SOCIAL ACTION FORUM FOR MANAV v. UNION OF INDIA MINISTRY OF LAW
Case at a glance
Provisions considered
Judgment
parties can approach the High Court under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and the High Court, keeping in view the law laid down in Gian Singh, shall dispose of the same. [Para 40] [50-A] Joginder Kumar v. State of U.P and Others (1994) 4 SCC 260 ; D.K. Basu v. State of W.B. (1997) 1 SCC 416 : [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284 ; Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar Pradesh and Others (2014) 2 SCC 1 : [2013] 14 SCR 713 ; Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar and Another (2014) 8 SCC 273 : [2014] 8 SCR 128 – relied on. Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and Others (2005) 6 SCC 281 ; B.S. Joshi and Others v. State of Haryana and Another (2003) 4 SCC 675 ; Brij Lal v. Prem Chand and Another [1989] 2 SCR 612 ; Rajesh Sharma and Others v. State of U.P. and Another 2017 (8) SCALE 313 ; [2017] 9 SCR 529 : Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa and Others (1993) 2 SCC 746 : [1993] 2 SCR 581; State of M.P. v. Shyamsunder Trivedi and Others (1995) 4 SCC 262 : [1995] 1 Suppl.
SCR 44 ; Lakshmi Kant Pandey v. Union of India (1984) 2 SCC 244 : [1984] 2 SCR 795 ; Vishaka and Others v. State of Rajasthan and Others (1997) 6 SCC 241 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 ; Common Cause (A Registered Society) v. Union of India and Another (2018) 5 SCC 1 ; Suresh Seth v. Commissioner, Indore Municipal Corporation and Others (2005) 13 SCC 287 ; Census Commissioner and Others v. R. Krishnamurthy (2015) 2 SCC 796 : [2014] 11 SCR 463 ; N.D. Jayal and Another v. Union of India and Others (2004) 9 SCC 362 : [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 152 ; Rustom Cavasjee Cooper v. Union of India (1970) 1 SCC 248 : [1970] 3 SCR 530 ; Premium Granites and Another v. State of T.N. and Others (1994) 2 SCC 691 : [1994] 1 SCR 579 ; M.P. Oil Extraction and Another v. State of M.P. and Others (1997) 7 SCC 592 : [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 671 ; State of Madhya Pradesh v. Narmada Bachao Andolan and Another (2011) 7 SCC 639 : [2011] 6 22 A B C D E F G H SOCIAL ACTION FORUM FOR MANAV ADHIKAR v.
UOI MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE SCR 443 : State of Punjab and Others v. Ram Lubhaya Bagga and Others (1998) 4 SCC 117 : [1998] 1 SCR 1120 – referred to. Case Law Reference (2005) 6 SCC 281 (2003) 4 SCC 675 [1989] 2 SCR 612 [2017] 9 SCR 529 [2014] 8 SCR 128 (1994) 4 SCC 260 referred to referred to referred to referred to relied on relied on [1996] 10 Suppl. SCR 284 relied on [1993] 2 SCR 581 referred to [1995] 1 Suppl. SCR 44 referred to [2013] 14 SCR 713 relied on [1984] 2 SCR 795 referred to [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 404 referred to (2018) 5 SCC 1 (2005) 13 SCC 287 [2014] 11 SCR 463 referred to referred to referred to [2003] 3 Suppl. SCR 152 referred to [1970] 3 SCR 530 [1994] 1 SCR 579 referred to referred to [1997] 1 Suppl. SCR 671 referred to [2011] 6 SCR 443 referred to [1998] 1 SCR 1120 referred to Para 3 Para 4 Para 5 Para 9 Para 22 Para 26 Para 28 Para 28 Para 28 Para 29 Para 35 Para 35 Para 35 Para 36 Para 37 Para 37 Para 37 Para 37 Para 37 Para 37 Para 37 23 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R. CIVIL ORIGINAL/APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Writ Petition (Civil) No.73 of 2015.
Under Article 32 of the Constitution of India WITH Criminal Appeal No. 1265 of 2017 Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 156 of 2017. P. S. Narsimha, ASG, K. Radhakrishnan, Ms. Indira Jaising, Sr. Advs., Ms. Indu Malhotra, V. Shekhar, Sr. Advs(ACs), Shivang Dubey, Ms.Tanvi R. Nayar, Prashant Singh, Gaurav Aggarwal, Ms. Deepti Gupta, Advs(ACs.), Ms. Charu Walikhanna, Dharmender Pal Singh, Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Mahesh Srivastava, P. N. Puri, Vaibhav Manu Srivastava, Pankaj Srivastava, Alok Singh, Ms. Surabhi Lata, Abhishek Singh, Sandeep S. Deshmukh, Ms. Manju Jetley, Raghavendra Tripathi, Mukul Singh, Ms. Arunima Dwivedi, R. R. Rajesh, Gautam Sharma, Ms. Sunita Sharma, Balram Das, B. Krishna Prasad, M. K. Maroria, Shadan Farasat, Ms. Aanchal Singh, Ms. Rudrakshi Deo, Pramod Dayal, Rajesh Kumar, Roopenshu Pratap Singh, Dr. Alok Sharma, Naresh Kumar, Gurmeet Singh Makker, Gaurav Agrawal, Shashank Shekhar, Umang Shankar, Namit Saxsena, Ms. Sindhu T. P., R. Beniwal, Bineesh K., Arushi Singh, P. V. Dinesh, Ms. Kirti Singh, Ms. Pallavi Langar, Ms. Nupur Agrawal, Advs. for the appearing parties. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by DIPAK MISRA, CJI.
Law, especially the criminal law, intends to control, if not altogether remove, the malady that gets into the spine of the society and gradually corrodes the marrows of the vertebrae of a large section of the society. A situation arises and the legislature, expressing its concern and responsibility, adds a new penal provision with the intention to achieve the requisite result. When a sensitive legal provision is brought into the statute book, the victims of the crime feel adequately safe, and if the said provision pertains to matrimonial sphere, both the parties, namely, wife and husband or any one from the side of the husband is booked for the offence and both the sides play the victim card. The accused persons, while asserting as victims, exposit grave concern and the situation of harassment is built with enormous anxiety and accentuated vigour. It is propounded in a court of law that the penal provision is abused to an unimaginable extent, for in a cruel, ruthless and 24 A B C D E F G H SOCIAL ACTION FORUM FOR MANAV ADHIKAR v.
UOI MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI] totally revengeful manner, the young, old and relatives residing at distant places having no involvement with the incident, if any, are roped in. Thus, the abuse of the penal provision has vertically risen. When the implementation of law is abused by the law enforcing agency, the legislature introduces a protective provision as regards arrest. Needless to say, the courts have ample power to grant pre-arrest bail or popularly called anticipatory bail and even to quash the criminal proceeding totally to stabilize the lawful balance because no court of law remotely conceives of a war between the two sexes. The courts remain constantly alive to the situation that though no war takes place, yet neither anger nor vendetta of the aggrieved section should take an advantage of the legal provision and harass the other side with influence or espousing the principle of sympathy.
The role of the law enforcing agency or the prosecuting agency is sometimes coloured with superlative empathy being totally oblivious of the sensation to make maladroit efforts to compete with the game of super sensitivity. Such a situation brings in a social disaster that has the potentiality to vertically divide the society. The sense of sensitivity and the study of social phenomenon are required to be understood with objectivity. In such a situation, it is obligatory on the part of the legislature to bring in protective adjective law and the duty of the constitutional courts to perceive and scrutinize the protective measure so that the social menace is curbed. We are, in the instant matters, focussing on Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short, ‘the IPC’).
Section 498-A was brought into the statute book in the year 1983. The objects and reasons for introducing Section 498-A IPC can be gathered from the Statement of Objects and Reasons of Criminal Law (Second Amendment) Act of 1983 and read as under :- “The increasing number of Dowry Deaths is a matter of serious concern. The extent of evil has been commented upon by the Joint Committee of the Houses constituted to examine the working of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. Cases of cruelty by the husband and the relatives of the husband which culminate in suicide by, or murder of the hapless woman concerned, constitute only a small fraction of the cases involving such cruelty. It is, therefore proposed to amend the Indian Penal Code, Code of Criminal Procedure and the Indian Evidence Act suitably to deal effectively not only with cases of Dowry Death but also cruelty to married woman by their in laws. 25 A B C D E F G H 26 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 12 S.C.R.
2. The following are the changes that are proposed to be made:- (i) The Indian Penal Code is proposed to be amended to make cruelty to a woman by her husband or any relative of her husband punishable with an imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and also with fine. Willful conduct of such a nature by the husband or any other relative of the husband as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or cause grave physical or mental injury to her, and harassment of woman by her husband or by any relative of her husband with a view to coercing her or any of her relatives to meet any unlawful demand for property would be punishable as cruelty, the offence will cognizable if information relating to the commission of the offence is given to the officer in charge of a Police Station by the victim of the offence or a relative of the victim of the offence or, in the absence of any such relative, by any public servant authorized in this behalf by the State Government. It is also being provided that no court shall take cognizance of the offence except upon a Police Report or complaint made by the victim of the offence or by her father, mother, brother, sister or by her father’s or mother’s brother or sister or with the leave of the court by any other person related to her by blood, marriage or adoption (vide Clauses 2, 5 and 6 of the Bill.) (ii) Provision is being made for inquest by Executive Magistrates and for postmortem in all cases where a woman has, within seven years of her marriage, committed suicide or died in circumstances raising a reasonable suspicion that some other person has committed an offence. Post-mortem is also being provided for in all cases where a married woman has died within seven years of her marriage and a relative of such woman has made a request in this behalf (vide Clauses 3 and 4 of the Bill) (iii)The Indian evidence Act, 1872 is being amended to provide that where a woman has committed suicide within a period of seven years from date of her marriage and it is shown that her husband or any relative of her husband and subjected her to cruelty, the court may presume that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband (vide Clause 7 of the Bill)
The Bill seeks to achieve the above objectives.” SOCIAL ACTION FORUM FOR MANAV ADHIKAR v. UOI MINISTRY OF LAW AND JUSTICE [DIPAK MISRA, CJI]
3. Regarding the constitutionality of Section 498-A IPC, in Sushil Kumar Sharma v. Union of India and others1, it was held by the Supreme Court:- “Provision of S. 498A of Penal Code is not unconstitutional and ultra vires. Mere possibility of abuse of a provision of law does not per se invalidate a legislation. Hence plea that S. 498A has no legal or constitutional foundation is not tenable. The object of the provisions is prevention of the dowry menace. But many instances have come to light where the complaints are not bona fide and have been filed with oblique motive. In such cases acquittal of the accused does not in all cases wipe out the ignominy suffered during and prior to trial. Sometimes adverse media coverage adds to the misery. The question, therefore, is what remedial measures can be taken to prevent abuse of the well-intentioned provision. Merely because the provision is constitutional and intra vires, does not give a licence to unscrupulous persons to wreck personal vendetta or unleash harassment. It may, therefore, become necessary for the legislature to find out ways how the makers of frivolous complaints or allegations can be appropriately dealt with. Till then the Courts have to take care of the situation within the existing frame-work.”
In B.S. Joshi and others v. State of Haryana and another2, the Court observed:-
There is no doubt that the object of introducing Chapter XX-A containing Section 498A in the Indian Penal Code was to prevent the torture to a woman by her husband or by relatives of her husband. Section 498A was added with a view to punishing a husband and his relatives who harass or torture the wife to coerce her or her relatives to satisfy unlawful demands of dowry. The hyper-technical view would be counter productive and would act against interests of women and against the object for which this provision was added. There is eveiy likelihood that non- exercise of inherent power to quash the proceedings to meet the ends of justice would prevent women from settling earlier. That is not the object of Chapter XXA of Indian Penal Code.