INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL ETC & Ors.

3 S.C.R. 1 INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC. (S.L.P. (C) Nos. 9036-9038 of 2016) MARCH 06, 2020 [ARUN MISHRA, INDIRA BANERJEE, VINEET SARAN, M. R. SHAH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.] Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: Legislative history of the Act of 2013 – Purpose of its enactment – Salient features – Departure from old Land Acquisition Act in 2013 Act relating to Social Impact Assessment, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme – Discussed . Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Twin requirement for the lapse – Firstly, physical possession has not been taken and secondly compensation has not been paid – Whether the conditions are cumulative i.e. both are to be fulfilled for lapsing of acquisition proceedings or the conditions are in alternative (“either/or”) – Held: s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 deals with a situation only where the award has been made five years or more before the commencement of the Act, but physical possession of the land has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid – As regards the collation of the words used in s.24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed – General rule of statutory interpretation of positive and negative conditions are that positive conditions separated by ‘or’ are read in the alternative but negative conditions connected by ‘or’ are construed as cumulative and ‘or’ is read as ‘nor’ or ‘and’ i.e. the expression ‘or’ has to be read as conjunctive and conditions of both the clauses must be fulfilled – Thus, the word ‘or ’ used in s.24(2) between possession and compensation has to be read as ‘nor’ or as ‘and’ – This would mean that the deemed lapse of land acquisition proceedings under s.24(2) takes place where due to inaction of authorities for five years or more prior to commencement of the Act of 2013, the possession of land has not been taken nor compensation has been paid – Thus, 1 1 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse – Interpretation of statutes.

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Interpreting “or” under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively – Effect of – Held: It would result in an anomalous situation, because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund – In case physical possession is with the landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation – In the absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover compensation paid – The landowner would be unjustly enriched – This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – The principle of restitution, unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own – Absence of provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces conclusion that the word “or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as “and” – Doctrine of unjust enrichment and principle of restitution.

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Purpose of – Held: To punish acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying compensation after making award five years or more before commencement of Act of 2013 in pending proceedings providing they would lapse. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24 – Vested right under – Held: s.24 of the Act of 2013 does not intend to take away vested rights – This is because there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: proviso to s.24(2) – Whether proviso is part of s.24(2) or s.24(1)(b) – Held: The proviso is part of the scheme of s.24(2) – The entire provision 2 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v.

MANOHARLAL 3 of s.24(2), including the proviso, operates when there is inaction for a period of five years or more, as contemplated therein. A Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Applicability to pending proceedings – Held: s.24(2) shall apply to the proceeding which is pending as on the date on which the Act of 2013, has been brought into force and it does not apply to the concluded proceedings – s.24(2) is not a tool to revive concluded proceedings and to question the validity of acquisition proceedings due to which possession were taken decades ago, or to question the manner of deposit of amount in the treasury – The Act of 2013 never intended revival of such claims – s.24(2) only contemplates lethargy/inaction of the authorities to act for five years or more. Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Whether gives rise to fresh cause of action – Held: s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 does not give rise to new cause of action to question the legality of concluded proceedings of land acquisition – s.24 does not revive stale and time-barred claims and does not reopen concluded proceedings nor allow landowners to question the legality of mode of taking possession to reopen proceedings or mode of deposit of compensation in the treasury instead of court to invalidate acquisition.

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – Exclusion of period of interim order(s) – Held: Any court’s interim order cannot be said to be inaction of the authorities or agencies; thus, time period is not to be included for counting the 5 years period as envisaged in s.24(2). Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) and its proviso – The expression ‘paid’ in the main part of s.24(2) does not include a deposit of compensation in court – The consequence of non-deposit is provided in proviso to s.24(2) in case it has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings then all beneficiaries (landowners) as on the date of notification for land acquisition under s.4 of the Act of 1894 shall be entitled to B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013 – In case the obligation under s.31 of the Act of 1894 has not been fulfilled, interest under s.34 of the said Act can be granted – Non- deposit of compensation (in court) does not result in the lapse of land acquisition proceedings – In case of non- deposit with respect to the majority of holdings for five years or more, compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to the “landowners” as on the date of notification for land acquisition under s.4 of the Act of 1894.

Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013: s.24(2) – When compensation, tendered, as provided in s.31(1) of the Act of 1894, but not paid/deposited in court – Whether acquisition lapse – Held: In case a person has been tendered the compensation as provided under s.31(1) of the Act of 1894, it is not open to him to claim that acquisition has lapsed under s.24(2) due to non-payment or non-deposit of compensation in court – The obligation to pay is complete by tendering the amount under s.31(1) – Land owners who had refused to accept compensation or who sought reference for higher compensation, cannot claim that the acquisition proceedings had lapsed under s.24(2) of the Act of 2013 – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.31(1). Land Acquisition: Mode of taking possession – When possession of large area of land is to be taken, then it is permissible to take possession by drawing Panchnama – Possession.

Possession: Concept of possession – Held: Possession comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi – Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed – If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not in possession – The established principle is that the possession follows title – Possession comprises of the control over the property – The element of possession is the physical control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power – Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co-exist. Delay/laches: In matters of land acquisition, delay is fatal in questioning the land acquisition proceedings – In case possession 4 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 5 has not been taken in accordance with law and vesting is not in accordance with s.16, proceedings before courts are to be initiated within reasonable time, not after the lapse of several decades – Land Acquisition Act, 1894 – s.16.

Interpretation of Statutes: Addition or substraction of word(s) in a statute – Power of Courts – Held: While interpreting the statutory provisions, addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible – It is not open to the court to either add or subtract a word – There cannot be any departure from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” – Legal maxim. Interpretation of Statutes: When two different expressions are used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. Interpretation of statutes: Proviso to a provision – The function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope – The proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. Interpretation of Statutes: Colon (punctuation mark) – Significance of its use – The use of the colon is to introduce a sub- clause that follows logically from the text before it – Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 – s.24(2).

Judicial Notice: Judicial notice is taken of the fact that in no other Government security, rate of interest is higher on the amount being invested under ss.32 and 33 of the Act of 1894 – Higher rate of interest is available under s.34 to the advantage of landowners – Land Acquisition Act, 1894. Repeal: Applicability of the General Clauses Act – Held: When repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require an examination of the language of the new enactment if it expresses an intent different from the earlier repealed Act – The enquiry would necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with or destroy them – If the new Act manifests different intentions, the application of the General Clauses Act will stand excluded – General Clauses Act.

A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. Words and phrases: Word ‘paid’, tender’, ‘vesting’ – Meaning of, discussed. Words and phrases: Word ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’ – Distinction between – Dictionary meaning and meaning in the context of s.24(2) of Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Words and phrases: Concept of vesting – Discussed. Answering the reference, the Court HELD:

The Act of 2013 repeals and replaces the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, a general law for acquisition of land of public purposes, which had been in force for almost 120 years, with a view to address certain inadequacies and/ or shortcomings in the said Act. The Act of 2013 is prospective and saves proceedings already initiated under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 before its repeal, subject to provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013, which begins with a non-obstante clause and overrides all other provisions of the Act of 2013. [Paras 6, 7][58 B-D]

Scope of Section 24

2.1 Section 24 begins with a non-obstante clause, overriding all other provisions of the Act of 2013 including Section 114 of the Act of 2013, dealing with repeal and saving. In terms of Section 114 of the Act of 2013, the general application of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, except otherwise provided in the Act, has been saved. Section 6(a) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 provides that unless a different intention appears, the repeal shall not revive anything not in force or existing at the time when the repeal has been made. The effect of the previous operation of any enactment so repealed or anything duly done or suffered thereunder is also saved by the provisions contained in Section 6(b). As per Section 6(c), the repeal shall not affect any right, privilege, obligation or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred. [Para 94][115 E-G]

2.2 Section 24(1)(a) of the Act of 2013 read with the non- obstante clause provides that in case of proceedings initiated 6 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 7 under the Act of 1894 the award had not been made under Section 11, then the provisions of the Act of 2013, relating to the determination of compensation would apply. However; the proceedings held earlier do not lapse. In terms of Section 24(1)(b), where award under Section 11 is made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the Act of 1894. It contemplates that such pending proceedings, as on the date on which the Act of 2013 came into force shall continue, and taken to their logical end. However, the exception to Section 24(1) (b) is provided in Section 24(2) in case of pending proceedings; in case where the award has been passed five years or more prior to the commencement of the Act of 2013, the physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed, and such proceedings cannot continue as per the provisions of Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 2013. [Para 95][115 G-H][116 A-C] A B C Principles of Statutory Interpretation (14th Edition) by Justice D G.P. Singh – referred to

2.3 As regards the collation of the words used in Section 24(2), two negative conditions have been prescribed. Thus, even if one condition is satisfied, there is no lapse, and this logically flows from the Act of 1894 read with the provisions of Section 24 of the Act of 2013. Any other interpretation would entail illogical results. Thus, for lapse of acquisition proceedings initiated under the old law, under Section 24(2), if both steps have not been taken, i.e., neither physical possession is taken, nor compensation is paid, the land acquisition proceedings lapse. [Paras 99, 101][119 G-H][122 B-C] Patel Chunibhai Dajibha, etc. v. Narayanrao Khanderao Jambekar and Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1457 : [1965] SCR 328; Punjab Produce & Trading Co. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal, [1971] SCR 977 – relied on Brown & Co. v. Harrison (1927) All ER Rep 195; Federal Steam Navigation Co. Ltd. v. Department of Trade and Industry 1974 (1) WLR 505 – referred to E F G H 8 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

2.4 Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 is a penal provision - to punish the acquiring authority for its lethargy in not taking physical possession nor paying the compensation after making the award five years or more before the commencement of the Act of 2013 in pending proceedings, providing that they would lapse. The expression “where an award has been made, then the proceedings shall continue” used in Section 24(1)(b) of the Act of 1894 means that proceedings were pending in praesenti as on the date of enforcement of the Act of 2013 are not concluded proceedings, and in that context, an exception has been carved out in section 24(2). [Para 112][131 A-C] M/s. Ranchhoddas Atmaram and Anr. v. The Union of India and Ors. AIR 1961 SC 935 : [1961] SCR 718; Prof. Yashpal & Ors. v. State of Chhattisgarh & Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 420 : [2005] 2 SCR 23; Joint Director of Mines Safety v. Tandur and Nayandgi Stone Quarries (P) Ltd (1987) 3 SCC 308 : [1987] 2 SCR 911; Samee Khan v Bindu Khan (1998) 7 SCC 59 : [1998] 1 Suppl. SCR 244; State of Bombay v. R.M.D. Chamarbaugwala [1957] 1 SCR 874; Tilkayat Shri Govindlalji Maharaj etc. v State of Rajasthan & Ors AIR 1963 SC 1638 : [1964] SCR 561 – relied on Pooran Singh v. State of M.P [1965] 2 SCR 853; Sri Nasiruddin v. State Transport Appellate Tribunal (1975) 2 SCC 671 : [1976] 1 SCR 505; Municipal Corporation of Delhi v. Tek Chand Bhatia (1980) 1 SCC 158 : [1980] 1 SCR 910; State of Punjab v. Ex-Constable Ram Singh (1992) 4 SCC 54 : [1992] 3 SCR 634 – referred to Marsey Docks and Harbour Board v. Coggins and Griffith (Liverpool) Ltd. LR (AC) Vol.XIII 1888 595; Re Hayden Pask v. Perry (1931) 2 Ch.333; Metropolitan Board of Works v. Street Bros (1881) VIII QBD 445 – referred to

2.5 When considering the scheme of the Act of 1894, once the award was made under Section 11, the Collector may, undertake possession of the land which shall thereupon vest absolutely in the Government free from all encumbrances. Section 16 of the Act of 1894 enables the Collector to take possession of INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 9 acquired land, when an award is made under Section 11. Clearly, there can be lapse of proceedings under the Act of 1894 only when possession is not taken. The provisions in Section 11A of the Act of 1894 states that the Collector shall make an award within a period of two years from the date of the publication of the declaration under Section 6 and if no award is made within two years, the entire proceedings for acquisition of the land shall lapse. The period of two year excludes any period during which interim order granted by the Court was in operation. Once an award is made and possession is taken, by virtue of Section 16, land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances. Vesting of land is automatic on the happening of the two exigencies of passing award and taking possession, as provided in Section 16. [Paras 114, 115][131 F-H][132 C-E]

2.6 The scheme of the Act of 1894 is clear that when the award is passed under Section 11, thereafter possession is taken as provided under Section 16, land vests in the State Government. Under Section 12(2), a notice of the award has to be issued by the Collector. Taking possession is not dependent upon payment. Payment has to be tendered under Section 31 unless the Collector is “prevented from making payment,” as provided under section 31(2). In case of failure under Section 31(1) or 31(3), also Collector is not precluded from making payment, but it carries interest under Section 34 @ 9% for the first year from the date it ought to have been paid or deposited and thereafter @ 15%. Thus, once land has been vested in the State under Section 16, in case of failure to pay the compensation under Section 31(1) to deposit under Section 31(2), compensation has to be paid along with interest, and due to non-compliance of Section 31, there is no lapse of acquisition.

The same spirit has been carried forward in the Act of 2013 by providing in Section 24(2). Once possession has been taken though the payment has not been made, the compensation has to be paid along with interest as envisaged under section 34, and in a case, payment has been made, possession has not been taken, there is no lapse under Section 24(2). In a case where possession has been taken under the Act of 1894 as provided by Section 16 or 17(1) the land vests absolutely in the State, free from all encumbrances, if compensation is not paid, there is no divesting there will be no A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. lapse as compensation carries interest @ 9% or @ 15% as envisaged under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. Proviso to Section 24(2) makes some wholesome provision in case the amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of landholdings, in such an event, not only those persons but all the beneficiaries, though for minority of holding compensation has been paid, shall be entitled to higher compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013.

The expression used is “all beneficiaries specified in the notification for acquisition under Section 4 of the said Land Acquisition Act”, i.e., Act of 1894, means that the persons who are to be paid higher compensation are those who have been recorded as beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4. The proviso gives effect to, and furthers the principle that under the Act of 1894, the purchases made after issuance of notification under Section 4 are void. As such, the benefit of higher compensation under the proviso to Section 24(2) is intended to be given to the beneficiaries mentioned in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894. [Para 118][133 D-H][134 A-D]

2.7 The benefits under the Act of 2013 envisage that where the award had not been made, or award has been made, but possession has not been taken (because once possession is taken, land is vests in the State) there can be lapse of acquisition. No doubt that payment is also to be made: that issue is taken care of by the provision of payment of interest under Section 34: also, in case of non-deposit- in respect of majority of holdings in a given award, higher compensation under the Act of 2013 has to be paid to all beneficiaries as on the date of notification under Section 4 issued under the Act of 1894. There is nothing in the Statement of Objects and Reasons making specific reference to non-payment of compensation where an award has been made, and possession has been taken. While interpreting the provisions of an Act, the court to consider the objects and reasons of the legislature, which the legislature had in mind also emphasised that once vesting is complete, there is no divesting. [Para 120][134 G-H][135 A-C] Workmen of Dimakuchi Tea Estate v. Management of Dimakuchi Tea Estate [1958] SCR 1156; Mukesh K. 10 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 11 Tripathi v. Senior Divisional Manager, LIC & Ors. (2004) 8 SCC 387 : [2004] 4 Suppl. SCR 127 – relied

2.8 Interpreting “or” under Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013 disjunctively, would result in an anomalous situation - because, once compensation has been paid to the landowner, there is no provision for its refund. In case physical possession is with the landowner; and compensation has been paid, there is no provision in the Act for disgorging out the benefit of compensation. In the absence of any provision for refund in the Act of 2013, the State cannot recover compensation paid. The landowner would be unjustly enriched. This could never have been the legislative intent of enacting Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. The principle of restitution, unless provided in the Act, cannot be resorted to by the authorities on their own. The absence of provision for refund in the Act of 2013 reinforces conclusion that the word “or” has to be read as conjunctively and has to be read as “and.” [Para 132][150-E][151 A-B] C. Padma & Ors. v. Dy. Secretary & Ors (1997) 2 SCC 627 : [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 158; Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant Singh & Ors (2003) 1 SCC 335 : [2002] 3 Suppl. SCR 534; Milkfood Ltd. v. GMC Ice Cream (P) Ltd 2004 (7) SCC 288 : [2004] 3 SCR 854 – referred to

In re: Vesting and divesting Once the land vests in the State, it cannot be divested, even if there is some irregularity in the acquisition proceedings. There is nothing in the Act of 1894 to show that non-compliance thereof will be fatal or will lead to any penalty. Once vesting takes place, and is with possession, after which a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser, not in rightful possession and vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. [Paras 141, 147][160-H][161-A][163 F-G] State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118; Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors (1996) 11 SCC 698 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6; Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 : [1995] 4 Suppl. A B C D E F G H 12 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. SCR 787; Puttu Lal (dead) by L.Rs. v. State of U.P. & Anr (1996) 3 SCC 99 : [1996] 2 SCR 638; The Fruit & Vegetable Merchants Union v.

In re: Vested rights under Section 24 of the Act of 2013 Section 24 of the Act of 2013 does not intend to take away vested rights. This is because there is no specific provision taking away or divesting title to the land, which had originally vested with the State, or divesting the title or interest of beneficiaries or third-party transferees of such land which they had lawfully acquired, through sales or transfers. When repeal is followed by a fresh enactment on the same subject, the provisions of the General Clauses Act would undoubtedly require an examination of the language of the new enactment if it expresses an intent different from the earlier repealed Act. The enquiry would necessitate the examination if the old rights and liabilities are kept alive or whether the new Act manifests an intention to do away with or destroy them. If the new Act manifests different intentions, the application of the General Clauses Act will stand excluded. [Paras 148, 149][164 F-G][166 A-C] State of Haryana v. Hindustan Construction Co. Ltd (2017) 9 SCC 463 : [2017] 9 SCR 482 – relied on Zile Singh v. State of Haryana (2004) 8 SCC 01 : [2004] 3 Suppl. SCR 400; CIT v. Sarkar Builders (2015) 7 SCC 579 : [2015] 7 SCR 56; Jawaharmal v. State of Rajasthan [1966] 1 SCR 890; Rai Ramkrishna v. State of Bihar [1964] 1 SCR 897; K.S. Paripoornan v. State of Kerala & Ors (1994) 5 SCC 593 : [1994] 3 Suppl. SCR 405 – relied on Yamashita-Shinnihon Steamship Co. Ltd.v L’office Chefifien Des Phosphates & Anr [1994] 1 A.C. 486; Lauri v. Renad (1892) 3 Ch. 402; Gloucester Union v. Woolwich Union (1917) 2 K.B. 374; The King v. The General Commissioners of Income Tax for Southampton (1916) 2 K.B. 249 – referred to Bennion, Statutory Interpretation, 5th Edition (2012) – referred to A B C D E F G H 14 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R.

In re: Legislative History of Act of 2013 The Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Bill, 2011 (Bill No.77 of 2011) was introduced in the Parliament. Section 24(1), as introduced originally, contained a provision with respect to award, which has not been made, but it was later on amended, and now as provided in Section 24(1)(a), there is no lapse and only higher compensation is available in case award has not been passed. The earlier Section 24(2) contained only the provision with respect to possession of the land that has not been taken. Earlier, there was no time limit prescribed, and it was proposed that the process for acquisition of land shall lapse. Debates in the Lok Sabha on 29.8.2013, were referred to during the hearings, to cite various reasons given in respect of the question why effect should be given retrospectively in cases where acquisition has not been completed. While replying to the debate, the Minister concerned had stated that there would be lapse only if in case possession has not been taken and compensation has not been paid. The emphasis right from the beginning was on possession. Thus, from the perusal of debate too, it is apparent that the word “or” had been understood as “and”. [Paras 161, 162, 164, 165][178 D-E][179 B-D][180 B- C][180 G-H] Tinsukhia Electric Supply Company Ltd. v. State of Assam & Ors., (1989) 3 SCC 709 : [1989] 2 SCR 544; C.I.T. v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers, (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balram Kamanat v. Union of India (2003) 7 SCC 628 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 24; New India Assurance Co. v. Nulli Nivelle, (2008) 3 SCC 279 : [2007] 13 SCR 598; H.S. Vankani v. State of Gujarat, (2010) 4 SCC 301 : [2010] 3 SCR 485; State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Hon’ble Mr. Justice R.A. Mehta (Retd.) and Ors., (2013) 3 SCC 1 : [2013] 1 SCR 1 – referred to

In Re: Objectives of the Act The Act of 2013 has been enacted considering the difficulties caused by the operation of the earlier laws and to subserve the public interest. Thus, the Court should interpret it in the context of the attendant circumstances. At the same time, the court should not, while ostensibly adopting a purposive or INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 15 liberal interpretation, affect matters which have become final, or stale. [Para 166][181 D-E] A Burrakur Coal Co. Ltd. v. Union of India [1962] 1 SCR 44; A. Thangal Kunju Musaliar v. M. Venkatachalam Potti [1955] SCR 1196; Arnit Das v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 488; Popat Bahiru Govardhane & Ors. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr., (2013) 10 SCC 765 : [2013] 8 SCR 241 – relied Bhavnagar University v. Palitana Sugar Mill (P) Ltd. & Ors., (2003) 2 SCC 111 : [2002] 4 Suppl. SCR 517 – referred to

In Re: proviso to Section 24(2): Whether the proviso is part of section 24(2) or Section 24(1).

7.1 When reading the word “or” as ‘and’ in the main part of section 24(2), it is clear that the proviso has to stay as part of section 24(2) where it has been placed by the legislature, and only then it makes sense. If ‘or’ used in-between two negative conditions of ‘possession has not been taken’ or ‘compensation has not been paid,’ disjunctively, in that case, the proviso cannot be operative and would become otiose and would make no sense as part of Section 24(2). In case of amount not having been paid the acquisition has to lapse, though possession (of the land) has been taken would not be the proper interpretation of the main part, when “or” is read conjunctively, section 24(2) provided for lapse in a case where possession has not been taken, nor compensation has been paid, in such a case proviso becomes operative in given exigency of not depositing amount with respect to majority of landholdings. [Para 171][184 D-F]

7.2 A reading of section 24(2) shows that in case possession has been taken even if the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall not lapse. In case payment has not been made nor deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings in the accounts of the beneficiaries, then all the beneficiaries specified in the notification under Section 4 of the Act of 1894 shall get the enhanced compensation under the provisions of the Act of 2013. Section 24(2) not only deals with failure to take physical B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. possession but also failure to make payment of compensation. If both things have not been done, there is lapse of the acquisition proceeding. Once an award has been passed and possession has been taken, there is absolute vesting of the land, as such higher compensation follows under the proviso, which is beneficial to holders. In a case where both the negative conditions have not been fulfilled, as mentioned in section 24(2), there is a lapse. Thus, the proviso is a wholesome provision and is, in fact, a part of section 24(2); it fits in the context of section 24(2) as deposit is related with the payment of compensation and lapse is provided due to non-payment along with not taking possession for five years or more whereas for non-deposit higher compensation is provided. [Para 172][184 F-H][185 A-D]

7.3 When considering the provisions of section 24(1)(b) where an award has been passed under section 11 of the Act of 1894, such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act as if it has not been repealed. The only exception carved out is the period of 5 years or more and that too by providing a non-obstante clause in Section 24(2) to anything contained in section 24(1). The non-obstante clause qualifies the proviso also to Section 24(2). It has to be read as part of Section 24(2) as it is an exception to Section 24(1)(b). Section 24(1)(b) is a self-contained provision, and is also a part of the non-obstante clause to the other provisions of the Act as provided in sub-section (1). Parliament worked out an exception, by providing a non- obstante clause in section 24(2), to Section 24(1). Compensation is to be paid under Section 24(1)(b) under the Act of 1894 and not under the Act of 2013. As such Section 24 (2) is an exception to section 24(1)(b) and the proviso is also an exception which fits in with non-obstante clause of Section 24(2) only. Any other interpretation will be derogatory to the provisions contained in Section 24(1)(b) which provides that the pending proceedings shall continue under the Act of 1894 as if it had not been repealed, that would include the part relating to compensation too. Even if there is no lapse of proceedings under section 24(1)(a), only higher compensation follows under Section 24(1)(a). [Para 173][185 D-H][186-A] 16 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 17 Delhi Metro Rail Corporation Ltd. v. Tarun Pal Singh & Ors. (2018) 14 SCC 161 : [2017] 14 SCR 202 171 – relied on Delhi Development Authority v. Virender Lal Bahri & Ors. – referred to

7.4 Punctuation used in Section 24(2): Parliament has used the full stop (.) after section 24(1) and colon (:) after section 24(2). It cannot be gainsaid that punctuation plays a vital role, particularly when an attempt is made to relocate any part of the provision. The use of the colon is to introduce a sub-clause that follows logically from the text before it. Though as the interpretation of the provision of Section 24(2) and its proviso needs no further deliberation regarding its placement, the same is to be read as a proviso to Section 24(2) and not Section 24(1) (b) Use of punctuation colon reinforces conclusion and punctuation mark has been an accepted method of statutory interpretation when such a problem arises. Though sometimes punctuation can be ignored also but not generally. The full stop after section 24(1)(b) expresses deliberate intent to end a particular sentence and detach it from the next part. It is clear that the colon (:) has a reference to the previous statement and enlarges the same and extends the meaning of the sentence. The colon indicates that the text is intrinsically linked to the previous provision preceding it, i.e., Section 24(2) in this case and not section 24(1). The colon indicates that what follows. The colon proves, explains, defines describes or lists elements of what precedes it. In case the proviso is bodily lifted and placed after section 24(1)(b), section 24(2) will end with a “colon,” which is never done to end a provision. [Paras 174, 176][186 D-G][187 D-E] Falcon Tyres Ltd. v. State of Karnataka (2006) 6 SCC 530 : [2006] 3 Suppl. SCR 734; Aswini Kumar Ghosh & Anr v Arabinda Bose & Anr [1953] SCR 1; Jamshed Guzdar v. State of Maharastra (2005) 2 SCC 591 : [2005] 1 SCR 223 – relied on A B C D E F G H 18 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. State of Gujarat v. Reliance Industries Ltd. (2017) 16 SCC 28 : [2017] 13 SCR 25; State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha and Ors (1982) 1 SCC 561 : [1982] 3 SCR 121 – referred to Marshall v. Cottingham [1982] Ch 82; Dingmar v. Dingmar 2007 (2) All ER 382; Kennedy v Information Commissioner and another (Secretary of State for Justice intervening) [2012] 1 WLR 3524; Taylor v. Caribou 102 Me. 401, 67 A.2 (1907) – referred to ‘Full Stop’ and ‘Colon’, Vepa P. Sarathi in the Interpretation of Statutes, Fifth Edition; Bennion on Statutory Interpretation – referred to

7.5 The provision of section 24(1)(a) is clear that if an award has not been passed, higher compensation to follow. No lapse is provided. In case award has been passed within the window period of section 24(1)(b), inter alia, the provisions for compensation would be that of the Act of 1894. The only exception to section 24(1) is created by the non-obstante clause in section 24(2) by providing that in case the requisite steps have not been taken for 5 years or more, then there is lapse as a negative condition. The proviso contemplates higher compensation, in case compensation has not been paid, and the amount has not been deposited with respect to the majority of the holdings, to all the beneficiaries under the Act of 2013, who were holding land on the date of notification under Section 4. If the proviso is added, section 24(1)(b) will destroy the very provision of section 24(1)(b) providing proceedings to continue under the Act of 1894, which is not the function of the proviso to substitute the main Section but to explain it. It is not to cause repugnancy with the main provision. The function of the proviso is to explain or widen the scope. It is a settled proposition of law that the proviso cannot travel beyond the provision to which it is attached. The proviso would travel beyond the Act of 1894 as it is the intention of section 24(1)(b) the proceedings to govern by the Act of 1894. Thus, the proviso has no space to exist with section 24(1) (b), and it has rightly not been attached by Parliament, with Section 24(2) and has been placed at the right place where it should have been. The proviso is part of the scheme of section 24(2), and the entire INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL & ORS. ETC. provision of section 24(2), including the proviso, operates when inaction is there for a period of 5 years or more, as contemplated therein. [Paras 185, 186][197 D-H][198-A][198 C-D]

In re: Proviso to be read as part of provision it is appended A proviso has to be construed as a part of the clause to which it is appended. A proviso is added to a principal provision to which it is attached. It does not enlarge the enactment. In case the provision is repugnant to the enacting part, the proviso cannot prevail. The proviso cannot nullify the provision of Section 24(1)(b) nor can it set at naught the real object of the enactment, but it can further by providing higher compensation, thus dealing with matters in Section 24 (2). Therefore, in effect, where award is not made [Section 24 (1)(a)] as well as where award is made but compensation is not deposited in respect of majority of the landowners in a notification (for acquisition) [i.e. proviso to Section 24 (2)] compensation is payable in terms of the new Act, i.e., Act of 2013. For the said reasons, considering the placement of the proviso, semi-colon having been used at the end of section 24(2), considering the interpretation of section 24(1)(b) and the repugnancy which would be caused in case the proviso is lifted which is not permissible and particularly when reading the word ‘or’ as ‘nor’ in section 24(2), it has to be placed where the legislature has legislated it, it has not been wrongly placed as part of section 24(2) but is intended for beneficial results of higher compensation for one and all where there is no lapse, but amount not deposited as required. [Paras 190, 196, 197][200 B-C] [207 C-F] State of Rajasthan v.

In re: What is the meaning to be given to the word “paid” used in section 24(2) and “deposited” used in the proviso to section 24(2)

9.1 The provisions of Section 31 of the Act of 1894 are attracted to the interpretation of provisions of section 24(2) to find out the meaning of the words ‘paid’ and ‘deposited’. Section 31(1) makes it clear that on passing of award compensation has to be tendered to the beneficiaries and Collector shall pay it to them. The payment is provided only in section 31(1). The expression ‘tender’ and pay to them in section 31(1) cannot include the term ‘deposited.’ Section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 deals with deposit in case Collector is ‘prevented’ from making payment by one or more contingencies mentioned in section 31(2). The deposit follows if the Collector is prevented from making payment. In case Collector is prevented from making payment due to contingencies, such refusal to receive the amount, or if there be no person competent to alienate the land, or if there is a dispute as to the title to receive the compensation or INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 21 as to the apportionment of it, he (i.e. the Collector) may withhold it or in case there is dispute as to apportionment, he may ask the parties to get a decision from the Reference Court i.e., civil court and to clear the title. In such exigencies, the amount of compensation is required to be deposited in the court to which reference would be submitted under section 18. Section 31(2) requires deposit in case of reference under section 18 and not the reference, which may be sought under section 30 or section 28A of the Act of 1894. [Paras 198, 199][208 B-F]

9.2 Section 24(2) deals with the expression where compensation has not been paid. It would mean that it has not been tendered for payment under section 31(1). Though the word ‘paid’ amounts to a completed event, however, once payment of compensation has been offered/tendered under section 31(1), the acquiring authority cannot be penalized for non-payment as the amount has remained unpaid due to refusal to accept, by the landowner and Collector is prevented from making the payment. Thus, the word ‘paid’ used in section 24(2) cannot be said to include within its ken ‘deposit’ under section 31(2). For that, special provision has been carved out in the proviso to section 24(2), which deals with the amount to be deposited in the account of beneficiaries. Two different expressions have been used in section 24. In the main part of section 24, the word ‘paid’ and in its proviso ‘deposited’ have been used. [Para 200][208 F-H][209- A]

9.3 The consequence of non-deposit of the amount has been dealt with in section 34 of the Act of 1894. As per section 24(2), if the amount has not been paid nor possession has been taken, it provides for lapse. Whereas the proviso indicates amount has not been deposited with respect to a majority of land holdings in a case initiated under the Act of 1894 for 5 years or more. The period of five years need not have been specified in the proviso as it is part of section 24(2) and has to be read with it. Two different consequences of non-deposit of compensation are: (i) higher compensation in a case where possession has been taken, payment has been made to some and amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of the holdings, (ii) in case A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. there is no lapse, the beneficiaries would be entitled to interest as envisaged under section 34 from the date of taking possession at the rate of 9% per annum for the first year and after that @ 15% per annum. [Para 201][209 B-D]

9.4 The word “paid” in Section 31(1) to the landowner cannot include in its ambit the expression “deposited” in court. Deposit cannot be said to be payment made to landowners. Deposit is on being prevented from payment. However, in case there is a tender of the amount that is to mean amount is made available to the landowner that would be a discharge of the obligation to make the payment and in that event such a person cannot be penalised for the default in making the payment. In default to deposit in court, the liability is to make the payment of interest under Section 34 of Act of 1894. The concept of “deposit” is different and quite apart from the word “paid”, due to which, lapse is provided in Section 24 of Act of 2013. In the case of non- deposit for the majority of landholdings, higher compensation would follow as such word “paid” cannot include in its ambit word “deposited”. To hold otherwise would be contrary to provisions contained in Section 24(2) and its proviso carrying different consequences. [Paras 203, 204][209 G-H][210-A][210 D-E]

9.5 There is a breach of obligation to deposit even if it is taken that amount to be deposited in the reference court in exigencies being prevented from payment as provided in Section 31(2). The default will not have the effect of reopening the concluded proceedings. The legal position and consequence which prevailed from 1893 till 2013 on failure to deposit was only the liability for interest and all those transactions were never sought to be invalidated by the provisions contained in Section 24. It is only in the case where in a pending proceeding for a period of five years or more, the steps have not been taken for taking possession and for payment of compensation, then there is a lapse under section 24(2). In case amount has not been deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, higher compensation has to follow. [Para 205][210 F-H][211-A]

9.6 When amount has been tendered, the obligation has been fulfilled by the Collector. Landowners cannot be forced to 22 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 23 receive it. In case a person has not accepted the amount and wants to take the advantage of non-payment, though the amount has remained due to his own act, it is not open to him to contend that amount has not been paid to him, as such, there should be lapse of the proceedings. Even in a case when offer for payment has been made but not deposited, liability to pay amount along with interest subsist and if not deposited for majority of holding, for that adequate provisions have been given in the proviso also to Section 24(2). The scheme of the Act of 2013 in Sections 77 and 80 is also the same as that provided in Sections 31 and 34 of the Act of 1894. [Para 206][211 B-D]

9.7 Judicial notice is taken of the fact in no other Government security rate of interest is higher on the amount being invested under sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894. Higher rate of interest is available under section 34 to the advantage of landowners. [Para 207][211 E-F]

9.8 Under the old regime, it was open to the Collector to fix a convenient date or dates for announcement of award, and tender payment. In the event of refusal by the landowner to receive, or in other cases, such as absence of the true owner, or in case of dispute as to who was to receive it, no doubt, the statute provided that the amount was to be deposited with the court: as it does today, under Section 77. Yet, neither during the time when the Act of 1894 was in operation, nor under the Act of 2013, the entire acquisition does not lapse for non-deposit of the compensation amount in court. Thus, it would be incorrect to imply that failure to deposit compensation [in court, under Section 31 (2)] would entail lapse, if the amounts have not been paid for five years or more prior to the coming into force of the Act of 2013. Such an interpretation would lead to retrospective operation, of a provision, and the nullification of acquisition proceedings, long completed, by imposition of a norm or standard, and its application for a time when it did not exist.

If the expression “deposited” is held to be included in the expression “paid” used in Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section, which has to be avoided and the non-compliance of the provisions of Section 31(2) is not fatal. Even if the amount has not been A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. deposited, higher compensation has to follow in the exigency proviso to Section 24(2). It is apparent that “tender” of the amount saves the party tendering it from the consequence to be visited on non-payment of the amount. [Paras 208, 209, 211][211 G- H][212-A-D][212-F] The Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind [1962] (Supp 3) SCR 318; The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi & Anr [1965] 1 SCR 998; Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (1968) 1 PLJR 94; The Benares State Bank Ltd. v.

The Commissioner of Income Tax, Lucknow (1969) 2 SCC 316 : [1970] 1 SCR 669; Bharat Aluminium Company v. Kaiser Aluminium Technical Services Inc. (2012) 9 SCC 552 : [2012] 12 SCR 327; The Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall [1955] 2 SCR 842; Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi v. M/s. East West Import and Export (P) Ltd (1989) 1 SCC 760 : [1989] 1 SCR 570 – relied on Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1; Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC & Anr (1948) 2 AER 825 – referred to

9.9 Two different expressions have been used in Section 24(2). The expression “paid” has been used in Section 24(2) and whereas in the proviso “deposited” has been used. “Paid” cannot include “deposit”, or else Parliament would have used different expressions in the main sub-section and its proviso, if the meaning were to be the same. The Court cannot add or subtract any word in the statute and has to give plain meaning and when compensation has not been paid under Section 24(2), it cannot mean compensation has not been deposited as used in the proviso. While interpreting the statutory provisions, addition or subtraction in the legislation is not permissible. There cannot be any departure from the words of law, as observed in legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum”. There is a conscious omission of the word “deposit” in Section 24(2), which has been used in the proviso. Parliament cannot be said to have 24 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 25 used the different words carrying the same meaning in the same provision, whereas words “paid” and “deposited” carry a totally different meaning. Payment is actually made to the landowner and deposit is made in the court, that is not the payment made to the landowner. It may be discharge of liability of payment of interest and not more than that. Applying the rule of literal construction also natural, ordinary and popular meaning of the words “paid” and “deposited” do not carry the same meaning; the natural and grammatical meaning has to be given to them. [Para 215][214 F-H][215 A-D] Principles of Statutory Interpretation by Justice G.P. Singh – referred to

9.10 When two different expressions are used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. [Para 216][216 G-H][217-A]

In re: Rules framed under Section 55 and the Standing Orders issued by State Governments

10.1 Rules and the Standing Orders are binding on the concerned Authorities and they have to follow them. They deposit the amounts in court only when a reference (for higher compensation) is sought, not otherwise. Even if a person refuses to accept it and the amount is deposited in court or even it is not tendered, only higher interest follows under Section 34. Once Rules have prevailed since long and even if it is assumed that deposit in court is mandatory on being prevented from payment as envisaged under Section 31(1), the only liability to make the payment of higher interest is fastened upon the State. The liability to pay the amount with interest would subsist. When amounts are deposited in court, there would occur a procedural irregularity and the adverse consequence envisaged is under Section 34 of the Act of 1894. The consequence of non-deposit in the court is that the amount of the landowner cannot be invested in the Government securities as envisaged under Sections 32 and 33 of the Act of 1894, in which interest is not more 15 per cent. Thus, no prejudice is caused to the landowners rather they stand to gain and still payment is safe as it is kept in the court. Acquisition cannot be invalidated, only higher compensation would follow in case amount has not been deposited with respect to A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries would be entitled for higher compensation as envisaged in the proviso to Section 24(2). [Para 229][227 G-H][228 A-D]

10.2 It is clear that once land is acquired, award passed and possession has been taken, it has vested in the State. It had been allotted to beneficiaries. A considerable infrastructure could have been developed and a third-party interest had also intervened. The land would have been given by the acquiring authorities to the beneficiaries from whose schemes the land had been acquired and they have developed immense infrastructure. Merely by deposit of amount in treasury instead of court would not invalidate all the acquisitions, which have taken place. [Para 241][235 G-H][236-A]

10.3 The proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, intends that the Collector would have sufficient funds to deposit it with respect to the majority of landholdings. In case compensation has not been paid or deposited with respect to majority of land holdings, all the beneficiaries are entitled for higher compensation. In case money has not been deposited with the Land Acquisition Collector or in the treasury or in court with respect to majority of landholdings, the consequence has to follow of higher compensation as per proviso to Section 24(2) of the Act of 2013. Even otherwise, if deposit in treasury is irregular, then the interest would follow as envisaged under Section 34 of Act of 1894. Section 24(2) is attracted if acquisition proceeding is not completed within 5 years after the pronouncement of award. Parliament considered the period of 5 years as reasonable time to complete the acquisition proceedings i.e., taking physical possession of the land and payment of compensation.

It is the clear intent of the Act of 2013, that provision of Section 24(2) shall apply to the proceeding which is pending as on the date on which the Act of 2013, has been brought into force and it does not apply to the concluded proceedings. Section 24(2) is not a tool to revive those proceedings and to question the validity of taking acquisition proceedings due to which possession in 1960s, 1970s, 1980s were taken, or to question the manner of deposit of amount in the treasury. In case such landowners were interested in questioning the proceedings of taking possession or mode of deposit with 26 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 27 the treasury, such a challenge was permissible within the time available with them to do so. [Para 242][236 B-H] A Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal and Ors. (1980) 3 SCC 304 : [1980] 3 SCR 179; State of Andhra Pradesh v.

Thakkidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554 : [1998] 3 SCR 1088; Ram Deen Maurya (Dr.) v. State of Uttar Pradesh and Ors (2009) 6 SCC 735 : [2009] 6 SCR 703; Rai Vimal Krishna and Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors. (2003) 6 SCC 401 : [2003] 1 Suppl. SCR 358; Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi and Anr (1990) Supp SCC 806; Kishan Das v. State of U.P (1995) 6 SCC 240 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584; D-Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Assn. v. State of U.P. (1997) 10 SCC 77 : [1997] 3 SCR 1096 – relied Howard v. Secretary of State for the Environment, (1975) Q.B. 235; Belvedere Court Management Ltd. v. Frogmore Developments Ltd. (1996) 3 W.L.R. 1008 – referred to

Mode of taking possession under the Act of 1894

11.1 Section 16 of the Act of 1894 provided that possession of land may be taken by the State Government after passing of an award and thereupon land vest free from all encumbrances in the State Government. Similar are the provisions made in the case of urgency in Section 17(1). The word “possession” has been used in the Act of 1894, whereas in Section 24(2) of Act of 2013, the is used. What was expression “physical possession” contemplated under the Act of 1894, by taking the possession meant only physical possession of the land. Taking over the possession under the Act of 2013 always amounted to taking over physical possession of the land. When the State Government acquires land and draws up a memorandum of taking possession, that amounts to taking the physical possession of the land. On the large chunk of property or otherwise which is acquired, the Government is not supposed to put some other person or the police force in possession to retain it and start cultivating it till the land is used by it for the purpose for which it has been acquired. B C D E F G H 28 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. The Government is not supposed to start residing or to physically occupy it once possession has been taken by drawing the inquest proceedings for obtaining possession thereof. Thereafter, if any further retaining of land or any re-entry is made on the land or someone starts cultivation on the open land or starts residing in the outhouse, etc., is deemed to be the trespasser on land which is in possession of the State. [Paras 244, 245][237 G-H][238- A][238 C-F]

11.2 The concept of possession is complex one. It comprises the right to possess and to exclude others, essential is animus possidendi. Possession depends upon the character of the thing which is possessed. If the land is not capable of any use, mere non-user of it does not lead to the inference that the owner is not in possession. The established principle is that the possession follows title. Possession comprises of the control over the property. The element of possession is the physical control or the power over the object and intention or will to exercise the power. Corpus and animus are both necessary and have to co- exist. [Para 247][239 A-C] Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. Anil Kumar Bhunja & Ors. (1979) 4 SCC 274 : [1980] 1 SCR 323; Ram Dass v. Davinder (2004) 3 SCC 684; Bhinka & Ors. v. Charan Singh [1959] (Suppl 2) SCR 798; V. Chandrasekaran & Anr. v. Administrative Officer & Ors (2012) 12 SCC 133 : [2012] 10 SCR 603 – relied on S.M. Yaqub v. T.N. Basu AIR 1949 Pat 146 – referred to Kynoch Limited v. Rowlands (1912) 1 Ch 527 – referred to Mitra’s “Law of Possession and Ownership of Property”, 2nd Edn.; Words and Phrases, Permanent Edition, West Publishing Co.; Jowitt’s Dictionary of English Law, Ed. 1969 – referred to

11.3 It is apparent that vesting is with possession and the statute has provided under Sections 16 and 17 of the Act of 1894 that once possession is taken, absolute vesting occurred. It is an indefeasible right and vesting is with possession thereafter. The vesting specified under section 16, takes place after various steps, INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 29 such as, notification under section 4, declaration under section 6, notice under section 9, award under section 11 and then possession. The statutory provision of vesting of property absolutely free from all encumbrances has to be accorded full effect. Not only the possession vests in the State but all other encumbrances are also removed forthwith. The title of the landholder ceases and the state becomes the absolute owner and in possession of the property. Thereafter there is no control of the land-owner over the property. He cannot have any animus to take the property and to control it.

Even if he has retained the possession or otherwise trespassed upon it after possession has been taken by the State, he is a trespasser and such possession of trespasser enures for his benefit and on behalf of the owner. The word ‘vest’ has to be construed in the context in which it is used in a particular provision of the Act. Vesting is absolute and free from all encumbrances that includes possession. Once there is vesting of land, once possession has been taken, section 24(2) does not contemplate divesting of the property from the State. [Paras 256, 258][245 E-H][246 G-H][247-A] Larsen & Toubro Ltd. v. State of Gujarat (1998) 4 SCC 387 : [1998] 2 SCR 339; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. and Ors., (1999) 9 SCC 700 : [1999] 2 SCR 1111; Kailash Nath Agarwal and Ors. v. Pradeshiya Industrial & Investment Corporation of U.P. Ltd. and Anr., (2003) 4 SCC 305 : [2003] 1 SCR 1159; DLF Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v.

State of Haryana and Ors., (2003) 5 SCC 622 : [2003] 2 SCR 1; Sita Ram Bhandar Society, New Delhi v. Lieutenant Governor, Government of NCT, Delhi and Ors., (2009) 10 SCC 501 : [2009] 14 SCR 507; Balmokand Khatri Educational and Industrial Trust, (1996) 4 Amritsar v. State of Punjab & Ors SCC 212 : [1996] 2 SCR 643; P.K. Kalburqi v. State of Karnataka and Ors. (2005) 12 SCC 489; National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Nareshkumar Badrikumar Jagad & Ors 2011 (12) SCC 695 : [2011] 14 SCR 472; M. Venkatesh and Ors. v. Commissioner, Bangalore Development Authority, etc. (2015) 17 SCC 1 : [2015] 15 SCR 499; Ram Singh v. A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 3 S.C.R. Jammu Development Authority (2017) 13 SCC 474 – relied on Ramesh Bejoy Sharma v. Pashupati Rai (1979) 4 SCC 27 : [1980] 1 SCR 6; Maguni Charan Dwivedi v. State of Orissa (1976) 2 SCC 134 : [1976] 3 SCR 76; Sri Tarkeshwar Sio Thakur Jiu v.

Dar Dass Dey & Co. (1979) 3 SCC 106; Karanpura Development Co. v. Union of India (1988) Supp. SCC 488 – distinguished Municipal Corporation of Greater Bombay & Corporation & Anr (2001) 8 SCC 143 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 50; NAL Layout Residents Association v. Bangalore Development Authority Ors. v. Hindustan Petroleum (2018) 12 SCC 400 : [2017] 13 SCR 1053 – referred Richardson v. Robertson, (1862) 6 LT 75 – referred to

11.4 Under the Act of 1894, when possession is taken after award is passed under section 16 or under section 17 before the passing of the award, land absolutely vests in the State on drawing of Panchnama of taking possession, which is the mode of taking possession. Thereafter, any re-entry in possession or retaining the possession is wholly illegal and trespasser’s possession inures for the benefit of the owner and even in the case of open land, possession is deemed to be that of the owner. When the land is vacant and is lying open, it is presumed to be that of the owner. Mere re-entry on Government land once it is acquired and vests absolutely in the State (under the Act of 1894) does not confer, any right to it and Section 24(2) does not have the effect of divesting the land once it vests in the State. [Para 272][255 G- H][256 A-C] Raghbir Singh Sehrawat v. State of Haryana (2012) 1 SCC 792 : [2011] 14 SCR 1113 – Not correct law Kashi Bai v. Sudha Rani Ghose (2012) 5 SCC 370 : [2012] 3 SCR 841 – relied on

11.5 The court is alive to the fact that there are a large number of cases where, after acquisition, land has been handed over to various corporations, local authorities, acquiring bodies, 30 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. MANOHARLAL 31 etc. After depositing compensation (for the acquisition) those bodies and authorities have been handed possession of lands. They, in turn, after development of such acquired lands have handed over properties; third party interests have intervened and now declaration is sought under the cover of section 24(2) to invalidate all such actions. As already held, section 24 does not intend to cover such cases at all and such gross misuse of the provisions of law must stop. Title once vested, cannot be obliterated, without an express legal provision; in any case, even if the landowners’ argument that after possession too, in case of non-payment of compensation, the acquisition would lapse, were for arguments’ sake, be accepted, these third party owners would be deprived of their lands, lawfully acquired by them, without compensation of any sort. [Para 277][258-H][259 A-C] Velaxan Kumar v Union of India (2015) 4 SCC 325; Narmada Bachao Andolan v. State of M.P. (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 SCR 443 – overuled