PIMPRI CHINCHWAD NEW TOWNSHIP v. VISHNUDEV COOPERATIVE HOUSING
Case at a glance
Outcome
Set aside
Impugned order is set aside
Provisions considered
Key paragraphs
- Para 33. Once it is held that the possession of the acquired land was with the State, the land stood vested in the State disentitling the State to release the land from the acquisition proceedings by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 48 of the…
Judgment
First, the State gave notice to all the co-owners of the land in question and informed them to remain present at the time of taking possession by the SLAO; Second, out of all the co-owners, two were present at the time of taking possession. It was sufficient compliance; Third, possession was taken in the presence of two witnesses by the SLAO; Fourth, panchanama evidencing taking of the possession was duly signed by the witnesses; Fifth, the name of the State Government was duly entered in the revenue records after obtaining possession as an owner; Sixth, the Government, in turn, handed over the possession of the land to the appellant (PCNTDA); and Seventh, the name of PCNTDA was also entered in the revenue records of the land in question. [Paras 43, 44] [324-C, E-G]
#3. Once it is held that the possession of the acquired land was with the State, the land stood vested in the State disentitling the State to release the land from the acquisition proceedings by taking recourse to the provisions of Section 48 of the Act. A fortiori, the then Revenue Minister had no power to deal with the land in question in any manner whatsoever and nor had any power to invoke the provisions of Section 48 of the Act for release of the land in question from the clutches of the acquisition proceedings. [Paras 45, 46] [324-G-H; 325-B]
4.1 The question is whether the order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the then Revenue Minister directing release of the acquired land in question has the attributes of an order within the meaning of Section 48 of the Act or, in other words, whether the order in question created any right in favour of the landowners so as to enable them to claim mandamus for enforcement of such order against the State. [Para 48] [325-C-D]
4.2 The answer to the aforesaid question is “no”. It is for the reasons that First, a mere noting in the official files of the Government while dealing with any matter pertaining to any person is essentially an internal matter of the Government and A B C D E F G H PIMPRI CHINCHWAD NEW TOWNSHIP DEV. AUTHORITY v. VISHNUDEV COOP. HOUSING SOCIETY 313 carries with it no legal sanctity; Second, once the decision on such issue is taken and approved by the competent authority empowered by the Government in that behalf, it is required to be communicated to the person concerned by the State Government. In other words, so long as the decision based on such internal deliberation is not approved and communicated by the competent authority as per the procedure prescribed in that behalf to the person concerned, such noting does not create any right in favour of the person concerned nor it partake the nature of any legal order so as to enable the person concerned to claim any benefit of any such internal deliberation. Such noting(s) or/and deliberation(s) are always capable of being changed or/and amended or/and withdrawn by the competent authority. Third, though Section 48 of the Act, in terms, does not provide that release of the land from any acquisition proceedings is required to be done by issuance of the notification by the State but, having regard to the scheme of the Act, which begins with the process of issuance of notification under Section 4 of the Act for acquisition of any land, the release of land from such acquisition is complete only when a notification is issued by the State in that behalf. [Paras 49, 50 and 51] [325-D-H; 326-A]
#5. The Revenue Minister, who passed the order dated 10.06.2004, had no power to deal with the matter relating to release of the land in question. He simply usurped the power under Section 48 of the Act, which he never possessed. It was an abuse of exercise of power by him while dealing with the State’s largesse. [Para 54] [327-E]
6.1 That apart, the filing of the writ petition by the landowners itself was an abuse of judicial process. It was for the simple reason that the earlier litigation having ended against the landowners, it was binding on the parties. It prevented the landowners to again raise the same issue. [Para 55] [327-F]
6.2 Indeed, the release of part of the land in landowners’ favour and retention of the remaining land for accomplishing the project vide notification dated 20.08.1994 was in the nature of a bargain. It disentitled the landowners to seek further release of A B C D E F G H 314 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2018] 11 S.C.R. the remaining land. This is apart from the fact that consequent upon obtaining the possession of the land by the State, the release of the remaining land under Section 48 of the Act was otherwise not legally possible. [Para 56] [327-G-H]
6.3 The High Court failed to examine the issues arising in the case in its correct perspective. One cannot, therefore, concur with the reasoning and the conclusion arrived at by the High Court which wrongly upheld the order dated 10.06.2004 passed by the concerned Revenue Minister. [Para 57] [328-A-B]
Questions this judgment answers
What did the Court decide in this case?
The Court recorded the following disposition: Impugned order is set aside
Which statutory provisions did this judgment involve?
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — s. 48; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908; What the Act.
Precedent status how later indexed judgments have treated this case
No known negative treatment found in the Courts & Cases corpus.
This is a result about the indexed corpus, not a finding that the judgment remains good law. Coverage may be incomplete.