State of Punjab & Anr. v. Jalour Singh & Ors.

ABCDEFGH925perhaps be even likened to a consent decision cannot be thebasis for redetermination of the compensation. What Section 28Aindeed insists is on decision by a Civil Court as defined in Section2(l). In other words what is made the only basis for invokingSection 28A of the Act is an adjudication by the Court as definedin the Act. The plea of estoppel which, ordinarily, arises from aconsent decree or Award passed by the Lok Adalat which, asalready noticed, does not involve any adjudication by a Court,would hardly suffice. The estoppel which is referred to by thisCourt applies as between the parties to the consent decree. AnAward passed by the Lok Adalat is to be taken as a decree of aCivil Court under Section 21 of the 1987 Act. What Section 28Arequires is redetermination of compensation by the Civil Court.Therefore, the Award of the Lok Adalat, in this manner ofreasoning, is to be conflated to the adjudication contemplatedunder Section 28A of the Act. [Paras 31, 32][949-E-H; 950-A]1.3 When a legal fiction is employed by the legislature, itbecomes a duty of the Court to interpret it and to give it meaning.In gleaning its meaning, the Court is duty bound to ascertain thepurpose of this legislative device. The Court cannot allow itsmind to be boggled undoubtedly as contended by the learnedsenior counsel for the respondent, in the matter of carrying thelegal fiction to its logical end. But this is not the same as holdingthat the Court will not look to the object of the Act and, in particular,the fiction in question. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat under1987 Act is the culmination of a non-adjudicatory process. Theparties are persuaded even by members of the Lok Adalat toarrive at mutually agreeable compromise. The Award sets outthe terms. The provisions contained in Section 21 by which theAward is treated as if it were a decree is intended only to clothethe Award with enforceability. In view of the provisions of Section21 by which it is to be treated as a decree which cannot bechallenged, undoubtedly, by way of an appeal in view of theexpress provisions forbidding it, unless it is set aside in otherappropriate proceedings, it becomes enforceable. The purportof the law giver is only to confer it with enforceability in likemanner as if it were a decree. Thus, the legal fiction that theAward is to be treated as a decree goes no further. [Paras 36,37][951-D-E; 953-D-F]NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. ABCDEFGH926SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others(2017) 3 SCC 362 : [2016] 8 SCR 499 – relied on.1.4 The Lok Adalat as constituted under Section 19(2) wouldhave jurisdiction inter alia to determine and to arrive at acompromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute inrespect of any case pending before any Court for which the LokAdalat is organized. The word ‘Court’ in this context would meanthe court as defined in section 2(aaa), viz., a civil, criminal orrevenue court. The word ‘Court’ also includes any tribunal orany authority constituted under any law for the time being in forcewhich for exercising judicial or even quasi-judicial functions. Thus,the word ‘Court’ in the 1987 Act in the context of Section 19(5)embraces the bodies referred to in Section 2(aaa) of 1987 Act.The manner of taking cognizance by Lok Adalats is provided inSection 20(1) read with Section 19(5). The Court as defined inSection 2 (aaa) can refer the case to the Lok Adalat. Such court,as already noticed, can be civil, criminal or a revenue court. Itcan be even a tribunal or authority. When success is achieved asa result of the holding of the Lok Adalat culminating in an award,the words, as the case may be, in Section 21 predicates that itmay be instead of a decree of a Civil Court, an order of any otherCourt. Learned counsel for the appellant would point out that if aCriminal Court were to refer a matter under Section 138 of theNegotiable Instruments Act to the Lok Addalat and the LokAdalat passes an Award then such an Award would be treated asan order of the Court. However, in this regard, we have noticedthe judgment of this Court reported in K.N. Govindan KuttyMenon (supra). Even when the Criminal Court refers the matterunder Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act in order tomake it executable, this Court has taken the view that it will betreated as if it were a decree. If a Revenue Court or a Tribunalwhich, undoubtedly, fall under Section 2(aaa) of the 1987 Act wereto refer a case to the Lok Adalat under Section 20(1) and anaward is passed it may become the order of the court/tribunal. Inother words, if the matter were finally concluded on a regularbasis, that is, without reference to the Lok Adalat, it would be anorder which would be passed. [Paras 38, 39][953-H; 954-A-F] ABCDEFGH9271.5 Section 28A, undoubtedly, has been introduced byparliament in the year 1984 to bring solace to those land ownersor persons having interest in land to claim the just amount due tothem even though they have omitted to file application underSection 18 of the Act seeking enhancement. Section 28A figuresin Part III of the Act. It has a heading. The heading reads as ‘Re-determination of the amount of compensation on the basis of theaward of the Court’. The very opening words in our view deal afatal blow to the very premise of the respondent’s contention. Anaward under Part III of the Act commences with a reference underSection 18. The Court proceeds to adjudicate the reference inparticular by bearing in mind the matters which are to beconsidered under Section 23 of the Act. [Paras 41, 42][955-A, D-E, 954-H]1.6 The award which is passed by the Lok Adalat cannot besaid to be an award passed under Part III. It is the compromisearrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat whichculminates in the award by the Lok Adalat. In fact, an award underPart III of the Act contemplates grounds or reasons and therefore,adjudication is contemplated and Section 26(2) of the Act is self-explanatory. The next aspect is even more fatal to the case of therespondents. Not only must it be an award passed as a result ofthe adjudication but it must be passed by ‘the Court’ allowingcompensation in excess of the amount awarded by the collector.The word ‘Court’ has been defined in the Act as the PrincipalCivil Court of original jurisdiction unless the appropriateGovernment has appointed a Special Judicial Officer to performjudicial functions of the court under this Act. We have noticedthe composition of a Lok Adalat in Section 19(2) of the ‘1987Act’. The Court is not the same as a Lok Adalat. [Paras 44,45][955-G-H; 956-A-C]1.7 The Award passed by the Lok Adalat in itself withoutanything more is to be treated by the deeming fiction to be adecree. It is not a case where a compromise is arrived at underOrder XXIII of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, between theparties and the court is expected to look into the compromiseand satisfy itself that it is lawful before it assumes efficacy byvirtue of Section 21. Without anything more, the award passedNEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. ABCDEFGH928SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.by Lok Adalat becomes a decree. The enhancement of thecompensation is determined purely on the basis of compromisewhich is arrived at and not as a result of any decision of a ‘Court’as defined in the Act. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat is not acompromise decree. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat withoutanything more, is to be treated as a decree inter alia. We wouldapprove the view of the learned Single Judge of the Kerala HighCourt in P.T. Thomas (supra). An award unless it is successfullyquestioned in appropriate proceedings, becomes unalterable andnon-violable. In the case of a compromise falling under OrderXXIII Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes a duty of the Court toapply its mind to the terms of the compromise. Without anythingmore, the mere compromise arrived at between the parties doesnot have the imprimatur of the Court. It becomes a compromisedecree only when the procedures in the Code are undergone. AnAward passed under Section 19 of the 1987 Act is a product ofcompromise. Sans compromise, the Lok Adalat loses jurisdiction.The matter goes back to the Court for adjudication. Pursuant tothe compromise and the terms being reduced to writing with theapproval of the parties it assumes the garb of an Award which inturn is again deemed to be a decree without anything more. Wewould think that it may not be legislative intention to treat suchan award passed under Section 19 of the 1987 Act to be equivalentto an award of the Court which is defined in the Act as alreadynoted by us and made under Part III of the Act. An award of theCourt in Section 28A is also treated as a decree. Such an Awardbecomes executable. It is also appealable. Part III of the Actcontains a definite scheme which necessarily involves adjudicationby the Court and arriving at the compensation. It is this whichcan form the basis for any others pressing claim under the samenotification by invoking Section 28A. The Court cannot beentirely oblivious to the prospect of an ‘unholy’ compromise in amatter of this nature forming the basis for redetermination as amatter of right given under Section 28A. [Paras 46-48][956-C-H; 957-A-C]1.8 An Award passed under Section (20) of the 1987 Act bythe Lok Adalat cannot be the basis for invoking Section 28A.[Para 49][957-D] ABCDEFGH9291.9 As far as the argument of the respondents that the awarddated 12.3.2016 can be treated as the order of the Court withinthe meaning of Section 18 of the Act read with Section 28A of theAct, such an argument cannot be accepted. In this case, the awarddated 12.3.2016 is the award passed by the Lok Adalat. This isclear from the judgment of the High Court, the case of the partiesbefore it and the terms of the award dated 12.3.2016. In otherwords, this is a case whereas as noted in the impugned judgmentLAR 6 of 2006 (Fateh Mohammaed v. State of U.P.) was referredto the Lok Adalat, that is the Additional District and SessionsJudge/FTC No.2, Gautam Buddh Nagar, U.P. Thus, theproceedings dated 12.3.2016 which is relied on by the respondentsis indeed an award which is passed under Section 20 of the 1987Act though it may appear to be an order. In other words, theAdditional District & Sessions Judge was acting as Lok Adalat.This is so even if the decision of the High Court in Mangu Ramwas relied upon by the parties and it is also referred to in theaward. He was not disposing of the case as ‘the Court’ within themeaning of Act. It also cannot be treated as an award of the Courtwithin the meaning of Section 20 and 21 of the ‘1987 Act. Anapplication under Section 28A of the Act cannot be maintainedon the basis of an award passed by the Lok Adalat under Section20 of 1987 Act. The impugned judgments stand set aside. [Paras50, 52][957-D-H; 958-A-B,C]P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job AIR 2005 SC 3575 : [2005]2 Suppl. SCR 20; Government of India v. VedantaLimited and Others (2020) 10 SCC 1; Attar Singh andAnother v. Union of India and Anr. (2009) 9 SCC 289:[2009] 12 SCR 315; Tahera Khatoon (D) by LRs. v.Salambin Mohammad (1999) 2 SCC 635 : [1999] 1 SCR901; Vasudave v. The Commissioner and SecretaryGovernment, Revenue Department & Ors. ILR 2007KAR 4533; Chanabasappa & Anr. v. Special LandAcquisition Officer ILR 2011 KAR 4276; Namdev v.State of Maharashtra 2014 SC Online Bombay 4091;Thankamma Mathew v. State of Kerala and Anr. (2017)2 KLT 1023; K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C. D. Shaji(2012) 2 SCC 51 : [2011] 15 SCR 447; SingirkondaNEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. ABCDEFGH930SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.Surekha v. G. V. Sharma and Others 2003 SCC OnlineAP 21; Union of India and Another v. Hansoli Deviand Others (2002) 7 SCC 273 : [2002] 2 Suppl. SCR324; K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji (2012)2 SCC 51 : [2011] 15 SCR 447; Jose Antonio CruzDos R. Rodriguese and Another v. Land AcquisitionCollector and Another (1996) 6 SCC 746 : [1996] 8Suppl. SCR 910 – referred to.Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure and others v. DistrictCollector and others (2021) 4 AIR Bom R 626; ThomasJob v. Thomas 2003 (3) KLT 936 – approved.Case Law Reference[2008] 1 SCR 922relied onPara 6(2020) 10 SCC 1referred toPara 6[2009] 12 SCR 315referred toPara 6[1999] 1 SCR 901referred toPara 9[2011] 15 SCR 447referred toPara 20[2007] 3 SCR 877relied onPara 27[2005] 2 Suppl. SCR 20referred toPara 28[2002] 2 Suppl. SCR 324referred toPara 30[2011] 15 SCR 447referred toPara 33[2016] 8 SCR 499relied onPara 36[1996] 8 Suppl. SCR 910referred toPara 41CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.901 of2022.From the Judgment and Order dated 20.05.2020 of the High Courtof Judicature at Allahabad in Writ-C No.27876 of 2018.WithCivil Appeal Nos.905, 904, 903, 906 and 902 of 2022.Anil Kaushik, Rachit Mittal, Ms. Ritika Dawalia, Sudhir Naagar,Advs. for the Appellant. ABCDEFGH931Dhruv Mehta, V. K. Shukla, Sr. Advs., Pradeep Kumar Mathur,Abhishek Thakur, Keith Varghese, Chiranjev Johri, M. K. Tiwari, Advs.for the Respondents.The Judgment of the Court was delivered byK. M. JOSEPH, J.1. Leave granted.2. In these batch of cases, the question which arises is whetherthe Award passed by a Lok Adalat under Section 20 of the Legal ServicesAuthorities Act, 1987 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘1987 Act’) canform the basis for redetermination of compensation as contemplatedunder Section 28A of the the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafterreferred to as ‘Act’). By the impugned judgment, the High Court hastaken the view that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat can indeedform the foundation for exercising power under Section 28A of the Act.3. A notification came to be issued under Section 4(1) of the Acton 21.03.1983 in respect of villages situated in Tehsil Dadri (Situation inDistrict Ghaziabad) for planned industrial development contemplated bythe Appellant. By the Award of the Land Acquisition Officer, which waspassed on 28.11.1984, compensation was fixed for the lands belongingto the respondents herein inter alia at the rate of Rs.24,033 per bigha.The respondents did not seek enhancement under Section 18 of the Act.One Fateh Mohammed filed an application seeking reference againstthe Award dated 28.11.1984. The said reference was made over to aLok Adalat. The reference is seen numbered as No. 6/02. The LokAdalat passed an Award on 12.03.2016. We may set out the terms ofthe said award: “Today, the matter has been placed before the Lok Adalat.Claimant Fateh Mohammed s/o Ummed Khan with his learnedCounsel Sri Jitendra Mathur and on behalf of respondents thelearned D.G.C. Civil are present in the court. The case file of thisL.A.R. case has already been clubbed/consolidated with the filesof other L.A.R. Cases, namely, L.A.R. No. 07 of 2002 JawalHussain Vs. State of U.P. and Ors; L.A.R. No. 08 of 2022Salimuddin Vs. State of U.P. and Ors. and L.A.R. No. 9 of 2002Mohakkam Singh Vs. State of U.P. and Ors., was passed by theconcerned Court on 268.2010 and the file of LAR No. 6/2002had been made as Leading Case. In course of hearing, both theNEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. ABCDEFGH932SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.parties have collectively filed application for placing all the clubbedLARs before the Lok Adalat vide application paper no. 59Ga2with Settlement/Compromise Agreement and photocopy of theorder of Hon’ble High Court. Besides this, the learned DistrictGovernment Counsel Civil appearing on behalf of the respondentshas filed photocopy of letters (Paper no. 61Ga2 and 62Ga2) ofconcerned party State Government and Noida DevelopmentAuthority whereby the learned District Government Counsel Civilhas been authorized to enter into the compromise/settlement inthe matter on behalf of the Authority and State Government. Heard and perused the case file. It is evident from availablerecord that the present Reference has been filed against the Awarddated 28.11.1984 and the Hon’ble High Court, while clubbing/consolidating all the appeals together, has disposed them off therebydirecting the concerned Authorities to determine the compensationat the rate of Rs.297.50 per sq.yard. On the basis of the saidorder, both parties have voluntarily executed, signed and verifiedthe Settlement/Compromise Agreement Paper No. 60Ka1 andsubmitted the same before the court. In such a situation, it is just and proper to decide the caseby passing the following order on the basis of the settlement/compromise agreement Paper no. 60Ka1 which shall form partof the decree: -ORDER Instant Reference No. 6/2002 is hereby decided on thebasis of Settlement/Compromise Agreement Paper No. 60Ka1filed by the parties. The Settlement/Compromise Agreement shallform part of the Decree and in the circumstances of the case,each party to bear their own costs. One copy each of this judgmentshall be kept in the file of LAR No. 7/2002, LAR No. 8/2002 andLAR No. 9/2002.4. As is evident, compensation was fixed at Rs.297 per squareyard as against Rs.20 per square yard which was fixed by the LandAcquisition Officer by his Award dated 28.11.1984. This led to therespondents filing applications before Additional District Magistrateseeking shelter under Section 28A of the Act. The Additional DistrictMagistrate rejected the applications on the basis that the Award dated12.03.2016 passed by the Lok Adalat was on the basis of the compromise. ABCDEFGH933This led to the writ petitions being filed by the respondents before theHigh Court. It is in the said writ petitions that the impugned judgmentshave been passed by the High Court finding that the Award of the LokAdalat would be deemed to be decree of the Civil Court and, consequently,the respondents would be entitled to invoke Section 28A of the Act.5. We have heard Shri Anil Kaushik, learned counsel for theappellant. We have also heard Shri Dhruv Mehta and Shri V. K. Shukla,learned senior counsel on behalf of the respondents.6. Learned counsel for the appellant would point out that Section28A is not available to be applied when there is no determination by theCourt in terms of the Act. He referred us to the definition of the word‘Court’ in the Act to contend that what Section 28A contemplates is anAward passed by such a Court. Lok Adalats, it is his contention areconstituted under Section 19 of the 1987 Act. They have no adjudicatoryor judicial function. The object of the 1987 Act is inter alia to bringabout settlement of dispute. The function of the Lok Adalat under Section19 is essentially to bring about a compromise. An award of the LokAdalat, in other words, merely sets out a compromise reached betweenthe parties. Therefore, it cannot be treated as an Award by a Courtunder the Act. He further contended that the deeming fiction in Section21 of the 1987 Act must be confined to the purpose for which the fictionwas created. In other words, the deeming provision must be appreciatedas a legislative device to clothe the Award with enforceability as if itwere a decree. On its own terms, in other words, an Award passed bythe Lok Adalat is not a decree as contemplated in Section 28A of theAct. He relied on judgments in State of Punjab and Another. v. JalourSingh and Others1, Government of India v. Vedanta Limited andOthers2 and Attar Singh and Another v. Union of India and Anr.3 insupport of his arguments.7. He further pointed out that there is a divergence of judicialopinion on this subject among the High Courts. He commended for ouracceptance the view taken by the High Court of Bombay in the decisionreported in Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure and Others v. District Collectorand Others4. He would submit that view taken by the High Courts whichhave held contrary do not represent the correct position in law.1 (2008) 2 SCC 6602 (2020) 10 SCC 13 (2009) 9 SCC 2894 2021 SCC OnLine Bom 917NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH934SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.8. He has further a case on merits. He points out that the HighCourt in the First Appeal No. 1100/04 titled as Mangu and others v.State of U.P., awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.297 per squareyard. However, it is his contention that while the case of Mangu aroseout of the notification of the year 1991, cases arising out of the earliernotification issued under Section 4 came to be tagged and heard as acommon batch. He points out that the review petition is already filed bythe appellant. He further contends that in the year 1982, the compensationwas fixed at Rs.20 per square yard. This computation of compensationwas upheld by the High Court and what is more, this view of the HighCourt was further approved by this Court by dismissal of the specialleave petition filed against the same. However, on the basis of the factswhich were not properly appreciated the Award came to be passed bythe Lok Adalat.9. Per contra, the learned senior counsel for the respondentswould point out, in the first place, that a perusal of the Award by LokAdalat would show that it would be wholly unfair on the part of theappellant to wriggle out of a rate which, in fact, was based on a decisionof the High Court (apparently the decision in Mangu and Others). It isfurther pointed out by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel, thatfull effect must be given to the legal fiction. The oft quoted admonitionthat the Courts must not allow their imagination to be boggled by theprospect of stretching a legal fiction to its logical culmination was invoked.In other words, it is the contention of Shri Dhruv Mehta that given thefact that an Award passed by the Lok Adalat is to be treated as a decree,it matters little that what led to the Award is not analogous to theprocedure that is ordinarily contemplated in a reference under Section18 of the Act. The fiction must have full play. Thus, being a decree of aCivil Court, the Award of the Lok Adalat would provide firm foundationfor similarly circumstanced persons to claim benefit of Section 28A. Inthis regard, he would point out that the Court must not be oblivious to thegrand command of equality to achieve which sublime goal it is that thelegislature introduced Section 28A in the first place. In other words,having regard to the above object of making available just compensationto those persons, who, by their ignorance, which for the large part, isfostered by illiteracy, poverty, and backwardness, do not follow up withthe remedies open to them under the Act, are given a window ofopportunity on the basis of an Award passed enhancing the compensationat the instance of similarly circumstanced persons. He points out there ABCDEFGH935is no dispute that the respondents are persons whose lands have beenacquired under the same notification as was of Fateh Mohammed. Hewould further highlight that Section 21 provides that said Award of aLok Adalat is inter alia to be treated ‘as the case may be’ as an orderof any other Court. The argument appears to be that Section 21 is wideenough to embrace within its scope the Award of a Lok Adalat as anorder of the Court under Section 18 of the Act. In other words, theaward of the Lok Adalat would become an order of the Court enhancingthe compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer. He wouldfinally contend, at any rate, that should this Court be inclined to holdagainst the respondents, while this Court may declare the law, it may stillnot exercise the discretionary jurisdiction in favour of the appellant underArticle 136 of the constitution. In this regard, he drew support from thedecision of this Court reported in Tahera Khatoon (D) by LRs. v.Salambin Mohammad5.10. Shri V.K. Shukla, learned senior counsel essentially advancedsimilar submissions. He would, in particular, highlight the facts which ledto the passing of the Award by the Lok Adalat, namely that, it wasaccepted by the appellant that compensation can be fixed at Rs. 297 persquare yard on the basis of the judgment of the High Court whichprevailed. This fact, he points out, may not be overlooked by this Court.He would also submit that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat wouldsatisfy the requirement of an application under Section 28A of the Act.He further drew upon the powers of the Lok Adalat.ANALYSIS11. We may advert to the scheme of the 1987 Act, Section 2(a)defines ‘case’:(a) ‘Case’ includes a suit or any proceeding before a court.Section 2(aaa) defines ‘Court’:(aaa) ‘Court’ means a civil, criminal or revenue court and includesany tribunal or any other authority constituted under any law forthe time being in force to exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions.Section 2(d) defines Lok Adalat as meaning a Lok Adalatorganized under Chapter VI.12. Chapter VI contains Sections 19 to 22. Section 19(1)contemplates Lok Adalats being organised at such intervals and places5 (1999) 2 SCC 635NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH936SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.and for exercising such jurisdiction and for such areas as is thought fitby the relevant bodies mentioned therein. Section 19(2) is significant asit provides for the composition of the Lok Adalat. It reads as follows:(2) Every Lok Adalat organised for an area shall consist of suchnumber of :-(a) Serving or retired judicial officers and(b) Other persons, of the area as may be specified by the StateAuthority or the District Authority or the Supreme Court LegalServices Committee or the High Court Legal Services Committee,or as the case may be, the Taluk Legal Services Committee,organising such Lok Adalats.Sub-section (3) goes on to deal with the experience and qualificationof the persons mentioned in clause (b).Sub-section (5) is again relevant as it indicates the jurisdiction ofthe Lok Adalat:(5) A Lok Adalat shall have jurisdiction to determine and to arriveat a compromise or settlement between the parties to a dispute inrespect of:-(i) Any case pending before or(ii) Any matter which is falling within the jurisdiction of, and is notbrought before, any court for which the Lok Adalat is organized.Provided that the Lok Adalat shall have no jurisdiction in respectof any case or matter relating to an offence not compoundableunder any law.13. Section 20 must be read with Section 19(5) and Section 21.Section 20 reads as follows:Section 20. Cognizance of Cases by Lok Adalats(1) Where in any case referred to in clause (i) of sub-section (5)of Section 19-(i)(i) (a) The parties thereof agree or(i) (b) One of the parties thereof makes an application to thecourt, for referring the case to the Lok Adalat for settlement andif such court is prima facie satisfied that there are chances ofsuch settlement or ABCDEFGH937(ii) The court is satisfied that the matter is an appropriate one tobe taken cognizance of by the Lok Adalat, the court shall referthe case to the Lok Adalat: Provided that no case shall be referredto the Lok Adalat under sub-clause (b) of clause (i) or clause (ii)by such court except after giving a reasonable opportunity of beingheard to the parties.(2) Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for thetime being in force, the Authority or Committee organising theLok Adalat under sub-section (1) of Section 19 may, on receipt ofan application from any, one of the parties to any matter referredto in clause (ii) of sub-section (5) of Section 19 that such matterneeds to be determined by a Lok Adalat, refer such matter to theLok Adalat, for determination; Provided that no matter shall bereferred to the Lok Adalat except after giving a reasonableopportunity of being heard to the other party.(3) Where any case is referred to a Lok Adalat under sub-section(1) or where a reference has been made to it under sub-section(2), the Lok Adalat shall proceed to dispose of the case or matterand arrive at a compromise or settlement between the parties.(4) Every Lok Adalat shall, while determining any reference beforeit under this Act, act with utmost expedition to arrive at acompromise or settlement between the parties and shall be guidedby the principles of justice, equity, fair play and other legalprinciples.(5) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the groundthat no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between theparties, the record of the case shall be returned by it to the court,from which the reference has been received under sub-section(1) for disposal in accordance with law.(6) Where no award is made by the Lok Adalat on the groundthat no compromise or settlement could be arrived at between theparties, in a matter referred to in sub-section (2), that Lok Adalatshall advice the parties to seek remedy in a court.(7) Where the record of the case is returned under sub-section(5) to the court, such court shall proceed to deal such referenceunder sub-section (1).”NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH938SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.14. Section 21 provides for the final decision by the Lok Adalatand it reads as follows:Section 21. Award of Lok Adalat(1) Every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be a decreeof a civil court or, as the case may be, an order of any other courtand where a compromise or settlement has been arrived at, by aLok Adalat in a case referred to under sub-section (1) of Section20, the court-fee paid in such case shall be refunded in the mannerprovided under the Court Fees Act, 1870 (7 of 1870).(2) Every award made by a Lok Adalat shall be final and bindingon all the parties to the dispute, and no appeal shall lie to any courtagainst the award.15. Shri V. S. Shukla also pointed out Section 22 of the 1987 Actunder which the Lok Adalats have the power vested in the Civil Courtas are mentioned therein. Section 22:Section 22. Powers of Lok Adalat or Permanent Lok Adalat(1) The Lok Adalat shall, for the purposes of holding anydetermination under this Act, have the same powers as are vestedin a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of1908), while trying a suit in respect of the following matters,namely: -(a) The summoning and enforcing the attendance of any witnessand examining him on oath.(b) The discovery and production of any document.(c) The reception of evidence on affidavits.(d) The requisitioning of any public record or document or copyof such record or document from any court or office and(e) Such other matters as may be prescribed.(2) Without prejudice to the generality of the powers contained insub-section (1), every Lok Adalat shall have the requisite powersto specify its own procedure for the determination of any disputecoming before it. ABCDEFGH939(3) All proceedings before a Lok Adalat shall be deemed to bejudicial proceedings within the meaning of Sections 193, 219 and228 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) and every Lok Adalatshall be deemed to be a civil court for the purpose of Section 195and Chapter XXVI of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973(2 of1974).”16. It will be interesting to note that Chapter VI(A) came to beinserted by the Act 37 of 2002 with effect from 11.06.2002. Thereunder,permanent Lok Adalats have been contemplated in respect of certainpublic utility services. Suffice is only to note that unlike a Lok Adalat,Section 22C sub-section (8) contemplates that when the parties fail toreach an agreement, the permanent Lok Adalat is duty bound, if thedispute does not relate to any offence, to decide the dispute.SCHEME OF THE ACT17. The Act provides for acquisition of land and for compensationto be provided thereunder. The proceedings are commenced by a notification under Section4. Compensation is determined with reference to the date of the saidnotification. After the procedures are undergone, an Award is passed.While Section 18 provides for a right with a person dissatisfied with theamount inter alia awarded by the Land Acquisition Officer to seekenhancement, Section 28A contemplates situations where a person hasnot availed of the right under Section 18 but any other person has utilizedthe provisions of Section 18 and obtained an enhancement. Otherconditions obtaining in Section 28A being present, a person who has notfiled application under Section 18 inter alia is entitled to claimredetermination of the compensation. Section 28A may be noticed:28A. Re-determination of the amount of compensation on thebasis of the award of the Court.-(1) where in an award under thispart, the court allows to the applicant any amount of compensationin excess of the amount awarded by the collector under section11, the persons interested in all the other land covered by thesame notification under section 4, sub-section (1) and who arealso aggrieved by the award of the Collector may, notwithstandingthat they had not made an application to the Collector under section18, by written application to the Collector within three monthsfrom the date of the award of the Court require that the amountNEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH940SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.of compensation payable to them may be re-determined on thebasis of the amount of compensation awarded by the court: Provided that in computing the period of three months withinwhich an application to the Collector shall be made under thissub-section, the day on which the award was pronounced and thetime requisite for obtaining a copy of the award shall be excluded.(2) The Collector shall, on receipt of an application under sub-section (1), conduct an inquiry after giving notice to all the personsinterested and giving them a reasonable opportunity of being heard,and make an award determining the amount of compensationpayable to the applicants.(3) Any person who has not accepted the award under sub-section(2) may, by written application to the Collector, required that thematter be referred by the Collector for the determination of theCourt and the provisions of sections 18 to 28 shall, so far as maybe, apply to such reference as they apply to a reference underSection 18.‘Court’ as defined under the Act reads as follows:(d) the expression “Court” means a principal Civil Court of originaljurisdiction unless, the appropriate Government has appointed (asit is hereby empowered to do) a special judicial officer within anyspecified local limits to perform functions of the Court under thisAct;DIVERGENCE IN THE VIEWS OF THE HIGH COURTS18. In Vasudave v. The Commissioner and SecretaryGovernment, Revenue Department & Ors.6, learned Single Judge ofthe Karnataka High Court took the view that was guided by Section 89of the Code of Civil Procedure and the fact that the award of the LokAdalat is to be deemed to be a decree of the Civil Court. Learned SingleJudge also considered the intention of introducing Section 28A and tookthe view that the provision is in consonance with the equality clause.The Court took the view that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat byconsent fell under Section 28A.19. However, another Learned Single Judge of the very sameCourt in the decision reported in Chanabasappa & Anr. v. Special6 ILR 2007 KAR 4533 ABCDEFGH941Land Acquisition Officer7 took the view that to apply Section 28A(3)of the Act, there must be an Award under Section 28A(2). He furthertook the view that the existence of an Award passed by a Court underPart III of the Act was a condition precedent to apply under Section28A. The award passed by the Lok Adalat was found to be by consent.In the decision reported in Namdev v. State of Maharashtra8 2014 SCOnline Bombay 4091, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court on03.11.2014 only notes that the Award passed by the Lok Adalat has aforce of decree and an application under Section 28A can be founded onsuch an Award. It is further stated that this view has been confirmed bythe High Court in number of matters.20. A learned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in the decisionreported in Thankamma Mathew v. State of Kerala and Anr9. didconsider the provisions of the 1987 Act in greater detail. The learnedSingle Judge was guided by the scope and effect of the deeming provisionunder Section 21 of the 1987 Act. He referred to the judgment of thisCourt reported in K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C. D. Shaji10.21. Primarily based on the award being a deemed decree of aCivil Court, he found that Section 28A applies in all cases where in anAward, the Court allows to the applicant any compensation in excess ofwhat is awarded by the collector and that there is no difference betweena decree passed by the Civil Court and the Award of the Lok Adalat inview of the pronouncement of this Court. In a recent decision, however,in Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure and others v. District Collector andothers11, a Division Bench of the Bombay High Court has had anoccasion to consider the matter in great detail. In the said case therewas an award made by a Lok Adalat in a reference under Section 18 ofthe Act. Based on the said award the application was filed under Section28A. The Division Bench referred to both the Acts in considerable detail.The Court found that the object of the Lok Adalats was to arrive at asettlement and that it had no adjudicatory or judicial functions. We find itapposite to refer to the following observations:“15. All this indicates that determination of a dispute by a LokAdalat has consequences exclusively for the parties to the dispute.7 ILR 2011 KAR 42768 (2014) SCC OnLine Bom 40919 (2017) 2 KLT 102310 (2012) 2 SCC 5111 (2021) 4 AIR Bom R 626NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH942SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.The referring court or the court for which such Lok Adalat isorganised does not come into the picture so far as suchdetermination is concerned. In fact, in the case of a referenceunder clause (ii) of Section 19(5) of the LSA Act, it is the authorityor committee organising the Lok Adalat, which itself refers thecase or matter to the Lok Adalat. The court, for which such LokAdalat is organised, is not concerned even at the stage of thereference. The award made by the Lok Adalat does not have togo back to that court to enable it to make it a part of its decree.The award itself is final and binding (and not appealable) asbetween the parties. It is deemed to be a decree of a civil courtand executable as such. There is nothing in this scheme of thingsfor treating an award passed by a Lok Adalat as a deemed decreeof that court which made the reference to the Lok Adalat or forwhich the Lok Adalat was organised. In the context of the LAAct, and particularly for the purposes of Section 28A, the fictionof “decree of a civil court” will not only have to be to be extendedto a decree of the court referring the matter to Lok Adalat or forwhich such Lok Adalat is organised, but such court having passedit under Part III of the LA Act, so as to have consequences forthird parties. There is nothing to suggest that if the award is in acompensation dispute in a land acquisition matter, any third partyshould thereby be entitled to apply for re-determination of itscompensation under Section 28A of the LA Act. As a matter ofprinciple, it is not possible to say that that eventuality (i.e. entitlementof a third party to apply for re-determination of its owncompensation after passing of the award by the Lok Adalat)inevitably follows as a corollary or consequence from such award.xxx xxx xxx20. If this consequence, namely, the award of Lok Adalat havingto be treated as an award of the reference court under Part III,does not follow as an inevitable sequitur, to come to suchconsequence the legal fiction contained in Section 21 of the LSAAct will have to be actually extended to import two other fictions,namely, that the award of Lok Adalat should be deemed (i) “adecree of the court which has referred the matter to the LokAdalat”, and (ii) “a decree passed under Part III of the LandAcquistion Act, 1894”. That, we are afraid, is impermissible under ABCDEFGH943the law stated by the Supreme Court in Sadan K. Bormal’scase (supra). It would be an artificial extension of the legal fictionand not a necessary corollary of the original statutory fiction; itwould be extending the original fiction beyond its statutorypurpose.”22. The Court distinguished the judgment of the Andhra PradeshHigh Court in Singirkonda Surekha v. G. V. Sharma and Others12 bytaking the view that it was distinguishable on the basis that, in the saidcase, the Reference Court had passed an Award based on a compromisearrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat and it was, therefore,a case of an Award made by the Reference Court under Part III of theAct.23. It is only, therefore, appropriate to notice the decision of theAndhra Pradesh High Court reported in Singirkonda Surekha (supra).In the said case, we notice that there was a reference under Section 18of the Act. The Sub-Court, Gudur, enhanced the market value by itsjudgment dated 31.07.1995 and fixed the market value at the rate ofRs.60,000 per acre of that land inter alia excluding all the statutorybenefits. A Lok Adalat was held at Sriharikota wherein the market valuefixed at above rates was recommended but denying statutory benefits.It is further stated that decree was passed enhancing the rates asrecommended by the Lok Adalat on 31.07.1995. It is thereupon that theapplications were filed by the petitioner therein under Section 28A. TheCourt referred to Section 19(5), 21 and 22 of the 1987 Act inter aliaand found the respondents could not defeat the legal right of the petitionerto claim the benefit of Section 28A by resorting to the method of arrivingat a settlement or compromise before the Lok Adalat on the strength ofwhich the decree was passed. It was further found that the mere factthat the Court had made such an Award only on the strength of acompromise would not alter the situation in any way.24. In Thomas Job v. Thomas13, a learned Single Judge of theKerala High Court took the view that by no stretch of imagination, itcould be held that an Award passed by the Lok Adalat despite the legalfiction created in Section 21 could be treated as a compromise decreepassed by a Civil Court. It is further found that a Lok Adalat is not aCourt; the Lok Adalat only certifies an agreement. It is further found12 2003 SCC Online AP 2113 2003 (3) KLT 936NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH944SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.that the Civil Court cannot vary the terms of the Award or extend thetime agreed to between the parties to an Award.25. Having set out the provisions and referred to the judgments,we may consider the respective arguments that are raised before theCourt.FINDINGS26. The object of the 1987 Act inter alia as can be noticed fromthe preamble to the Act, also is the organisation of Lok Adalats. It isclear beyond the shadow of any doubt that the jurisdiction of the LokAdalat under Section 20 is to facilitate a settlement of disputes betweenthe parties in a case. It has no adjudicatory role. It cannot decide a lis.All that it can do is to bring about a genuine compromise or settlement.Sub-Section (4) of Section 20 is important insofar as the law giver hasset out the guiding principles for a Lok Adalat. The principles are justice,equality, fair play and other legal principles. The significance of thisprovision looms large when the Court bears in mind the scheme of Section28A of the Act.27. The scheme of Section 28A of the Act is unmistakably clearfrom its very opening words. What section 28A contemplates is aredetermination of compensation under an award passed under Part III.Part III takes in Section 23. Section 23 deals with the matters to betaken into consideration. Various aspects including the market value onthe date of the notification under Section 4(1) are indicated. What wewish to emphasise is that elements of Section 23 are not in consonanceas such with the guiding principles set out in Section 19(4) of the ‘1987Act’ which are to guide a Lok Adalat. When the Court deals with thematter under Section 18, in other words, it is bound to look into theevidence and arrive at findings based on the evidence applying the legalprinciples which have been enunciated and arrive at the compensation.While it may be true that there is reference to ‘other legal principles’ inSection 19(4) of the 1987 Act, the Lok Adalat also can seek light fromthe principles of justice, equity, and fair play. The Lok Adalat by virtue ofthe express provisions is only a facilitator of settlement and compromisein regard to matters which are referred to it. It has no adjudicatory role(See State of Punjab & Anr. v. Jalour Singh & Ors (supra)). In Unionof India v. Ananto (Dead) & Anr.14, this Court inter alia held as follows:14 (2007) 10 SC 748 ABCDEFGH945“7. The specific language used in sub-section (3) of Section 20makes it clear that the Lok Adalat can dispose of a matter by wayof a compromise or settlement between the parties. Two crucialterms in sub-sections (3) and(5) of Section 20 are “compromise”and “settlement”. The former expression means settlement ofdifferences by mutual concessions. It is an agreement reachedby adjustment of conflicting or opposing claims by reciprocalmodification of demands. As per Termes de la Ley, “compromiseis a mutual promise of two or more parties that are at controversy”.As per Bouvier it is “an agreement between two or more persons,who, to avoid a law suit,amicably settle their differences, on suchterms as they can agree upon”.The word “compromise” impliessome element of accommodation on each side. It is not apt todescribe total surrender. [See Re NFU Development Trust Ltd.[1973] 1 All ER 135(Ch.D)]. A compromise is always bilateraland means mutual adjustment. “Settlement” is termination of legalproceedings by mutual consent. The case at hand did not involvecompromise or settlement and could not have been disposed ofby Lok Adalat. If no compromise or settlement is or could bearrived at, no order can be passed by the Lok Adalat. Therefore,question of merger of Lok Adalats order does not arise.”28. An argument was raised by Shri Dhruv Mehta, learned seniorcounsel for the respondents, that the Lok Adalat insofar as it manifeststhe stand of the appellant and it being consensual based on the consentof the NOIDA, NOIDA is estopped. In this regard, he drew our attentionto the judgment of this Court in P.T. Thomas v. Thomas Job15.29. We see no merit in this argument. What has been laid downby this Court may be noticed in this regard in the aforesaid judgment: “In Sailendra Narayan Bhanja Deo vs. The State of Orissa,AIR 1956 SUPREME COURT 346, (CONSTITUTIONBENCH) held as follows: A Judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppelbetween the parties as a judgment whereby the court exercisesits mind on a contested case. (1895) 1 Ch.37 & 1929 AC 482,Rel. on;In - ’In re South American and Mexican Co., Ex. ParteBank of England’, (1895) 1 Ch 37(C), it has been held that a15 AIR 2005 SC 3575NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH946SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.judgment by consent or default is as effective an estoppel betweenthe parties as a judgment whereby the Court exercises its mindon a contested case. Upholding the judgment of Vaughan Williams,JLord Herschell said at page 50 :-“The truth is, a judgment by consent is intended to put astop to litigation between the parties just as much as is a judgmentwhich results from the decision of the Court after the matter hasbeen fought out to the end.And I think it would be very mischievous if one were not togive a fair and reasonable interpretation to such judgments, andwere to allow questions that were really involved in the action tobe fought over again in a subsequent action.”To the like effect are the following observations of theJudicial Committee in - ’Kinch v. Walvott’, 1929 AC 482 at p.493(D):-“First of all, their Lordships are clear that in relation to thisplea of estoppel it is of no advantage to the appellant that theorder in the libel action which is said to raise it was a consentorder. For such a purpose an order by consent, not discharged bymutual agreement, and remaining unreduced, is as effective as anorder of the Court made otherwise than by consent and notdischarged on appeal.” What this Court has laid down is that when there is a consentdecree, the parties to the consent decree would be estopped by its termsfrom resiling from its impact. There can be no quarrel with the saidproposition. It is, however, a far cry therefrom to hold that the fact thatparties to such a consent decree would be estopped as against eachother, can yet form the premise for a redetermination of the compensationqua persons who are not parties to an award which is the offspring of acompromise between the parties. In other words, when Section 28Aprovides for what undoubtedly is a benefit to those who have not availedof their right under Section 18 of the Act, a beneficial view can be taken,the Court cannot shut its eyes to the command of the law giver.30. It is the province and duty of the Court in the ultimate analysisto give effect to the will of the legislature. The golden rule of interpretationof statutes along with other principles came to be discussed, as it may beindeed set out by the Constitution Bench of this Court reported in Union ABCDEFGH947of India and Another v. Hansoli Devi and Others16 and which alsoarose under Section 28A of the Act. One of the questions which pointedlyarose was whether the dismissal of an application filed beyond timeunder Section 18 of the Act would entitle a person to invoke Section28A:“9. Before we embark upon an inquiry as to what would be thecorrect interpretation of Section 28-A, we think it appropriate tobear in mind certain basic principles of interpretation of a statute.The rule stated by Tindal, C.J. in Sussex Peerage case [(1844)11 Cl & Fin 85 : 8 ER 1034] still holds the field. The aforesaid ruleis to the effect: (ER p. 1057)“If the words of the statute are in themselves precise andunambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expoundthose words in their natural and ordinary sense. The wordsthemselves alone do, in such case, best declare the intention ofthe lawgiver.”It is a cardinal principle of construction of a statute that when thelanguage of the statute is plain and unambiguous, then the courtmust give effect to the words used in the statute and it would notbe open to the courts to adopt a hypothetical construction on theground that such construction is more consistent with the allegedobject and policy of the Act. In Kirkness v. John Hudson & Co.Ltd. [(1955) 2 All ER 345 : 1955 AC 696 : (1955) 2 WLR 1135]Lord Reid pointed out as to what is the meaning of “ambiguous”and held that : (All ER p. 366 C-D)“A provision is not ambiguous merely because it contains a wordwhich in different contexts is capable of different meanings. Itwould be hard to find anywhere a sentence of any length whichdoes not contain such a word. A provision is, in my judgment,ambiguous only if it contains a word or phrase which in thatparticular context is capable of having more than one meaning.”It is no doubt true that if on going through the plain meaning of thelanguage of statutes, it leads to anomalies, injustices and absurdities,then the court may look into the purpose for which the statute hasbeen brought and would try to give a meaning, which would adhereto the purpose of the statute. Patanjali Sastri, C.J. in the case of16 (2002) 7 SCC 273NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH948SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.Aswini Kumar Ghose v. Arabinda Bose [AIR 1952 SC 369 :1953 SCR 1] had held that it is not a sound principle of constructionto brush aside words in a statute as being inapposite surplusage, ifthey can have appropriate application in circumstances conceivablywithin the contemplation of the statute. In Quebec Railway, LightHeat & Power Co. Ltd. v. Vandry [AIR 1920 PC 181] it hadbeen observed that the legislature is deemed not to waste its wordsor to say anything in vain and a construction which attributesredundancy to the legislature will not be accepted except forcompelling reasons. Similarly, it is not permissible to add words toa statute which are not there unless on a literal construction beinggiven a part of the statute becomes meaningless. But before anywords are read to repair an omission in the Act, it should be possibleto state with certainty that these words would have been insertedby the draftsman and approved by the legislature had their attentionbeen drawn to the omission before the Bill had passed into a law.At times, the intention of the legislature is found to be clear butthe unskilfulness of the draftsman in introducing certain words inthe statute results in apparent ineffectiveness of the language andin such a situation, it may be permissible for the court to reject thesurplus words, so as to make the statute effective. Bearing inmind the aforesaid principle, let us now examine the provisions ofSection 28-A of the Act, to answer the questions referred to us bythe Bench of two learned Judges. It is no doubt true that theobject of Section 28-A of the Act was to confer a right of makinga reference, (sic on one) who might have not made a referenceearlier under Section 18 and, therefore, ordinarily when a personmakes a reference under Section 18 but that was dismissed onthe ground of delay, he would not get the right of Section 28-A ofthe Land Acquisition Act when some other person makes areference and the reference is answered. But Parliament havingenacted Section 28-A, as a beneficial provision, it would causegreat injustice if a literal interpretation is given to the expression“had not made an application to the Collector under Section 18”in Section 28-A of the Act. The aforesaid expression would meanthat if the landowner has made an application for reference underSection 18 and that reference is entertained and answered. Inother words, it may not be permissible for a landowner to make areference and get it answered and then subsequently make another ABCDEFGH949application when some other person gets the reference answeredand obtains a higher amount. In fact in Pradeep Kumari case[(1995) 2 SCC 736] the three learned Judges, while enumeratingthe conditions to be satisfied, whereafter an application underSection 28-A can be moved, had categorically stated (SCC p.743, para 10) “the person moving the application did not make anapplication to the Collector under Section 18”. The expression“did not make an application”, as observed by this Court, wouldmean, did not make an effective application which had beenentertained by making the reference and the reference wasanswered. When an application under Section 18 is not entertainedon the ground of limitation, the same not fructifying into anyreference, then that would not tantamount to an effectiveapplication and consequently the rights of such applicant emanatingfrom some other reference being answered to move an applicationunder Section 28-A cannot be denied. We, accordingly answerQuestion 1(a) by holding that the dismissal of an applicationseeking reference under Section 18 on the ground of delay wouldtantamount to not filing an application within the meaning of Section28-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.”31. We would think that, therefore, a plea founded on estoppelarising out of a consent decree or from an Award passed by a LokAdalat which can perhaps be even likened to a consent decision cannotbe the basis for redetermination of the compensation. What Section 28Aindeed insists is on decision by a Civil Court as defined in Section 2(l). Inother words what is made the only basis for invoking Section 28A of theAct is an adjudication by the Court as defined in the Act. The plea ofestoppel which, ordinarily, arises from a consent decree or Award passedby the Lok Adalat which, as already noticed, does not involve anyadjudication by a Court, would hardly suffice. The estoppel which isreferred to by this Court applies as between the parties to the consentdecree.32. This brings us to the next question, i.e., the implication ofSection 21 of the 1987 Act under which the Award of the Lok Adalat isto be treated as a decree. The High Court in the impugned judgment hasdrawn upon Section 21 to uphold the contention of the respondents. Thereasoning runs as follows: An Award passed by the Lok Adalat is to be taken as a decree ofa Civil Court under Section 21 of the 1987 Act. What Section 28ANEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH950SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.requires is redetermination of compensation by the Civil Court. Therefore,the Award of the Lok Adalat, in this manner of reasoning, is to be conflatedto the adjudication contemplated under Section 28A of the Act.33. In K.N. Govindan Kutty Menon v. C.D. Shaji17, this Courtwas concerned with the question as to whether under Section 21 of the1987 Act, when a case is referred to the Lok Adalat in a criminal caseunder Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act and the matter issettled and an award is passed, whether it could be treated as a Decreeof a Civil Court and, thus, executable. The Court held:“23. A statutory support as evidenced in the Statement ofObjects and Reasons of the Act would not only reduce the burdenof arrears of work in regular courts, but would also take justice tothe doorsteps of the poor and the needy and make justice quickerand less expensive. In the case on hand, the courts below erred inholding that only if the matter was one which was referred by acivil court it could be a decree and if the matter was referred bya criminal court it will only be an order of the criminal court andnot a decree under Section 21 of the Act. The Act does not makeout any such distinction between the reference made by a civilcourt and a criminal court. There is no restriction on the power ofLok Adalat to pass an award based on the compromise arrived atbetween the parties in a case referred by a criminal court underSection 138 of the NI Act, and by virtue of the deeming provisionit has to be treated as a decree capable of execution by a civilcourt. In this regard, the view taken in Subhash NarasappaMangrule [(2009) 3 Mah LJ 857] and Valarmathi OilIndustries [AIR 2009 Mad 180] supports this contention and wefully accept the same.”34. Thereafter the Court concluded as follows:“26. From the above discussion, the following propositions emerge:(1) In view of the unambiguous language of Section 21 ofthe Act, every award of the Lok Adalat shall be deemed to be adecree of a civil court and as such it is executable by that court.(2) The Act does not make out any such distinction betweenthe reference made by a civil court and a criminal court.17 (2012) 2 SCC 51 ABCDEFGH951(3) There is no restriction on the power of the Lok Adalatto pass an award based on the compromise arrived at betweenthe parties in respect of cases referred to by various courts (bothcivil and criminal), tribunals, Family Court, Rent Control Court,Consumer Redressal Forum, Motor Accidents Claims Tribunaland other forums of similar nature.(4) Even if a matter is referred by a criminal court underSection 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 and by virtueof the deeming provisions, the award passed by the Lok Adalatbased on a compromise has to be treated as a decree capable ofexecution by a civil court.”35. There can be no quarrel with principle that the purpose of thefiction being properly appreciated, even in a case under Section 138 ofthe Negotiable Instruments Act, when following a Reference, an awardis passed under the 1987 Act, it is in accord with the purpose to treat theaward as a decree for the purpose of enforcing the award as a decree.36. When a legal fiction is employed by the legislature, it becomesa duty of the Court to interpret it and to give it meaning. In gleaning itsmeaning, the Court is duty bound to ascertain the purpose of this legislativedevice. The Court cannot allow its mind to be boggled undoubtedly ascontended by the learned senior counsel for the respondent, in the matterof carrying the legal fiction to its logical end. But this is not the same asholding that the Court will not look to the object of the Act and, inparticular, the fiction in question. In this regard, we notice the judgmentof this Court in State of Karnataka v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others18:“75. In this context, we may usefully refer to the Principles ofStatutory Interpretation, 14th Edn. by G.P. Singh. The learnedauthor has expressed thus:“In interpreting a provision creating a legal fiction, the court isto ascertain for what purpose the fiction is created [State ofTravancore-Cochin v. Shanmugha Vilas CashewnutFactory, AIR 1953 SC 333; State of Bombay v. PandurangVinayak, AIR 1953 SC 244 : 1953 Cri LJ 1094] , and afterascertaining this, the Court is to assume all those facts andconsequences which are incidental or inevitable corollaries tothe giving effect to the fiction. [East End Dwellings Co. Ltd.18 (2017) 3 SCC 362NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH952SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.v. Finsbury Borough Council, 1952 AC 109 : (1951) 2 All ER587 (HL); CIT v. S. Teja Singh, AIR 1959 SC 352] But in soconstruing the fiction it is not to be extended beyond the purposefor which it is created [Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd. v. State ofBihar, AIR 1955 SC 661; CIT v. Amarchand N. Shroff, AIR1963 SC 1448] , or beyond the language of the section by whichit is created. [CIT v. Shakuntala, AIR 1966 SC 719; MancheriPuthusseri Ahmed v. Kuthiravattam Estate Receiver, (1996)6 SCC 185 : AIR 1997 SC 208] It cannot also be extended byimporting another fiction. [CIT v. Moon Mills Ltd., AIR 1966SC 870] The principles stated above are ‘well-settled’. [Stateof W.B. v. Sadan K. Bormal, (2004) 6 SCC 59 : 2004 SCC(Cri) 1739 : AIR 2004 SC 3666] A legal fiction may also beinterpreted narrowly to make the statute workable.[Nandkishore Ganesh Joshi v. Commr., Municipal Corpn.of Kalyan and Dombivali, (2004) 11 SCC 417 : AIR 2005 SC34] “76. In Aneeta Hada v. Godfather Travels and Tours [AneetaHada v. Godfather Travels and Tours, (2012) 5 SCC 661 : (2012)3 SCC (Civ) 350 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 241] , a three-Judge Benchhas ruled thus : (SCC p. 681, paras 37-38)“37. In State of T.N. v. Arooran Sugars Ltd. [State of T.N. v.Arooran Sugars Ltd., (1997) 1 SCC 326] the ConstitutionBench, while dealing with the deeming provision in a statute,ruled that the role of a provision in a statute creating legalfiction is well settled. Reference was made to Chief Inspectorof Mines v. Karam Chand Thapar [Chief Inspector of Minesv. Karam Chand Thapar, AIR 1961 SC 838 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ1] , J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India[J.K. Cotton Spg. and Wvg. Mills Ltd. v. Union of India,1987 Supp SCC 350 : 1988 SCC (Tax) 26] , M. Venugopal v.LIC [M. Venugopal v. LIC, (1994) 2 SCC 323 : 1994 SCC(L&S) 664] and Harish Tandon v. ADM, Allahabad [HarishTandon v. ADM, Allahabad, (1995) 1 SCC 537] and eventually,it was held that when a statute creates a legal fiction sayingthat something shall be deemed to have been done which infact and truth has not been done, the Court has to examine andascertain as to for what purpose and between which persons ABCDEFGH953such a statutory fiction is to be resorted to and thereafter, thecourts have to give full effect to such a statutory fiction and ithas to be carried to its logical conclusion.38. From the aforesaid pronouncements, the principle that canbe culled out is that it is the bounden duty of the court toascertain for what purpose the legal fiction has been created.It is also the duty of the court to imagine the fiction with all realconsequences and instances unless prohibited from doing so.That apart, the use of the term “deemed” has to be read in itscontext and further, the fullest logical purpose and import areto be understood. It is because in modern legislation, the term“deemed” has been used for manifold purposes. The object ofthe legislature has to be kept in mind.””37. In the light of the principles which have been laid down, weare inclined to take the following view.An Award passed by the Lok Adalat under 1987 Act is theculmination of a non-adjudicatory process. The parties are persuadedeven by members of the Lok Adalat to arrive at mutually agreeablecompromise. The Award sets out the terms. The provisions contained inSection 21 by which the Award is treated as if it were a decree is intendedonly to clothe the Award with enforceability. In view of the provisions ofSection 21 by which it is to be treated as a decree which cannot bechallenged, undoubtedly, by way of an appeal in view of the expressprovisions forbidding it, unless it is set aside in other appropriateproceedings, it becomes enforceable. The purport of the law giver isonly to confer it with enforceability in like manner as if it were a decree.Thus, the legal fiction that the Award is to be treated as a decree goesno further.38. The further argument of Shri Dhruv Mehta is that apart fromthe Award of the Lok Adalat being treated as a decree, it is also capableof being treated as an order of the Court, as the case may be. In thisregard, we have already noticed the scheme of the 1987 Act. We haveconsidered the definition of the word ‘Case’ and the word ‘Court’. Wehave also noticed the provisions of Section 19(5) and Section 20(1). Theconspectus of these provisions would yield the following result:The Lok Adalat as constituted under Section 19(2) would havejurisdiction inter alia to determine and to arrive at a compromise orNEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH954SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.settlement between the parties to a dispute in respect of any case pendingbefore any Court for which the Lok Adalat is organized. The word ‘Court’in this context would mean the court as defined in section 2(aaa), viz., acivil, criminal or revenue court. The word ‘Court’ also includes any tribunalor any authority constituted under any law for the time being in forcewhich for exercising judicial or even quasi-judicial functions. Thus, theword ‘Court’ in the 1987 Act in the context of Section 19(5) embracesthe bodies referred to in Section 2(aaa) of 1987 Act. The manner oftaking cognizance by Lok Adalats is provided in Section 20(1) read withSection 19(5). The Court as defined in Section 2 (aaa) can refer thecase to the Lok Adalat. Such court, as already noticed, can be civil,criminal or a revenue court. It can be even a tribunal or authority. Whensuccess is achieved as a result of the holding of the Lok Adalat culminatingin an award, the words, as the case may be, in Section 21 predicates thatit may be instead of a decree of a Civil Court, an order of any otherCourt. Learned counsel for the appellant would point out that if a CriminalCourt were to refer a matter under Section 138 of the NegotiableInstruments Act to the Lok Addalat and the Lok Adalat passes an Awardthen such an Award would be treated as an order of the Court. However,in this regard, we have noticed the judgment of this Court reported inK.N. Govindan Kutty Menon (supra). Even when the Criminal Courtrefers the matter under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Actin order to make it executable, this Court has taken the view that it willbe treated as if it were a decree.39. If a Revenue Court or a Tribunal which, undoubtedly, fall underSection 2(aaa) of the 1987 Act were to refer a case to the Lok Adalatunder Section 20(1) and an award is passed it may become the order ofthe court/tribunal. In other words, if the matter were finally concludedon a regular basis, that is, without reference to the Lok Adalat, it wouldbe an order which would be passed.40. The argument, however, according to Shri Dhruv Mehta,learned senior counsel, appears to be that by virtue of this legislativedevice, the award of the Lok Adalat passed in these cases by theReference Court under Section 18 executing the Lok Adalat must betreated as an order passed by the Court under Section 28A of the Act.We will answer this question after considering the requirement underSection 28A now.41. Section 28A, undoubtedly, has been introduced by parliamentin the year 1984 to bring solace to those land owners or persons having ABCDEFGH955interest in land to claim the just amount due to them even though theyhave omitted to file application under Section 18 of the Act seekingenhancement. In fact, in Jose Antonio Cruz Dos R. Rodriguese andAnother v. Land Acquisition Collector and Another19, this Court, in aBench of three learned Judges, has held that the period of limitation ofthree months for invoking Section 28A of the Act would commencefrom the date of passing of the order by the original court answering thereference under Section 18 and not from the date of the appellate court.In Union of India and Another v. Hansoli Devi and Others (supra),the Constitution Bench of this Court has held that the right under Section28A is available even to the person who has unsuccessfully filed a timebarred application under Section 18, the fact that a land owner hasreceived the compensation awarded by the Land Acquisition Officerwith or without protest will not take away his right under Section 28A.42. Can the Court be oblivious to the plain language of the statute?Can we ignore the voice of the legislature when it is clear andunambiguous? Section 28A figures in Part III of the Act. It has a heading.The heading reads as ‘Re-determination of the amount of compensationon the basis of the award of the Court’. The very opening words in ourview deal a fatal blow to the very premise of the respondent’s contention.An award under Part III of the Act commences with a reference underSection 18. The Court proceeds to adjudicate the reference in particularby bearing in mind the matters which are to be considered under Section23 of the Act.43. Section 24 declares matters which are to be neglected indetermining compensation. Section 26 deals with the form of the award.Section 26(2) reads as follows:“26. Forms of awards……………………………………………………………………………………………….……………………………………………………………………………………………….(2) Every such award shall be deemed to be a decree and thestatement of the grounds of every such award a judgment withinthe meaning of section 2. clause (2), and section 2, clause (9),respectively of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 (5 of 1908).”44. The award which is passed by the Lok Adalat cannot be saidto be an award passed under Part III. It is the compromise arrived at19 (1996) 6 SCC 746NEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH956SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.between the parties before the Lok Adalat which culminates in the awardby the Lok Adalat. In fact, an award under Part III of the Actcontemplates grounds or reasons and therefore, adjudication iscontemplated and Section 26(2) of the Act is self-explanatory.45. The next aspect is even more fatal to the case of therespondents. Not only must it be an award passed as a result of theadjudication but it must be passed by ‘the Court’ allowing compensationin excess of the amount awarded by the collector. The word ‘Court’ hasbeen defined in the Act as the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdictionunless the appropriate Government has appointed a Special JudicialOfficer to perform judicial functions of the court under this Act. Wehave noticed the composition of a Lok Adalat in Section 19(2) of the‘1987 Act’. The Court is not the same as a Lok Adalat.46. The Award passed by the Lok Adalat in itself without anythingmore is to be treated by the deeming fiction to be a decree. It is not acase where a compromise is arrived at under Order XXIII of the Codeof Civil Procedure, 1908, between the parties and the court is expectedto look into the compromise and satisfy itself that it is lawful before itassumes efficacy by virtue of Section 21. Without anything more, theaward passed by Lok Adalat becomes a decree. The enhancement ofthe compensation is determined purely on the basis of compromise whichis arrived at and not as a result of any decision of a ‘Court’ as defined inthe Act.47. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat is not a compromisedecree. An Award passed by the Lok Adalat without anything more, isto be treated as a decree inter alia. We would approve the view of thelearned Single Judge of the Kerala High Court in P.T. Thomas (supra).An award unless it is successfully questioned in appropriate proceedings,becomes unalterable and non-violable. In the case of a compromise fallingunder Order XXIII Code of Civil Procedure, it becomes a duty of theCourt to apply its mind to the terms of the compromise. Without anythingmore, the mere compromise arrived at between the parties does nothave the imprimatur of the Court. It becomes a compromise decreeonly when the procedures in the Code are undergone.48. An Award passed under Section 19 of the 1987 Act is a productof compromise. Sans compromise, the Lok Adalat loses jurisdiction. Thematter goes back to the Court for adjudication. Pursuant to thecompromise and the terms being reduced to writing with the approval of ABCDEFGH957the parties it assumes the garb of an Award which in turn is again deemedto be a decree without anything more. We would think that it may not belegislative intention to treat such an award passed under Section 19 ofthe 1987 Act to be equivalent to an award of the Court which is definedin the Act as already noted by us and made under Part III of the Act. Anaward of the Court in Section 28A is also treated as a decree. Such anAward becomes executable. It is also appealable. Part III of the Actcontains a definite scheme which necessarily involves adjudication bythe Court and arriving at the compensation. It is this which can form thebasis for any others pressing claim under the same notification by invokingSection 28A. We cannot be entirely oblivious to the prospect of an‘unholy’ compromise in a matter of this nature forming the basis forredetermination as a matter of right given under Section 28A.49. We would, therefore, approve the view taken by the BombayHigh Court in Umadevi Rajkumar Jeure (supra) and the learned singleJudge of the Karnataka High Court in Vasudave (supra) and hold thatan Award passed under Section (20) of the 1987 Act by the Lok Adalatcannot be the basis for invoking Section 28A.50. As far as the argument of the respondents that the awarddated 12.3.2016 can be treated as the order of the Court within themeaning of Section 18 of the Act read with Section 28A of the Act, weare of the view such an argument cannot be accepted. Unlike in thefacts of the case decided by the Andhra Pradesh High Court reported in2003 SCC ONLINE AP 21 (supra) which has been distinguished by theBombay High Court in Umadevi (supra) on the score that in the casefrom Andhra Pradesh, the Reference Court has passed an award basedon a compromise arrived at between the parties before the Lok Adalat,in this case, the award dated 12.3.2016 is the award passed by the LokAdalat. This is clear from the judgment of the High Court, the case ofthe parties before it and the terms of the award dated 12.3.2016. Inother words, this is a case whereas as noted in the impugned judgmentLAR 6 of 2006 (Fateh Mohammaed v. State of U.P.) was referred tothe Lok Adalat, that is the Additional District and Sessions Judge/FTCNo.2, Gautam Buddh Nagar, U.P. Thus, the proceedings dated 12.3.2016which is relied on by the respondents is indeed an award which is passedunder Section 20 of the 1987 Act though it may appear to be an order. Inother words, the Additional District & Sessions Judge was acting as LokAdalat. This is so even if the decision of the High Court in Mangu RamNEW OKHLA INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY(NOIDA) v. YUNUS & ORS. [K. M. JOSEPH, J.] ABCDEFGH958SUPREME COURT REPORTS[2022] 11 S.C.R.was relied upon by the parties and it is also referred to in the award. Hewas not disposing of the case as ‘the Court’ within the meaning of Act.It also cannot be treated as an award of the Court within the meaning ofSection 20 and 21 of the ‘1987 Act.51. We have also noticed the case of the appellant that the HighCourt decision in Mangu Ram (supra) which found the rate at Rs.297.50per square yard was erroneous in regard to the notification under Section(4) which is relevant to the cases before us and that a review petition isalso filed and pending.52. Having regard to all circumstances and the facts of this casewe deem it appropriate to pass the following order:(1) The appeals are allowed. We declare that an application underSection 28A of the Act cannot be maintained on the basis of an awardpassed by the Lok Adalat under Section 20 of 1987 Act. The impugnedjudgments stand set aside. Parties to bear the respective costs.Divya PandeyAppeals allowed.(Assisted by : Preetam Bharti, LCRA)