ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA & Ors.

Judgment

) – s.3 empowers the Central Government, the State Government or the specially empowered officer to make an order, directing a person to be detained – Once the detention order has been made by any of the authorities competent to detain in terms of s.3(1), the representation to seek revocation of the detention order can be considered and decided by the Detaining Authority dehors the decision of the Advisory Board and the acceptance of recommendation by the appropriate Government – The consideration for revocation of a detention order is limited to examining whether the order conforms with the provisions of law whereas the recommendation of the Advisory Board is on the sufficiency of material for detention, which alone is either confirmed or not accepted by the appropriate Government – It would be a matter of prudence and propriety for the Detaining Authority to defer the decision on the representation to revoke the detention order, when the matter is being considered by the Advisory Board, consisting of three sitting Judges of the High Court – The consideration of the representation by the Detaining Authority in these circumstances cannot be said to be delayed as the representation was received after the matter was referred to the Advisory Board. Allowing the writ petitions, the Court HELD: Per Uday Umesh Lalit, J. (for himself and Indu Malhotra, J.)

#1. Where the detention order is made inter alia under Section 3 of the COFEPOSA Act by an officer specially empowered for that purpose either by the Central Government or the State Government, the person detained has a right to make a representation to the said officer; and the said officer is obliged to consider the said representation; and the failure on his part to ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1049 do so would result in denial of the right conferred on the person detained to make a representation. Further, such right of the detenue has been taken to be in addition to the right to make the representation to the State Government and the Central Government. It must be stated that para 12 of the grounds of detention in the instant case is in tune with the law so declared by this Court. [Para 12][1079 D-G]

2.1 In Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty, it was stated that the obligation on part of the Government to consider representation would be irrespective whether the representation was made before or after the case was referred to the Advisory Board. As stated in paragraph 18, this was stated so, as any delay in consideration of the representation would not only be an irresponsible act on part of the appropriate authority but also unconstitutional. The contingency whether the representations were received before or after was again considered in para 29 of the decision in Haradhan Saha. In terms of these principles, the matter of consideration of representation in the context of reference to the Advisory Board, can be put in following four categories:- A) If the representation is received well before the reference is made to the Advisory Board and can be considered by the appropriate Government, the representation must be considered with expedition. Thereafter the representation along with the decision taken on the representation shall be forwarded to and must form part of the documents to be placed before the Advisory Board. B) If the representation is received just before the reference is made to the Advisory Board and there is no sufficient time to decide the representation, in terms of law laid down in Jayanarayan Sukul and Haradhan Saha the representation must be decided first and thereafter the representation and the decision must be sent to the Advisory Board. This is premised on the principle that the consideration by the appropriate Government is completely independent and also that there ought not to be any delay in consideration of the representation. A B C D E F G H 1050 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R. C) If the representation is received after the reference is made but before the matter is decided by the Advisory Board, according to the principles laid down in Haradhan Saha, the representation must be decided. The decision as well as the representation must thereafter be immediately sent to the Advisory Board. D) If the representation is received after the decision of the Advisory Board, the decisions are clear that in such cases there is no requirement to send the representation to the Advisory Board. The representation in such cases must be considered with expedition. [Para 15][1096 B-H; 1097-A]

2.2 There can be no difficulty with regard to the applicability of the principles in the 1st and the 4th stage of the aforesaid categories. The difficulty may arise as regards the application of principles at the 2nd and the 3rd stage. But that difficulty was dealt with sufficient clarity in Jayanarayan Sukul and Haradhan Saha. If it is well accepted that the representation must be considered with utmost expedition; and the power of the Government is completely independent of the power of the Advisory Board; and the scope of consideration is also qualitatively different, there is no reason why the consideration by the Government must await the decision by the Advisory Board. None of the aforesaid cases even remotely suggested that the consideration must await till the report was received from the Advisory Board. However, it was for the first time that the decision in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi laid down in paragraph 16 that it would be proper for the Government in the two situations dealt with in said paragraph to await the report of the Board; those two situations being:- a) where the representation is received before the matter is referred to the Advisory Board and where there may not be sufficient time to dispose of the representation before referring the case to the Advisory Board, and b) where the representation is received after the case is referred to the Advisory Board. It was also laid down:- “In both the situations there is no question of consideration of the representation before the receipt of report of the Advisory Board.” Since the decision of this Court in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi was rendered by the Constitution Bench of this Court after A B C D E F G H ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1051 considering all the earlier decisions on the point including those in Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty, Jayanarayan Sukul and Haradhan Saha, the principles laid down therein are binding. [Para 16, 17, 18][1097 B-H]

#3. In Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty and in Jayanarayan Sukul, the orders of detention were passed by the District Magistrates under Section 3(ii) of 1950 Act. The relevant statutory provisions contemplated the concept of approval within 12 days of the passing of such orders of detention passed by the District Magistrates. In Haradhan Saha power was exercised by the District Magistrates under the provisions of the MISA, wherein similar concept of approval on part of the State Government within 12 days of the passing of the order of detention by the District Magistrate was contemplated. The distinction on that count was noted by this Court in para 34 of the decision in Kamlesh kumar. The orders of detention in these decisions were not passed by a specially empowered officer but by the concerned Government. The same logic regarding deemed approval was extended initially in Sushila Mafatlal Shah to cases where the orders of detention were passed not by the concerned Government but by a specially empowered officer. The matter was, however, corrected and the distinction in that behalf was succinctly dealt with in Kamleshkumar. [Para 20][1098 B-E]

#4. It must also be borne in mind that in all cases, the appropriate Government would be acting in two capacities; one while considering the representation and the other while taking appropriate decision after a report is received from the Advisory Board that there is sufficient cause for detention. Since the decision would be required to be taken in these two capacities, it was observed in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi that it would be proper for the appropriate Government to wait till the report is received from the Advisory Board. But such may not be the case with the Detaining Authority who is a specially empowered officer. [Para 21][1098 E-G]

#5. A specially empowered officer who passes the order of detention, in exercise of special empowerment, has no statutory role to play at the stage when the report is received from the A B C D E F G H 1052 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H Advisory Board. The report is to be considered by the appropriate Government and not by the specially empowered officer. It may also be relevant at this stage to consider the element of confidentiality associated with the report of the Advisory Board. In terms of Section 8, the report of the Advisory Board is meant only for the consumption of the appropriate Government and apart from the operative part of the report which is to be specified in a separate paragraph as per sub-section (c), the mandate in terms of sub-section (e) is to keep the report of the Advisory Board completely confidential. Thus, a specially empowered officer who may have passed the order of detention, by statutory intent is not to be privy to the report nor does the statute contemplate any role for such specially empowered officer at the stage of consideration of the opinion of the Advisory Board. The report of the Advisory Board may provide some qualitative inputs for the appropriate Government but none to the specially empowered officer who acted as the Detaining Authority. [Paras 22, 23][1098 G-H; 1100 D-F]

#6. When K.M. Abdulla Kunhi was decided on 23.01.1991, the decision that was holding the field as to the role of a specially empowered officer who had passed an order of detention, was one rendered in Sushila Mafatlal Shah. The law that was holding the field was the concept of deemed approval as was explained in Sushila Mafatlal Shah and any representation made to such specially empowered officer who had passed the order of detention, in terms of the decision in Sushila Mafatlal Shah, could be considered by the appropriate Government itself and not separately by such specially empowered officer. The subsequent decision in Amir Shad Khan was rendered by a Bench of three Judges on 09.08.1991 and the apparent conflict in the decisions between Sushila Mafatlal Shah and Amir Shad Khan was resolved by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kamleshkumar rendered on 17.04.1995, i.e. well after the decision in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi. Thus, if the law is now settled that a representation can be made to the specially empowered officer who had passed the order of detention in accordance with the power vested in him and the representation has to be independently considered by such Detaining Authority, the concerned principles adverted to in paragraph 16 of the decision in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi would not ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1053 be the governing principles for such specially empowered officer. It must be stated that the discussion in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi was purely in the context where the order of detention was passed by the appropriate Government and not by the specially empowered officer. The principle laid down in said paragraph 16 has therefore to be understood in the light of the subsequent decision rendered by another Constitution Bench of this Court in Kamleshkumar. The Detaining Authority ought to have considered the representation independently and without waiting for the report of the Central Advisory Board. [Paras 24, 25, 26][1100 F-H; 1101 A-F]

#7. The facts in the instant case indicate that the comments of the Sponsoring Authority in respect of the representation were already received by the Detaining Authority. After receipt of letter on 27.11.2019 that the detenues were received in custody, the time for considering the representation started ticking for the Detaining Authority. But the representation was considered only on 14.01.2020 and the reason for such delayed consideration is that the report of the Central Advisory Board was awaited. It is already held that the Detaining Authority was obliged to consider the representation without waiting for the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. Thus, there was no valid explanation for non- consideration of the representation from 27.11.2019 till 14.01.2020. Therefore, complete inaction on part of the Detaining Authority in considering the representation caused prejudice to the detenues and violated their constitutional rights. [Para 26][1101 E-H]

#8. There could be clear dichotomy when the representations are made simultaneously to such specially empowered officer who had passed the order of detention and to the appropriate Government. If we go by the principle in paragraph 16 in K.M. Abdulla Kunhi it would be proper for the appropriate Government to wait till the report was received from the Advisory Board, while at the same time the specially empowered officer who had acted as the Detaining Authority would be obliged to consider the representation with utmost expedition. At times a single representation is prepared with copies to the Detaining Authority namely the specially empowered officer and to the appropriate A B C D E F G H 1054 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R. Government as well as to the Advisory Board. In such situations there will be incongruity as stated above, which may be required to be corrected at some stage. However, such difficulty or inconsistency cannot be the basis for holding that a specially empowered officer while acting as a Detaining Authority would also be governed by the same principles as laid down in paragraph 16 of K.M. Abdulla Kunhi. [Para 27][1102 A-D]

#9. Since there was complete inaction on part of the Detaining Authority in the present case, to whom a representation was addressed in dealing with the representation in above manner, the constitutional rights of the detenues were violated and the detenues are entitled to redressal on that count. Therefore, the continued detention of the detenues in terms of the Detention Orders is held illegal, invalid and unconstitutional. [Para 28][1102 D-F] K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India and others (1991) 1 SCC 476 : [1991] 1 SCR 102 – held inapplicable

Golam Biswas v. Union of India and Another (2015) 16 SCC 177; Ibrahim Bachu Bafan v. State of Gujarat and others (1985) 2 SCC 24 : [1985] 2 SCR 891; State of Maharashtra and another v. Smt. Sushila Mafatlal Shah and others (1988) 4 SCC 490 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 827; Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and others (1991) 4 SCC 39 : [1991] 3 SCR 443; Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel vs. Union of India and others [1951] SCR 167; Pankaj Kumar Chakrabarty and others v. The State of West Bengal (1969) 3 SCC 400 : [1970] 1 SCR 543; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra (1980) 2 SCC 275 : [1980] 2 SCR 1095; Jayanarayan Sukul (1970) 1 SCC 219 : [1970] 3 SCR 225; Haradhan Saha v. The State of West Bengal and others (1975) 3 SCC 198 : [1975] 1 SCR 778 – referred to Per Hemant Gupta, J. (Dissenting)

#1. Section 3 of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 empowers the A B C D E F G H ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1055 Central Government, the State Government or the specially empowered Officer of the rank not below the rank of the Joint Secretary of the Central Government or Secretary of the State Government, to make an order, directing a person to be detained. The Detaining Authority has jurisdiction to revoke the detention order in view of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, whereas, an appropriate Government passes an order of revocation of detention or confirmation of the order of detention on receipt of the report of the Advisory Board. The consideration for the Detaining Authority for revocation, is to see whether the detention order is in conformity with the power under law whereas, the Advisory Board considers the representation to examine whether there is sufficient cause for detention. The consideration of the Advisory Board is an additional safeguard and not a substitute for the consideration of the representation by the appropriate Government. [Para 3][1103 B-E]

#2. The first part of the consideration of representation, as to whether the order of detention is in conformity with power under the law, does not make a distinction as to whether the Detaining Authority is the Central or State Government or a specially empowered Officer in that behalf. The consideration for detention by the Detaining Authority is confined to examining whether the order of detention is in conformity with the power under the law. On the other hand, the Advisory Board examines if there is sufficient cause for detention. The exercise of jurisdiction by the Government, whilst dealing with the representation as a detaining authority and whilst considering the Advisory Board’s recommendation, is in two separate and distinct spheres. [Para 4][1103 E-H; 1104 A]

#3. In view of K. M. Abdulla Kunhi, once the detention order has been made by any of the authorities competent to detain in terms of Section 3 (1) of the COFEPOSA Act, the representation to seek revocation of the detention order can be considered and decided by the Detaining Authority dehors the decision of the Advisory Board and the acceptance of recommendation by the appropriate Government. The consideration for revocation of a detention order is limited to examining whether the order A B C D E F G H 1056 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R. conforms with the provisions of law whereas the recommendation of the Advisory Board is on the sufficiency of material for detention, which alone is either confirmed or not accepted by the appropriate Government. [Para 22][1115 E-G]

#4. It is a matter of prudence and propriety for the Detaining Authority to defer the decision on the representation to revoke the detention order, when the matter is being considered by the Advisory Board, consisting of three sitting Judges of the High Court. The consideration of the representation by the Detaining Authority in these circumstances cannot be said to be delayed as the representation was received after the matter was referred to the Advisory Board. [Para 23][1115-G; 1116-A] K. M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India and Others (1991) 1 SCC 476 : [1991] 1 SCR 102 – relied on Jayanarayan Sukul v. State of West Bengal (1970) 1 SCC 219 : [1970] 3 SCR 225; Vimalchand Jawantraj Jain v. Shri Pradhan and Others (1979) 4 SCC 401 : [1979] 3 SCR 1007; Khairul Haque v. The State of W.B. W.P. No. 246 of 1969 decided on 10-9-69; Frances Coralie Mullin v. W.C. Khambra and Others (1980) 2 SCC 275 : [1980] 2 SCR 1095; Om Prakash Bahl v. Union of India W.P. NO. 845 of 1979 decided on October 15, 1979; Kamleshkumar Ishwardas Patel v. Union of India and Others (1995) 4 SCC 51 : [1995] 3 SCR 279; State of Maharashtra & Anr. v. Sushila Mafatlal Shah and others (1988) 4 SCC 490 : [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 827; Amir Shad Khan v. L. Hmingliana and Others (1991) 4 SCC 39 : [1991] 3 SCR 443; Golam Biswas v. Union of India and Another (2015) 16 SCC 177 – referred to Case Law Reference Per Uday Umesh Lalit, J. (2015) 16 SCC 177 referred to Para 4 [1991] 1 SCR 102 held inapplicable Para 4 A B C D E F G H ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. 1057 [1985] 2 SCR 891 referred to [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 827 referred to [1991] 3 SCR 443 [1995] 3 SCR 279 [1951] SCR 167 [1970] 1 SCR 543 [1980] 2 SCR 1095 [1970] 3 SCR 225 [1975] 1 SCR 778 Per Hemant Gupta, J. [1991] 1 SCR 102 [1970] 3 SCR 225 [1979] 3 SCR 1007 [1980] 2 SCR 1095 [1995] 3 SCR 279 referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to referred to relied on referred to referred to referred to referred to [1988] 2 Suppl. SCR 827 referred to [1991] 3 SCR 443 (2015) 16 SCC 177 referred to referred to Para 11 Para 11 Para 11 Para 11 Para 11 Para 13 Para 13 Para 13 Para 13 Para 2 Para 5 Para 7 Para 10 Para 16 Para 16 Para 16 Para 20 CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION: Writ Petiton (Criminal) No.362 of 2019. [Under Article 32 of the Consitution of India] Mukul Rohatgi, Neeraj Kishan Kaul, Sr. Advs., Saurabh Kirpal, Sanjay Agarwal, Karan Bharioke, Nikhil Rohatgi, Ashish Batra, Sarthak Sachdev, Watan Sharma, Amit K. Nain, Advs. for the Petitioner. K. M. Nataraj, ASG, Sharath Nambiar, Kanu Agarwal, Vinayak Sharma, Shreekanth P.S., Ms. Priyanka S. Bhat, B. Krishna Prasad, Advs. for the Respondents. A B C D E F G H 1058 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R. A The Judgments* of the Court were delivered by UDAY UMESH LALIT, J. 1. This petition under Article 32 of the Constitution of India prays for quashing of the Detention Orders1 dated 01.07.2019and for a direction that the detenues be set at liberty.

#2. The facts leading to the filing of this petition, in brief, are as under: (a) On 01.07.2019, Joint Secretary to the Government of India, specially empowered under Section 3(1) of the COFEPOSA Act2 passed the Detention Orders after being satisfied that with a view to prevent the detenues from smuggling goods, abetting the smuggling of goods, and dealing in smuggled goods otherwise than by engaging in transporting or concealing or keeping smuggled goods, in future, it was necessary to make the said Detentions Orders. b) The detenues were served with the Detention Orders, the grounds of detention andthe relied upon documents on 02.07.2019. The grounds of detention, in para 12, recited as under:- “You ……….. have the right to represent against your detention to the Detaining Authority, to the Central Government as well as to the Advisory Board. If you wish to avail this right, you should send your representation through the Jail Authorities where you are detained, in the manner indicated below: (a) Representation meant for the Detaining Authority should be addressed to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA), Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, 6th Floor, B-Wing, Janpath Bhawan, New Delhi-110001. (b) Representation meant for the Central Government should be addressed to the Director General, Central Economic Intelligence Bureau, Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue, 6th Floor, B-Wing, Janpath Bhawan, New Delhi-110001. 1 Nos.PD-12001/34/2019-COFEPOSA and PD-12001/35/2019-COFEPOSA, both dated 01.07.2019, issued by the Respondent No.2 against Shri Ashok Kumar Jalan and Shri Amit Jalan respectively 2 The Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 *Ed. Note : One Judgment delivered by Uday Umesh Lalit, J. (for himself and Indu Malhotra, J.). The other Judgment delivered by Hemant Gupta, J. B C D E F G H ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.] 1059 (c) Representation meant for the Advisory Board should be addressed to the Chairman, COFEPOSA Advisory Board, Delhi High Court, Sher Shah Road, New Delhi-110002. (c) On 18.07.2019 the cases of the detenues were referred to the Central Advisory Board3 along with the grounds of detention and relied upon documents. (d) On 22.07.2019 representation dated 17.07.2019 made on behalf of both the detenues, addressed to the Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA), Government of India, Ministry of Finance, Department of Revenue was received through the Presidency Correctional Home, Alipore, Kolkata. The representation stated inter alia:- “9….(iii) To enable me to make an effective representation at the earliest opportunity, I may please be forthwith provided with- a) b) a copy of the Retraction Petition of Shri Anand stated to be relied upon in the grounds of detention; a copy of the pen-drive or CD/DVD of the CCTV footage directed by the CMM to be submitted on 18th June, 2019 may please be provided to me and may please be shown to me on a laptop or any other device.

#10. Kindly note that unless the aforesaid prayers are considered expeditiously, I am unable to make my final representation to the Central Government and the Advisory Board, etc. Therefore, the instant representation may please be considered as expeditiously as possible in true spirit of Article 22(5) read with Articles 14 & 21 of the Constitution of India.” (e) On 24.07.2019, the representation was forwarded to the Sponsoring Authority, namely, DRI, Kolkata for its comments which were received on 29.07.2019. Said representation as well as the para-wise comments received from the Sponsoring Authority were forwarded on31.07.2019 to the Central Advisory Board. The meeting of the Central Advisory Board was scheduled to be held on 02.08.2019. (f) On 02.08.2019 itself, Writ Petition No.1840 of 2019 preferred on behalf of the detenues was allowed by the High Court4 on the grounds that when the detenues were in judicial custody and there was no 3 The Central Advisory Board, Delhi High Court, New Delhi 4 The High Court of Delhi at New Delhi A B C D E F G H 1060 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2020] 2 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H imminent possibility of their release on bail and when not even a bail application was preferred by them, the power of preventive detention ought not to have been exercised; and, that non-placement of relevant material in the form of retraction petition of one Shri Anand and its non- consideration by the Detaining Authority vitiated the Detention Orders. The High Court thus quashed the Detention Orders and directed that the detenues be released forthwith. (g) In its Meeting dated 02.08.2019, the Central Advisory Board recorded that since the Detention Orders were quashed, there was no possibility of proceeding further in the matter. (h) The decision of the High Court was challenged in Criminal Appeal No.1746 of 2019 in this Court, which by its Judgment and order dated 22.11.2019 set aside the view taken by the High Court. While allowing the appeal, the detenues were directed to be taken into custody forthwith. The Detaining Authority was thereafter informed by the Jail Superintendent on 27.11.2019 that the detenues were received in custody in pursuance of the decision of this Court. (i) On 02.12.2019 a direction was issued to process the files of the detenues for reference to the Central Advisory Board. After obtaining appropriate approval, the case was referred to the Central Advisory Board on 05.12.2019 stating inter alia:- “Keeping in view the judgment dated 03.06.2015 of the Apex Court delivered in Crl. Appeal No.829 of 2015 arising out of SLP(Crl) No.2489 of 2015 – Golam Biswas v. Union of India, the said representations will be considered for disposal by the competent authority only after receipt of opinion of the Hon’ble Board.”

#3. The instant writ petition was filed on or about 16th December, 2019 challenging the stand taken in the communication dated 05.12.2019 that the representation would be considered only after the receipt of the opinion of the Central Advisory Board. It was submitted that the representation ought to be considered independently by the Detaining Authority and without waiting for the report of the Central Advisory Board; and that the delay in consideration of such representation violated the rights of the detenues guaranteed by the Constitution of India. Soon thereafter, another representation reiterating the stand as aforesaid was made by the Advocate for the detenues on 18.12.2019. ANKIT ASHOK JALAN v. UNION OF INDIA AND ORS. [UDAY UMESH LALIT, J.] 1061

#4. On 18.12.2019 notice was issued by this Court, whereafter, an affidavit in reply was filed on behalf of the respondents stating inter alia:- (a) On 06.01.2020 a report was submitted by the Central Advisory Board that there was sufficient cause for the detention of the detenues. (b) After considering the report of the Central Advisory Board and the other material on record, the Central Government confirmed the Detention Ordersvideproceedings dated 14.01.2020. (c) On the same date i.e. 14.01.2020 the Detaining Authority, namely, Joint Secretary (COFEPOSA) rejected the representations dated 17.07.2019 and 18.12.2019 made on behalf of the detenues. After referring to the decisions of this court in Golam Biswas v. Union of India and Another5 and K.M. Abdulla Kunhi and B.L. Abdul Khader v. Union of India and others6 it was stated that the representations were considered only after the receipt of the opinion of the Central Advisory Board dated 06.01.2020.

#5. We heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi and Mr. Neeraj KishanKaul, learned Senior Advocates in support of the petition and Mr. K.M. Nataraj, learned Advocate Solicitor General for the respondents.

#6. The learned Counsel for the petitioner accepted that by the time representation dated 17.07.2019 was received by the Detaining Authority, the matter was referred to the Central Advisory Board and since the Detention Orders were set aside by the High Court on 02.08.2019, the non-consideration of the representation till 02.08.2019, in the facts of the instant case, would not be of any significance. However, in their submission, after the decision of the High Court was set aside by this Court and the detenues were taken back in custody in November, 2019, the non-consideration of and delay in disposal of said representation wasmore pronounced and relevant. It was submitted:- (a) A representation against an order of detention can be made to the Detaining Authority where the detention order has been passed by a specially empowered officer of the Central Government as well as to the Central Government and the Central Advisory Board.