UNION OF INDIA & Ors. v. MAJOR S.P. SHARMA & Ors.

permanent commissioned officers of the Indian Army were terminated, since they were found suspected to be involved in espionage activities. Aggrieved by the termination order, the respondents, except two, filed writ petitions before the High Court. These respondents D challenged the said termination order as being illegal and malafide. The High Court by order dated 21.4.1980 dismissed the writ petitions and held that the termination was on account of pleasure doctrine. The Union of India has been consistently contesting these petitions and this E Court has found substance- in the argument of the appellants that the High Court while delivering the judgment dated 21.12.2000 overlooked this important legal aspect of finality coupled with the doctrine of res judicata. This aspect cannot be ignored and the issue of F fact cannot be re-opened in the instant case as well as has been done under the impugned judgment by relying on certain material which the High Court described to have been fraudulently withheld from the courts. Fraud is not a term or ornament nor can it be presumed to exist G on the basis of a mere inference on some alleged material that is stated to have been discovered later on. The discovery of a reinvestigated fact could have been a ground of review in the same proceedings, but the same cannot be made the basis for re-opening the issue H 338 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R. A through a fresh round of litigation. A fresh writ petition or Letters Patent Appeal which is in continuation of a writ petition cannot be filed collaterally to set aside the judgment of the same High Court rendered in earlier round of litigation upholding the termination order. The B High Court has committed a manifest error by not lawfully defining the scope of the fresh round of litigation on the principles of res judicata and doctrine of finality. To establish fraud, it is the material available which may lead to the conclusion that the failure to produce the material c was deliberate or suppressed or even otherwise occasioned a failure of justice. This also, can be attempted if legally permissible only in the said proceedings and not in a collateral challenge raised after the matter has been finally decided in the first round of litigation. The judgment which had become final in 1980 also included writ petition filed by the respondent 'SPS'. Once, this Court had put a seal to the said litigation vide judgment dated 1.9.1980 then a second round of litigation by the same respondents including 'SPS' in another writ E petition was misplaced. [paras 65, 67) [384-D-E; 385-F-H; 0 386-A-F] F

#9. The very genesis of an identical challenge relating to the same proceedings of termination on the pretext of a 5% cut in terminal benefits was impermissible apart from the attraction of the principle of merger. This aspect of finality, therefore, cannot be disturbed through a collateral challenge. The principle of finality of litigation is based on a sound firm principle of public policy. In the absence of such a principle great oppression might G result under the colour and pretence of law inasmuch as there will be no end to litigation. The doctrine of res judicata has been evolved to prevent such an anarchy. In a country governed by the rule of law, finality of judgment is absolutely imperative and great sanctity is H attached to the finality of the judgment and it is not UNION OF !NOIA v. MAJOR S.P. SHARMA 339 permissible for the parties to reopen the concluded A judgments of the court as it would not only tantamount to merely an abuse of the process of the court but would have far reaching adverse affect on the administration of justice. It would also nullify the doctrine of stare decisis a well established valuable principle of precedent which B cannot be departed from unless there are compelling circumstances to do so. The judgments of the court and particularly the Apex Court of a country cannot and should not be unsettled lightly. [Paras 68, 75, 76] [386-G; 388-E-H; 389-A] C Naresh Shridhar Mirajkar vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. AIR 1967 SC 1: 1966 SCR 744; Mohd. Aslam vs. Union of India AIR 1996 SC 1611: 1996 (3) SCR 782; Babu Singh Bains etc. versus Union of India and Ors. etc., AIR 1997 SC 116: 1996 (6) Suppl. SCR 120; Khoday Distilleries Limited D & Anr. vs. The Registrar General, Supreme Court of India, (1996) 3 sec 114: 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR 190; M. Nagabhushana vs. State of Kamataka & Ors., AIR 2011 SC 1113: 2011 (2) SCR 435 - relied on. E

#10. Precedent keeps the law predictable and the law declared by this Court, being the law of the land, is binding on all courts/tribunals and authorities in India in view of Article 141 of the Constitution. The judicial system "only works if someone is allowed to have the last word" and the last word so spoken is accepted and religiously F followed. The doctrine of stare decisis promotes a certainty and consistency in judicial decisions and this helps in the development of the law. Besides providing guidelines for individuals as to what would be the consequences if he chooses the legal action, the doctrine G promotes confidence of the people in the system of the judicial administration. Even otherwise it is an imperative necessity to avoid uncertainty, confusion. Judicial propriety and decorum demand that the law laid down by the highest Court of the land must be given effect to. H 340 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 4 S.C.R. A [Para 77) [389-A-D] 9

#11. Violation of Fundamental Rights guaranteed under the Constitution have to be protected, but at the same time, it is the duty of the court to ensure that the decisions rendered by the court are not overturned frequently, that too, when challenged collaterally as that was directly affecting the basic structure of the Constitution incorporating the power of judicial review of this Court. There is no doubt that this Court has an extensive power to correct an error or to review its C decision but that cannot be done at the cost of doctrine of finality. An issue of law can be overruled later on, but a question of fact or, as in the present case, the dispute with regard to the termination of services cannot be reopened once it has been finally sealed in proceedings inter-se between the parties up to this Court way back in 1980. [Para 84) [393-B-D] D