KOLKATA METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. PRADIP KUMAR GHOSH & Ors.

Judgment

10 S.C.R. 229 KOLKATA METROPOLITAN DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY v. PRADIP KUMAR GHOSH & OTHERS (Civil Appeal No. 461 of2009) OCTOBER 24, 2017 [ARUN MISHRA AND MOHAN M. SHANTANAGOUDAR, JJ.] B West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948: ss. 3, 4 and 5 - Land acquisition, for development of Calcutta - C Property handed over to Development Corporation - Property requisitioned in year 1979, by issuance of notification u!s. 3( I) - Requisitioned continued for long for 14 years - Challenge to - In writ petition,. Single Judge of the High Court by order dated · 10.03.1993, did not quash notification issued u/s. 3( 1) but directed the authorities to acquire the properties within 6 months and if the D authorities did not acquire the property within the time specified, the Land Acquisition Collector to release the property under requisition and restore the possession to the petitioner - Thereafter, some delay in initiating the land acquisition proceedings - l5suance of notification u!s. 4( /)(a) for acquisition of premises - However, the Division Bench held that requisition ·u/s. 3( I) deemed to have been lapsed, as such acquisition was illegal ~ Held: To enforce an order it should be effective on date mandamus is sought to be enforced - ft can be interdicted by another order or by statutory intervention - By virtue of s. 6, until and unless r~lease order is passed and delivery of possession pursuant thereto takes place, the requisition would continue - In the instant case, court had not quashed the order of requisition and has not ordered that on lapse of 6 months period grallted for acquisition and further period of 6 months property shall stand derequisitioned - Direction was issued to the L.A.C. to release the property from requ45ition - There was no G automatic consequence of the de-requisition on lapse of specified time - Thus, if the property had not been released u/s 6 obviously the requisition continued and statutory power of acquisition could have been exercised - Requisition continued until the dot!' <if acquisition notification and there was no time limit for i11itiMin E F 229 'I 230 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] JO S.C.R. acquisition - It is not a case that order was void but statutory power has been exercised - As statutory power has been exercised, the statutory action is not stifled by the order of the court - Thus, the Division Bench of the High Court erred in law in quashing the acquisition - Order passed by the Division Bench set aside and that of the Single Bench is restored. A B Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 It is apparent from ss. 3 and 4 of the West Bengal Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1948 that the property that is under re<1uisition can only be acquired. Requisition is a c sine qua non for a property as on the date when notification under section 4 is issued. Section 3 had 'been omitted w.e.f. 1.4.1994. However the property was requisitioned before the provision was omitted. It is apparent that Section 6 requires an order to be passed by the State Government for release of the property from requisition. Government has to conduct an inquiry if any, D considered necessary then the release order has to be passed and possession of the property has to be delivered under section 6. Section 6(2) also provides that even if possession has been delivered pursuant to a release order, the same shall not prejudice any right in respect of such land, if any other person may be E entitled by due process of law to enforce against the person to whom possession of land was delivered. In the instant case, the High Court has not directed delivery of possession and possession had not been handed over. Thus, by virtue of the provisions contained in section 6, until and unless release order is passed and delivery of possession pursuant thereto takes place, the requisition would continue. [Paras 11-13] [243-H; 244-A, G H; 245-A-B] F G Collector of Kamrup & Ors. v. Kamakhya Ram Barooah etc. AIR 1965 SC 1301; H.D. Vora v. State of Maharashtra & Ors. (1984) 2 SCC 337 : [1984] 2 SCR 693; Jiwani Kumar Paraki v. First land Acquisition Collector, Calcutta & Ors. (1984) 4 SCC 612 : [1985] 1 SCR 686; Grahak Sanstha Manch & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra (1994) 4 SCC 192 - referred to.

1.2 To enforce an order it should be effective on date H mandamus is sought to be enforced. H can be interdicted by KOLKATA METROPOLITAN DEVEWPMENT AUTHORITY v. PRADIP KUMAR GHOSH & ORS. 231 another order or by statutory intervention. [Para 19] [249-D] A Comptroller and Auditor-Gerreral of India, Gian Prakash, New Delhi & Am: v. K.S. Jagannathan & Anr. (1986) 2 SCC 679 : [1986] 2 SCR 17; Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Va11das Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust & Ors. v. V.R. Rudani & Ors. (1989) 2 SCC 691 : {1989] 2 SCR 697: Mansukhlal Vithaldas Chauhan v. State of Gujarat (1997) 7 SCC 622 : [1997] 3 Suppl. SCR 705; State of A.P. & Ors. F. Raja Shri V.S.K. Krishna Yachandra Bahadur Varuh Rajah of Venkatagiri & 01:1·. (2002) 4 SCC 660; Director of Settlements, A.P. & Ors. \'. M.R. Apparao & Anr. (2002) 4 SCC 638 : [2002] 2 SCR 661 - referred to. B c

1.3 In the instant case, the nature of mandamus that has been issued on 10.9.1993 has to be considered.· Firstly the court had not quashed the order of requisition. Apart from that, the D court has not. ordered that on lapse of 6 months period granted for acquisition and further period of 6 months property shall stand derequisitioned. The direction was issued to the L.A.C. to release the property in question from requisition. It was not an automatic consequence of the command issued. Thus, if the property had E not been released under section 6 obviously the re<1uisition continued and statutory power of acquisition could have IJeen exercised. [Para 221 [254-C-E]

1.4 In the instant case, as the High Court has not quashed the notification under section 3 and till derequisition was actually F made, once statutory power had been exercised under section 4 which could be exercised when requisition continues and that· as a matter of fact, continued as the court had not culled out the consequence, there was. no automatic consequence of the de requisition on lapse of specified time. Proceedings under section 6 were required to be undertaken. No order of release was passed. G Requisition continned until the date of acquisition notification and there was no time limit for initiating acquisition under the Act. The statutory provision would not be stultified by the command so issued by the High Court in view of the decision of this Court in Jacob case. Though, Single Judge has opined that H 232 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2017] IO S.C.R. A considering the order, it would be a case of violation of the order to be dealt with under the Contempt of Courts Act. However, when statutory provision had been invoked for acquisition, there is no question of applicability of contempt of court also as laid down in Jt1coh '.5 case. [Para 241 [257-C-El B c D