SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHA MATH & Ors.

2.7 Once a property is vested by an Act of legislature, to achieve the laudable object, the same cannot be divested by the enactment of any subsequent general law and vest such property under such law. Similarly, if in the instant case, the submissions on behalf C of the respondent Math were accepted, then Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955would be rendered useless and nugatory and thereby the laudable object and intendment of the Temple Act would be defeated and the interest of the public at large would be affected. Thus, the notification dated 18.03.1974 issued by the State Government under Section 3-A of the OEA Act, 1951, whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri vested in the State Government is quashed to that extent. As a consequence, the order dated 30.09.1981 E passed by the OEA Tahsildar, who falls within the inclusive definition of Collector in terms of Section 2 (d) of the OEAAct, 1951, settling the land in favour of the Mahantas of various Maths as Marfatdars of the Shri Jagannath Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri is in violation of the F provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 and is set aside. [Para D 25] [1352-G-H; 1353-A·C]

3.1 The Form 'H' submitted in terms of the OEAAct, 1951 in Claim Case No. 58 of 1975 reveals that while G Column 9-whether with respect to the lands in possession of the applicant or his temporary lessee or mortagagee on the date of vesting]" is marked as 'Self Possession', and Column 11-lf in the possession of a temporary lessee or mortgagee give full details of the H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHAMATH & ORS. 53 lessee or mortgage, has been left blank. Therefore, the A claim of the respondent Math and the basis of its claim is not stated in the claim petition. In the absence of the same, its claim as intermediary to prefer claim under Sections 5, 6, 7, 8 of the OEA Act, 1951 before the Tahsildar is wholly untenable in law. Further, the order, B passed in OEA Claim Case filed by the respondent Math to settle the lands in their favour has been passed by the Tahsildar, Puri. S~ction 8-Aof the Act clearly provides that the claims have to be filed before the Collector. The submission that the definition of Collector in the OEA C Act, 1951 is an inclusive one, and therefore he had the authority to determine the rights of the respondent, · cannot be accepted. The proceedings under Section 8- A are quasi judicial in nature. [Para 29] [1355-C-H] D

3.2 A quasi judicial function cannot be delegated and therefore, the inclusive reading of the definition of Collector under Section 2(d) of the OEAAct, 1951 to also include Tahsildar can be applied only as far as it pertains to the discharge of administrative powers of the E Collector. Since the Tahsildar performs only an administrative function under the OEAAct, 1951 and not a quasi judicial function, thus, .he was not competent to pass the order of settlement of claim either under Section F 6 or 7 or 8 of the OEA Act, 1951. The vesting of the suit lands in favour of the Math is bad in law. Further, once the land already vested in the Temple Committee under Sections 5 and 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 which is a special enactment to deal with the properties endowed G to the appellant Temple Committee, the same could not haye been divested by applying the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951 by way of an amendment to the Act by insertion of Sections 2(oo) and 3A in the OEAAct, 1951, · as the operation of the said Act and the Temple Act, 1955 H 54 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15 S.C.R. A are in different fields and the objects and intendment of . the abovementioned two Acts are entirely different. [Paras 30, 31) [1356-C-D; 1357-B·D]

3.2 The point no. 1 being held in favour of the B Temple, there was no need for the Temple Committee to file claim proceedings under Section 8-A of the OEAAct, 1951, in respect of its own lands which were already vested in it under Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. The suit lands vest in the Temple Committee itself. Thus, in C view of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955, the settlement of the suit lands in favour of the respondent Math cannot be sustained, as it is bad in law. [Para 31) [1360-C-D) o

3.3 Since the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951 have no application to the lands of the Lord Jagannath Temple at Puri, there is no need to pass an order in favour of the Temple under the OEAAct, 1951 as the suit lands were already vested in favour of the Lord Jagannath Temple E at Puri by virtue of the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955. [Para 33) [1360-G-H] Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa AIR 1964 SC 150; Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Surjanarayan Das AIR 1967 SC 256 : 1966 SCR 436; State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Kureshi Kassab Jamat (2005) 8 SCC 534 : 2005 (4 ) Suppl. SCR 582; R. Unnikrishnan v. V.K. Mahanudevan (2014) 4 SCC 434 : 2014 (1 ) SCR 350; Muncipa/ Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur(1989) 1SCC101 : 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929; State of U.P v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd. (1991) 4 SCC 139; Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd. (2001) 6 SCC 356: 2001 (3) SCR 479; Sheodan Singh v. Daryao F G H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITIEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. Kunwar AIR 1966 SC 1332 : 1966 SCR 300; Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai & Ors. v. Mohd. Hanifa & Ors. AIR 1976 SC 1569: 1976 (3) SCR 721; National Textile Corporation Ltd. v. Naresh Kumar Badrikumar Jagad (2011) 12 SCC 695 : 2012 (14) SCR 472; U.P State Electricity Board & Anr. v. Hari Shankar Jain & Ors. (1978) 4 SCC 16 : 1979 ( 2 ) SCR 355; Commercial Tax Officer, Rajasthan v. Binani Cements Ltd. & Anr. (2014) 8 SCC 319 : 2014 (3) SCR 1; KC Gajapati Narayan Dea & Ors. v. State of Orissa AIR 1953 SC 375: 1954 SCR 1; UC v. D. J. Bahadur AIR 1980 SC 2181 : 1981 (1) SCR 1083; Commercial Tax Officer v. Binani Cements Ud. (2014) 8 SCC 319 : 2G14 (3) SCR 1; J.K. Cotton Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of U.P. (1961) 3 SCR 185; Bharat Bihari Mishra v. State of Orissa 2012 (II) OLR 968; Basanti Kumar Sahu v. State of Orissa (1998) 8 SCC 722; Calcutta Gas Company Ltd. v. State of West Bengal AIR 1962 SC 1044: 1962 Suppl. SCR 1 - referred to. Case Law Reference 55 A B c D E 1988 (3) Suppl. SCR 732 ' referred to Para 1 AIR 1964 SC 150 referred to Para 6 F 1966 SCR 436 referred to Para 9 2005 (4) Suppl. SCR 582 referred to Para 11 2014 (1) SCR 350 referred to Para 11 1988 (2) Suppl. SCR 929. (1991) 4 sec 139 2001 (3) SCR 479 1966 SCR 300 referred to Para 13 G referred to Para 13 referred to Para 13 referred to Para 15 H 56 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15S.C.R. A 1976 (3)"SCR 721 referred to Para 15 2012 (14) SCR 472 referred to Para 15 1979 (2) SCR 355 2014 (3) SCR 1 B 1954 SCR 1 1981 (1) SCR 1083 2014 (3) SCR 1 (1961) 3 SCR 185 2012 (II) OLR 968 (1998) 8 sec 122 1962 Suppl. SCR 1 c referred to Para 17 referred to Para 17 referred to Para 21 referred to Para 22 referred to Para 23 referred to Para 23 referred to Para 29 referred to Para 30 referred to Para 31 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7729 of 2009 D From the Judgment and Order dated 07.07.2009 of the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in OJC No. 2421 of 2000 WITH E Civil Appeal Nos. 7730 of 2009, 142, 221, 2981, 3414, 3415, 3446 and 9627 of 2010 and 14631-14632 of 2015. H.P. Raval, J. K. Das, M. L. Varma, M.·L. Verma, Sr. Advs., S. K. Das, Swetaketu Mishra, Anando Mukherjee, Ms. Divya Anand, Nipun Saxena, Anirush Sharma, V. K. Monga, F Sandeep Das, Shibashish Misra, Ashish Kumar Sinha, Radha Shyam Jena, Vinoo Bhagat, Rutwik Panda, Anshu Maiik, Rajdipa Behura, V. S. Lakshmi, A. Venayagam Balan, Atul Kumar, A. Mukherjee, Ms. Gargi Tuli, Pulak Bagchi, S. K. Verma, Rakesh Kumar Gupta, Satya Mitra, Kunal Verma, G Prasanna Mohan, Ms. Keki Vajpei, Ms. Rajdipa Behura, V. S. Lakshmi, Ashok Panigrahi, Sibo Sankar Mishra, Raj iv S. Roy, Pranab Kumar Mullick, A. Jyoti Chatterjee, Sukumar, Soma Mullick, Jayasree Saha Chatterjee, Abhijit S. Roy, Sebat Kumar Deuria, C. K. Sasi, Advs. for the appearing parties. H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. The Judgment of the Court was delivered by V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. 1. Leave granted in the Special Leave Petitions. 57 A

#2. The present appeals arise out of the impugned judgment and order dated 07.07.2009 passed in Original B Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000 and other Writ Petitions which were disposed of in terms of the judgment dated 07 .07 .2009 by the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack, whereby the High Court allowed the Writ Petitions filed by the respondents he~ein and held that as the disputed land was C earlier settled in the name of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije Puri, Marfat Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das and thus; the subsequent settlement made in favour of the Temple Managing Committee in OEA Claim Case No. 68/90 was without jurisdiction. D

#3. As the facts in all the appeals are common, for the sake of corivenience, we refer to the facts of Civil Appeal No. 7729 of 2009, which are stated inbrief hereunder: , E The present case revolves around the ancient temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri. The lands in question have been accorded the status of 'amrutamanohi' properties. On 18.03.1974, the State Government of Orissa issued a notification under Section 3-A of the Orissa Estate Abolition F Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as the "OEA Act, 1951 "), whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri vested in the State Government. The vesting notification was challenged by the Temple before the High Court of Orissa in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 233 of 1977. The High Court G rejected the claim of the Temple. The same was upheld by this Court vide its judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath through Jagannath Singri Narasingh Das Mahapatra Sridhar Panda and Ors v. State of Orissa 1 • We will advert to '1989 (1) Suppl.sec 553 H 58 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15 S.C.R. A B this judgment in detail at a later part of this judgment. The State Government of Orissa subsequently issued a notification dated 18.04.1989 and extended the time for filing claims under Section 8-Aofthe OEAAct, within which the Temple filed Claim Case No. 68 of 1990 for recording the lands in question in favour of Shree Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Puri, Marfat Shree Jagannath Temple Managing Committee. Vide order dated 30.11.1992, the OEA Collector and Tahsildar, Puri observed that the suit lands in question have been recorded in the name of Shri Jagannath Mahaprabhu Bije, Srikhetra, C and accordingly settled the suit lands in favour of the Temple. In the year 2000, the respondent-Math filed a Writ Petition before the High Court of Orissa at Cuttack in Original Jurisdiction Case No. 2421 of 2000, challenging the order of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 on the ground that the lands in question have been accorded the status of 'amrutamanohi' and that they were recorded as Trust Estate as defined under Section 2( oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 and that lands had wrongly been settled in favour of the Temple. The High Court by the impugned judgment dated 07.07.2009 set aside the order of the Tahsildar dated 30.11.1992 and held as under: 0 E " ...... it is seen in the instant case, the property has been dedicated as Amrutmonahi to Lord Sri Jagannath of Puri and the marfatdar of the property is Mahanta Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das. Thus, the property is attached with a charge of rendering service to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs thereof as food offering . to Lord Jagannath by using the usufructs threof as food offering to Lord Jagannath. It is further found that on the above analysis, the property cannot be held to be under the control of the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple but is a trust property attached with a charge and the trustee has to fulfil the wish of the dedicator of the said property by offering the usufructs to Lord Jagannath as F G H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 59 food offering. However, since the trustee/marfatdar is A the Mahanta of Siddha Math, it cannot be said that the math has absolutely no interest over the said property just because it is recorded as Amrutmonohi. Applying the ratio of the decision in the case of Mahanta Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das (supra) of the Supreme Court, it B is seen that the Siddha Math is an institution, which comes within the definition of 'Math' as given in section 3 (vii) of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951. The property involved in this Writ Petition comes within the definition of"Trust Estate" as defined in section C 2(oo) of the O.E.A Act and vested in the State Government pursuant to the notification made under Section 3-Aofthe O.E.AAct issued on 18.03.1974. It is also an admitted position that upon such vesting, the D · intermediary had a right to make an application under sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.AAct. As a matter of fact, as stated earlier, such application was made by the marfatdar of the property, i.e Mahanta of Siddha Math and the land was settled in the name of Shri Jagannath E Mohaprabhu Bije, Puri marfat Mahanta Siddha Brundaban Ramanuj Das. Hence there was no scope for the administrator of Shri Jagannath Temple to make a subsequent application under sections 6 and 7 of the O.E.AActforre-settlementofthe land and the impugned F order dated 30.11.1992 having been passed without jurisdiction cannot be sustained and the said order is accordingly quashed." Hence, the present appeals have been filed by the appellant G Temple and State Government and others.

#4. We have heard the learned senior counsel for both, the parties. We have also heard Mr. Vinoo Bhagat, the learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Math in the C.As. @ H 60 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15 S.C.R. A Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 9167-9168 of 2010 and Ms. V.S. Lakshmi, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the Math in .C.A. No. 9627 of 2010. On the basis of the factual evidence on record produced before us, the circumstan.ces of the case and also in the light of the rival legal contentions urged B by the learned senior counsel for both the parties, we have broadly framed the following points which require our attention and consideration:- c D 1) Whether the suit lands can vest in the respondent Math in the light of the provisions of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955? 2) Whether even otherwise, the Math had the right to prefer claim rights in respect of the Temple Lands and initiate the proceedings under the OEAAct, 1951 by virtue of being an intermediary? 3) What order? Answer to Point No.1 E

#5. At the outset, before we advert to the rival legal contentions of the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of both the parties, it is important for us to examine the provisions of the relevant Acts, as well as the previous judgments of this Court on the issue. There are two important F acts which operate in the instant case. The first is the Shri Jagannath Temple Act, 1955 (hereinafter referred to as the "Temple Act, 1955"). The long title of the Act reads as follows: "An Act to provide for better administration and governance of Shri Jagannath Temple at Puri and its endowments." The Preamble of the Temple Act, 1955 states as under: "Whereas the ancient Temple of Lord Jagannath of Puri has ever since its inception been an institution of ·G H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.) 61 unique national importance in which millions of Hindu A devotees from regions far and wide have reposed their faith and belief and have regarded it as the epitome of their tradition and culture. And whereas by Regulation IV of 1809 passed by the B Governor-General in Council on 28th April, 1809 and thereafter by other laws and regulations and in pursuance of arrangement entered into with the Raja of Khurda, later designated the Raja of Puri, the said Raja came to be entrusted hereditary with the management c of the affairs of the Temple and its properties as Superintendent subject to the control and supervision of the ruling power; And whereas in view of grave and serious irregularities thereafter Government had to intervene on various D occasions in the past; And whereas the administration under the Superintendent has further deteriorated and a situation has arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize the scheme of management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties and provide better E administration and governance therefore in supersession of all previous laws. regulations and arrangements, having regard to the ancient customs and usages and the unique and traditional nitis and rituals F contained in the Record-of-Rights prepared under the . - Puri Shri Jagannath Temple (Administration)Act, 1952 (OrissaActXIVof 1952) ............ " (emphasis laid by this Court) Section 2 of the Temple Act, 1955 bars the operation of the G Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 on the Temple, and reads as follows: "2 (1): The provisions of the Orissa Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1951 (Orissa Act 2 of 1952) shall H 62 A B c D E F SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15 S.C.R. cease to apply to the said Temple except with respect to actions taken, things done and contributions levied and the same shall be deemed to have been validly taken, done and levied as if this Act had not been passed: (2) All laws, regulations and other enactments passed for the purpose of providing for the management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties and all deeds executed in favour of and all arrangements entered into for the said purpose with the Raja of Khurda or the Raja of Puri, as the case may be, prior to the commencement of this Act, in so far as such enactments, deeds or arrangements are inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, shall cease to have any effect." Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955 provides for the setting up of a Temple Managing Committee as under: "5. Notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force or custom, usage or contract, Sanad, deed or engagement, the administration and the governance c:if the Temple and its endowments shall vest in a Committee called the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee constituted as such by the State Government, and it shall have the rights and privileges in respect thereof as provided in Section 33." Section 30 of the Temple Act, 1955 grants power of general superintendence of the Temple and its endowments to the State Government which may pass orders for the maintenance and G administration of the temple, which reads as under: "30. (1) Subject to the provisions of this Act the general superintendence of the Temple and its endowments shall vest in the State Government which may pass any orders that may be deemed necessary for the proper H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 63 maintenance or administration of the Temple or its A endowments or in the interest of the general public worshipping in the Temple." Section 33 of the Temple Act, 1955 empowers the Committee to be in possession of all the moveable and immoveable B properties belonging to the Temple. It reads as under: "33. (1) The Committee shall be entitled to take and be in possession of all movable and immovable properties including the Ratna Bhandar and funds and jewelries, C records, documents and other assets belonging to Temple." . 6. A Constitution Bench of this Court had the occasion to examine the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 in detail, while adjudicating upon its constitutional validity in the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb v. State of Orissa 2• Wanchoo, J., speaking for the bench observed as under: 0 "This review of the provisions of the Act shows that broadly speaking the Act provides for the management E of the secular affairs of the Temple and does not interfere, with the religious affairs thereof, which have to be performed according to the record of rights prepared under the Act of 1952 and where there i s no such record of rights in accordance with custom and F usage obtaining in the Temple. It is in this background that we have to consider the attack on the constitutionality of the Act." After adverting to the history of the administration of the Temple, G it was also held: "Finally the preamble says that the administration under the superintendent has further deteriorated and a 2 AIR 1964 SC 1501 H 64 A B c SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15 S.C.R. situation has arisen rendering it expedient to reorganize the scheme of management of the affairs of the Temple and its properties and provide better administration and governance therefore in supersession of all previous laws. regulations and arrangements. having regard to the ancient customs and usages and the unique and traditional nitis and rituals contained in the record of rights prepared under the 1952 Act. So for all these reasons the appellant was removed from the sole superintendence of the Temple and a committee was appointed bys. 6 of the Act for its management." (emphasis laid by this Court) A perusal of the provisions of the Act and the decision of this Court in the case of Raja Bira Kishore Deb referred to supra D clearly shows that as far as Shri Jagannath Temple of Puri is concerned, the position of law is that all the endowments and properties belonging to the Temple vest in the Shri Jagannath Temple Managing Committee. E

#7. We now turn our attention to the OEAAct, 1951. The Act received the assent of the President on 23.01.1952. The long title of the Act reads as follows: "An act to provide for the abolition of all the rights, title and interest in land of intermediaries by whatever name known, including the mortgagees and lessees of such interest, between the raiyat and the state of Orissa, for vesting in the said state of the said right, title and interest and to make provision for other matter connected therewith ...... " All estates of the intermediaries were thus, abolished and by way of a notification, stood vested in the State Government. Section 2(oo) of the OEAAct, 1951 (which was ins.erted by way of an Amendment in 197 4) defines a Trust Estate as under: F G H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHAMATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 65 '"trust estate' means an estate the whole of the net A income whereof under any trust or other legal obligation has been dedicated exclusively to charitable or religious purposes of a public nature without any reservation of pecuniary benefit to any individual : B Provided that all estates belonging to the Temple of Lord Jagannath at Puri within the meaning of the Shri Jagannath Temple Act. 1955 and all estates declared to be trust estates by a competent authority under this Act prior to the date of coming into force of the Orissa c Estates Abolition (Amendment) Act, 1970 shall be deemed to be trust estates." (emphasis laid by this Court) Section 3 of the OEA Act, 1951 provides for vesting of an D estate in the State by way of a notification as under: "3. Notification vesting an estate in the State- (1) The State Government, may from time to time by notification, declare that the estate specified in the E notification has passed to and become vested in the State free from all encumbrances." "(3) Such publication shall be conclusive evidence of the notice of the declaration to everybody whose interest is affected by it." F

#8. Section 2(oo)was inserted byway of an amendment on 26.02.1974. On 18.03.1974, a notification was issued by the State Government under Section 3-A whereby the estate of Lord Jagannath vested with the State Government. The G validity of the notification was challenged, which came for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra. This Court upheld the validity of the notification declaring the estate of Lord Jagannath as 'trust estate' after giving the reasons as follows: H 66 A B C D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15 S.C.R. "It is true that an order was passed under s.13-G declaring the petitioner's estate as a trust estate" and further by the insertion of clause (oo) in s 2 the petitioner's estate continued to be a 'trust estate'', but the question is as to what is the legal effect flowing from such a declaration This aspect is dealt within s.13-1, which is quoted as under (omitting sub-section (2) which is not relevant in the present context): "13-1. Effect of orders passed under section 13-G: (I) All estates declared under this Chapter to be trust estates by the Tribunal or the High Court, as the case may be; shall he deemed to have been excluded from the operation of the vesting notification and never to have vested in the State in pursuance thereof." It is manifest from the language of the Section that it saves a "trust estate" so declared under s.13-G from the operation of a notification issued under s. 3 or 3-A, but does not extend the benefit any further The provisions do not confer protection from the Act itself and cannot be interpreted to clothe it with a permanent immunity from being vested by a later notification issued under the Act Such an estate could be vested in the State of Orissa by a subsequent notification was made clear by clause (b) of s 13-K which reads as follows: '(a) ... (b)nothing in this Chapter shall be deemed to debar the State Government from vesting any trust estate by the issue of a notification under Section 3.' Sections 7 -A, 8-A, 8-D and X-E of the Act include special provisions for a trust estate and unmistakably indicate that trust estates" are within the purview of the Act. The SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 67 benefit they receive from a declaration under s.13-G is A limited and referable only to a vesting notification issued earlier. There is thus, no merit in the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant that the petitioner's estate could not be vested in the State by a notification issued subsequently." B It is important to note at this stage that while upholding the validity of the notification, this C9urt did not advert to the provisions of the Temple Act, 1955 at all.

#9. Another judgment of this Court which is important to be examined is the Constitution Bench decision in the case of Mahant Shri Srinivas Ramanuj Das v. Surjanarayan Das3 , which examined the nature of 'amrutamanohi'properties. c

#10. Mr. M. L. Varma, the learned senior counsel D appearing on behalf of the respondent Math contends that the · controversy in the instant case is squarely covered by two judgments of this Court, the Division Bench judgment in the case of Lord Jagannath and the Constitution Bench judgment E in the case of Surjanarayan Das referred to supra. The learned senior counsel places strong reliance on the following paragraphs of the decision in the case of Surjanarayan Das (supra): "40. We may now consider the properties in schedule F Kha said to be the Amruta Monohi properties of Lord Jagannath and held by the plaintiff as marfatdar. The plaintiff alleges that these properties were acquired either by purchase or 'krayadan' or by way of gift subject G to a charge of some offering to Lord Jagannath which depended upon the individual judgment and discretion of the plaintiff, and that the public had no concern with the enjoyment or management of the usufruct thereof. 3 AIR 1967 SC 256 H 68 A B c D E F G H SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015) 15 S.C.R. The Gazetteer makes a reference to such properties and states:- 'Both Saiva and Vaishnava Maths exist in Puri. The lands of the latter are known asAmruta Manohi (literally nectar food), because they were given with the intention that the proceeds thereof should be spent in offering bhoga before Jagannath and that the Mahaprasad thus.obtained should be distributed among pilgrims, beggars and ascetics; they are distinct from the Amrut Manohi lands of the Temple itself which are under the superintendence of the Raja.' This statement makes it clear that lands endowed to the temple of Lord Jagannath are distinct from the lands or property endowed to the Vaishnava Maths for the purpose of utilising the proceeds of those properties for offering bhoga before Lord Jagannath and the subsequent distribution of that Mahaprasad among pilgrims, beggars and ascetics, presumably visiting the Math, or approaching its authorities for a po.rtion of the Maha Prasad. The mere fact that the proceeds of the properties were to be so used, would not justify the conclusion that these properties were not endowed to the Maths but were endowed to the temple of Lord Jagannath. Properties endowed to the temple of Lord Jagannath were. according to this statement. in the Gazetteer. not under the superintendence of any Math or Mahant but under the superintendence of the Raja of Puri himself.

#41. As already stated, these Amrut Manohi properties are properties which are endowed to the Math by the devotees for a particular service, which is done to Lord Jagannath by the Mahant on behalf of the Math. The properties are therefore properties endowed to the Math SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITIEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. ] 69 and not merely gifted to the plaintiff or, as had been A suggested, to Lord Jagannath." ( emph~sis laid by this Court) B

#11. The learned senior counsel contends that since an earlier decision of this Court already covers the controversy in the instant case, the same is binding on the parties as well as this Court and this Court should respect the principle of stare decisis. He further contends that the judgments delivered in the case of Surjanarayan Das and Lord Jagannath have C held field since 1967 and 1989, respectively. The learned senior counsel places reliance on a seven judges Bench decision of this Court in State of Gujarat v. Mirzapur Moti Ku res hi Kassab Jamat, 4 wherein, while examining the scope of the doctrine of stare decisis, it was held as under: . o "111. Stare decisis is a Latin phrase which means "to stand by decided cases; to uphold precedents; to maintain former adjudication". This principle is expressed in the maxim "stare decisis et .non quieta E movers" which means to stand by decisions and not to disturb what is settled. This was aptly put by Lord Coke in his classic English version as "Those things which have been so often adjudged ought to rest in peace". However, according to Justice Frankfurter, the doctrine F of stare decisis is not "an imprisonment of reason" (Advanced Law Lexicon, P. Ramanatha Aiyer, 3rd Edition 2005, Volume 4, p. 4456). The underlying logic of the doctrine is to maintain consistency and avoid uncertainty. The guiding philosophy is that a view which G has held the field for a long time should not be disturbed only because another view is possible. • (zoos) a sec 534 H 70 A B c D E F G SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 15 S.C.R.

#119. Sir John Salmond, while dealing with precedents and illustrating instances of departure by the House of Lords from its own previous decisions, states it to be desirable as 'it would permit the House (of Lords) to abrogate previous decisions which were arrived at in different social conditions and which are no longer adequate in present circumstances. This view has been succinctly advocated by Dr. Goodhart who said: "There is an obvious antithesis between rigidity and growth, and if all the emphasis is placed on absolutely binding cases then the law looses the capacity to adapt itself to the changing spirit of the times which has been described as the life of the law". This very principle has been well stated by William O' Douglas in the context of constitutional jurisprudence. He says: "So far as constitutional law is concerned, stare decisis must give way before the dynamic component of history. Once it does, the cycle starts again"." The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of R. Unnikrishnan v. V.K. Mahanudevan 5 , wherein it was held as under: "19. It is trite that law favors finality to binding judicial decisions pronounced by Courts that are competent to deal with the subject matter. Public interest is against individuals being vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of judgments pronounced by the Courts of competent jurisdiction has always been treated as an essential part of the rule of law which is the basis of the administration of justice in this country. We may gainfully refer to the decision of Constitution Bench of this Court in the Daryao v. State of U.P. where the Court succinctly summed up the law in the following words: H • (2014) 4 sec 434 SRIJAGANNATHTEMPLEMANAGINGCOMMITIEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 71 'It is in the interest of the public at large that a finality A should attach to the binding decisions pronounced by Courts of competent jurisdiction, and it is also in the public interest that individuals should not be vexed twice over with the same kind of litigation. The binding character of judgments pronounced by courts of B competent jurisdiction is itself an essential part of the rule of law, and the rule of law obviously is the basis of the administration of justice on which the Constitution lays so much emphasis.' c

#20. That even erroneous decisions can operate as res judicata is also f.airly well settled by a long line of · decisions rendered by this Court. In Mohanlal Goenka v. Benoy Kishna Mukherjee this Court observed: D 'There is ample authority for the proposition that even an erroneous decision on a question of law operates as 'res judicata' between the parties to it. The correctness or otherwise of a judicial decision has no bearing upon the question whether or not it operates E as 'res judicata.'

#21. Similarly, in State of West Bengal v. Hemant Kumar Bhattacharjee this Court reiterated the above principles in the following words: F 'A wrong decision by a court having jurisdiction is as much binding between the parties as a right one and may be superseded only by appeals to higher tribunals or other procedure like review which the law provides.' G

#22. The recent decision of this Court in Kalinga Mining Corporation v. Union of India is a timely reminder of the very same principle. The following passage in this regard is apposite: H 72 A B SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2015] 15 S.C.R. 'In our opinion, if the parties are allowed to reagitate issues which have been decided by a court of competent jurisdiction on a subsequent change in the law then all earlier litigation relevant thereto would always remain in a state of flux. In such circumstances, every time either a statute or a provision thereof is declared ultra vires, it would have the result of reopening of the decided matters within the period of limitation following the date of such decision." C

#12. The learned senior counsel contends that the decision rendered by this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra cannot be wished away by brariding it as per incuriam. It is an extremely serious matter to contend that a judgment is per incuriam. It is contended that in order to render a judgment D per incuriam, it must be first shown that the oversight or inadvertence is a glaring and obtrusive omission. E

#13. Mr. Harin P. Raval, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant Temple Committee, on the other hand, contends that the decision of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath referred to supra is per incuriam as it was passed in ignorance of the Temple Act, 1955. The learned senior counsel contends that the judgment does not even notice Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. The judgment F was passed only on considering the provisions of the OEA Act, 1951. The judgment held that it cannot be said that the estate of Lord Jagannath could not be vested in the State government by a notification issued subsequently. The learned senior counsel contends that the OEAAct, 1951 is an Act which G was principally enacted for the purpose of abolishing all rights in land of "intermediaries" between the Raiyats and the state by whatever name known and for the vesting of the same in the state. It could thus, only divest the intermediaries of its rights in land by vesting it in the State but cannot affect the statutory H SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.] 73 vesting of all endowments in the managing committee under A Section 5 of the Temple Act, 1955. Thus, the provisions of the OEAAct, 1951 even by way of insertion of Section 3Aand the issue of a subsequent notification cannot divest the absolute ownership of the endowments of the Temple. The learned "Senior counsel submits that the endowments vested in the B managing committee and hence it ceased to be an intermediary interest and became the absolute vested property of Lord Jagannath. The learned senior counsel contends that a decision given in ignorance of a statute or a rule having the force of a statue can be held to be per incuriam, as was held C by a three Judge Bench of this Court in the case of Muncipal Corporation of Delhi v. Gurnam Kaur. The learned senior counsel further places reliance on another decision of this Court in the case of State of U.P v. Synthetics and Chemicals Ltd.,7 wherein the principle of per incurJam was discussed as under: 0 '"lncuria literally means 'carel'essness'. In practice per in curium appears to mean per ignoratium.' English Courts have developed this principle in relaxation of the E rule of stare decisis. The 'quotable in law' is avoided and ignored if it is rendered, in ignoratium of a statute or other binding authority' (Young v. Bristol Aeroplane Ltd.). Same has been accepted, approved and adopted by this Court while interpreting Article 141 of the F Constitution which embodies the doctrine of precedents as a matter of law. In Jaisri Sahu v. Rajdewan Dubey, this Court while pointing out the procedure to be followed when conflicting decisions are placed before a Bench G extracted a passage from Halsbury Laws of England incorporating one of the exceptions when the decision of an Appellate Court is not binding." • (1989) 1 sec 101 1 (1991) 4 sec 139 H 74 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2015] 15 S.C.R. A The learned senior counsel further places reliance on the decision of this Court in the case of Fuerst Day Lawson Ltd. v. Jindal Exports Ltd., 8 wherein this Court examined the prior decisions on the issue of per incuriam at length and arrived at the following conclusion: B C D "23. A prior decision of this court on identical facts and law binds the Court on the same points of law in a latter case. This is not an exceptional case by inadvertence or oversight of any judgment or statutory provisions running counter to the reason and result reached. Unless it is a glaring case of obtrusive omission, it is not desirable to depend on the principle of judgment 'per incuriam'. It is also not shown that some part of the decision based on a reasoning which was demonstrably wrong, hence the principle of per incuriam cannot be applied ......... "

#14. The learned senior counsel contends that in the Lord Jagannath case, not only did the Court ignore the provisions E of the Temple Act, 1955, it also ignored the decision of the Constitution Bench in the case of Raja Kishore Deb referred to supra, wherein this Court has held that the Lord Jagannath Temple occupies a unique position in the State of Odisha and is a temple of national importance and no other temple in that F state can be compared with it. It stands in a class by itself and with respect to be a subject of special consideration by the State Government and thus requires special .treatment.

#15. We are unable to agree with the contention advanced G by Mr. M.L. Varma, the learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent Math. The decision of this Court in the case of Lord Jagannath (supra) does not bar the present case by res judicata. The principle of res judicata, codified in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been examined H • (2001) 6 sec 356 SRI JAGANNATH TEMPLE MANAGING COMMITTEE v. SIDDHA MATH & ORS. [V. GOPALA GOWDA, J.} 75 in a catena of cases by this Court. A Constitution Bench of this A Court in Sheodan Singh v. Daryao Kunwar8, held as under: "A plain reading of s, 11 shows that to constitute a matter res judicata, the following conditions must be satisfied, namely- (i) The matter directly and substantially in issue s in the subsequent suit or issue must be the same matter which was directly and substantially in issue in the former suit; (ii) The former suit must have been a suit between the same parties or between parties under whom they or any of them claim; (iii) The parties must have litigated C under the same title in the former suit; (iv) The court which decided the former suit must be a court competent to try the subsequent suit or the suit in which such issue is subsequently raised; and (v) The matter directly and substantially in issue in the subsequent suit must have D been heard and finally decided by the Court in the first suit." The above legal principles laid down by this Court have been reiterated in the case of Syed Mohd. Salie Labbai & Ors. v. E Mohd. Hanifa & Ors. 10 , as under: " ....... it may be necessary to mention that before a plea of res judicata can be given effect, the following conditions must be proved-(1) that the litigating parties F must be the same; (2) that the subject-matter of the su'it also musf be identical; (3) that the matter must be finally decided between the parties; and ( 4) that the suit must . be decided by a court of competent jurisdiction." In the Lord Jagannath case referred to supra, this Court was concerned only with the validity of the vesting notification dated 18.03.197 4, whereas in the instant case, it is the validity of the