VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY & Ors.

Interim injunction in a civil suit – Restraining interalia the respondent-Secretary of the respondent-Society from functioning as Secretary – Challenged in revision petition – High Court allowed the petition setting aside the injunction order holding that the same was passed in haste – Appeal to Supreme Court – Held: High Court had overlooked the fact that the respondent-Secretary having been injuncted from acting as a Secretary of the respondent-Society, could not have filed revision petition on behalf of the respondent- Society – High Court was also wrong in holding that the order was passed in haste – Injunction order was passed after duly hearing the opposite party – Order XXXIX r.3A of CPC also mandates disposal of injunction application within 30 days – Therefore, impugned order set aside – Advocate Commissioner appointed to convene the ‘General Body’ as well as ‘Executive Committee’ meeting for the election of Office Bearers – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. XXXIX r.3A. 634 VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY 635 Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Primarily the High Court went wrong in overlooking the fact that there was already an appeal under Order XLI, Rule 1(r) of CPC, at the instance of the fifth defendant in the suit (third respondent), as against the very same order of injunction and, therefore, there was no justification for invoking the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227. [Para 11] [639-H; 640-A]

#2. The High Court ought to have seen that when a remedy of appeal under Section 104(1)(i) read with Order XLIII, Rule 1(r) of CPC was directly available, the respondents 1 and 2 ought to have taken recourse to the same. It is true that the availability of a remedy of appeal may not always be a bar for the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction of the High Court. But courts should always bear in mind a distinction between (i) cases where such alternative remedy is available before Civil Courts in terms of the provisions of CPC and (ii) cases where such alternative remedy is available under special enactments and/or statutory rules and the fora provided therein happen to be quasi-judicial authorities and tribunals. In respect of cases falling under the first category, which may involve suits and other proceedings before civil courts, the availability of an appellate remedy in terms of the provisions of CPC, may have to be construed as a near total bar. Otherwise, there is a danger that someone may challenge in a revision under Article 227, even a decree passed in a suit, on the same grounds on which the respondents 1 and 2 invoked the jurisdiction of the High court. “orders of civil court stand on different footing from the orders of authorities or Tribunals or courts other than judicial/civil courts. Therefore wherever the proceedings are under CPC and the forum is the Civil Court, the availability of a remedy under the CPC, will deter the High Court, not merely as a measure of self imposed restriction, but as a matter of discipline and prudence, from exercising its power of superintendence under the Constitution. Hence, the High Court ought not to have entertained the revision under Article 227 especially in a case where a specific remedy of appeal is provided under the Code of Civil Procedure itself. [Paras 12, 13 and 14] [640-B-G; 641-A-B] A B C D E F G H 636 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2019] 13 S.C.R. A B C D E F G

#3. Another aspect that was overlooked by the High Court was that the second respondent was already restrained by the Sub-Court, from functioning as the Secretary of the first respondent society. It is seen from the records that the civil revision was filed before the High court by the first respondent society as well the second respondent. The second respondent was not only the second petitioner in the Civil Revision Petition filed before the High Court, but he also sought to represent the first respondent-Society as its Secretary, before the High court in the Civil Revision. On the date on which the first respondent- Society filed the Civil Revision before the High court, the second respondent was not the secretary and could not have acted on behalf of the society. This aspect was also overlooked by the High Court. [Paras 15 and 16] [641-C-D; G-H]

#4. The observation of the High Court that the trial Court proceeded in great haste, appears to be uncharitable. Order XXXIX Rule 3A of CPC itself mandates the disposal of an application for injunction within 30 days, whenever an injunction was granted without notice to the opposite party. In the present case, the trial Court, without granting an ex-parte order of injunction, chose to allow the opposite parties to file counter affidavit(s) along with documents and then heard the opposite parties before allowing the application for injunction. Finding the line of demarcation between speedy disposal and hurried dispatch, with mathematical precision, is not possible. In any case, even if the High Court was convinced that the trial Court had proceeded hastily, the High Court could have only remanded the matter back. But the High Court allowed the application for injunction without recording any finding on merits. In fact the order of the Trial Court deals with the rival contentions and is one passed on merits after due consideration of the pleadings and documents. The High Court did not even deal with the matter on merits to over turn the decision of the Trial Court. Therefore, the order of the High Court is liable to be set aside and the order of the Trial Court is liable to be restored. [Paras 17 and 18] [642-A-E]

#5. It is brought to the notice of the Court that after the High Court allowed the Civil Revision petition by its order dated H VIRUDHUNAGAR HINDU NADARGAL DHARMA PARIBALANA SABAI v. TUTICORIN EDUCATIONAL SOCIETY 637

28.08.2018, the second respondent proceeded with the meeting of the General Body and the Executive Committee on 25.09.2018 and also conducted elections. Notice was ordered and the interim order of the status quo was passed in the above special leave petition only on 8.10.2018. Normally, in the above circumstances, the appeal could have been held having become infructuous. But in the present case every meeting of the General Body and every attempt at holding elections to the first respondent-Society have created a series of litigation before three different fora namely (i) the Civil Courts (ii) the Registrar of Societies (iii) the High court (in Writ Petitions arising out of orders of the Registrar of Societies). Therefore, the only way to bring to an end all the litigations between the parties before various fora would be to set aside the impugned order and the elections held pursuant thereto and to appoint an Advocate Commissioner to convene the General Body as well as the Executive Committee for the election of office bearers. Accordingly, the order of the High court as well as the elections purportedly held pursuant to the order of the High Court are set aside. [Paras 19, 20 and 21] [642-F-H; 644-C-E]