SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, LIFE INSURANCE v. SHREE LAL MEENA

#1. The undisputed fact is that as on the date when respondent was revolving the thought in his mind of voluntary retirement, there was no such provision in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Staff) Regulations, 1960 applicable. Thus, his repeated communications setting forth a thought process for ‘voluntary retirement’ had no legal backing on that date. It is in these circumstances that no response was forthcoming to his letters, when he talked about a concept which did not exist. Conscious of this aspect and wanting to leave the services of the appellant-LIC, the respondent took recourse to what was permissible on that date, i.e., ‘resignation’. Section 3 of the Staff Regulations has a heading ‘Termination’. The other expression used before the relevant Regulation 18 is ‘Determination of Service’. The Regulation itself uses the expression ‘leave or discontinue’ service. In whatever manner these expressions are understood, in legal and common parlance, they amount to, first a unilateral act on the part of an employee, desirous of not continuing with her/his service with the employer and then, the acceptance of the same by the employer, subject to a notice period, which, in the present facts, had been waived at the request of the employee. Thus, on the relevant date he took a conscious decision to dis-engage himself from the services of the appellant, on the terms & conditions as prevalent on that A B C D E F G H 394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R. date. As to what happened five years hence, would have no bearing on any benefit, which can accrue to such employee as a respondent, except to the extent which is specifically made applicable to him. [Para 17] [403-D-H]

#2. It is trite to say that statutory provisions must be given their clear meaning unless there is ambiguity in the wordings. There is no ambiguity in the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Rules, 1995 in question as to require any import to be given that is different from its plain words. The Pension Rules have been brought into force from a retrospective date of 1.11.1993. Thus, they would logically apply to all employees in service on or after 1.11.1993. The respondent was not such a person. There is only one further twist to the Pension Rules. Rule 3(1)(a) of the Pension Rules refers to applicability of these Pension Rules even to such of the employees who “retired” on or after 1.1.1986 and before 1.11.1993. Even for such of the employees, there is a requirement for an option to be exercised, in writing, that within a period of time of 120 days from the notified date they become member of the Life Insurance Corporation of India (Employees) Pension Fund, and refund within 60 days thereafter, the entire amount of LIC’s contribution to the Provident Fund, including interest accrued thereon. This is so, as employees who retired during this period of time had availed of the contributory provident fund benefit under the then existing Staff Regulations, and would have to surrender the benefits under those Regulations to the extent they were contributed for by the LIC, for the new Pension Rules to be made applicable to them. The expression used unequivocal– ‘retired’. It has not used any alternative expression also, for determination of the relationship of employer-employee, like ‘resignation’. In the same Rules, expressions like ‘resignation’, ‘dismissal’, ‘removal’ have been used, more specifically in Rule 23 of the Pension Rules. When different expressions are used in the same Rules, in different contexts then all of them cannot be given the same meaning. [Para 18] [404-A-F] in Rule 3(1)(a) A B C D E F G H SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. SHREE LAL MEENA 395

#3. What is most material is that the employee in this case had resigned. When the Pension Rules are applicable, and an employee resigns, the consequences are forfeiture of service, under Rule 23 of the Pension Rules. Attempting to apply the Pension Rules to the respondent would be a self-defeating argument. As, suppose, the Pension Rules were applicable and the employee like the respondent was in service and sought to resign, the entire past service would be forfeited, and consequently, he would not qualify for pensionary benefits. To hold otherwise would imply that an employee resigning during the currency of the Rules would be deprived of pensionary benefits, while an employee who resigns when these Rules were not even in existence, would be given the benefit of these Rules. [Para 19] [405-A-C]

#4. Ther e ar e some obser vations on the pr inciples of public sectors being model employers and provisions of pension being beneficial legislations. When the Legislature, in its wisdom, brings forth certain beneficial provisions in the form of Pension Regulations from a particular date and on particular terms and conditions, aspects which are excluded cannot be included in it by implication. The provisions will have to be read as they read unless there is some confusion or they are capable of another interpretation. It is also to be noted that while framing such schemes, there is an important aspect of them being of a con- tributory nature and their financial implications. Such financial implications are both, for the contributors and for the State. Thus, it would be inadvisable to expand such beneficial schemes beyond their contours to extend them to employees for whom they were not meant for by the Legislature. [Para 25] [411-C-E] C.A. No.10904 of 2016

#5. In the year 2011, this Court in Sheel Kumar Jain v. New India Assurance Company Limited gave benefit of General Insurance (Employees’) Pension Scheme, 1995 to certain employees. The judgment was delivered on 28.7.2011. Once again, almost after two years, the appellant made a representation dated 4.4.2013 seeking pension on the basis of A B C D E F G H 396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R. the 1995 Scheme, resting his case on the aforesaid judgment. There was no response to this representation, resulting in the appellant filing a writ petition before the Bombay High Court. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court, in terms of the impugned judgment dated 07.04.2016 rejected the same. The reasoning of the Division Bench was that the case of the appellant was of resignation and not of voluntary retirement. The appellant had tendered his resignation before 1.11.1993, while the conditions for availing of the benefit were: (i) the employees must have retired on or after 1.11.1993, and before the notified date; and (ii) the employee must have exercised the option to voluntarily retire within120 days from the notified date, to become a member of the General Insurance Corporation (Employees’)Pension Fund while refunding the amount of Provident Fund contributed by the insurance company. These two aspects were stated to be absent in the case of the appellant, who had never opted for voluntary retirement within the requisite period nor refunded the amount, which were pre-requisites for availing the benefit of the new pension scheme. The opinion of the Division Bench was also based on a relevant fact, that the condition in terms of clause 4(4A) required completion of 55 years of age, while the appellant was not of 55 years of age on the date of his resignation or its acceptance. [Paras 28, 29] [412-C-H; 413-A]

#6. Mere categorisation by the appellant himself of his resignation as “premature retirement” is of no avail. The principle of forfeiture of service, would be applicable here and the appellant did not have the requisite age when he resigned even were the General Insurance (Termination, Superannuation and Retirement of Officers and Development Staff) Scheme, 1976 to be made applicable. [Para 35] [414-G-H]

#7. Also that the appellant remained silent for years together and that this Court, taking a particular view subsequently, in Sheel Kumar Jain, would not entitle stale claims to be raised on this behalf, like that of the appellant. In fact the appellant slept over the matter for almost a little over two years even after the pronouncement of the judgment. [Para 36] [415-A-B] A B C D E F G H SENIOR DIVISIONAL MANAGER, L.I.C. OF INDIA LTD. v. SHREE LAL MEENA 397 Civil Appeal Nos. 3138-3141 of 2019 @ SLP(C) Nos.5716-5719 of 2016 A

#8. It is relevant to note that M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. dealt with a similar scheme for employees of the Canara Bank, and the plea was that such of the employees who had resigned must be construed as voluntarily retired, thus, entitling them to pensionary benefits. Suffice to say that, once again, the principle was of differentiation between the concept of ‘voluntary retirement’ and ‘resignation’. Regulation 2(y)as applicable to the employees of Canara Bank, being pari materia to Rule 2(y) under the Pension Regulations of 1995,had brought in ‘volun- tary retirement’ in the definition of ‘retirement’, but had not considered it appropriate to bring in the concept of ‘resignation’. Service jurisprudence, recognising the concept of ‘resignation’ and ‘retirement’ as different, and in the same regulations these expressions being used in different connotations, left no manner of doubt that the benefit could not be extended, especially as resignation was one of the disqualifications for seeking pensionary benefits, under the Regulations. [Para 42] [416-A-D] JK Cotton Spinning & Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., Kanpur v. State of U.P., AIR 1990 SC 1808 : [1990] 3 SCR 523 – distinguished. Reserve Bank of India & Anr. v. Cecil Dennis Solomon & Anr. (2004) 9 SCC 461: [2003] 6 Suppl. SCR 465; UCO Bank & Ors. v. Sanwar Mal (2004) 4 SCC 412 : [2004] 2 SCR 1125; M.R. Prabhakar & Ors. v. Canara Bank & Ors. (2012) 9 SCC 671 : [2012] 8 SCR 1072 ; CIT v. Sun Engineering Works (P.) Ltd. (1992) 4 SCC 363 : [1992] 1 Suppl. SCR 732; Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall [1955] 2 SCR 842 ; Kanhaiyalal Vishindas Gidwani v. Arun Dattatray Mehta (2001) 1 SCC 78; Shashikala Devi v. Central Bank of India (2014) 16 SCC 260 ; Asger Ibrahim Amin v. Life Insurance Corporation of India (2016) 13 SCC 797:[2015] SCR 865 – relied on. J.M. Singh v. Life Insurance Corporation of India& Ors. CWP No.10157/1996 decided on 8.1.2010 ; Sheel B C D E F G H 398 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 5 S.C.R. A B