DR. (MAJOR) MEETA SAHAI v. STATE OF BIHAR & Ors.

Construction of statutory provision – Held: As a first step the Courts ought to interpret the text of the provision and construct it literally – This tool of interpretation can only be applied where the text of the enactment is susceptible to only one meaning – Where there is ambiguity in the meaning of the text, the Courts must also give due regard to the consequences to remedy such deficiency – When there are two plausible interpretations, the one which promotes constitutional values must be preferred. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1The principle of estoppel prevents a candidate from challenging the selection process after having failed in it. The underlying objective of this principle is to prevent candidates from trying another shot at consideration, and to avoid an impasse wherein every disgruntled candidate, having failed the selection, challenges it in the hope of getting a second chance. [Para 17] [287-F; 288-B-C]

1.2 However, this principle is differentiated insofar as the candidate by agreeing to participate in the selection process only accepts the prescribed procedure and not the illegality in it. In a situation where a candidate alleges misconstruction of statutory rules and discriminating consequences arising therefrom, the same cannot be condoned merely because a candidate has partaken in it. The constitutional scheme is sacrosanct and its violation in any manner is impermissible. In fact, a candidate may not have locus to assail the incurable illegality or derogation of the provisions of the Constitution, unless he/she participates in the selection process. [Para 18] [288-C-D] DR. (MAJOR) MEETA SAHAI v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 275

1.3 The appellant has rightly not challenged the selection procedure but has narrowed her claim to only against the respondents’ interpretation of ‘work experience’ as part of merit determination. Since interpretation of a statute or rule is the exclusive domain of Courts, and given the scope of judicial review in delineating such criteria, the appellant’s challenge cannot be turned down at the threshold. [Para 20] [289-A-B] Manish Kumar Shahi v. State of Bihar (2010) 12 SCC 576 – relied on.

2.1 It is a settled cannon of statutory interpretation that as a first step, the Courts ought to interpret the text of the provision and construct it literally. Provisions in a statute must be read in their original grammatical meaning to give its words a common textual meaning. However, this tool of interpretation can only be applied in cases where the text of the enactment is susceptible to only one meaning. Nevertheless, in a situation where there is ambiguity in the meaning of the text, the Courts must also give due regard to the consequences of the interpretation taken. [Para 21] [289-C-D] Nathi Devi v. Radha Devi Gupta (2005) 2 SCC 271: [2004] 6 Suppl. SCR 1141 – relied on.

2.2 It is the responsibility of the Courts to interpret the text in a manner which eliminates any element of hardship, inconvenience, injustice, absurdity or anomaly. A legislation must further its objectives and not create any confusion or friction in the system. If the ordinary meaning of the text of such law is non-conducive for the objects sought to be achieved, it must be interpreted accordingly to remedy such deficiency. [Para 22] [289-E] Madan Lal v. State of J&K (1995) 3 SCC 486 : [1995] 1 SCR 908 – relied on. Principles of Statutory Interpretation by GP Singh (14th Edn., 2016) Pp. 145-170 – referred to.

2.3 There is no doubt that executive actions like advertisements can neither expand nor restrict the scope or A B C D E F G H 276 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H object of laws. It is therefore necessary to consider the interpretation of the phrase ‘Government hospital’ as appearing in the Rules. [Para 23] [289-F]

2.4 Rule 2 of Bihar Health Service (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules 2013 is a definitional provision and defines ‘Government’ as a noun. However, it would not necessarily govern instances where the word has been used in another form. Under Rule 5, the operative phrase is “any Government hospital”. Here, ‘Government’ is restrictively defining the noun ‘hospital’ to exclude those run by certain entities. Thus, ‘Government’ as part of ‘Government hospital’ is a noun adjunct and has been used as an adjective. Such usage of a noun in its adjectival form changes its character altogether and it would be unwise to import the meaning of its noun form. This is especially true considering how the prefatory portion of Rule 2 explicitly provides that the definitions as prescribed thereunder shall be referred to unless otherwise required in context. The phrase ‘Government hospital’ therefore cannot be construed to exclude other non-private hospitals which are otherwise run exclusively with the aid and assistance of the Governments. Additionally given the difference in common usage wherein ‘government hospital’ refers to all non-private hospitals and not hospitals established by a particular government, Rule 5 & 6(iii) would not be bound by Rule 2(a). [Para 24] [290-C-F] Navinchandra Mafatlal v. CIT, [1955] 1 SCR 829 – relied on. FCC v. AT&T Inc. 562 U.S. 397 (2011) – referred to.

2.5 Presence of the word ‘any’ in Rule 5 is also critical. It indicates a legislative intent to bestow a broad meaning to hospitals eligible for accrual of work experience. Importing the restrictive definition of Rule 2(a) would hence lead to an anomalous situation in having both expansive and restrictive adjectives applied to the same underlying noun. Consequently, the Court is inclined to adopt an expansive interpretation of the phrase, and not lay weight on Rule 2(a). [Para 25] [290-G; 291- A] DR. (MAJOR) MEETA SAHAI v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 277

2.6 In addition to this, adopting the respondents’ interpretation would increase uncertainty and create practical difficulties. When Rule 2(a) is applied to ‘Government hospital’ there is substantial ambiguity created as to whether or not hospitals run by instrumentalities of the Government, which are not strictly owned by the Government of Bihar would be included within Rule 5. Such issues are bound to arise repeatedly in any selection process. Given how there is no simple answer to such questions, the rigid interpretation adopted by the Government would only lead to friction in the system and cause interpretative chaos which would undermine the fair and just right to compete for public employment. [Para 26] [291-B-D]

2.7 Further, if faced between a choice in which only a few people would be eligible versus a fairly large group, the latter ought to be adopted to have a diverse pool of applicants. This would promote merit, bring better doctors and further the Constitutional scheme of providing equal opportunity in public employment to the masses. Thus, the provisions of the Rules in the present case cannot be construed or explained by applying the principle of literal interpretation. [Para 27] [291-E]

2.8 Therefore, it is necessary to resort to purposive interpretation of the provisions of the Rules, in the light of its objectives. Otherwise also as per the prefatory part of Article 309 of the Constitution, the Rules framed thereunder must be in conformity with all other Constitutional provisions, which necessarily includes Part III. Dealing with recruitment in Government hospitals, it is clear that the object and purpose of the Rules too must satisfy the test of Article 16. [Para 28] [291- F-G]

2.9 Further, given the absence of express definition of ‘Government hospitals’ under the Rules, the Court deems it fit to make use of Constitutional values as a tool of statutory interpretation. The Constitution must not only be seen as a benchmark for testing the validity of legislations, but also as an inspirational document to guide State action. When there are two plausible interpretations, the one which promotes Constitutional values must be preferred. [Para 29] [291-H; 292-A-B] R v. Jarvis, 2019 SCC 10 – relied on. A B C D E F G H 278 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R. A B C D E F G H

2.10 Under the constitutional scheme, obligations and duties of the ‘State’ have eloquently been divided using a three- tier system of governance. The Union of India at the national level, individual State Governments at the State Level and various Municipalities/Panchayats at the local level, parallelly discharge their respective Constitutional duties for the welfare of the general public. In deference to their duties to raise the standard of living, ensure adequate nutrition and public health of its people under Article 47 of the Constitution, both the Central as well as the State Governments formulate various welfare schemes and establish institutions including hospitals/ primary health centres. Still further, under Article 243G read with Entry 23 of Schedule XI of the Constitution, the legislature of the State can entrust the functions of “Health and sanitation, including hospitals, primary health centres and dispensaries” to the Panchayati Raj Institutions. Similarly, the State legislature may entrust under Article 243W read with Entry 6 of Schedule XII, the functions of “Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management” to Municipalities. Hospitals of these local governments are often run on the back of funds derived from the Consolidated Fund of the States. It may thus be seen that the Constitution envisages the setting up of hospitals by many different public authorities, including the Central Government, State Government, Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions. [Para 30, 31] [292-B-F]

2.11 In addition, several hospitals throughout the country have been set up by instrumentalities of the Central or State Governments, more notably the Employees’ State Insurance Corporation Hospitals, to cater to the need of poor and needy persons. These hospitals, therefore, are at par with other government hospitals for all intents and purposes, and the experience gained by a doctor in such hospitals subsume the characteristics acquired in a hospital set up by the Bihar Government. [Para 32] [292-G; 293-A]

2.12 Other hospitals are also established by instrumentalities of the States and the Centre in pursuance of Constitutional obligations under Part IV. These although not strictly covered within the ambit of the Rules as propounded by DR. (MAJOR) MEETA SAHAI v. STATE OF BIHAR & ORS. 279 the respondents, nevertheless serve the same purpose of providing best medical facilities to public at large. An apt example is of Army hospitals, and there is little reason to ignore and overlook the experience gained in such hospitals. [Para 33] [293- B]

2.13 It is hence irrational to urge that the work experience in any such hospital is different from that in a Government of Bihar hospital. Hence, it would be constitutionally unjust to allow differentiation between the experience gained by doctors at these hospitals established by Panchayats or Municipalities or by the Central Government and its instrumentalities in the territory of Bihar vis-à-vis those run by the Bihar Government. Any attempt to discriminate between hospitals run by the State Government and the Central Government or Municipalities/Panchayati Raj Institutions is bound to hit the very ethos of the Constitutional governance setup. [Para 34] [293-C-D]

2.14 Having said so, the Court is not oblivious to the fact that equality does not imply that there can be no classification. Instead, sometimes it may be necessary to treat unequals unequally, for equal treatment of persons with unequal circumstances creates an unjust situation. Such classification, however, must not be arbitrary but rationally founded on some quality or characteristics which are identifiable within the class of people so created and absent in those excluded from such classification. [Para 35] [293-E] Indira Sawhney v. Union of India (1992) Supp. 3 SCC 217 : [1992] 2 Suppl. SCR 454 – followed.

2.15 The purpose behind formulation of the Rules was to recognize the unique challenges of hospitals in Bihar and incentivise doctors to work in non-private hospitals. Experience in a non-private hospital instills sensitivity in its doctors, making them more adept to understand the ail and agony of poor patients. Such experience will undoubtedly be useful in furthering the object of Government hospitals and must be given due weightage while selecting suitable candidates. Interpreting ‘Government hospitals’ to include only a small class of persons who have worked under the Government of Bihar, is thus clearly erroneous and anti-merit. Such an objective would not be A B C D E F G H 280 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 15 S.C.R. A defeated by the understanding of the Rules as has been construed. [Para 36] [293-F-G; 294-A-B]

2.16 Therefore, Rule 5 & 6(iii) of the Bihar Health Service (Appointment and Service Conditions) Rules, 2013 are construed to include the experience gained by a doctor in any hospital run by the Bihar Government or its instrumentalities, as well as any other non-private hospital (including those run by the Central Government, Municipalities and Panchayati Raj Institutions; or other public authorities) within the territory of Bihar. Respondents are accordingly directed to rework and prepare a fresh merit list by granting due weightage to the appellant and other similarly placed candidates. [Para 37] [294- C-D]