RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & Anr.

Judgment

17 S.C.R. 1089 1089 RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. (Civil Appeal No. 3613 of 2016) DECEMBER 10, 2019 [ARUN MISHRA, INDIRA BANERJEE, VINEET SARAN, M. R. SHAH AND S. RAVINDRA BHAT, JJ.] Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011 – s. 13(2) – Appeal against an order of the Rent Control Tribunal to Supreme Court – Validity of s.13(2) – Held: On a conjoint reading of Art. 323B and Arts. 245 and 246 with Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule, the Chhattisgarh State Legislature was competent to enact the Rent Control Act, to the extent that it provides for the adjudication of original disputes relating to tenancy and rent by the Rent Controller, and creates a Tribunal to decide appeals from orders of the Rent Controller – However, Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court – Also Art. 200 cannot validate an ultra vires enactment which the concerned Legislature lacked competence to enact – Thus, s. 13(2) providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act, which provides for appellate adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy and rent by a Tribunal – In enacting s. 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, the Chhattisgarh State Legislature overtly transgressed the limits of its legislative power – Thus, Chhattisgarh State Legislature, patently lacked competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh – Thus, s. 13(2) is declared ultra vires the Constitution, null and void and of no effect – Constitution of India – Art. 323B and Arts. 245 and 246 with Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule. Constitution of India – Vires of any enactment – Consideration of – Held: Is to be seen, whether looking at the legislation as a whole, it can be said to be a legislation, 1089 A B C D E F G H 1090 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H substantially with respect to any of the matters, with regard to which the Legislature is competent to legislate, under any specific Article of the Constitution, or any of the Entries in the relevant List in the Seventh Schedule thereto – Once it is held that it is so, the legislative power conferred by that Entry is to extend to all ancillary matters, which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that arena – Furthermore, while the widest amplitude should be given to the language used in one entry, every attempt has to be made to harmonize its contents with those of other Entries, so that the latter may not be rendered nugatory – Interpretation of Statutes. Constitution of India – Art. 245 – Laws made by Parliament and by the Legislature of States – Power to legislate – Held: Both the Union legislature and the State Legislature derive their power to legislate from Art. 245 – Legislature of a State may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India – There is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra-territorial operation, similar to Art. 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws with extra-territorial operation, enacted by Parliament – Thus, Chhattisgarh State Legislature, patently lacks competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh. Constitution of India – Art. 138 – Enlargement of the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court – Term ‘special agreement’ u/ Art 138(2) – Held: Art. 138(2) provides that the Supreme Court shall have such further jurisdiction and powers with respect to any matter as the Government of India and the Government of any State may by special agreement confer, if Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court – Special agreement, means, an independent agreement arrived at between the Government of India and the Government of a State through deliberations and negotiations and not just an approval of legislation by the President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers – In any case, the Supreme Court may exercise further jurisdiction pursuant to a special agreement between the Government of India and the State Government on any particular issue, provided Parliament by law provides for the exercise of such jurisdiction and powers by the Supreme Court. RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. 1091 Constitution of India – Art. 200, second proviso – Assent to Bills – Requirement of – Held: Art. 200 requires Bills passed by the Legislative Assembly of a State, or in case of a State having a Legislative Council, a bill passed by both the houses of the Legislature of the State, to be presented to the Governor for assent – Such Bills become law on receipt of assent of the Governor – Second proviso to Art. 200, prohibits the Governor from assenting to a Bill, which in the opinion of the Governor would, if it became law, so derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which the High Court is, by the Constitution, design to fill – Governor is obliged to reserve such bill for the consideration of the President – Presidential assent is imperative in the case of law enacted by a State Legislature, which would derogate from the powers of the High Court, as to endanger the position which that Court is, by the Constitution, designed to fill – Second proviso to Art. 200 is not attracted in the case of s. 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, since it does not derogate from any power of the High Court – Chhattisgarh Rent Control Act, 2011. Constitution of India – Arts. 226 and 227 – Power of superintendence of the High Court under – Held: Power of superintendence conferred by Art. 227 is, supervisory and not appellate – This power is to be exercised sparingly, to keep subordinate courts and tribunals within the limits of their authority – High Court interferes only when there is grave miscarriage of justice or flagrant violation of law – Interference is restricted to cases of patent error of law which go to the root of the decision; perversity; arbitrariness and/or unreasonableness; violation of principles of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction and usurpation of powers – High Court does not re-assess or re-analyze the evidence and/or materials on record – Exercise of writ jurisdiction by the High Court to test a decision of the Rent Control Tribunal would depend on the facts and circumstances of the case – Writ jurisdiction of the High Court cannot be converted into an alternative appellate forum, just because there is no other provision of appeal in the eye of law. Answering the question referred, the Court HELD: 1. The State Legislature lacked legislative competence to enact Section 13(2) of the Chhattisgarh Rent A B C D E F G H 1092 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H Control Act, 2011. Therefore, Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act is declared ultra vires the Constitution of India, null and void and of no effect. [Para 89] [1127-E] L Chandrakumar v. Union of India and others AIR (1997) SC 125 – followed. H.S. Yadav v. Shakuntala Devi Parakh (2019) 10 SCC 265 – relied on.

#2. Art. 246 of the Constitution, which distributes legislative powers between the Union Legislature and the State Legislature, confers exclusive power to Parliament to make laws in respect of the matters specified in List I in the Seventh Schedule, that is, the Union List. The Union Parliament also has, subject to Clause (3) of Art. 246, the power to make laws with respect to any of the matters enumerated in List III in the Seventh Schedule, that is, the Concurrent List. The State Legislature has exclusive power to make laws with respect to matters enumerated in the State List, subject to Clauses (1) and (2) of Art. 246. Along with the Union Legislature, the State Legislature is also competent to enact laws in respect of the matters enumerated in the Concurrent List, subject to the provisions of Article 246(1). [Para 37, 38] [1117-E-G]

3.1 The relevant entries in the instant matter are, Entry 77 of the Union List, Entries 18 and 65 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List. Entry 18 of the State List enables the State Legislature to enact law with respect to land, including rights in and over land, land tenures including relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent. The State Legislature being clothed with power to enact law in respect of land tenures, including the relation of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent, it had legislative competence to enact the Rent Control Act, in so far as the same regulates the relationship of landlord and tenant and the collection of rent. [Para 39, 42] [1117-H; 1118-A-H; 1119-A]

3.2 Entry 18 of the State List, which only enables the State Legislature to legislate with regard to land, land tenures, landlord tenant relationship, collection of rents etc. does not enable the State Legislature to enact law conferring appellate RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. 1093 jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in respect of orders passed by an Appellate Rent Control Tribunal, constituted under a state law. [Para 53] [1121-A-B]

3.3 In view of Entry 77 of the Union List, only Parliament has the legislative competence to legislate with respect to the constitution, organization, jurisdiction or powers of the Supreme Court. Entry 64 of the State List and Entry 46 of the Concurrent List enable the State Legislature to enact law with respect to the jurisdiction and powers of Courts except the Supreme Court. In other words, the said Entries expressly debar the State Legislature from legislating with respect to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. [Para 54] [1121-B-C]

4.1 The Supreme Court has been established under Article 124 of the Constitution of India and derives its jurisdiction and powers from Articles 131 to 145 thereof. There is no provision in the Constitution which provides for direct appeal to the Supreme Court, from an order of a Tribunal constituted under any law enacted by a State Legislature. [Para 40] [1118-E]

4.2 Article 262(2) of the Constitution which enables Parliament to enact law abrogating the power of the Supreme Court to adjudicate the disputes referred to in Article 262(1), and Article 348 of the Constitution, demonstrate that all matters pertaining to the Supreme Court are exclusively within the legislative domain of Union Parliament. [Para 41] [1118-F-G]

5.1 Article 323B (3)(d) provides that a law made under Article 323B (1) may exclude the jurisdiction of all courts except the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 136, with respect to all or any of the matters falling within the jurisdiction of the said tribunals. Article 323B does not enable a State Legislature to expand the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court by enacting a provision for further statutory appeal to the Supreme Court from an order of an Appellate Tribunal. [Para 55] [1121- D]

5.2 On a conjoint reading of Article 323B and Articles 245 and 246 with Entry 18 of the State List in the Seventh Schedule, there can be no doubt that the State Legislature was competent to enact law to provide for adjudication and trial of all disputes, A B C D E F G H 1094 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 17 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H complaints and offences relating to tenancy and rent, by a Tribunal. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature was thus competent to enact the Rent Control Act, to the extent that it provides for the adjudication of original disputes relating to tenancy and rent by the Rent Controller, and creates a Tribunal to decide appeals from orders of the Rent Controller. [Para 46, 47] [1119-F-G]

#6. When the question of vires of any enactment is considered, it is to be seen, whether looking at the legislation as a whole, it can be said to be a legislation, substantially with respect to any of the matters, with regard to which the Legislature is competent to legislate, under any specific Article of the Constitution, or any of the Entries in the relevant List in the Seventh Schedule thereto. Once it is held that it is so, the legislative power conferred by that Entry is to extend to all ancillary matters, which may fairly and reasonably be said to be comprehended in that arena. [Para 48] [1119-H; 1120-A-B] United Provinces v. Atika Begum AIR 1941 FC 16 (25) – referred to.

7.1 Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, providing for direct appeal to the Supreme Court from orders passed by the Rent Control Tribunal, is not ancillary or incidental to the power of the Chhattisgarh State Legislature to enact a Rent Control Act, which provides for appellate adjudication of appeals relating to tenancy and rent by a Tribunal. In enacting Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act, the Chhattisgarh State Legislature has overtly transgressed the limits of its legislative power. [Para 49] [1120-C]

7.2 While the widest amplitude should be given to the language used in one entry, every attempt has to be made to harmonize its contents with those of other Entries, so that the latter may not be rendered nugatory. Both the Union legislature and the State Legislature derive their power to legislate from Article 245 of the Constitution of India. It is axiomatic that the legislature of a State may only make laws for the whole or any part of the State, while Parliament may make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India. There is no provision in the Constitution which saves State laws with extra-territorial RAJENDRA DIWAN v. PRADEEP KUMAR RANIBALA & ANR. 1095 operation, similar to Article 245(2) which expressly saves Union laws with extra-territorial operation, enacted by Parliament. The Chhattisgarh State Legislature, thus, patently lacks competence to enact any law which affects the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, outside the State of Chhattisgarh. [Para 50, 51] [1120-D- F]

7.3 The submission that Section 13(2) of the Rent Control Act does not confer on the Supreme Court, jurisdiction it did not already possess, but is only incidental to and/or extension of its power under Article 136, is not sustainable in law. [Para 56] [1121-E]

8.1 Under Article 136 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court does not act as a regular court of appeal. The power of the Supreme Court under Article 136 is not to be confused with the appellate power ordinarily exercised by Appellate Courts and Tribunals under specific statutes. Article 136 does not confer a right of appeal on any party, but confers a discretionary power on the Supreme Court to interfere in appropriate cases. This power can be exercised in spite of other provisions for appeal contained in the Constitution, or any other law. Conclusiveness or finality given by a statute to decision of a Court or Tribunal, cannot deter the Supreme Court from exercising this jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution. Appellate jurisdiction is not exercised when a statute gives finality to a decision of the Court or Tribunal. [Para 57-59] [1121-F-H; 1122-A-B]