPL and also AISL for modification ofits Government Order dated 22.12.2005. It examined thebifurcation under various heads. State Government issuedGovernment Order dated 22.03.2006 splitting the infrastructuresrequired with further stipulation that all other terms and conditionsmentioned in the Government Order dated 22.12.2005 wouldapply as it is to both the Companies. The only change sought byMSPL was the integrated steel plant be set up by AISL whichwas its own subsidiary. These are commercial matters and theState after examining the proposal for change in its wisdomaccepted the same. There was no change in the project, as such, regarding the finance, employment and other infrastructures. Theobjection raised to the aforesaid effect does not meritconsideration. [Para 41][632-G-H; 633-A-B]F. Relevance of Shri Ramtanu judgment:6. The impugned judgment has placed reliance upon thejudgment in the case of Shri Ramtanu for the proposition that theacquisition under the 1966 Act was in pari materia to theM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. ABCDEFGH598SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.Maharashtra Industrial Development Act, 1962 and, therefore, the acquisition has to be for public purpose only and not for aprivate company. It may be recorded that validity of the 1962 Actwas being considered in the case of Shri Ramtanu. In the presentlitigation, there is no challenge to the validity of the 1966 Act orthe 2002 Act. Further, the object and purpose of the 1962 Actwas for securing the orderly establishment in industrial areasand industrial State of industries in the State of Maharashtrawhereas the 1966 Act, the object and preamble was to promotethe establishment and orderly development of industries (inindustrial areas). Thus, it is to be noticed that the purpose in1962 Act was for establishment of industrial areas whereas in theother statute i.e 1966 Act, it was for promotion of theestablishment and orderly development of industries. Thus, thereliance by the Division Bench in the impugned judgment on thecase of Shri Ramtanu is misplaced. [Para 42, 43][633-C-E; 634-G-H]G. Value Judgments of policy views7. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment seems tohave been swayed by its own philosophy in due deference to theprinciples of statutory interpretation. The statute is to be read inits plain language. Setting up of industries is part of development. There has to be a sustainable growth and existence of all facetsand, that is why, laws have been framed, cheques and balancehave been imposed so that development takes place side by sidewith the protection and preservation of nature and environment.A perusal of the above makes it amply clear that the DivisionBench introduced several value judgments and policy views inorder to interpret the provisions of the 1966 Act and the 2002Act. It is only as a measure of caution that the said aspect isbeing taken note of. Such value judgments and policy views arebeyond the domain of the Courts. The Courts should refrain itselffrom expressing value judgments and policy views in order tointerpret statutes. Statutes are to be read in their plain languageand not otherwise. [Para 44, 45][635-A-B; 636-B-C]H. Challenge to acquisition by a minority (10%) of landowners. ABCDEFGH5998. It is admitted position that the challenge to the acquisitionof more than a thousand acres was made by a small fraction ofland owners having land less than 10% of the total acquisition. Compensation for rest of the 90% land acquired had beenaccepted by their respective land owners. The Division Benchhas quashed the entire acquisition of more than a thousand acresat the instance of such a small fraction. Out of approx 110 acresof land acquires for MSPL, only one land owner possessing only4.34 acres of land, had filed the writ appeal before the DivisionBench. Quashing the entire acquisition at the instance of oneland owner having 4.34 acres of land out of total acquisition forMSPL of 110 acres, would be against the public policy and publicinterest. The MSPL alone provides employment to 292 personswith a substantial investment of Rs.200 crores. The employmentto approximately 300 persons by MSPL is also alleged to bedouble of the number of employees as projected in the proposal. Further, in the case of AISL acquisition of 914 acres is challengedby a fraction of less than 10% land owners. The estimated projectof AISL is approx Rs.2092 crores and would employment to atleast one thousand persons. In view thereof, the Division Benchcommitted an error in quashing the acquisition proceedings. Thejudgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the writ petitionsstand dismissed as ordered by the Single Judge. [Para 46- 48][636-G; 637-A-E]Shri Ramtanu Co–op. Housing Society Ltd. v. State ofMaharashtra (1970) 3 SCC 323 : [1971] 1 SCR 719;Chairman & MD, BPL Ltd. v. S.P. Gururaja (2003) 8SCC 567 : [2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 587; Deputy GeneralManager (HRM) and another v. Mudappa and others(2007) (9) SCC 768 : [2007] 2 SCR 363; Narayanappav. State of Karnataka (2006) 7 SCC 578 : [2006] 4Suppl. SCR 716; Amarjit Singh v. State of Punjab(2010) 10 SCC 43 : [2010] 12 SCR 163; Om Prakashv. State of U.P. (1998) 6 SCC 1 : [1998] 3 SCR 64 –referred to. Case Law Reference[1971] 1 SCR 719referred toPara 24[2003] 4 Suppl. SCR 587referred toPara 31M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. ABCDEFGH600SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.[2007] 2 SCR 363referred toPara 33[2006] 4 Suppl. SCR 716referred toPara 39[2010] 12 SCR 163referred toPara 46[1998] 3 SCR 64referred toPara 46CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.4678of 2021.From the Judgment and Orders dated 22.03.2012 of the HighCourt of Karnataka at Circuit Bench at Dharwad in Writ Appeal No.6224of 2009 (LA-KIADB)WithCivil Appeal Nos.7167 Of 2022, 4699-4719, 4679-4698, 4745-4747of 2021.Ranjit Kumar, Gurukrishna Kumar, Shekhar S. Naphade, UdayaHolla, Krishnan Venugopal, Ms. Kiran Suri, Sr. Advs., A.V.S. Raju, D.Srinivas, Krishan Pal Mavi, S.K. Kulkarni, M. Gireesh Kumar, Ankur S.Kulkarni, Ms. Uditha Chakravarthy, G.V. Chandrashekar, N.K. Verma, Ms. Anjana Chandrashekar, P. V. Dinesh, Ashwini Kumar Singh, BineeshK., Rahul Raj Mishra, Somanatha Padhan, Mrs. Shubhangi Tuli, V. N.Raghupathy, Balaji Srinivasan, Nishanth Patil, M.V. Mukunda, GunturPrabhakar, Dr. P. V. Saravanaraja, Anantha Narayana M.G., Ms.Aishwarya Dash, Ms. Farah Hashm, Dr. Prashant Pratap, KumarMitakshar, Ajit S. Bhasme, Sanjay Kumar Visen, Suresh Kumar Bhan, Ms. Asmita Dwivedi, Ms. Swati Yadav, Mahesh Agarwal, M.S. Ananth, Rohan Talwar, Shaswat Singh, E. C. Agrawala, Nishanth Patil, Ms.Aishwarya Kumar, Advs. for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered byVIKRAM NATH, J.1. Leave granted in SLP(C) No. 23351/2012.2. The State of Karnataka (Civil Appeal No. 4745-4747 of 2021),the Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board (Civil Appeal No.4699-4719 of 2021), M/S MSPL Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4678 of 2021)and AARESS Iron & Steel Limited (Civil Appeal No. 4679-4698 of2021) have jointly assailed the correctness of the judgement and orderdated 22.03.2012 passed by the Division Bench of the Karnataka High ABCDEFGH601Court, Circuit Bench at Dharwad in a group of writ appeals filed by theland owners. By the said judgment, the Division Bench allowed the writappeals, set aside the order of the learned Single Judge dated 17.03.2009and the writ petitions were allowed. The notifications under Sections3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the Karnataka Industrial Areas DevelopmentAct, 19661 were quashed.3. Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 23351 of 2012 is filed by a landowner Syed Ahmed challenging the judgment dated 14.12.2011 passedby the Division Bench of the Karnataka High Court, Circuit Bench atDharwad in Writ Appeal No. 6098 of 2009 whereby the writ appeal wasdismissed and the judgement of the learned Single Judge dated 23.06.2008dismissing the writ petition {bearing number W.P.No. 18617 of 2007(LA-KIDAB)} was affirmed. As the argument of the appellant is basedupon the Division Bench Judgement of the Karnataka High Court dated22.03.2012 which is impugned in the group of Civil Appeals referred toabove, this matter has been taken up analogous with the above saidappeals. Background4. Two State Acts legislated in the State of Karnataka are relevantfor determination of issues in the present case. Karnataka IndustrialAreas Development Act, 1966 and the Karnataka Industries (Facilitation)Act, 20022.(i) The 1966 Act came up with the following preamble/object:“An Act to make special provisions for securing the establishmentof industrial areas in the 1 [State of Karnataka]1 and generally topromote the establishment and orderly development of industriestherein, and for that purpose to establish an Industrial AreasDevelopment Board and for purposes connected with the mattersaforesaid. WHEREAS it is expedient to make special provisionsfor securing the establishment of industrial areas in the 1 [State ofKarnataka]1 and generally to promote the establishment and theorderly development of industries in such industrial areas, and forthat purpose to establish an Industrial Areas Development Boardand for purposes connected with the matters aforesaid;”(ii) The 2002 Act was enacted with the following preamble/object:1 In short “the 1966 Act”2 In short “the 2002 Act”M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH602SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.“An Act to provide for the promotion of industrial developmentand facilitation of new investments to simplify the regulatoryframe work by reducing procedural requirements andrationalising documents and to provide for an investor friendlyenvironment in the State of Karnataka. Whereas, it is expedientto provide for speedy implementation of industrial and otherprojects in the State by providing single point guidance andassistance to promoters, reducing the procedural requirements, rationalising documents and to ensure smooth operation;”5. The acquisition is for two companies viz. M/s MSPL Ltd.3 andM/s AARESS Iron and Steel Ltd.4, for setting up an iron ore palletisationplant and an integrated steel plant respectively.6. Before setting out the facts it is relevant to note that challengeto the notifications under Section 1(3) and 3(1) of 1966 Act is made onlyin W.P. No.6304 of 2008. This petition relates to the land acquired forMSPL. The land owner in this petition S. Narayana Reddy owned only4.35 acres whereas the total land acquired for MSPL was approx: 110acres. Thus, S.Narayana Reddy owned a fraction of land being lessthan 4% of the total acquisition for MSPL. Rest of the 10 petitionschallenged the notification under Section 28 of 1966 Act. The writpetitioners therein in all the 10 petitions held less than 10% of the totalland acquired for AISL. For sake of convenience facts from the appealof MSPL have been recorded. It covers the relevant facts of the AISLappeal also. Chronology of events:i.MSPL moved an application on 23.03.2005 before the StateHigh Level Clearance Committee5 under the 2002 Act forapproval of project to set up palletisation plant and anintegrated steel plant in Koppal Taluk of Koppal District inthe State of Karnataka.ii. The SHLCC in its meeting dated 06.06.2005 approved theproposal of the project of MSPL to establish 1.20 millionTPA iron ore pellet plant and 1 million TPA speciality steelplant (an integrated steel plant with an initial capacity of 13 In short “MSPL”4 In short “AISL”35 In short “SHLCC” ABCDEFGH603million TPA) with a total cost of Rs. 2296.26 Crores forboth the plants.iii. The SHLCC also approved infrastructural facilities for theaforesaid project which included acquisition of 1034 acresof land by Karnataka Industrial Area Development Board63setup under the 1966 Act.iv. Government of Karnataka on the aforementionedrecommendations issued a Government Order dated22.12.2005 permitting MSPL to setup the project and alsoapproved the infrastructural facilities, including 1034 acresof land to be acquired by the KIADB.v.MSPL on 04.01.2006 transferred all applications made tothe Government of Karnataka for setting up of palletisationand iron and steel plant to AISL.vi. Consequent to the above, AISL on 09.01.2006 applied forall applications submitted by MSPL to be transferred in itsname.vii.On 16.01.2006, a further restructuring was made by MSPLand it was communicated to the Department of Industriesthat the palletisation project was to be done by MSPLwhereas the iron and steel project was to be done by AISL.viii.On 28.01.2006, the Land Audit Committee granted approvalof 1034 acres of land for acquisition.ix.On 15.02.2006, Karnataka Udyog Mitra conveyed thedecision dated 28.01.2006 to KIADB to give 1034 acres ofland for the project.x.The Government of Karnataka issued another GovernmentOrder dated 22.03.2006 modifying already approved projectfor pellet plant in favour of the MSPL and integrated steelplant in the name of AISL.xi. The State Government issued notifications under Section1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act somewhere between09.11.2006 till 07.05.2007.xii. The Karnataka State Pollution Control Board74on 19.10.2006forwarded its inspection report for the palletisation plant ofMSPL. 6 In short “KIADB”47 In short KSPCBM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH604SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.xiii. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB on 20.11.2006issued notice to the land owners under Section 28(2) of1966 Act inviting their objections.xiv.On 12.04.2007, the Special Land Acquisition Office, KIADBissued an order under Section 28 (3) of 1966 Act afterdealing with each of the objections.xv. Thereafter, notifications under Section 28(4) of 1966 Actwas issued on 17.05.2007, 13.03.2008 and 17.04.2007 fora total area of 110 acres 24 guntas required by MSPL.(Similar notifications were issued for the land required forAISL)xvi. The compensation under Section 29 (2) of 1966 Act wasdetermined at a sum of Rs. 3,64,98,000/- for MSPL.xvii. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, KIADB issued itsorders determining compensation of land in two categories:Rs. 3 lac per acre for dry land and Rs. 3.50 lacs per acrefor irrigated lands. The land owners were requested tocollect their compensation.xviii. Writ Petition No. 10501 of 2007 and 10 other petitions werefiled praying for quashing of the notifications issued underSection 28(4) of the 1966 Act for MSPL and AISL. It wouldbe relevant to mention that more than 90 per cent of theland owners covering 90 per cent of the area acquiredaccepted the compensation. It was only 10 per cent or lessof the land owners who had filed the above 11 petitions. InWrit Petition No. 6304 of 2008 challenge was also made tothe grant under Sections 1(3) and 3(1) of the 1966 Act. The area of petitioners therein sought to be acquired is only4 acres and 34 guntas. Further the Writ Petition No. 6304of 2008 was with respect to the land for the pelletisationplant being set up by MSPL The other 10 petitions were forthe land acquired for AISL.xix.On 31.01.2008, the Government of Karnataka issued anorder for transfer of land with respect to 110 acres and 24guntas.xx. The transfer of possession took place on 10.03.2008 andboth the companies MSPL and AISL were handed overpossession. ABCDEFGH605xxi.MSPL entered into an agreement with KIADB on11.03.2008.xxii.KSPCB gave its consent to MSPL to establish pellet planton 02.08.2008 and 01.12.2008.xxiii. Further the Ecology and Environment Department ofGovernment of Karnataka gave environmental clearanceon 01.10.2010.xxiv.On 17.03.2009, the learned Single Judge dismissed all the11 petitions.xxv. Judgment of the Single Judge was challenged by way writappeals before the Division Bench.xxvi. The Division Bench vide judgment dated 22.03.2012 allowedthe appeals and quashed the acquisition proceedings forthe entire areas which was not even challenged.xxvii. Special Leave Petitions filed in this Court with a requestfor interim order in favour of MSPL. This Court grantedinterim protection on 27.07.2012 by staying operation ofthe impugned judgment of the Division Bench.xxviii. The Ministry of Environment and Forest issued an orderdated 08.09.2014 providing that the plant may be continuedto operate.xxix. The KSPCB issued an order dated 16.10.2014 asking MSPLto apply for Terms of Reference (TOR) by 07.12.2014 andalso to obtain environment clearance within one year.xxx. The Ministry of Environment and Forest vide letter dated23.09.2016 communicated environmental clearance toMSPL.7. The above chronology of events is part of the written note ofthe appellant MSPL. No objection has been taken by the respondents tothe said chronology. Proceedings before the High Court:8. Before the learned Single Judge, the learned counsels for landowners had raised two points as recorded in paragraph 3 thereof; thesame is reproduced below:M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH606SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.“Sri Mahabaleshwar Goud, learned counsel appearing onbehalf of some of the petitioners canvassed mainly two points:(a) The State Government has not issued Notification underSection 1(3) of the KIADB Act and consequently, Chapter 7of the KIADB Act has not come into force in so far as it relatesto the present acquisition is concerned and therefore, theacquisition notifications issued under Section 28(1) and 28(4)of the KIADB Act are bad in the eye of law, and (b) theacquisition is in respect of only one company and therefore, the same is not for public purpose. According to him, it is thecase of colourable exercise of power and the action of therespondents is fraudulent and therefore, the acquisitionproceedings vitiate.”9. Insofar as the first point was concerned regarding the absenceof notification under Section 1(3) of the 1966 Act, the learned counselappearing for KIADB produced the notification of the Government dated09.01.2006 notifying that chapter VII of the 1966 Act would come intoforce in the relevant area. Insofar as the second point is concerned thatthe acquisition was only for one company and as such it could not be forpublic purpose, the exercise being colourable exercise of power and theaction of respondents is fraudulent was dealt with by the learned SingleJudge in detail and relying upon the judgments of the Karnataka HighCourt under the 1966 Act held that the second argument would also fail. The learned Single Judge has also recorded in the last paragraph thatonly 1/10 i.e. 10% of the land owners submitted their grievances byfiling the writ petitions. It further gave reasons for not accepting theirchallenge in larger public interest relying upon a judgment of this Court. The last paragraph of the judgment of learned Single Judge is reproducedhereinbelow:“As aforementioned, the owners of only 1/10th of the landswhich are sought to be acquired are agitating their grievancesby filing these writ petitions. If the Notifications under Section28(1) and Section 28(4) of the KIADB Act are set aside, quathese pockets of lands, then the entire development activity inthe industrial area will come to a grinding halt and that wouldnot be in the interest of anyone. It is not advisable nor feasibleto interfere with the acquisition of such a large tract of landswhen the occupants of 9/10th of the acquired lands have not ABCDEFGH607thought it fit to challenge the acquisition proceedings. Theaforesaid view of mine is supported by the judgement of theApex Court in the case of OM PRAKASH AND ANOTHER -vs- STATE OF U.P. AND OTEHRS ((1998) 6 SCC PAGE-1).The individual’s right of the land owner must yield place tothe larger public purposes. In view of the same, this Courtdeclines to interfere I the acquisition proceedings.”10. The Division Bench allowed the appeals, and after settingaside the judgement of the learned Single Judge proceeded to quash theacquisition proceedings. In paragraph 127, the Division Bench recordedits conclusions which are reproduced hereunder:“127. In the result, we sum up our conclusions as under:i) In the Indian context, Judicial review of administrativeaction is much more precise, pervasive and accurate than ascontemplated either under the English legal system or asdeveloped in the American legal system. In the wake of ourcountry having a written Constitution and laws made bycompetent legislatures, judicial review of administrative actionis not merely confined to the question of decision makingprocess on the parameters of the same being affected orvitiated due to unreasonableness, arbitrariness orirrationality, which concepts are not capable of a precisedefinition though many erudite authors have made goodcontributions and administrative law is very much part ofjurisprudence but is on more substantial and preciseparameters such as on the touchstone of the statutoryprovisions and the constitutional provisions and therefore anydecision and the process of making such a decision, if is notin conformity with the relevant statutory provisions and theconstitutional provisions, the decision is affected and cannotbe sustained.ii) Acquisition of private lands even for a public purpose, while should always be in conformity with the laws governingacquisition proceedings and existence of public purposewhich subserve a public interest is a sine quo none of suchacquisition proceedings, in a situation where acquisition isof private agricultural lands belonging to agriculturists andhas the effect of affecting their very livelihood and deprivingM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH608SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.them of their avocation, then the acquisition proceedings willhave to be tested even on the touchstone of the constitutionalprovisions such as Articles 14, 21 and 300A of the Constitutionof India and though there is no corresponding safeguard asis provided under Article 22 of the Constitution of India visa-vis violations of Article 21, nevertheless, Courts will have toapply the test of strict compliance with proceduralrequirements and any deviation even from proceduralrequirement will vitiate acquisition proceedings.iii) Acquisition of lands under the provisions of the KarnatakaIndustrial Areas Development Act, 1966 can only be for thepurpose of developing the subject lands as an industrial areaand by the Board and cannot be for the benefit of a privateindustry or company or companies, particularly as thenotifications issued under the provisions of 1, 3 and 28 ofthe Act, proclaiming that the subject lands are notified foracquisition for the purpose of the board and when once it isso, handing over of such lands to a private industrialistamounts to an instance of improper exercise of power andfor a purpose other than the published and stated purpose, but more importantly, distribution of such acquired land, whether after development or before development, being inthe nature of distribution of largesse of the State, amounts todepriving equal opportunity to all aspirants, who propose toset up industries in industrial areas and when the State handsover acquired lands to a private individual, it is thereforeviolative of the equality clause in the Constitution of India.In this regard, statement of law as enunciated in the singlebench decision of this Court in the case of Heggappanavara[supra], later followed by another learned Single Judge inthe case of N. Somashekar [supra], on the basis of thejudgment of the Supreme Court in the case of RAMTANU[supra], does not state the correct legal position as indicatedin para 21 of the judgment of the constitutional bench of theSupreme Court, reading as under:21. Counsel on behalf of the petitioners contended thatthere was procedural discrimination between the LandAcquisition Act and the Act in the present case. It was said ABCDEFGH609that there was a special procedure designed by the LandAcquisition Act for acquisition of land for the companieswhereas in the present case the State was acquiring landfor companies without adopting the procedure of the LandAcquisition Act. It is to be remembered that the Act in thepresent case is a special one having the specific and specialpurpose of growth, development and organisation ofindustries in the State of Maharashtra. The Act has its ownprocedure and there is no provision in the Act foracquisition of land for a company as in the case of LandAcquisition Act. In the present case, acquisition under theAct is for the purpose of development of industrial estatesor industrial areas by the Corporation or any other purposein furtherance of the objects of the Act. The policyunderlying the Act is not acquisition of land for anycompany but for the one and only purpose of development, organisation and growth of industrial estates and industrialareas. The Act is designed to have a planned industrialcity as opposed to haphazard growth of industrial areasin all parts of the State. The Act is intended to prevent, growth of industries in the developed parts of the State. Industries are therefore to be set up in the developing ornew parts of the State where new industrial towns will bebrought into existence. The object of the Act is to carveout planned areas for industries. On one side there will beengineering industries and on the other there will bechemical industries. There will be localisation of industrieswith the result that the residents and dwellers of towns andcities will not suffer either from the polluted air orobnoxious chemicals of industries or the dense growth ofindustries and industrial population, within and near aboutthe residential areas. The Land Acquisition Act is a generalAct and that is why there is specific provision foracquisition of land by the State for public purpose andacquisition of land by the State For companies. The presentAct on the other hand is designed the sole purpose ofdevelopment of industrial areas and industrial estates andgrowth and development of industries within the State. Industrial undertakings or persons who are engaged inM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH610SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.industries all become entitled to the facilities on suchindustrial growth. Under the Land Acquisition Actacquisition is at the instance of and for the benefit of acompany whereas under the present Act acquisition issolely by the State for public purposes. The two Acts aredissimilar in situations and circumstances.though the examination by the Supreme Court of theMaharashtra Act was in the context of the Constitutionalvalidity of the Maharashtra Act as being repugnant to theCentral Enactment - Land Acquisition Act - as we find thepurpose of acquisition of lands under the Maharashtra Actas well as the Karnataka Act is both for the purpose ofdeveloping industrial areas in the State, and therefore cannotbe held to be laying down the correct law and ratio asindicated in the two single bench decisions of this Court tothis effect is hereby overruled.iv) An approval of the project proposed by an entrepreneurand cleared by the State high level clearance committee underSection 5 of the Felicitation Act by itself cannot act as aninsurance against any possible violations, infractions, illegalities or irregularities in the matter of acquisition ofprivate lands by the State Government in exercise of its powerunder any enabling acquisition Acts including the presentact (KIAD Act, 1966). Such clearance cannot and does notabsolve the State Government from adhering to the proceduralrequirements envisaged tinder the Acquisition Act and in theinstant case, under the provisions of the KIAD Act and thelegality or otherwise of the proceedings for acquisition oflands has to bear scrutiny independently and the mereapproval of the project by the State high level clearancecommittee cannot and will not validate the illegalities orirregularities in the matter of acquisit ion of land. On suchan independent examination in the instant case, we find fromthe records that the State Government as an acquiring authorityand the board as a statutory development board, have not, only committed infractions of statutory provisions of Sections3(1) and 28 of the Act but having also merely surrendered tothe decision of the State high level committee and have thereby ABCDEFGH611abdicated their duties and responsibilities under the acquiringAct.v) Simultaneous issue of notifications by the State Governmentfor declaring an area as industrial area under Section 3(1)of the Act for notifying the applicability of Chapter-VII of theAct in respect of an industrial area under Section 1(3) of theAct and the State Government issuing the notification of itsintention to acquire any extent of land in an industrial areafor the purpose of development by the board, particularlywhen different extent of lands are mentioned in thesenotifications, betrays a clear lack of understanding of thestatutory provisions as well as lack of awareness to thelegislative scheme in making provisions in the Act for issuingof not only notifications but also to gazette the same underthese three different statutory provisions and unless it isfactually and on record that the State Government is able toestablish a commensurate application of mind to the threedifferent enabling sections of the Act, a presumption that eitherthe notifications are validly issued or that the notificationsare fully in conformity with the procedural requirement doesnot arise. For a valid acquisition of lands by the StateGovernment in exercise of its powers under Section 28 of theAct, unless the State Government has adhered to theprocedural requirement under sub-sections (2) to (8) of Section28 of the Act, the acquisition proceedings get vitiated, as theacquisition results in deprivation of not merely land ofagriculturists but also their livelihood and denial of theiravocation, and therefore the present acquisition of landbecomes unsustainable as procedural requirements underthese statutory provisions are not adhered to in the presentcases.vi) Proceedings for acquisition of lands notified under Section28 of the Act are also vitiated for the reason that the StateGovernment has not shown its awareness to the mandate ofsub-rule (3) of Rule 5 of the Environment (Protection) Rules,1986, imposing restrictions and prohibitions on new projectsor activities based on their potential environmental impactsin respect of the industries and the nature of industriesM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH612SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.proposed to be set up by the fourth respondent in the subjectlands before embarking on acquisition proceedings. Theamended Rule has come into force as per notification dated14-9-2006 and in clear and emphatic terms envisages theprocedure for either granting or rejecting of priorenvironmental clearance. In terms of the notification, evenbefore construction of new projects, it has to be approved/permitted or cleared by the central government or by the Statelevel environment impact assessment authority, constituted bythe Central Government under sub-section (3) of Section 3of the Environment (Protection) Act. The industries proposedto be set up by respondents 4 and 5 having an annualproduction capacity far exceeding 20000 tonnes are a classof industries/activities within the meaning of column 3(a) ofthe schedule to the notification and therefore prior clearanceby the Central Government was essential. The StateGovernment having embarked on the acquisition proceedingsby issue of preliminary notification dated 9-11-2006 i.e.,subsequent to the publication of the notification dated 14-9-2006 under the provisions of the Environment (Protection)Act, indicates that the State Government had embarked onacquisition proceedings for the benefit of a private companyto set, up industries covered by the notification even before itwas known as to whether a project of this nature can be clearedby the Central Government and therefore the acquisitionproceedings get vitiated. Acquisition of private agriculturallands by the State Government and in the name of a publicpurpose cannot be either casual or without being aware ofthe suitability and possibility of the acquired lands beingavailable or otherwise for the proposal. In this view of thematter the State action affecting rights of citizens under Articles21 and 300A of the Constitution of India and in turn violatingArticle 14 also, cannot pass muster before a constitutionalCourt.”11. Based on the above conclusion, the Division Bench allowedthe bunch of appeals and quashed the notifications issued under Sections1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act. Aggrieved by the same, the appealshave been preferred by not only the companies for whose benefits theland was acquired but also by the KIADB and the State of Karnataka. ABCDEFGH613At the cost of repetition, it is pointed out that Civil Appeal @ SLP (C)No. 23351 of 2012 has been preferred by a land owner aggrieved byjudgment dated 14.12.2011, whereby the writ appeal of the said petitionerwas dismissed, confirming the dismissal of the writ petition by the learnedSingle Judge with respect to a challenge relating to similar acquisitionfor a company BMM Ispat Ltd. on similar grounds.12. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties and perusedthe material on record. Shri Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior counselappearing for the MSPL, after taking us through the chronology of events, summarised the findings and reasonings given in the impugned judgmentas follows:a.The appellant being a ‘private’ company, its interests arenot public.b.The appellant MSPL multiplied into two or three entitieseven during the process of acquisition proceedings.c.The 2002 Act cannot lead to a situation that ‘at the sametime it can never be by giving a go by to other statutoryrequirements and procedural compliances.d.The process followed in terms of Section 28 of the 1996Act was not proper and many land owners werecomplaining about being dispossessed or thrown out of theirland as procedural requirements were not complied.e.Section 28(7) of the 1996 Act is ‘draconian’.f.There is no ‘public purpose’ when land is acquired for oneentity.g.The KIADB has not examined the issue of EnvironmentalClearance.h.Acquisition proceedings, in the background of the 2002 Act, are not in accordance with law and not for public purpose.13. Mr. Venugopal also briefly summarised the conclusions givenin paragraph 127 of the impugned judgment, which have already beenreproduced above as follows:i.KIADB cannot acquire lands for a single company/privateindustrialist and the same is improper exercise of power. Itis also not in public interest.M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH614SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.ii. Approval of project by SHLCC under the 2002 Act is notimmunity against illegalities/irregularities in land acquisition.iii. Simultaneous issuance of Notifications under Sections 1(3),3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act for declaration of the landas ‘industrial area’ and its acquisition, ‘betrays a clear lackof understanding of the statutory provisions as well as lackof awareness to the legislative scheme’ and further, ‘unlessit is factually and on record that the State Government isable to establish a commensurate application of mind to thethree different enabling sections of the 1966 Act, apresumption that either the notifications are validly issuedor that the notifications are fully in conformity with theprocedural requirement does not arise’.iv. State Government has not complied with the EIANotification for Environmental Clearance.14. Shri Krishnan Venugopal, learned Senior Counsel then advancedhis submissions which are briefly summarised hereunder:a. Failure to appreciate following facts and material on recordApproval of Project was after due consideration of materiali. The initiation of the entire process is based on an applicationfiled by Appellant and its consideration under the 2002 Act. The Application was considered on 06.06.2005.ii. The Government Order approving the Project was on22.12.2005. The approval was not hastily done and theGovernment Order in fact notes key features of the project.iii. The approval for modification of the Government Order byinclusion of AISL was based on an application filed byMSPL. The details and relation between AISL and MSPLare set out in additional documents, which discloses thatMSPL and AISL had common shareholders and were undersame management and ultimately, AISL was a wholly ownedsubsidiary of MSPL.iv. Full and complete disclosure was made by Applicant andthe same was duly considered and not mechanically ABCDEFGH615approved by Government of Karnataka. The High Courthas observed:“106…..There is absolutely no application of mindat the subsequent levels. A notification issued underSection 3 of the Act in the name of the Act and fordeclaring an area mentions names of respondentNos. 4 and 5. Respondent No. 5 was never anapplicant before the State High Level ClearanceCommittee, but, nevertheless, figures in thenotification under Section 3 of the Act. Evenmentioning of the names do not reveal or spell outas to how they figure there. No preamble or legendis given to it. Then follows the application of chapter-VII in respect of the land notified.”v.The above observations have not taken into considerationthe Government Order dated 22.03.2006. The grant of landis also approved by the Land Audit Committee in its meetingon 28.01.2006.Objections of land owners duly consideredvi. Upon approval to the Project under the 2002 Act, thenotifications for land acquisition are issued under the 1966Act. The Notifications for acquisition of land were issuedon 09.11.2006:- (A) declaration under Section 1(3) thatChapter VII would apply (B) declaration under Section 3(1)that an area is ‘industrial area’ for the 1966 Act and (C)acquisition of land.vii. Notice is only thereafter issued under Section 28(1) of the1966 Act to the individual landowners to show cause as towhy land should not be acquired. In the present case, noticeunder Section 28(2) was issued on 20.11.2006 and theobjections were duly considered. The Special LandAcquisition Officer passed an order under Section 28(3) ofthe KIAD Act after considering these objections.viii. Sample Panchnama has also been placed before thisHon’ble Court. Without any basis and despite material onrecord, the High court has concluded that procedure in termsof Section 28(3) was violated.M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH616SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.b. Failure to appreciate lawScope of Facilitation Acti. The High Court has erroneously concluded that the 2002Act ‘virtually leaves no option to all other agencies of theState whether statutory or otherwise and has produced inthem a state of submissiveness and they have mechanicallylike robots acted in a compliant manner.’ It is submittedthat the very purpose of a SHLCC and Single WindowClearance Committee would be defeated if the approvalgranted by such committee is reviewed again and again byother departments. The approach of the High Court willnot only render the text of the 2002 Act otiose andunworkable, but will defeat the very purpose of the 2002Act as set out in the Statement of Object and Reasons.ii. Further, the Hon’ble High Court has completly exceededits jurisdiction to review the very approval of the Projectwhen the only issue to have examined was – whether themandate of Section 28 of the 1966 Act was complied.iii. The High Court’s conclusion that the 2002 Act leads to acomplete ‘go by’ to ‘statutory requirements and proceduralcompliances’ is manifestly contrary to the record. Theapproval of the project by the SHLCC, the StateGovernment Order along with the compliances in terms ofsite inspection by KPSCB and even obtaining EnvironmentalClearance, the approval in terms of the 2002 Act has notgiven a ‘go by’ to statutory requirements and proceduralcompliances.iv.It is submitted that the High Court has erred in appreciatingthe scope of the Facilitation Act. It is submitted that thesame is only for approval of proposal of a project and notfor construction and operation itself, which are only subjectto various other approvals. Process under section 28 of 1966 Actv. The High Court has concluded that the power of StateGovernment to take possession of land under Section 28(7)of the 1966 Act is draconian. However, this power is ABCDEFGH617conferred only in the scenario that orders are passed afterconsidering objections and further notice to the landownersin terms of Section 28(6) of the 1966 Act.vi.It is only on the refusal in such an event that the power toforcibly acquire land is conferred on the State Government. Single entity being eligible Applicantvii.It is submitted that the High Court has committed a graveerror of jurisdiction in reconsidering the approval grantedto the Project- which was cleared by the SHLCC and alsoby the Land Audit Committee. It is submitted that the HighCourt could not have second-guessed the policy decision toapprove a palletisation and integrated steel plant.viii. Without prejudice to the above contention, in any event, it issubmitted that a single applicant can be an eligible applicantand there is no bar for the same.ix. The conclusions fail to appreciate the socio-economic benefitto the State of Karnataka and the scope of what constitutes‘public purpose’.15. Learned counsels appearing for AISL, State of Karnatakaand KIADB have majorly adopted the arguments advanced by Mr.Krishnan Venugopal and have submitted that the impugned judgment ofthe Division Bench be set aside. It is their submission that the procedureas prescribed under the law has been strictly adhered to.16. On behalf of the respondent no.8 in the Appeal of MSPL, ShriShekhar S. Naphade, learned Senior counsel made submissions. Othercounsels appearing for other land owners in the appeal of AISL haveadopted the same. Briefly the arguments advanced on behalf of theprivate respondents are reproduced below:a.MSPL and AISL did not have any Environmental Clearance, in the absence of which the land could not have beenacquired for setting up the plant.b.The land owner–respondents have not accepted anycompensation.c.Just because 90% of acquirees have acceptedcompensation, that does not validate an illegal acquisition.M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH618SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.d.This is a colourable exercise of power since the 1996 Actdoes not contemplate acquisition for a private party directly.An area has to be set up as an industrial area in whichprivate industry can be set up later. In the present case, theprocedure has been shortened at the behest of privateparties.e.AISL was not even before the SHLCC and the onlyapplicant was MSPL. Hence, the acquisition for AISL isbad in law.f.Division Bench considered the issues in detail and has rightlyquashed the notifications under 1966 Act. It does not callfor any interference. The appeal deserves to be dismissed.17. In so far as Civil Appeal @ SLP (C) No. 23351 of 2012 isconcerned, Shri Ankur S. Kulkarni, learned counsel, supported thearguments of Mr. Shekhar S. Naphade. He has further submitted thatjudgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012 is correct on law andfacts as such the Division Bench dismissing the writ appeal by theimpugned judgement dated 14.12.2011 committed an error and, therefore, needs to be set aside.18. It may be noted here that depending upon the outcome of thedecision in the appeals filed by MSPL, AISL, KIADB and State ofKarnataka in which the judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012is under challenge, the fate of the aforesaid Civil Appeal of Syed Ahmadwould rest.19. Before proceeding to deal with the respective submissions, abrief outline of the two state enactments i.e. 1966 Act and the 2002 Act, is spelled out. 1966 Act.20. The object of the 1966 Act is already reproduced in the earlierpart of this order. It is for securing the establishment of industrial areasand generally to promote the establishment and orderly development ofindustries therein within the state of Karnataka.(i) Under section 1(3), it is provided that the Act would come intoforce at once except Chapter VII which shall come into force insuch area and from such date as the State Government may fromtime to time by notification specify on this behalf. ABCDEFGH619(ii) Section 2 deals with the definitions of the various words andphrases used in the Act.(iii) Under section 3(1), the State Government by Notification maydeclare any area in the State to be an industrial area for purposesof the Act.(iv) Under section 6, a Board is to be established chaired by theSecretary, Commerce and Industries Department. Its constitutionis provided therein and comprises of the following as members:•The Secretary, Finance Department;•The Secretary, Housing and Urban Development;•The Commissioner, Industrial Development;•Director, Industries and Commerce;•The Chairman and Managing Director, Karnataka StateIndustrial Investment and Development CorporationLimited;•The Chairman, Karnataka State Pollution Control Board;•The Director, Town Planning;•The Managing Director, Karnataka State Small IndustriesDevelopment Corporation Limited;•The Managing Director, Karnataka State FinancialCorporation;•The Executive Member of the Board; and •Two nominees of the Industrial Development Bank of India;(v) The functions of the Board are enumerated in section 13 andfurther general powers of the Board are spelled out in section 14of the 1966 Act. The same are reproduced hereunder:“13. Functions.- The functions of the Board shall be,- (i) generally to promote and assist in the rapid andorderly establishment, growth and development ofindustries [and to provide industrial infrastructuralfacilities and amenity] in industrial areas, and(ii) in particular, and without prejudice to thegenerality of clause (i), to,-M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH620SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.(a) develop industrial areas declared by the StateGovernment and make them available for undertakingsto establish themselves;(b) establish, maintain, develop, and manageindustrial estates within industrial areas;(c) undertake such schemes or programmes ofworks, either jointly with other corporate bodies orinstitutions, or with the Government or local or statutoryauthorities, or on an agency basis, as it considersnecessary or desirable, for the furtherance of thepurposes for which the Board is established and for allpurposes connected therewith.14. General powers of the Board.- Subject to the provisionsof the Act, the Board shall have power,- (a) to acquire and hold such property, both movable andimmovable as the Board may deem necessary for theperformance of any of its activities and to lease, sell, exchangeor otherwise transfer any property held by it on suchconditions as may be deemed proper by the Board;(b) to purchase by agreement or take on lease or under anyform of tenancy any land, to erect such buildings and toexecute such other works as may be necessary for the purposeof carrying out its duties and functions;(c) to provide or cause to be provided amenities [industrialinfrastructural facilities] and common facilities in industrialareas and construct and maintain or cause to be maintainedworks and buildings therefor;(d) to make available buildings on lease or sale or lease-cum-sale to industrialists or persons intending to startindustrial undertakings;(e) to construct buildings for the housing of the employees ofindustries;(f) (i) to allot to suitable persons [premises or parts thereof]including residential tenements in the industrial areasestablished or developed by the Board; ABCDEFGH621(ii) to modify or rescind such allotments, including the rightand power to evict the allottees concerned on breach ofany of the terms or conditions of their allotment; (iii) to resume possession of premises or part thereofincluding residential tenements in the industrial area, orindustrial estate in the manner provided in section 34B.(g) to delegate any of its powers generally or specially to theExecutive Member; (h) to enter into and perform all such contracts as it mayconsider necessary or expedient for carrying out any of itsfunctions; and(i) to do such other things and perform such acts as it maythink necessary or expedient for the proper conduct of itsfunctions, and the carrying into effect the purposes of thisAct.(vi) Chapter VII deals with the acquisition and disposal of theland. Section 27 provides that the areas notified by the StateGovernment under section 1(3) would be applicable to this Chapterwith effect from the date specified in the notification. Section 28and its sub-sections (i) to (viii) provide the procedure for acquisitionof land. Section 29 provides for determination of compensation ofthe land acquired. Section 30 provides that Land Acquisition Act,1894 would mutatis mutandis apply with respect to the provisionstherein for inquiry and award by the Deputy Commissioner, reference to Court, apportionment and payment of compensation. Section 40 confers powers on the State Government to makerules and section 41 confers power on the Board to frameregulations with the previous approval of the State Government. 2002 Act:21. This Act was promulgated for promotion of industrialdevelopment and facilitation of new investments to simplify the regulatoryframework. Statement of objects and reasons is reproduced below:-“STATEMENT OF OBJECTS AND REASONS.- It isconsidered necessary to provide for the promotion ofindustrial development and facilitation of new investments, to simplify the regulatory frame work, by reducing theM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH622SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.procedural requirements and rationalising documents andto provide for an investor friendly environment in the Stateof Karnataka. The Bill among other things provides forthe following, namely:- 1. Constitution of State High Level Clearance Committee, State Level Single Window Clearance Committee andDistrict Level Single Window Clearance Committee forconsideration of application from entrepreneurs intendingto establish industries in the State. 2. Appointment of Karnataka Udyoga Mitra as a NodalAgency at State Level and the District Industries Centre atNodal Agency at the District level to undertake investmentpromotional activities and to render necessary guidanceand assistance to entrepreneurs to setup industrialundertaking in the State. 3. Providing Combined Application Form in lieu of existingforms prescribed under various laws. 4.Facilitating entrepreneurs by furnishing a selfcertification at the time of submitting the combinedapplication form to the Nodal Agency. 5. Rationalising inspections by various authorities.6. Providing for deemed approval by the departments orauthorities in case of delay. 7. Penalty for entrepreneurs who fail to comply with theconditions of undertaking in the self certification. “(i) Section 3(1) provided for establishment of a SHLCC consistingof such members as may be notified by the State Government towork as a single point clearance committee. Under sub-section(2), the SHLCC was to examine and consider such proposalsreceived from any entrepreneur relating to setting up of anyindustrial or any other project in the State with the minimuminvestment of Rs.100 Crores or above. The functions of theSHLCC are provided in section 4 and its powers are provided insection 5.(ii) Under section 6, a State Level Single Window ClearanceCommittee (SLSWCC) is to be notified by the State Government ABCDEFGH623which has the power to deal with the proposals with the investmentof more than Rs.15 Crores but less than Rs.100 Crores. The powers of SLSWCC are provided in section 7 and section 8.(iii) Similarly, there would be a District Level Single WindowClearance Committee (DLSWCC) dealing with investments upto Rs.15 Crores and its functions and powers spelled out inparagraphs 10 and 11.(iv) Under section 11(A), the Government could constitute a StateLevel Empowered Committee which was to be chaired by theChief Secretary of the State, with Principal Secretaries of 10different departments, Chairman of KSPCB, Director-Generaland Inspector-General of Police & State Fire Extinguishing andEmergency Services, Chief Executive Officer & ExecutiveMember of KIADB and the Commissioner for IndustrialDevelopment & the Director for Industries and Commerce as itsmembers.(v) There was also provision made for Nodal Agencies, KarnatakaUdyog Mitra at the State Level under section 12 and its functionsenumerated under section 13.(vi) Section 14 provides for a Combined Application Form for useof entrepreneurs for obtaining clearance to be prescribed by theState Government to all the Clearance Committees.(vii) Section 17 provides for deemed approval in case clearanceis not issued within stipulated time.(viii) Section 18 provided for an appeal by any person aggrievedby the decision of the above-mentioned committees. 22. In the present case as stated in the chronology of events, theMSPL had initially moved an application under the 2002 Act. During theconsideration of the said application by the State Government, MSPLshared its projects of the two industries by inducting AISL a fully ownedsubsidiary of MSPL. The introduction of AISL was accepted by theState Government and necessary applications were given by AISL also. The SHLCC had earlier approved both the projects and one of therecommendations was for acquisition of land under the 1966 Act. TheKIADB considered the recommendations of the SHLCC, KarnatakaM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH624SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.Udyog Mitra & the State Government and accordingly acquired theland as per the procedure prescribed under section 28 of the 1966 Act. 23. It is this acquisition of land for MSPL and AISL which isunder challenge in these proceedings. The Division bench having quashedthe acquisition as also the notifications under section 1(3) and section3(1) along with section 28 of 1966 Act is now for consideration in thepresent group of appeals.24. Based upon the arguments advanced by the learned counsels, the following issues arise in these appeals for our consideration:(I) Whether in the absence of environmental clearance, theacquisition in question could have taken place? (II) Whether the acquisition was vitiated in view of theundue haste and non-application of mind by the competentauthorities?(III) Whether the procedure prescribed under the 1966 Actwas duly followed?(IV) Whether the acquisition for a single company couldbe said to be for public purpose and could be made under the1966 Act?(V) Whether acquisition could be made for a non-applicantAISL under the 1966 Act without its application being routedthrough SHLCC.(VI) Whether the comparison with the MaharashtraIndustrial Development Act, 1962, placing reliance on the judgmentof this Court in the case of Shri Ramtanu Co-op. HousingSociety Ltd. Vs. State of Maharashtra, reported in (197) 3SCC 323 in the impugned judgment is correct?(VII) Whether the conclusions arrived at in the impugnedjudgment are vitiated on account of inclusion of value judgmentsof policy views by the High Court?(VIII) Whether the entire acquisition could be quashed upona petition by a fraction of landowners holding a fraction of acquiredland which is only 10 % or less of the total acquired land?A. Environmental Clearance.25. On record environmental clearance has been given on23.09.2016 by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government ofIndia, copy of which has been filed along with I.A. No.118035 of 2017 in ABCDEFGH625the appeal of MSPL. Prior to it, the Ministry itself vide paragraph-2 ofthe Notification dated 14.09.2006 provided that no EnvironmentClearance from MOEF was required for securing land. It may also berelevant to note here that KSPCB had given its clearance and no objectionmuch earlier for setting up the plant vide communication dated02.08.2008. Further, the Ecology and Environmental Department ofGovernment of Karnataka had given clearance on 01.10.2010. Further, the Ministry of MOEF had issued an order dated 08.09.2014 providingthat the plant may be continued to operate. Thereafter, the KSPCBissued an order dated 16.10.2014 requiring MSPL to apply for Terms ofReference by 07.12.2014 and to obtain environment clearance fromMOEF within one year. The MSPL accordingly applied as per the Termsof Reference and was granted the environment clearance by MOEFvide communication dated 23.09.2016. In view of the above facts, as ofdate, no objection can be raised that there is no environmental clearancecertificate from the Ministry of Environment and Forest as the same hasalready been issued on 23.09.2016.B. Non-application of mind and undue haste.26. From the chronology of events what is to be noted is that theSHLCC after considering all aspects of the matter had resolved toapprove the project and had made recommendations accordingly. Thereafter, the KIADB accepted the recommendations of the SHLCCand the same also had due approval of the Government at the highestlevel. The division made by MSPL (the initial applicant) for setting upthe two industries by two different entities also had due approval of theKIADB and the Government.27. The original writ petitioners (land owners) had challenged thenotifications under Section 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act on theground of non-application of mind and undue haste. No grounds wereraised nor any foundation laid in the petitions alleging mala fide. Theobject of the 2002 Act was primarily to provide a Single WindowClearance by the High Level Committees constituted under the 2002Act. We have gone through the reports and recommendations of thedifferent Committees as also the State Government and we find that allaspects of the matter have been considered and a conscious decisionhas been taken on the overall conspectus of the project and the proposalssubmitted.M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH626SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.28. The meeting of the SHLCC dated 06.06.2005 was chaired bythe Chief Minister, State of Karnataka, the concerned Ministers andSecretaries were also present in the meeting. The complete project wasdiscussed under different heads including the background of thepromoters, background of the company, means of finance, infrastructurefacilities, environment and pollution control clearances, local employment, water consumption, electricity consumption and incentives &concessions.29. The Government Order, thereafter, was issued on 22.12.2005detailing the different facets of the proposal and granting due approvalfor establishment of the palletization plant as also the integrated steelplant with a total investment of 2292.26 crores and generatingemployment to one thousand persons.30. Thereafter, under the provisions of 1966 Act, the Land AuditCommittee in its meeting of 28th January, 2006, which was chaired bythe Principal Secretary, Department of Commerce & Industries andSecretaries of other relevant Departments with special invitees also tooka conscious decision with respect to the project submitted by MSPL forboth the plants at subject Item No.2.5 and recommended for acquisitionof 1034 acres of land and to intimate the same to the KIADB. It wasthereafter that the Nodal Agency of the State level i.e. Karnataka UdyogMitra in its meeting dated 15.02.2006 after considering the proceedingsof the SHLCC dated 6th June, 2005 and that of the Land Audit Committeedated 28.01.2006 accepted the recommendation for acquisition of 1034acres of land.31. These aspects were examined by this Court in Chairman &MD, BPL Ltd. Vs. S.P. Gururaja, reported in (2003) 8 SCC 567.This Hon’ble Court was dealing with a similar situation where a StateHigh Level Committee was constituted to grant approvals and acquireland to the appellant therein. This process was challenged in a publicinterest litigation. This Court was pleased to dismiss the writ petitionfinding that:17. The Company intended to set up more than one unit. Forthe purpose of achieving the objective of economicdevelopment of the State, the State is entitled to deal with theapplications of the entrepreneurs in an appropriate manner. For the said purpose a High Level Committee was constituted. The said Committee held its meeting on 10.10.1994 wherein ABCDEFGH627not only the members referred to hereinbefore but also variousother officers were present. Presumably, prior thereto theapplications filed by the Company were scrutinized by thecompetent authorities. After detailed discussions, the HighLevel Committee resolved: (a) to permit the unit to change thelocation from Malur Indl. Area. to Dobespet Industrial Area;(b) to allot a total of 500 acres of land for the three projectsviz., Colour Picture Tube, Colour Televisions and Battery, inDobespet Industrial Area, Nelamangala to, in lieu of theearlier allotment of 100 acres of land at Malur Indl Area forthe Colour TV sets project, subject to the promoters indicatingthe individual land requirement for Colour Picture Tubeproject, Colour TV project and the battery project dulyjustifying the requirement with necessary plans, blockdiagrams, etc.18. Similar considerations were made in respect of ColourTelevision Picture Tube Project of the Company andManufacture of Batteries. The matter relating to allotment ofland is a statutory function on the part of the Board. In termsof the provisions of the Act, consultations with the StateGovernment is required if Regulation 13 of the Regulationsin place of Regulation 7 is to be taken recourse to. Does itmean that consultations must be held in a particular manner,i.e. by exchange of correspondences and in no other? Answerto the said questions must be rendered in negative. The HighLevel Committee was chaired by the Minister who in terms ofthe Rules of Executive Business framed under Article 166 ofthe Constitution of India was entitled to represent the State. Once a consultation takes place by mutual discussion and aconsensus is arrived at between different authoritiesperforming different functions under the statutes, the purposefor which consultation was to be made would stand satisfied. Under the Act or the Regulations framed thereunder, noprocedure for holding such consultations had been laid down.In that situation it was open to the competent authorities toevolve their own procedure. Such a procedure of taking adecision upon deliberations does not fall foul of Article 14 ofthe Constitution of India. No malice of fact has been allegedin the instant case.”M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH628SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.32. In view of the above, the finding in the impugned judgmentregarding non-application of mind and the submission of Mr. Naphade tothe aforesaid effect cannot be sustained.33. Insofar as the notifications under Section 1(3), 3(1) and 28(1)of 1966 Act being issued on the same date, it may be noted that there isno embargo on the same. The statutes do not prohibit the same. Moreover, this issue has also been dealt with by this Court in the case of DeputyGeneral Manager (HRM) and another Vs. Mudappa and othersreported in 2007 (9) SCC 768. Para 30 of the said judgment isreproduced hereunder:“In our judgment, the learned Single Judge was wholly inerror in taking such view and quashing the notification. Upholding of such view would make statutory provisionsunder the Act or similar provisions in other laws, (for example, the Land Acquisition Act, 1894) nugatory and otiose. We arealso of the view that the learned Single Judge was not right infinding fault with the State Authorities in issuing notificationsunder Section 1(3), Section 3(1) and Section 28(1)simultaneously. There is no bar in issuing such notificationsas has been done and no provision has been shown to us bythe learned counsel for the contesting respondents whichprevented the State from doing so. Even that ground, therefore, cannot help the land-owners”.34.The above view has the approval of this Court in its recentorder dated 28.01.2020 passed in Special Leave Petition (c)No(s).9662 of 2013 (C. Jayaram and others Vs. The State ofKarnataka and others).C. Procedure Prescribed under the 1966 Act duly followed:35. As already noted above from the chronology of events givenin the earlier part of the judgment, the due procedure had been followed.It is also to be noticed that the objections were invited under the procedureprescribed in Section 28 of the 1966 Act and the same were dulyconsidered and disposed of, as such, it cannot be alleged that theobjections have not been considered vitiating the acquisitions. In thisrespect it would be relevant to mention that the Land Audit Committeeapproved the grant of 1034 acres of land in its meeting dated 28.01.2006,which was duly accepted and approved by the State Nodal Agency, ABCDEFGH629Karnataka Udyog Mitra in its meeting dated 15.02.2006 and dulycommunicated vide letter of even date to the KIADB to start the processfor acquisition. It was thereafter that the notifications were issued underSection 3(1), 1(3) and 28(1) of the 1966 Act, on 09.11.2006. Simultaneouspublication of the said notifications has already been upheld to be notsuffering from any illegality or irregularity.36. Pursuant to the notification under Section 28(1) of the 1966Act, further steps were taken and after inviting objections and disposingof the same, final declaration was made, compensation was determinedand thereafter possession taken. It would be also relevant to state herethat from the material on record, it is apparent that the land was acquiredin the name of the State, thereafter transferred to the KIADB, whichproceeded to allot the same to MSPL and AISL respectively and, accordingly, lease deeds were executed. The entire process as providedunder the Act has been strictly followed. The Division Bench in theimpugned judgment apparently was swayed by its own personal viewsbased on assumptions and having no material backing which led to thequashing of the notifications.D. Acquisition for a Single Company.37.Section 28(1) of the KIAD Act is reproduced below:“28. Acquisition of land.- (1) if at any time, in the opinion ofthe State Government, any land is required for the purpose ofdevelopment by the Board, or for any other purpose infurtherance of the objects of this Act, the State Governmentmay by notification, given notice of its intention to acquiresuch land.” [Emphasis Provided]The words for the purpose of development by the Board, and orfor any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of this Act make itamply clear that the intention to acquire land in the opinion of the StateGovernment could be not only for the purpose of development by theBoard but for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of thisAct. This gives power to acquire land beyond development by KIADB.Further, the regulations framed by the Board under Section 41 particularlydeal with this aspect in Regulation 13 which reads as under;“Allotment of Plots in Special Cases: Notwithstandinganything contained in these regulations, the Board inconsultation with the State Government may allot any plot orM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH630SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.area other than those in respect of which applications arecalled for under Regulation 7 to any individual or companyfor the establishment of an industry or for the provision ofany amenity required in the Industrial area.” [EmphasisProvided]38.Under the above regulations, the Board is empowered to allotany plot or area to any individual or company for establishment of anindustry in consultation with the State Government. This provision alsocontemplates acquiring land for the purpose of allotment to a singlecompany to set up an industry. In the present case, the allotment by theBoard is duly approved by the State Government.39.In the same context, it would be relevant to refer to a judgmentof this Court in the case of P. Narayanappa Vs. State of Karnatakareported in (2006) 7 SCC 578, where it upheld the acquisition of land infavour of a private company under the 1966 Act. Paragraphs 6, 13 and14 of the said judgment are reproduced below:“6. Shri Shanti Bhushan, learned senior counsel for theappellants, has challenged the impugned notifications onseveral grounds and the principal ground is that the land hasbeen acquired in order to benefit a company, namely, VikasTelecom (P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) who had submitted aproject report for setting up a software technology park whichincluded an I.T. Training Institute/Engineering College, Research and Development Centre, Educational Centre, Commercial and Residential Buildings and Service Apartments, Convention Centre, Hotel, Shopping Mall, etc………………13. The provision for acquisition of land under the Act iscontained in Section 28 which is somewhat different from theprovisions contained in Sections 4, 5A and 6 of the LandAcquisition Act. The legislature in its wisdom thought it properto make a specific provision for acquisition of the land in theAct itself rather than to take recourse to Sections 4 and 6 ofthe Land Acquisition Act. A plain reading of sub-section (1)of Section 28 would show that land can be acquired for thepurpose of (i) development by the Board, or (ii) for any otherpurpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Sub-section ABCDEFGH631(3) of Section 28 is similar to Section 5A of the LandAcquisition Act and the final notification is issued under sub-section (4) of Section 28. The necessary precondition for avalid notification under sub-section (4) of Section 28 is thatthe State Government should be satisfied that the land isrequired for the purpose specified in the notification issuedunder sub-section (1), viz., for the purpose of (i) developmentby the Board, or (ii) for any other purpose in furtherance ofthe objects of the Act. Therefore, in order to judge the validityof the notification what is to be seen is whether the acquisitionof land is being made for securing the establishment ofindustrial areas or to promote the establishment or orderlydevelopment of industries in such areas. In view of widedefinition of the words “industrial infrastructural facilities”as contained in Section 2 (7a) of the Act, making of atechnology park, research and development centre, townships, trade and tourism centres or making provisions for marketingand banking which would contribute to the development ofindustries will meet the objectives of the Act and acquisitionof land for such a purpose would be perfectly valid.14……….Sub-section (1) of Section 28 clearly shows that theland can be acquired for (i) development by the Board; or (ii)for any other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. Under sub-section (8) of Section 28, the State Government isempowered, after it has taken possession of land, to transferthe same to the Board for the purpose for which the land hasbeen acquired. Section 32 empowers the State Government toplace at the disposal of the Board any land vested in it andthe Board is enjoined to deal with the land in accordancewith the regulations made and directions given by the StateGovernment in this behalf. This stage when the Board getsthe authority to deal with the land comes at a later stage whichis after the land has been developed by it. An entrepreneuror a company may give a proposal to the State Governmentfor setting up an industry or infrastructural facility and theGovernment may thereafter acquire the land and give it tothe Board. It is also possible that after the land has alreadybeen acquired and developed by the Board, it may be allottedto an entrepreneur or a company for setting up an industryM/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH632SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.or infrastructural facility. Therefore, the scheme of the Actdoes not show that at the time of acquisition of the land andissuing a preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of theAct, the complete details of the nature of the industry orinfrastructural facility proposed to be set up should also bementioned. At that stage what is to be seen is whether theland is acquired for development by the Board or for anyother purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act, asmentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 28 of the Act. In fact, if the contention raised by the learned senior counsel for theappellants is accepted, it would mean that even at the stageof preliminary notification under Section 28(1) of the Act, the nature of the activity which may be done by someentrepreneur or a company which may give a proposal forsetting up an industry or infrastructural facility much afterland has been acquired should also be taken note of andspecifically mentioned in the notification, which is well nighimpossible. While interpreting the provisions of the Act, theCourt should not only take into consideration the facts of thepresent case but should also have in mind all possiblecontingencies. Therefore, on a plain reading of the languageused in the Act, it is not possible to accept the contention ofthe learned senior counsel for the appellants that the impugnednotification is vague or cryptic as the complete details of theproject which was proposed to be established by Vikas Telecom(P) Ltd. (respondent no.9) were not mentioned and on accountof the aforesaid lacuna, the landowners were deprived of theirright to make a proper representation or to show cause againstthe proposed acquisition.” [Emphasis Provided]40.Therefore, the view expressed by the Division Bench that noacquisition could be made for a single company cannot be sustained.E- Acquisition for a non-applicant (AISL).41. It is not disputed that AISL (non-applicant) is fully ownedsubsidiary of MSPL (applicant). In effect, AISL is a new Companypromoted by the same promoters. The State Government examined therequest of MSPL and also AISL for modification of its GovernmentOrder dated 22.12.2005. It examined the bifurcation under various heads. State Government issued Government Order dated 22.03.2006 splitting ABCDEFGH633the infrastructures required with further stipulation that all other termsand conditions mentioned in the Government Order dated 22.12.2005would apply as it is to both the Companies. The only change sought byMSPL was the integrated steel plant be set up by AISL which was itsown subsidiary. These are commercial matters and the State afterexamining the proposal for change in its wisdom accepted the same. There was no change in the project, as such, regarding the finance, employment and other infrastructures. The objection raised by Mr.Naphade to the aforesaid effect does not merit consideration.F. Relevance of Shri Ramtanu judgment:42.The impugned judgment has placed reliance upon the judgmentin the case of Shri Ramtanu(supra) for the proposition that theacquisition under the 1966 Act was in pari materia to the MaharashtraIndustrial Development Act, 1962 and, therefore, the acquisition has tobe for public purpose only and not for a private company. At the outset, it may be recorded that validity of the 1962 Act was being considered inthe case of Shri Ramtanu (supra). In the present litigation, there is nochallenge to the validity of the 1966 Act or the 2002 Act. Further, theobject and purpose of the 1962 Act was for securing the orderlyestablishment in industrial areas and industrial State of industries in theState of Maharashtra whereas the 1966 Act, the object and preamblewas to promote the establishment and orderly development of industries(in industrial areas). This Court while dealing with the 1962 Act discussedthis aspect in para 21 of ShriRamtanu (supra), which is reproducedhereunder:Counsel on behalf of the petitioners contended that there wasprocedural discrimination between the Land AcquisitionAct and the Act in the present case. It was said that there wasa special procedure designed by the Land Acquisition Act foracquisition of land for the companies whereas in the’ presentcase the State was acquiring land for companies withoutadopting the procedure of, the Land Acquisition Act. It is tobe remembered that the Act in the present case is a specialone having the specific and special pur- pose of growth, development and Organisation of industries in the State ofMaharashtra. The Act has its own procedure and there is noprovision in the Act for acquisition of land for a company asin the case of Land Acquisition Act. In the present case,M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH634SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.acquisition under the Act is for the purpose of development ofindustrial estates or industrial areas by the Corporation orany other purpose in furtherance of the objects of the Act. The policy underlying, the Act is not acquisition of land forany company but for the one. and only purpose of development, Organisation and growth of industrial estates and industrialareas. The Act is designed to have a planned industrial cityas opposed to haphazard growth of industrial areas in allparts of the State. The Act is intended to prevent ,.growth ofindustries in the developed parts of the State. Industries aretherefore to be set up in the developing or, new parts of theState where new industrial towns will be brought into existence. The object of, the Act is to carve out planned areas forindustries. On one side there Will be engineering industriesand on the other there will be chemical industries. There willbe localisation of industries with the result that the residentsand dwellers of towns and cities will not suffer either fromthe polluted air or obnoxious. chemicals of industries or thedense growth of industries and industrial population, withinand near about the residential areas. The Land AcquisitionAct is a general Act and that is why there is specific provisionfor acquisition of land by the, State for public purpose andacquisition of land by the State for companies. The presentAct on the other hand is designed the sole purpose ofdevelopment of industrial areas and industrial estates andgrowth and development of industries within the State. Industrial undertakings or persons who are engaged inindustries all become entitled to the’ facilities on suchindustrial growth. Under the Land Acquisition Act acquisitionis at the instance of and for the benefit of a company whereasunder the present Act acquisition is solely by the State forpublic purposes. The two acts are dissimilar in situations andcircumstances.”[Emphasis Provided]43.Thus, it is to be noticed that the purpose in 1962 Act was forestablishment of industrial areas whereas in the other statute i.e 1966Act, it was for promotion of the establishment and orderly developmentof industries. Thus, the reliance by the Division Bench in the impugnedjudgment on the case of Shri Ramtanu (supra) is misplaced. ABCDEFGH635G. Value judgments of policy views.44. The Division Bench in the impugned judgment seems to havebeen swayed by its own philosophy in due deference to the principles ofstatutory interpretation. The statute is to be read in its plain language. Setting up of industries is part of development. There has to be asustainable growth and existence of all facets and, that is why, lawshave been framed, cheques and balance have been imposed so thatdevelopment takes place side by side with the protection and preservationof nature and environment. Certain extracts from the impugned judgmentwherein the Division Bench had expressed its personal policy views andvalue judgments are reproduced hereunder: “Though the word ‘development’ is used, when this word isexamined in an objective manner, in an impassionate manner, it is nothing but interference with the existing state of natureand destroying naute !” (P.90-91)“Any industry inevitably creates and causes pollution of theland, air and water….” (P.91)“Unfortunately, by and large,….courts have been proacquisition and have generally approved or upheldacquisition proceedings in the name of public interest.” (P.96)“When examined on such a touchstone and such tests areapplied, we find that the present acquisition proceedingscannot stand. The affectation is very adverse and the benefitif at all is a return because of future development of anyindustry with some potential for employment and may be alittle revenue to the State. The affectation to the livelihoodand dignified life of thousands of people which is not examinedeven it is not the focal point, it should be at least be given dueattention which it deserved” (P.105)“…..[A]nd with the history of limited companies being toowell-known, though the British claim the invention of jointstock company is the genius of English legal mind when theconcept is examined from the perception as it prevails in thiscountry and in the society and examine from the ethos of oursociety, it is nothing short of deception or playing fraud.”(P.106)M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.] ABCDEFGH636SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 14 S.C.R.“A joint stock company is invented only to defraud creditors.”(P.106-107)“Let us not lose our souls in the name of development bydepriving land holders of their land holdings.” (P.108)45.A perusal of the above makes it amply clear that the DivisionBench introduced several value judgments and policy views in order tointerpret the provisions of the 1966 Act and the 2002 Act. It is only as ameasure of caution that the said aspect is being taken note of. Suchvalue judgments and policy views are beyond the domain of the Courts. The Courts should refrain itself from expressing value judgments andpolicy views in order to interpret statutes. Statutes are to be read in theirplain language and not otherwise. Reference may be had to the followingdecisions:(i)Regina Vs. Barnet London Borough Council; (1983) 1AII ER 226;(ii)Union of India Vs. Elphinstone Spinning and WeavingCompany Ltd.; (2001) 4 SCC 139 (Para 17)(iii) D.R. Venkatachalam Vs. Transport Commissioner;(1977) 2 SCC 273 (Para 29)(iv) Padma Sundara Rao Vs. State of Tamil Nadu; (2002) 3SCC 533 (Para 13);(v)Harbhajan Singh Vs. Press Council of India; (2002) 3SCC 722 (Para 11) and(vi) Unique Butyle Tube Industries Vs. U.P. FinancialCorporation; (2003) 2 SCC 455 (Para 12).H. Challenge to acquisition by a minority (10%) of landowners.46.It is admitted position that the challenge to the acquisition ofmore than a thousand acres was made by a small fraction of land ownershaving land less than 10% of the total acquisition. Compensation for restof the 90% land acquired had been accepted by their respective landowners. The Division Bench has quashed the entire acquisition of morethan a thousand acres at the instance of such a small fraction. Thisaspect has been dealt with by this Court in the case of Amarjit SinghVs. State of Punjab reported in (2010) 10 SCC 43 and Om Prakash ABCDEFGH637Vs. State of U.P. reported in (1998) 6 SCC1. The learned Single Judgehad placed reliance on the judgment of Om Prakash(supra). It is alsoworthwhile to mention that out of approx 110 acres of land acquires forMSPL, only one land owner possessing only 4.34 acres of land, had filedthe writ appeal before the Division Bench. Quashing the entire acquisitionat the instance of one land owner having 4.34 acres of land out of totalacquisition for MSPL of 110 acres, would be against the public policyand public interest. The MSPL alone provides employment to 292 personswith a substantial investment of Rs.200 crores. The employment toapproximately 300 persons by MSPL is also alleged to be double of thenumber of employees as projected in the proposal. Further, in the caseof AISL acquisition of 914 acres is challenged by a fraction of less than10% land owners. The estimated project of AISL is approx Rs.2092crores and would employment to at least one thousand persons.47.In view of the above analysis, we are of the view that theDivision Bench committed an error in quashing the acquisitionproceedings. Accordingly, the appeals filed by MSPL, AISL, KIADBand State of Karnataka are allowed.48.The judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012 is setaside and the writ petitions stand dismissed as ordered by the learnedSingle Judge vide judgment dated 17.03.2009.49.Insofar as the claim of Syed Ahmed is concerned, which is inrespect of similar acquisition for M/S BMM Ispat Ltd. on similar groundsbased upon the judgment of the Division Bench dated 22.03.2012impugned in the other appeals, deserves to be dismissed as we havealready set aside the said judgment. Relevant to state here that SyedAhmed was owner of 14.35 acres out of total land measuring 705.99acres acquired for M/S BMM Ispat Ltd., which is less than 2%. Theappeal of Syed Ahmed is accordingly dismissed.50.There shall be no order as to costs.51. Pending application(s), if any, is/are disposed of. Nidhi JainMatters disposed of.(Assisted by : Tamana, LCRA)M/S. M.S.P.L. LIMITED v. THE STATE OF KARNATAKAAND ORS. [VIKRAM NATH, J.]