INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS & Ors.

Order

Consequence of interim order – Held: When there is interim stay with respect to possession or order of status quo, everything comes to stand still till the interim order is vacated – When once the court has restrained the State authorities to take possession, or to 17 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R. maintain status quo, they cannot pay the amount or do anything further, as such the consequences of interim orders cannot be used against the State – Land acquisition. (Per majority) Effect of – Held: It is settled proposition of law that no litigant can derive the benefit of pendency of a case in a court of law – In case any interim order is passed during the pendency of litigation it merges in the final order – In case, the case is dismissed the interim order passed during its pendency is nullified automatically. (Per majority) Per incuriam – Decision in Pune Municipal Corporation case – Principle of ‘per incuriam’, applicability – The concept of “per incuriam” signifies those decisions rendered in ignorance or forgetfulness of some inconsistent statutory provisions, or of some authority binding on the Court concerned – The concept means that a given decision is in disregard of the previous decisions of the Court itself, or that it was rendered in ignorance of the terms of an applicable statute or of a rule having the force of law – In the instant case, the decision in Pune Municipal Corporation case is held per incuriam. (Per majority) Repeal – Effect of repealing law on accrued rights – Held: It is settled law that accrued rights cannot be taken away by repealing statutory provisions – The repealing law must provide for taking away such rights expressly or by necessary implications. (Per majority) Words and phrases – Vesting – Meaning of. (Per majority) Answering the reference, the Court HELD: PER ARUN MISHRA, J. (For himself and for Adarsh Kumar Goel, J.) (MAJORITY VIEW)

#1. INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 24

1.1 In case the award has not been passed then as per section 24(1)(a), compensation has to be determined under the Act of 2013. Section 24(1)(b) provides that where an award under section 11 of the 1894 Act has been made, then such proceedings shall continue under the provisions of the said Act of 1894 as if it 18 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. has not been repealed. However, in case physical possession of the land has not been taken, or the compensation has not been paid, the proceedings shall be deemed to have lapsed; and, in case of compensation with respect to a majority of landholdings has not been deposited in the account of the beneficiaries, then, all beneficiaries i.e. landowners shall be entitled to compensation in accordance with the provisions of the Act of 2013. [Para 24][75- E-G]

1.2 In section 24(2), the expression that has been employed is “compensation has not been paid”. The expression “deposited”, which occurs in the proviso to sub-section (2), has not been used in the main section 24(2). Its proviso uses the expression “deposited in the account of the beneficiaries”, meaning thereby, in the case with respect to the majority of land holdings amount has not been deposited in the account of beneficiaries, though the acquisition would not lapse, all beneficiaries would get benefit of the compensation under the Act of 2013. Thus, the consequence of non-deposit of the amount, with respect to the majority of land holdings, in the account of the beneficiaries, is that the acquisition would not lapse, and only compensation under the new Act would be payable. Whereas, under the main part of section 24(2), it is apparent that, the expression “compensation has not been paid” has been used. The word “deposited” is missing from main part of section 24(2), and it is only used in the proviso. Thus, the Legislature has used two different expressions to carry, respectively different meanings; and, the proviso operates in a different field, where the acquisition would not lapse. The object is that a body or State Government, for whose benefit land has been acquired, must have possessed the requisite funds for payment to the landowners. The proviso is not attracted where compensation has been paid. The proviso to section 24(2) does not provide that amount of compensation has to be deposited in the court. It obviously refers to a payment deposited with LAO or in treasury. [Paras 25, 26 and 27][75-H; 76-A-E]

1.3 The expression used in section 31 of Act of 1894 and Section 77(1) of Act of 2013 is to “tender payment”. Once there is tender, then in case of refusal to accept the same, the obligation 19 A B C D E F G H 20 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R. to pay under section 31(1) is complete by tender, and that tantamount to making the payment; and, that is precisely what is intended by the word “paid” in section 24(2) of 2013 Act. In Section 31(2) of the 1894 Act, the word ‘deposited in Court’ is used. The deposit in Court is not payment to the beneficiaries. It is only after their refusal to accept the compensation tendered under section 31(1) of the Act of 1894 it is to be deposited in Court. It is further provided in the rules that in case reference is sought, the amount is to be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise it is to be deposited in the treasury. If the expression “deposited”, used in the proviso to section 24(2), and expression “paid” used in main section 24(2), are both taken as contained in expression “paid” i.e. the tender; and, on refusal it is deposited in court to make the “payment” complete; if expression “deposited” is included in expression ‘payment’ under Section 24(2), inconsistency and repugnancy would be caused as between the proviso and the main sub-section; which has to be eschewed. The Court cannot add the word “deposited” to the expression “paid”/ “tender” in Section 31 of Act 1894 or Section 24(2) of Act of 2013. [Paras 28, 29][76-F-H; 77-A-B]

#2. MEANING OF “PAID” IN SECTION 31 OF THE ACT OF 1894 AND SECTION 24(2) OF THE ACT OF 2013 :

2.1 The meaning of expression “tender”: is when a person has tendered the amount and made it unconditionally available and the landowner has refused to receive it, the person who has tendered the amount cannot be saddled with the liability, which is to be visited for non-payment of the amount. “Tender” may save the tendering party from the penalty for non-payment or non-performance or penalty if another party unjustifiably refusing the tender, places the other party in default. The expression “tender” has been used in section 31. The concept of deposited in court is different from “tender” and “paid”. [Para 32][77-F-G] Straw Board Manufacturing Co. Ltd., Saharanpur v. Gobind AIR 1962 SC 1500 : [1962] Suppl. SCR 618; The Management of Delhi Transport Undertaking v. The Industrial Tribunal, Delhi & Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1503; Indian Oxygen Ltd. v. Narayan Bhoumik (1968) 1 PLJR 94; N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay & Ors. v. The Elphinstone Spinning & Weaving INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. Mills Co. Ltd. (1971) 1 SCC 337; J. Dalmia v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi AIR 1964 SC 1866 : [1964] SCR 579 – relied on. Black’s law Dictionary – referred to. 2.2 The expression “paid” would mean in section 31(1) of Act 1894 and section 24(2) of Act of 2013 as soon as it is offered and made unconditionally available. Merely, if a landowner refuses to accept it, it cannot be said that it has not been paid. Once amount has been tendered that would amount to payment. The legal maxim “A Verbis Legis Non Est Recedendum” means: from the words of law, there must be no departure. When language of the provision is clear, there is no scope for reading something into it. Section 24(2) uses the expression “compensation has not been paid”. To complete the payment, deposit of payment in the court cannot be read as payment to the landowners. Deposit cannot and need not be added to expressions paid/ tender. In case the legislature wanted the ‘deposit in Court’ to be included in ‘paid/ tender’, it could have easily said so. But it has used expressions differently, with different consequences. The legislature has consciously omitted the expression “deposited” in main section 24(2), whereas, it is used in the proviso; both have different objectives. When the legislature has used different expressions with respect to past events – the word “paid” is used in a discernibly distinctive sense than the sense conveyed by the word “deposited” occurring in the proviso – both are required to be given different meanings. There is casus omissus, i.e. conscious omission made by the Legislature in main Section 24(2) when the expression “deposited” has not been used in the expression “has been paid”, and it is only after amount tendered is declined, it is to be deposited in Court that too in certain exigencies as per section 31(2). [Paras 39, 41(a), 41(b), 42][81-D; 82-B; 85-A-B, E-H; 86-A] Nali Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyamsunder Halder AIR 1953 SC 148 : [1953] SCR 533; State of Madhya Pradesh v. G.S. Dall and Flour Mills AIR 1991 SC 772 : [1990] 1 Suppl. SCR 590; State of Gujarat and Ors. v. Dilipbhai Nathjibhai Patel and Anr. (1998) 3 SCC 234 : [1998] 2 SCR 56; Competition Commission of India v. Steel Authority of India Ltd. (2010) 10 SCC 21 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R. 744 : [2010] 11 SCR 112; Assessing Authority cum- Excise and Taxation Officer v. East India Cotton Mfg. Co. Ltd. (1981) 3 SCC 531 : [1982] 1 SCR 55; Paul Enterprises & Ors. v. Rajib Chatterjee & Co. & Ors. AIR 2009 SC 187 : [2008] 14 SCR 419; Sakshi v. Union of India (2004) 5 SCC 518 : [2004] 2 Suppl. SCR 723; Commissioner of Income Tax, Kerala v. Tata Agencies (2007) 6 SCC 429 : [2007] 8 SCR 136; Ram Narain Medhi v. State of Bombay AIR 1959 SC 459 : [1959] Suppl. SCR 489; S.P. Gupta v. President of India AIR 1982 SC 149 : [1982] SCR 365; Dadi Jagannadham v. Jammulu Ramulu (2001) 7 SCC 71 : [2001] 2 Suppl. SCR 60; P.K. Unni v. Nirmala Industries AIR 1990 SC 933 : [1990] 1 SCR 483; Royal Trust Company v. Minister Of Finance AIR 1921 PC 184 – relied on. Crawford v. Spooner (1846) 6 Moore PC 1; Lord Howard de Walden v. IRC (1948) 2 AER 825 – referred to. “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” by G.P. Singh (14th edition) – referred to. 2.3 While making statutory interpretation, inconsistency and repugnancy is to be avoided and harmonious construction has to be adopted. The construction to be adopted should be such, as would make the statute as a whole, a consistent enactment. Applying the rule of harmonious construction to the provisions of section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, i.e. as between the main part of the section and its proviso, the word “paid” occurring in the main part, has to be construed differently (with a different meaning being given to it) from the word “deposited” occurring in the proviso; otherwise, inconsistency and repugnancy would be the result of the provision contained in section 24(2) as a whole; and, that is what has to be avoided. In the instant case, proviso to Section 24(2) cannot be ignored while interpreting the main subsection. The proviso is enacted as part of section 24(2); it is not an independent provision and applies to an acquisition made five years or before, in which amount, with respect to majority of holdings, has not been deposited in court. There has to be 22 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. harmonized construction of provision of section 24(2). Since there is no ambiguity of drafting in the provisions contained in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, so also none is there in those contained in sections 31(1) and 31(2) of the Act of 1894. There is no accidental omission as to the concept of payment in section 24(2) or section 31(1) of these Acts. Thus, it is not permissible to supply the word “deposited” to include in the expression “payment”. [Paras 44-48][86-F-G; 87-A-E]

Raj Krushna v. Binod Kanungo AIR 1954 SC 202 : [1954] SCR 913; Sultana Begum v. Premchand Jain AIR 1997 SC 1006 : [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 707; Kailash Chandra v. Mukundi Lal (2002) 2 SCC 67 : [2002] 1 SCR 83; CIT v. Hindustan Bulk Carriers (2003) 3 SCC 57 : [2002] 5 Suppl. SCR 387; Balasinor Nagrik Cooperative Bank Limited v. Babubhai Shankerlal Pandya (1987) 1 SCC 606 – relied on. Inco Europe Ltd. v. First Choice Distribution (a firm) by the House of Lords in (2000) 2 All ER 109 – referred to. 2.4 Rule of literal construction lays down that words of a statute are first understood in their natural, ordinary or popular sense and phrases, and sentences are construed according to their grammatical meaning. In the instant case, when giving the plain, natural and grammatical meaning to the word ‘paid’/ ‘tender’, which has been used in contradistinction to the words “deposited in court”, it is clear that tendering payment would not include deposit in court, in that it is only when payment is refused, that the same is deposited in court; obligation to pay is over as soon as amount is tendered and refused. [Paras 49(a), 50][88-A; 89-E- F] Harbhajan Singh v. Press Council of India AIR 2002 SC 1351 : [2002] 2 SCR 369 – relied on G.P. Singh, in “Principles of Statutory Interpretation” (14th edition), at Page 91 – referred to. 2.5 When two different expressions have been used in the same provision of a statute, there is a presumption that they are not used in the same sense. This principles of statutory construction that different words to be given different meaning 23 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R. indicate that the expression ‘deposited’ cannot be added to ‘tender’/‘paid’, both carry different consequences under section 24, tender on lapse of acquisition/non-deposit higher interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894. It is a settled proposition of law that when two different expressions have been used in section 24(2) of the Act of 2013, as well as in section 31 of the Act of 1894, i.e. “paid to the landowners” and “deposited in the court”, they both carry different meanings, and have to be interpreted as used in the respective contexts. It is not the expression used that deposit in the court is payment to landowners, neither it is used that amount deposited in the treasury is the payment to the landowners. The payment indicates the obligation to pay; and, deposit is made in the court or revenue treasury only upon happening of various exigencies as provided in Section 31, and there can be several other exigencies which are not covered under section 31(2) of the Act of 1894 and in the statutory rules/ orders. [Paras 51(a), 51(d), 51(e)][89-H; 92-B-E] Member, Board of Revenue v. Arthur Paul Benthall AIR 1956 SC 35 : [1955] SCR 842; CIT v. East West Import & Export (P) Ltd., Jaipur (1989) 1 SCC 760 : [1989] 1 SCR 570; Kailash Nath Agarwal v. Pradeshiya Industries and Investment Corporation of Uttar Pradesh (2003) 4 SCC 305 : [2003] 1 SCR 1159; Tejmohammed Hussainkhan Pathan v. V.J. Raghuvanshi (1993) Suppl. 2 SCC 493; D.L.F. Qutab Enclave Complex Educational Charitable Trust v. State of Haryana (2003) 5 SCC 622 : [2003] 2 SCR 1; Pallawi Resources Ltd. v. Protos Engineering Company Pvt. Ltd. (2010) 5 SCC 196 : [2010] 3 SCR 847; Grasim Industries Ltd. v. Collector of Customs, Bombay (2002) 4 SCC 297 : [2002] 2 SCR 945; B.R. Enterprises v. State of U.P. AIR 1999 SC 1867 : [1999] 2 SCR 1111; ShriIshar Alloy Steels Ltd. v. Jayaswals Neco Ltd. (2001) 3 SCC 609 : [2001] 2 SCR 36; Labour Commissioner, Madhya Pradesh v. Burhanpur Tapti Mills and Ors. AIR 1964 SC 1687 – referred to. Brighton Parish Guardians v. Strand Union Guardians 1891 QB 156 – referred to. 24 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. G.P. Singh, in his treatise Interpretation of Statutes (14th Edition) at page 395 – referred to.

2.6 When considering the intendment of the beneficial provisions of the Act of 2013, it addresses the concern of farmers and of those whose livelihood is dependent upon the land being acquired, while at the same time facilitating land acquisition for myriad reasons, including urbanization, rural electrification et al., in a timely and transparent manner. The legislature has not brook the delay of five years or more on part of authorities in completing the acquisition. When it says ‘timely’,it would mean without delay on the part of authorities, not delay due to dilatory tactics and conduct of land owners/interested persons. [Para 53][92-F-H]

#3. EFFECT OF RULES FRAMED UNDER SECTION 55 OF 1894 ACT AND ORDERS ISSUED BY STATE GOVERNMENTS

3.1 There are various State rules framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 by various State Governments as well as there are instructions issued with respect to dealing with Government money as provided in Article 283 of the Constitution of India, and when it is the Government money it has to be dealt with in accordance with the instructions issued by the State Government from time to time. There are other Financial Codes/Rules/orders issued time to time by various State Governments with respect to dealing with Government money. It is apparent from rules that when no reference is sought on refusal to accept, amount is to be deposited in treasury. Rules have to be harmonized with the provision in the Act, thus, it would be necessary to deposit in court when reference is sought. Thus, under section 31(2) provision of deposit in court on refusal would be attracted, when reference had been sought, as provided in rules. Section 31(2) does not come in play at all in cases of refusal to accept amount when reference has not been sought and deposit in treasury would be valid deposit even otherwise where reference is sought and person refuses to accept it only liability of non-compliance of deposit in Court would be higher interest under section 34. [Paras 54, 60][93-A-C; 98-B-C]

3.2 ‘Deposit-in-treasury’ is stipulated under the rules made 25 A B C D E F G H 26 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R. with reference to a constitutional provision, so also framed under Section 55 of the 1894 Act, as well as under other statutory or administrative powers. The deposit in treasury is not, in any manner, invalid. If the deposit is valid, there is no reason to hold that the said deposit has to be ignored. Government finances, after all, have to be handled as per the applicable rules. The deposit in treasury is as per binding procedural rules/orders issued by Government of India and/or in exercise of the powers under Article 283 of the Constitution of India. [Para 63][99-D-F] Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227 – partly dissenting.

#4. PRACTICAL DIFFICULTY ON REFUSAL/NON- ACCEPTANCE OF COMPENSATION BY CONDUCT; PRACTICE AND LEGAL POSITION UNDER ACT OF 1894.

4.1 One mode of refusal to acceptance of compensation is when it is tendered, it is refused. Another mode is of filing a litigation to question the very land acquisition, filing application for an interim stay and contesting it for decades reflects clear conduct of non-acceptance of acquisition/compensation. State authorities cannot retain the money in their own hands in such circumstances and are bound to deposit the Government money where it is supposed to be i.e. in the treasury as provided in rules. Thus, by conduct also, there can be non-acceptance of compensation. Once compensation is accepted, right to challenge acquisition would vanish. State authorities are not expected to retain the money with them and run after the landowners and match with their dilatory tactics with vigil to find out that one ultimate day, the litigation would attain finality. Once by their conduct, there is refusal to accept the land acquisition itself, much less compensation, in such circumstances such landowners have to inform the authorities about the outcome of the litigation and in case they have lost, to ask for compensation. Same would be the position in case amount is deposited in court. They have to apply for its withdrawal. The obligation of authorities is at initial stage. At subsequent stage, unless and until there is willingness shown by landowners/interested persons to accept the compensation, authorities cannot presume that they would accept INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. it and that landowners are not going to question acquisition in the higher forum and it is not open to the authorities to offer to them compensation time and again, once amount is deposited in treasury during the pendency of litigation. In case of interim stay also authorities cannot offer the compensation as that would tantamount to violation of court’s order and after interim stay ceases to operate, it is for the landowners to apprise the authorities of their intention not to take the litigation further and their willingness to accept compensation. Section 24(2) does not provide cover to such litigation. [Para 64][99-G-H; 100-A-G]

4.2 The law as prevailed under the Act of 1894 never invalidated any land acquisition in the absence of amount being deposited in court since the time immemorial in most cases where reference is not sought, amount had been invariably deposited in the Treasury as provided in statutory rules framed under section 55 of Act of 1894 and other standing order issued by State Governments, and there were decisions of this Court which have simply laid down that in case landowner is not responsible for delay in payment, at the most he may be entitled to interest on such amount, in case it has not been tendered/paid to him when possession has been taken. Similar provisions are made under sections 77 and 80 of the Act of 2013. All of a sudden it would not be appropriate considering the statutory rules which have been framed under section 55 of the Act of 1894 and order to invalidate all such land acquisitions which have taken place in various States in the country by laying down that once amount has not been deposited in the court but in treasury, acquisitions would lapse under section 24. It will be a very harsh operation of law as old Act never provided for such a consequence since 1894 the Act was enacted till new 2013 Act came into force. When there were such anomalous situation, the statutory rules and statutory orders issued by various State Governments dealing how the Government money has to be dealt with, it would not be appropriate to unsettle the legal position. The 1894 Act never contemplated such result and by and large, it was not the practice to deposit in court. Only in those cases the amount used to be deposited in court, where reference was sought under sections 18 or 30, as provided under rules also and there was dispute as 27 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R. to person entitled to it or apportionment thereof between the claimants. Primarily it is for the Land Acquisition Collector to distribute the compensation and poor farmers are not supposed to know the court and place where the reference would be made, if it was not sought person would not know a place where it would not be submitted to court, the question of deposit in court would not arise. The court is not disbursing authority of compensation when reference is not sought. Farmers/ claimants are primarily concerned with the Land Acquisition Collector and for more than one century this procedure of deposit in treasury was prevailing and by and large amounts had been deposited in the treasury only and thus it would not be appropriate to make the operation of law to be such as to invalidate land acquisition when deposit is made in Treasury. Such an interpretation is not permissible as per the intendment of the Act of 2013. Though it is a beneficial law to benefit the incumbents it cannot be interpreted to be a law which would be to invalidate concluded transaction as per prevailing law and divest the land which has vested in State, development has taken place, possession taken, awards passed, after litigation/several rounds of litigation lost and then land cannot be ordered to revert back. The law does not intend that effect, as it may be termed as arbitrary and beyond legislative competence. Such misuse of provisions and anomalous results need to be avoided. [Para 66][101-G-H; 102-A-H; 103-A]

4.3 The spirit of the provisions of the Act of 2013 is to benefit farmers, at the same time, not to thwart the entire development which has taken place or to burden the Exchequer with such liability which is not contemplated in the Act of 2013 and invalidate acquisitions that have taken place in 1912, 1950s and 1960s onwards and have attained finality, as are sought to be reopened under the guise of 2013 Act taking advantage of the said technical aspect. Courts are duty-bound to thwart all such attempts as the land which has been acquired long back, it would not be possible to make payment of compensation as of the rate as provided in the Act of 2013 to undeserving persons at the cost of public revenue, and it would not be appropriate to interpret the provisions in such a manner to entertain stale and dead claims and to revive them on the ground of technical and procedural 28 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. defaults, if any, and created by landowners conduct. The intendment of section 24 is that acquisition to be completed early. If authorities for no good cause fail to take steps for five years or more on their own the lapse of acquisition under section 24 to follow. [Para 67][103-B-E]

#5. PREJUDICE DUE TO NON-DEPOSIT IN COURT: It is trite law that in the given situation unless aggrieved party makes out a case of prejudice and injustice, every infraction of law would not vitiate the act. [Para 69][104-B-C] Jankinath Sarangi v. State of Orissa (1969) 3 SCC 392; Sunil Kumar Banerjee v. State of West Bengal (1980) 3 SCC 304 : [1980] 3 SCR 179; State of Andhra Pradesh v. Thakkidiram Reddy (1998) 6 SCC 554 : [1998] 3 SCR 1088; Willie (William) Slaney v. State of Madhya Pradesh AIR 1956 SC 116 : [1955] SCR 1140; Abdul Sayeed v. State of Madhya Pradesh (2010) 10 SCC 259 : [2010] 13 SCR 311; State of Punjab v. Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar AIR 2012 SC 364 : [2011] 15 SCR 540; Bahamans v. State of Karnataka (2012) 9 SCC 650 : [2012] 7 SCR 909 – relied on.

#6. CONSEQUENCE OF NOT DEPOSITING THE AMOUNT UNDER SECTION 31 OF THE 1894 ACT :

6.1 In case there is dispute as to person entitled to compensation or its apportionment in between person interested or person was not even competent to make alienation of property that has been acquired it would not be necessary to tender amount as it may not be so done due to said exigencies as authority may decide not to pay it till court orders then it is to be deposited in court to save further liability of exorbitant interest under section 34 of the Act of 1894. Apart from that section 31(2) does not cover all the exigencies and it does not require that invariably the compensation has to be deposited with the court. It is only when reference is sought that reference court comes to picture not otherwise as provided in rules/orders in case person refuses and seeks a reference to court it has to be deposited in court where reference would be submitted otherwise as provided in the rules it has to be deposited in treasury. It is only when court 29 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 2 S.C.R. comes into play then deposit in reference court is required in exigencies of section 31(2) read with 32 as provided in rules. Even section 31(2) comes into play to “tender payment” is obligatory provision. Tender of payment is complete when it is made unconditionally available it could not have been equated with the deposit in court under section 31(2) or 24(2) of old and new Acts respectively as these are two different exigencies and consequence of non-payment of compensation is clearly culled out in section 34. There is a liability for payment of interest. [Para 71][105-C-G] Delhi Development Authority v. Sukhbir Singh & Ors. (2016) 16 SCC 258 : [2016] 5 SCR 227; Hissar Improvement v. Smt. Rukmani Devi & Anr. AIR 1990 SC 2033; Kishan Das & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1995) 6 SCC 240 : [1995] 3 Suppl. SCR 584; Seshan & Ors. v. Special Tehsildar & Land Acquisition Officer, SPICOT, Pudukkottai (1996) 8 SCC 89 : [1996] 1 SCR 1058; D Block Ashok Nagar (Sahibabad) Plot Holders’ Association (Regd.) v. State of U.P. & Ors. (1997) 10 SCC 77 : [1997] 3 SCR 1096 – relied on.

6.2 Deposit in Treasury is permissible mode of deposit under the proviso to section 24(2) and within the purview of main section 24(2). The expression “deposited in the account of landowners” would not mean deposited in the court as envisaged in Section 31(2) of the old Act, action as permissible as per the financial instructions having statutory or administrative orders having force of law as well as under the Rules framed by various State Governments in exercise of power under section 55 of Act of 1894 can always be taken. In various States, Financial Code/ Order/Rules deals with Government money and as such amount is required to be deposited in the Treasury by opening separate accounts of landowners/beneficiaries/claimants that would be full compliance of the proviso of section 24(2) of new Act.[Para 76][107-D-G] Mahavir & Ors. v. Union of India 2018(1) SCALE 174; Nazir Ahmed v. King Emperor AIR 1936 PC 253 (2) – relied on. 30 A B C D E F G H INDORE DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. SHAILENDRA (DEAD) THROUGH LRS. 31

#7. WHETHER SECTION 24(2) DIVESTS THE STATE OF A LAND

7.1 The concept of absolute vesting in the State under Act of 1894 is well settled and on award being passed, possession being taken, compensation being offered but refused, section 24 would not apply in such a situation to divest the State if the land is acquired. Merely by obtaining interim order or keeping the litigation pending or filing it afresh that too by way of stale and belated claim after the Act of 2013 came into force, no divesting of land is contemplated. It is only in exigencies provided deemed lapse take place either when possession not taken or compensation not paid as provided in Section 24(2) and where award has not been passed, the provisions of section 24 of Act of 2013 applies. [Para 79][109-C-E] State of Punjab v. Sadhu Ram 1996 (7) JT 118 : [1995] 5 Suppl. SCR 448; Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 698 : [1996] 7 Suppl. SCR 6; Market Committee v. Krishan Murari (1996) 1 SCC 311 : [1995] 4 Suppl. SCR 787; PuttuLal (dead) by LRs. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1996) 3 SCC 99:[1996] 2 SCR 638 – relied on. Black’s Dictionary – referred to. 7.2 When there is absolute vesting in the State it is vesting along with possession and thereafter a person who remains in possession is only a trespasser not in rightful possession. Vesting cannot be considered with any rider as to title or possession. Vesting contemplates absolute title, possession in the State. There is no deemed lapse under section 24 in such a case. In case of urgency also before award is passed as provided in section 17(1), 17(3A) vesting takes place on fulfillment of conditions. [Paras 81(d), 82][113-G-H; 117-D] O R D E R We unanimously agree to the answers given to all the questions i.e. Nos.I to V, except to the aspect decided by majority whether Pune Municipal Corporation & Anr. v. Harakchand Misirimal Solanki, 2014 (3) SCC 183, is per incuriam or not. As the majority has taken the view that it is per incuriam, it is declared to be per incuriam. The questions referred stand answered in terms of majority judgment. Hence, ordered accordingly. Mattes may now be listed on 16.2.2018 for orders before an appropriate Bench, subject to the orders of the Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. Devika Gujral Referred questions answered. A B C D E F G H