Civil Appeal No. 21784 of2017 · Of High Court

HELD: 1.1 It is not in dispute that the suit house was the self-acquired property of late Mr. BDR, appellant's father. It is also not in dispute as one can take it from reading the contents of Will that Mr. BDR had intended to give only "life interest" to his wife (appellant's mother) in the suit house, which he gave to her for the first time by way of disposition of his estate independent of her any right. It is also not in dispute that it was confined to a right of residence to live in the suit house during her lifetime and to use the income earned from the suit house to maintain herself and the suit house. It is also not in dispute that the testator gave to his son (appellant) ground floor of the suit house and first floor to his daughter (respondent no.I) with absolute right of ownership. D The testator also permitted both of them to get their names mutated in the municipal records as absolute owners and also get them assessed as owners in the wealth tax assessment cases. [Para 34] [551-C-E] c

1.2 It is a settled principle of law that what the testator intended to bequeath to any person(s) in his Will has to be gathered primarily. by reading the recitals of the Will only. On facts, reading of the Will would go to show that it does not leave any kind of ambiguity therein and one can easily find out as to how and in what manner and with what rights, the testator wished to give to three of his legal representatives his self acquired properties and how he wanted to make its disposition. [Paras 36, 37] . [551-G-H]

1.3 The ambit of Section 14(2) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 must be confined to cases where property is acquired by a female Hindu for the first time as a grant without any pre existing right, under a gift, will, instrument, decree, order or award, the terms of which prescribe a "restricted estate" in the property. Where, however, property is acquired by a Hindu female at a partition or in lieu of right of maintenance, it is in virtue of a E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] 13 S.C.R. pre-existing right and such an acquisition would not be within the scope and ambit of Section 14(2) of the Act, even if the instrument, decree, order or award allotting the property prescribes a "restricted estate" in the property. The case of plaintiff No.2 (appellant's mother) does not fall under Section 14 (1) of the Act but it squarely falls under Section 14 (2) of the Act. A/ortiori, plaintiff No.2 (appellant's mother) received only "life interest" in tile suit house by the Will from her late husband and such "life inte1rest" neither enlarged nor ripened into an absolute interest in tile suit house and remained "life interest", i.e., "restricted estate" till her death under Section 14(2) of the Act. This is for following factual reasons. [Paras 41-43) (556-B-FJ V Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by L.Rs. (1977) 3 SCC 99 : [1977) 3 SCR 261 - relied on.

1.4 First, the testator-BDR being the exclusive owner of the suit house was free to dispose of his property the way he liked because it was his self earned property. Second, the testator gave the suit house in absolute ownership to his son and the daughter and conferred on them absolute ownership. At the same time, he gave only "life interest" to his wife, i.e., a right to live in the suit house which belonged to son and daughter. Such disposition, th~ testator could make by virtue of Section 14 (2) read with Section 30 of the Act. Third, such "life interest" was in the nature of !•restricted estate" under Section 14(2) of the Act which remain¢d a "restricted estate" till her death and did not ripen into an "absolute interest" under Section 14(1) of the Act. In Miler words, once the case falls under Section 14(2) of the Act, it comes out of Section 14(1). It is permissible in Jaw because Section 14(2) is held as proviso to Section 14(1) of the Act. Fourth, the effect of the Will once became operational after the death of testator, the son and the daughter acquired absolute ownership in the suit house to the exclusion of everyone whereas the wife became entitled to live in the suit house as of right. In other words, the wife became entitled in law to enforce her right to live in the suit house qua her son/daughter so long as she was alive. If for any reason, she was deprived of this right, she was entitled to enforce such right qua son/daughter but not beyond it. However, such was not the case here. Fifth, the testator had also 544 A B c D E F G H MR. RANVIR DEWAN v. MRS. RASHMI KHANNA & ANR. 545 given his other properties absolutely to his wife which enabled A her to maintain herself. Sixth, it is a settled principle of law that the "life interest" means an interest which determines on the termination of life. It is incapable of being transferred by such person to others being personal in nature. Such person, therefore, could enjoy the "life interest" only during his/her lifetime which B is extinguished on his/her death. Such is the case here. Her "life interest" in the suit house was extinguished on her death on 12.09.2016. [Paras 44-49] [557-A-C, D] Sadhu Singh v. Gurudwara Sahib Narike & Ors. (2006) 8 SCC 75 : [2006] 5 Suppl. SCR 799- held applicable.