SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P & Ors.

Arunachalam v. P.S.R.Sadhanantham & Anr. (1979) 2 SCC 297 : 1979 (3) SCR 482; Ganga Kumar Shrivastav v. State of Bihar (2005) 6 SCC 211; CAG v. K.S. Jagannathan (1986) 2 SCC 679 : 1986 (2) SCR 17; Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Muktajee Vandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Ruda11i (1989) 2 SCC 691 : 1989 (2) SCR 697; Hari Vishnu Kamath v. Ahmad Jshaque AIR 1955 SC 233: 1955 F G H 34 A B c D SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R. SCR 1104; Suo Motu Proceedings against R.Karuppan, Advocate (2001) 5 SCC 289: 2001 (3) SCR 750; R.S. Maddanappa (DJ by LRs. v. Chandramma & Anr. AIR 1965 SC 1812 : 1965 SCR 283; Rattan Chand Hira Chand\( Askar Nawaj Jung (DJ by Lrs. & Ors. (1991) 3 SCC 67 : 1991 (1) SCR 327; Ce111ral Inland Water Transport Corporation Ltd. & Anr. v. Brojo Nath Ganguly & Anr. AIR 1986 SC 1571 : 1986 (2) SCR 278; Indian Council for Enviro-Legal Action v. Union of India & Ors. (2011) 8 SCC 161 : 2011 (9) SCR 146; Trisha/a Jain & Anr. v. State of Uttaranchal & Anr. (2011) 6 sec 47 : 2011 (8) SCR 520; Hamza Haji V. State of Kera/a & Anr. (2006) 7 SCC 416 : 2006 (4 ) Suppl. SCR 604; S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu (D) By LRs. v. Jagannath (DJ by Lrs. & Ors. AIR 1994 SC 853 : 1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422 - referred to. Case Law Reference (2010)15 sec 201 AIR 2007 Andhra Pradesh 57 [FB] approved distinguished Para 2 Para6 AIR 2010 Madras 18 disapproved Para6 E AIR 2000 Kar. 46 1962 SCR 97 approved Para6 relied on Para6 AIR 1990 Madras 251 approved Para 7 1964 SCR 733 1979 (3) SCR 482 (200~) 6 sec 211 1986 (2) SCR 17 1989 (2) SCR 697 1955 SCR 1104 2901 (3) SCR 750 1965 SCR 283 1991 (1) SCR 327 F G H distinguished Para 8 referred to Para8 referred to Para8 referred to Para8 referred to Para8 referred to Para8 referred to Para9 referred to Para9 referred to Para9 SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. 35 1986 (2) SCR 278 2011 (9) SCR 146 2011 (8) SCR 520 referred to Para9 A referred to Para9 referred to Para9 2006 (4) Suppl. SCR 604 referred to Para9 1993 (3) Suppl. SCR 422 referred to Para 9 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6673 of2014. From the Judgment and Order dated 03.08.2011 of the High Cout1 of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition No. 13505 of2008. Ms. Shashi Juneja, Ms. Sylona Mohapatra, Udit Arora, C. D. Singh (For Mishra Saurabh, Adv.), Advs. for the Appellant. Satyajit A. Desai, Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Neelmani Pant, Akash Kakade, Advs. for the Respondents. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by A. M. KHANWILKAR, J. 1. This appeal has been placed before a three Judges' Bench in terms of order dated August 25, 2015, consequent to the difference of opinion between the two learned Judges of the Division Bench.

2. Justice Dipak Misra took the view that, in the fact situation of the pres(;Jnt case the Writ Petition filed by the appellant challenging the order passed by the Sub-Registrar (Registration) and the Inspector General (Registration) was rightly dismissed by the High Court. However, His Lordship opined that a question would still arise for consideration, namely, whether in absence of any specific Rule in the State of Madhya Pradesh, the general principle laid down in the case of Thota Ganga Laxmi & Anr. vs. Government of Ami/mi Pradesh & Ors. 1 would be applicable?

3. Justice V.Gopala Gowda on the other hand allowed the appeal on the finding that the Sub-Registrar (Registration) had no authority to register the Extinguishment Deed presented by the respondent-Society dated 9'h August 200 I and his action of registration of that document was void ab initio. For the same reason, the subsequent deeds in respect ' (2010) 15 sec 207 B c D E F G H 36 A B SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 12 S.C.R. of the property in question registered by the Sub-Registrar dated 21st April, 2004 and 11 •h July 2006 were also without authority and void ab initio. His Lordship held that, the High Court should have declared the above position and set aside registration of the subject documents and also the orders passed by the Sub-Registrar (Registration) and Inspector General (Registration). His Lordship allowed the appeal filed by the appellant with compensation amount to be paid by the respondents quantified at Rs. I 0 Lakh. E c

4. Briefly stated, Plot No.7-B at Punjabi Bagh, Raisen Road, Bhopal was allotted to the appellant's mother Smt. Veeravali Anand by Punjabi Housing Cooperative Society Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the "Society"), vide a registered deed dated 22"d March 1962. Smt. Veeravali Anand expired on l 2'h June 1988. After her death, the Society through its Office Bearer executed a Deed of Extinguishment on 91h August 2001, unilaterally, cancelling the said allotment of plot to Smt. Veeravali Anand because of violation of the Bye-laws of the Society in D not raising any construction 0;1' the plot so allotted within time. On the basis of the said Extinguishment Deed, the Society executed and got registered a deed dated 21st April, 2004 in favour of Mrs. Manjit Kaur (Respondent No.5) in respect of the same plot. The appellant objected to the said transaction. However, a compromise deed was executed between the Society and Mrs. Manjit Kaur (Respondent No.5) on the one hand and the appellant on the other hand -whereunderthe appellant received consideration ofRs.6.50 Lakh (Rupees Six Lakh Fifty Thousand) - Rs.4.50 Lakh (Rupees Four Lakh Fifty Thousand) by a demand draft and Rs.2/- Lakh by a post-dated cheque). Notwithstanding the compromise deed, the appellant filed a dispute under Section 64 of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960 (hereinafter ri;ferred to ns the "Act of 1960"), before the Deputy Registrar, Cooperative Societies bearing Dispute No. 81 of2005. The appellant challenged the Society's action ofunilaterally registering the Extinguishment Deed dated 91h August 2001 a11d allotting the subject plot to Mrs Manjit Kaur vide deed dated 21st April, 2004; and prayed for a declaration that he continues to be the owner of the subject plot allotted by the Society to his mother, having inherited the same. In the said dispute, the appellant filed interim applications praying for restraint order and for appointment of a Receiver. It is not necessary to dilate on those facts to consider the issues on hand. Suffice it to note that the said dispute is still pending adjudication. G F H SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] 37

5. During the pendency of the said dispute, the Society permitted A B . transfer of the subject plot in favour of Mrs. Meenakshi and Mr. S.C. Sharma (Respondent Nos. 6 & 7) vide registered Deed dated JI th July 2006. Sin.ce the appellant was perseverating the dispute and resorting to multiple proceedings in relation to the subject plot, the respondents issued a notice on 12th July 2007 asking the appellant to refund the consideration amount accepted by him in furtherance of the compromise deed dated 6th July 2004. The appellant did not pay any heed to that demand and instead continued with the multiple proceedings resorted to by him before the Authority under the Act of 1960, including criminal proceedings. The appellant also moved an application before the Sub-Registrar (Registration) calling upon him to cancel the registration of C Extinguishment Deed dated 9'h August 200 I and the subsequent two deeds dated 21" April 2004 and 11th July 2006 respectively. This application was filed on 4rh February 2008 by the appellant. The Sub Registrar (Registration) by a speaking order rejected the said application on 28th June 2008 mainly on two counts. Firstly, a dispute was pending D between the parties with regard to the same subject matter. Secondly, he had no jurisdiction to cancel the registration of a registered document in question. For, his jurisdiction was limited to registration of the document when presented by the executant before him for that purpose. The appellant then approached the Inspector General (Registration) by way of an application under Section 69 of the Registration Act, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as the "Act of 1908"). The Inspector General (Registration) vide order dated I 91h September 2008 rejected the said application on the ground that powers conferred on him were limited to the general superintendence of the Registration Offices and making Rules. E

6. The appellant thereafter approached the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, Judicature at Jabalpur, by way of Writ Petition No. I 3505/2008 under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to challenge the order passed by the Inspector General (Registration) dated 15•h September 2008 as also the order passed by the Sub-Registrar (Registration) dated 28th June 2008. The appella~1t further prayed for a declaration that the Extinguishment Deed dated 9'11 August 200 I as well as the subsequent two deeds dated 2JSI April, 2004 and 11th July 2006 are void ab initio with a further direction to the Inspector General (Registration) and the Sub-Registrar (Registration) to record the cancellation of those F G H 38 SUPREME COURT REPORTS f20161 12 S.C.R. A documents. This Writ Petition was dismissed by the Division Bench of the High Court primarily on the ground that the appellant had already resorted to a remedy (a dispute) before the appropriate Forum under the Act of 1960, which was pending; and the declaration, as sought, can be considered in those proceedings after recording of the evidence and B production of other material to be relied on by the parties therein. Accordingly, the High Court held that since an alternative remedy before a competent Forum was available and was pending between the parties, it was not feasible to invoke the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. Indeed, the High Court adverted to the reported cases relied on by the parties to buttress their stand. The High Court C took note of the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in the case of Ymu1/a Mal/eshwari vs. Ammthula Sayamnw 2 and the decision of Madras High Court in E.R.Ka/aivan vs. Inspector General of Registration, Clte111wi & Anr. 3 The High Court held that the arguments of the appellant deserve to be negatived in light of the D majority view of the Full Bench of Andhra Pradesh High Court and that the dictum in the case before the Madras High Court was distinguishable. The High Court also referred to the decision of the Karnataka High Court in M.Ranwkrisluw Reddy vs. Sub-Registrar, Bangalore~. In para 15 and 16, the High Court observed thus: \ E F G H "15. In view of aforesaid discussion we are of the view that after registration of the extinguished deed or other documents by the Sub-Registrar, if any application is moved by any of the affected party of such document stating that the same was not registered by practicing the fraud with his right then Sub-Registrar in the lack of any specific provision in this regard could neither entertain nor adjudicate such application under the provisions of Section 17, 18 or 69 or some other provisions of the Act.· Section 69 of the Act only confers the superintending power of registration offices and to make rules to the Inspector General respondent No.2. It does not give any rights to cancel the earlier registered documents or modifying any entries in the index or in other record at the instance of any of party. 2 AIR 2007 Andhra Pradesh 57 [FB] 3 AIR 2010 Madras I8 'AIR 2000 Kar.46. SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] So, Section 17(l)(b) read with 69 of the Act is also not helping to the petitioner in this writ petition. Consequently, it is held that Sub-Registrar as well as Inspector General have not committed any fau/1 in dismissing the application of the petilioner with direction to approach the competent forum for adjudication of his dispute. 16. Apart the above the alleged dispute and allegations of the alleged fraud could not be adjudicated by this Court under the writ jurisdiction. The same could be adjudicated by the Civil Court under the common law after recording the evidence of the parties and on appreciation of the same in a duly constituted suit." ( The High Court then adverted to the decision in the case of Government of U.P. vs. R£~i" Molwmnuul Amir Ahmad Klum 5 • It held that since the Registering Officer registered the document presented to him for registration, his function is exhausted. He would then become functus officio and no power to impound the document under Section 33 of the Act. This decision of the High Court is the subject matter of challenge in the present appeal. 0

7. When this appeal came up for hearing before the Division Bench of the two learned Judges, as aforesaid, His Lordship Justice Dipak Misra found that the High Court did not commit any error in dismissing the Writ Petition filed by the appellant. His Lordship, however, adverted to all the relevant provisions of the Act of 1908 and also analysed the decision of the Full Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court in Mal/esltwari's case (supra) and also of the.Madras High Court in Kalaivan (supra) and of the Karnataka High Court in M.R.Reddy (supra). Finally, His Lordship considered the decision of this Court in Tlwta Gang" Laxmi (supra) and noted two aspects. That, in that case, the Court had opined that a unilateral cancellation deed cannot be registered with reference to Rule 2(k)(i) of the Rules framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh under Section 69 of the Act of 1908. His Lordship was of the view that the dictum of the Cou11 in Tlwt" Ganga L"xmi (supra) must be considered in the context ofa specific Rule framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh, which had come into force after the pronouncement by the Full Bench in the case of Malleshwari (supra). His Lordship then observed that the principle stated in the case ofTlwta 'AIR 1961 SC 787 39 A B c D E F G H 40 A B c D E F SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016] 12 S.C.R. Ganga Laxmi (supra) cannot be made applicable to the case on hand in absence of a specific Rule in that regard in the State of Madhya Pradesh. Further, on a careful reading of the provisions of the Act of 1908, there is no prohibition to register a document of cancellation of a deed of extinguishment; and that the procedure under Section 35 of that Act cannot be construed to confer a quasi judicial power on the Registering Authority. His Lordship also referred to the decision of the Madras High Court in Park View Enterprises vs. State of Tamil Nadu 6 wherein it has been observed that the function of the Sub-Registrar for the purposes ofregistration is purely administrative and not quasi-judicial. He cannot decide whether a document which is executed by a person has had title as is recited in the given instrument. His Lordship found it difficult to agree with the general principle stated in the case of Thota Ganga Laxnii (supra) that the Registering Authority cannot register a unilateral deed of cancellation or extinguishment, in absence of any specific Rule in that behalf. Therefore, His Lordship opined that the general observation in that case required reconsideration by a larger Bench. Having said this, His Lordship also noted that the validity of the action taken by the Society in execution of the extinguishment deed dated 9'h Augu~t 2001, cancelling the deed in favour of the appellant's mother dated 22"d March 1962 was the subject matter of a dispute filed by the appellant wherein all relevant issues could be answered appropriately. For, that Authority is competent to consider the validity ofaction of the Society to unilaterally cancel the allotment of the plot made in favour of the appellant's mother. His Lordship also adverted to the other proceedings between the parties including the order passed by this Court in SLP (Civil) No. 13255/2012 dated July 12, 2013, taking note of the Inspecti~n Reports submitted by the Sub-Registrar dated !31h March 2007 mentioning that two duplex were constructed and two more were near completion standing on the subject plot on the date of inspection. His Lordship also adverted to the factum of compromise deed entered by the appellant with the respondents and having received consideration in that behalf from the subsequent purchaser and yet the appellant was pursuing remedy before the Sub- G Registrar for cancellation of the Extinguishment Deed.

8. His Lordship Justice V.Gopala Gowda, however, formulated a question in para 12 of the judgment as to whether the appellant was entitled to seek relief of cancellation of the registered documents dated 9•h August 2001, 21"April2004 and l J 'h July 2006, registered in respect H 'AIR 1990 Madras 25 l SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] B of the immovable property in question. His Lordship, inter-alia, following A the exposition in Tlwta Ganga Laxmi (supra) found that the Registrar could not have permitted registration ofExtinguishment Deed dated 9'h August 200 l, unilaterally cancelling the allotment of the subject plot made to the appellant's mother. His Lordship held that the Extinguishment Deed was a nullity, in law. His Lordship then considered the dictum in Kalaivan ~case of the Madras High Court and opined that it aptly applied to the facts of the present case and held that as the Extinguishment Deed was unilaterally registered it ought to be rescinded. His Lordship . proceeded to examine the issue in the light orSection 62 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872. It provides that ifthe parties to a contract agree to substitute a new contract for it, or to rescind or alter, the original contract C need not be performed. Thus, for any novation, rescission and alteration of the contract, it can be made only bilaterally and with amicable consent of both the parties. His Lordship then adverted to the scope of Clause_ 43(1) of the Bye-laws of the Society as amended in the year 1991 and opined that the said Clause can have no retrospective effect for D cancellation of the allotment of the plot in the name ofappellant's mother vi de Extinguishment Deed dated 9'h August 200 I . The latter is only a subterfuge. Reference is then made to Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 to hold that unilateral cancellation of the deed would be in violation of the said provision read with Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963, which requires cancellation of any instrument witl1in 3 years. In the present case, the deed in favour of the appellant's mother was executed on 22nd March 1962 and registered on 30'h March 1962 concerning the subject plot; and for whiclh reason extinguishment of the said deed after lapse of 39 years was impermissible in law. On this finding, it has been held that the Sub-Registrar had no authority under the Act of 1908 nor by virtue of Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 read with Article 59 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to unilaterally cancel the said deed; and consequently, registration of the Extinguishment Deed by the Sub-Registrar amounts to playing fraud on the power vested in the Authority under law. Exercise of power of registering a document by the Sub-Registrar, in the present case, was ultra vires the relevant G provisions and the Constitution oflndia. Reference is then made to the decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in Pratap Sing/I vs. State of Punjab' to hold that the respondent-Society had no authority to re-allot the subject plot to respondent No.5 by cancelling the registered E F 7 AIR 1964 SC 72 H 42 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2016) 12 S.C.R. deed which has become absolute and been acted upon by the parties. As a consequence of this conclusion, His Lordship held that the deed executed in favour of respondent No.5 or for that matter respondent Nos.6 and 7 was also void ab initio; and also because respondent No.5 could not be allotted the subject plot as her husband was already allotted another plot by the same Society. His Lordship then went on to observe that the appellant has got a valid Constitutional right over the said plot of land as guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution oflndia and could not be deprived of that property without authority of law. His Lordship was of the view that merely because the Extinguishment Deed _ could be challenged by approaching the Civil Court cannot denude the appellant of the relief, as sought in the Writ Petition, qua the Extinguishment Deed dated 9•h August 2001 which was void ab initio; and for the same reason order could be passed against respondent No.5 to 7 - as the deeds in their favour rested on the Extinguishment Deed. For that, His Lordship adverted to the dictum in the case of Aru11achalam vs. P.S.R.&ullmmmtlmm & Anr.8 and Ga11ga Kumar Shrivastav vs. State of Bi/1ar9 • Further, having noticed that the septuagenarian appellant had been litigating for last 14 years because of the untenable action of the Society and also of the Sub-Registrar, affecting his valuable Constitutional right under Article 300A of the Constitution oflndia, His Lordship was of the opinion that the relief claimed by him in the Writ Petition deserved to be granted. As regards the observation made by this Court dismissing the Special Leave Petition No.13255/2012 vi de order dated l 7'h July 2013, His Lordship held that the same will be of no avail much less to denude the appellant of the reliefs due to him. His Lordship then held that the compromise executed by the appellant on 6th July 2004 also cannot denude the appellant of the relief - because it is an admitted position that the respondent No.5 through Advocate had sent a legal notice dated 12th July 2007 to rescind the said agreement and called upon the appellant to refund the amount of Rs.6.50 Lakh received by him with interest. His Lordship also adverted to the decisions of this Court in CA G vs._K.S.Jaga1111atlu111 10 ; A11di M uklfi Sa(/guru Shree Muktajee Va11das Swami Suvama Jayallli Malwtsav Smarak Trust vs. V.R. Rudfmi" and Hari Vishnu Kamath vs. Almuul lslwque 12 to '(1979) 2 sec 297 ' c2oos) 6 sec 211 '° (1986) 2 sec 679 " (1989) 2 sec 691 "AIR 1955 SC 233 SATYA PAL ANAND v. STATE OF M.P. & ORS. [A. M. KHANWILKAR, J.] 43 hold that the High Court failed to exercise its discretionary power which A has resulted in grave miscarriage of justice and entailing in denial of the valuable right guaranteed under Article 300A of the Constitution oflndia to the appellant. Accordingly, His Lordship held that the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court as well as the impugned instruments i.e. Extinguishment Deed dated 9'h August 200 I and the subsequent deeds dated 21"April,2004 ai1d 11 <h July 2006 respectively, are quashed and set aside. Further direction is given to respondent Nos. 6 and 7 to vacate the s.ubject property and hand over possession thereof to the appellant forthwith. His Lordship was of the, view that the appellant was entitled to further relief of compensation amount of Rs. I 0,00,000/ (Rupees Ten Lakhs) to be paid to the appellant for his suffering and the injustice caused to him by the respondents for the last 14 years. B c

9. The appellant appeared in person. He adopted the view taken by His Lordship Justice V. Gopala Gowda as his argument. He placed reliance on the decisions noted hereinabove and adverted to in the two separate judgments given by Their Lordships. In substance, his argument D was that the respondent-Society could not have unilaterally executed the Ext!nguishment Deed dated 9m August 200 I in relation to the subject plot. That action of the respondent-Society was in violation of the governing laws and void ab initio. Further, the Sub-Registrar had no authority to register such a document and in any case unilaterally. Hence, the act of registration of Extinguishment Deed was also void ab initio. E As a consequence, the Society had no authority, in law, to execute the subsequent deed in favour of respondent No.5 or to put her in possession of the subject plot and the respondent No.5 in turn could not have executed the deed in favour of respondent Nos. 6 and 7. In other words, the deeds executed between the respondent No. 4 - Society and respondent F No. 5 and also respondent Nos. 6 and 7 were void ab initio. That declaration must follow and the High Court was duty bound to allow the Writ Petition filed by him, as the action of the respondent No.4-Society was replete with fraud on the Statute and also on the Constitutional right guaranteed to the appellant. In all fairness to the appellant, it must be mentioned that he has additionally relied on Su() Motu Proceedings G , R.S.M"ddmwppa (D) by LRs. vs. against R.Karuppan, Advocate 13 Chandramma & Anr.14 , Rattan Cluuul Hira Cluuul vs. Askar Nmvaj Jung (D) by Lrs. & Ors.1-', Central lnla11d W"ter Transport "(2001 J s sec 289 "AIR 1965 SC 1812 "(1991) 3 sec 67 H SUPREME COURT REPORTS f20161 12 S.C.R. Corporation Ltd. & Anr. vs. Brojo Natft Gtmguly & Anr. 16 , Indian Cou11ci/ for E11viro-Legal Actio11 vs. Union of India & Ors. 17 , Tris/ta/a Jain & Anr. vs. State of Uttartmclwl & Anr. 18 , Hamza Haji vs. State of Kera/a & A11r.' 9 and S.P.Clten1:alvaraya Naidu (D) By LRs. vs. Jagamwtli (D) by Lrs. & Ors. 10 , during the arguments. Besides the oral arguments, the appellant has filed written submissions on 11 'h July 2016 and additional written submissions on 12'h August 2016 which make reference to several reported cases. The decisions referred to in the written submissions are essentially multiplying the cases on the contention already answered in favour of the appellant by His Lordship Justice V.Gopala Gowda. 44 A B c D E

10. The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Writ Petition has been justly rejected by the High Court on the ground that the appellant was pursuing remedy for the same reliefs in substantive proceedings by way of a dispute filed under Section 64 of the Act of 1960 before the competent Forum. Besides the said proceedings, it was open to the appellant to take recourse t9 other appropriate remedy before the Civil Court, to the extent necessary. The High Court in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution oflndia not only exercises an equitable jurisdiction but also an extraordinary jurisdiction. The High Court in any case is not expected to enter upon the plea of declaring agreements and documents executed between private parties as illegal or for that matter void ab initio, which remedy is available before the cooperative Forum or the Civil Court. It was contended that if this contention is accepted, it may not be necessary to answer the other issue noted in the judgment of Justice Dipak Misra as the same can be considered in an appropriate proceedings, if and when the occasion arises. Alternatively, it was contended that the dictum of this Court in Tliot<t Ganga Laxmi's case (supra) must be understood as applicable to the express procedure prescribed for registration of an Extinguishment Deed or cancellation deed in the State of Andhra Pradesh in terms of statutory Rules. Inasmuch as, in absence of any express provision about the procedure for registration of such document, that requirement cannot be G considered as mandatory. For, it is not possible to hold that no Extinguishment or cancellation deed can ever be executed by the party F