UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & Ors.

accrued right or the adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. In that background while considering condonation of delay, the routine explanation would not be enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation.[Para 20] [1274-H; 1275- A-C]

#2. The delay in the instant facts in filing the LPA is 916 days and as such the consideration to condone can be made only if there is reasonable explanation and the condonation cannot be merely because the appellant is public body. The entire explanation, depicts the casual approach unmindful of the law of limitation despite being aware of the position of law. That apart when there is such a long delay and there is no proper explanation, laches would also come into play while noticing as to the manner in which a party has proceeded before filing an appeal. In addition, there was delay and laches in filing the writ petition itself at the first instance from which the present appeal had arisen. [Para 21] [1275-E-F]

#3. The entire explanation for the inordinate delay of 916 days is twofold, i.e. the non-availability of the Vice- Chancellor due to retirement and subsequent appointment of new Vice- Chancellor, also that the matter was placed before the Executive Council and a decision was taken to file the appeal and the said process had caused the delay. The reasons, as stated, do not appear very convincing since the situation was of availing the appellate remedy and not the original proceedings requiring such deliberation when it was a mere continuation of the proceedings which had already been filed on behalf of the appellant, after due deliberation. Significantly, the Vice-Chancellor who was at the helm of affairs when the writ petition was filed, prosecuted and disposed of on 27.04.2015 was available in the same office till 28.10.2015, for about six months which was a long enough period as compared to 30 days limitation period for filing appeal. In that circumstance when the said Vice-Chancellor who had prosecuted the writ petition was available, the submission of the appellant that unseen hands are likely to have prevented the filing of the appeal also cannot be accepted. Secondly, the reason sought to be put forth about the decision required to be taken by the UNIVERSITY OF DELHI v. UNION OF INDIA & ORS. 1261 Executive Council is also not acceptable when it was just the matter of filing the appeal. In fact, in the writ petition an affidavit was filed referring to Resolution No.56 and 173 of Academic Council and Executive Council authorising for filing writ petition. When the writ petition was filed based on such authorisation and the stand of the appellant, as the writ petitioner was put forth and had failed in the writ petition, it cannot be accepted that the appellant with all the wherewithal was unable to file the appeal, that too when the same Vice-Chancellor was available for six months after dismissal of the writ petition. Hence the reasons put forth cannot constitute sufficient cause. [Para 22] [1275-H; 1276-A-E]

#4. That apart, the approval from the Executive Council was obtained on 28.02.2017 / 07.03.2017, the appeal was ultimately filed on 01.03.2018 after an year from the said date which only indicates the casual approach which is now sought to be overcome with the plea of public interest despite there being no explanation for the delay at every stage. It is true that every day’s delay need not be explained with such precision but the fact remains that a reasonable and acceptable explanation is very much necessary. [Para 23] [1276-F-G]

#5. In the present matter, the land was converted to residential use in 2005 and Respondent No.11 – DMRC had invited bids and public auction was conducted on 28.07.2008 which ought to have awakened the appellant for the first time since the fact of conversion of the land into residential development was in public domain even if is assumed that the earlier process of approval etc. by the DDA on the approval request of DMRC are internal process and not be known to the appellant. [Para 26] [1277-E]

#6. Despite the writ petition having been filed belatedly in respect of certain actions which had commenced in the year 2005 and even though the writ petition was filed after obtaining approval of the Executive Council, no steps were taken to file the writ appeal for 916 days after disposal of the writ petition. In such circumstance, the cumulative effect of the delay and laches cannot be ignored. [Para 27] [1277-G-H; 1278-A] A B C D E F G

#7. Though contention is put forth that the delay is required to be condoned since public interest is involved, the nature of H 1262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 16 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H the proceedings that have taken place thus far would indicate that the matter has been examined at different stages in the earlier litigations and if the grounds on which the appellant was assailing the action of the respondents were to be examined on merits, they ought to have been more diligent in prosecuting the matter before the Court. [Para 27] [1278-B-C]

#8. In the matter of condonation of delay and laches, the well accepted position is also that the accrued right of the opposite party cannot be lightly dealt with. In that regard, rather than taking note of the hardship that would be caused to respondent No.13, what is necessary to be taken note is the manner in which respondent No.11 – DMRC has proceeded in the matter. The respondent No.11-DMRC is engaged in providing the public transport and for the said purpose the Government through policy decision has granted approval to generate resources through property development and in that regard the development is taken up. Pursuant thereto the respondent No.11 has received a sum of Rs.218.20 crores from respondent No.13 as far back as in the year 2008. The said amount as indicated is used for its projects providing metro rail service to the commuting public. In such circumstance, if at this stage the inordinate delay is condoned unmindful of the lackadaisical manner in which the appellant has proceeded in the matter, it would also be contrary to public interest. [Para 28] [1278-D-F]

#9. Therefore, not only the Single Judge was justified in holding that the writ petition inter alia is hit by delay and laches but the decision of the Division Bench in dismissing the LPA on the ground of delay of 916 days is also justified and the orders do not call for interference. [Para 29] [1278-F-G]