GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD & Anr. v. THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & Ors.

#5. The notice said to have been issued to Petitioner- G being Notice No. WT/53 cannot be described as a F 'pipeline notice'. It cannot be reasonably said that the pipeline extends from 1956-57 up to 1975. Assuming that a notice issued in 1956-57 is a pipeline notice even in 1975, the question would, nevertheless, relate to the meaning and impact of "issued" of Section 2(f)(iii) of the G Private Forests Act read with Section 35 of the Forest Act. Undoubtedly, the first rule of interpretation is that the· words in a statute must be interpreted literally. But at the same time if the context in which a word is used and the provisions of a statute inexorably suggest a subtext other H 210 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R. A B than literal, then the context becomes important. It is true that ordinary rule of construction is to assign the word a meaning which it ordinarily carries. But the subject of legislation and the context in which a word or expression is employed may require a departure from the rule of literal construction. The scheme of Section 35 of the Forest Act needs to be kept in mind while considering "issued" in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act. A notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is intended to give an opportunity to the owner of a forest to show c cause why, inter alia, a regulatory or a prohibitory measure be not made in respect of that forest. Such a notice pre-supposes the existence of a forest. The owner of the forest is expected to file objections within a reasonable time as specified in the notice and is also given an opportunity to lead evidence in support of the objections. After these basic requirements are met, the owner of the forest is entitled to a hearing on the objections. This entire procedure obviously cannot be followed by the State and the owner of the forest unless the owner is served with the notice. Therefore, service of E a notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is inherent in the very language used in the provision and the very purpose of the provision. [paras 52-56] [248-D H; 249-E-F; 250-A-D] 0 F

#6. Additionally, Section 35(4) of the Forest Act provides that a notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act may provide that for a period not exceeding six months (extended to one year in 1961) the owner of the forest can be obliged to adhere to one or more of the G regulatory or prohibitory measures mentioned in Section 35(1) of the Forest Act. On the failure of the owner of the forest to abide by the said measures, he/she is liable to imprisonment for a term upto six months and/or a fine under Section 35(7) of the Forest Act. Surely, given the H penal consequence of non-adherence to a Section 35(4) GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 211 ·direction in a Section 35(3) notice, service of such a A notice must be interpreted to be mandatory. On the facts .of the case in Petitioner-G, such a direction was in fact ;'.given and Petitioner-G was directed, for a period of six :months, to refrain from the cutting and removal of trees ;and timber and the firing and clearing of vegetation. B '.Strictly speaking, therefore, despite not being served with Notice No. WT/53 and despite having no knowledge of it, .Petitioner-G was liable to be punished under Section , 35(7) of the Forest Act if it cut or removed any tree or : timber or fired or cleared any vegetation. [para 57] [250- C D-H; 251-A] Jagir Singh v. State of Bihar (1976) 2 SCC 942: 1976. (2) SCR 809; Black Diamond Beverages v. Commercial Tax Officer (1998) 1 SCC 458 1997 ( 4) Suppl. SCR 133; R.L Arora v. State of U.P. (1964) 6 SCR 784; Tata Engg. & D Locomotive Co. Ltd. v. State of Bihar (2000) 5 SCC 346 2000 (3) SCR 219; Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal (2002) 5 SCC 397 2002 (3) SCR 1078 - relied on. Robinson v. Barton-Eccles Local Board (1883) 8 AC 798 E - referred to.

#7. This interplay may be looked at from another point of view, namely, the need to issue a direction under Section 35(4) of the Forest Act, which can be only to prevent damage to or destruction of a forest. If the notice under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is not served on the owner of the forest, he/she may continue to damage the forest defeating the very purpose of the Forest Act. Such an interpretation cannot be given to Section 35 of the Forest Act nor can a limited interpretation be given to the G word "issued" used in the context of Section 35 of the Forest Act in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act. Finally, Section 35(5) of the Forest Act mandates not only service of a notice issued under that provision "in the manner provided in the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, for H F 212 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2014] 2 S.C.R. A the service of summons" but also its publication "in the manner prescribed by rules". This double pronged receipt and confirmation of knowledge of the show cause notice by the owner of a forest makes it clear that Section 35(3) of the Forest Act is not intended to end the 8 process with the mere issuance of a notice but it also requires service of a notice on the owner of the forest. The need for ensuring service is clearly to protect the interests of the owner of the forest who may have valid reasons not only to object to the issuance of regulatory C or prohibitory directions, but to also enable him/her to raise a jurisdictional issue that the land in question is actually not a forest. The need for ensuring service is also to prevent damage to or destruction of a forest. Unfortunately, Chintamani missed these finer details because it was perhaps not brought to the notice of this D Court that Section 35 of the Forest Act as applicable to the State of Maharashtra had sub-sections beyond sub section (3). [paras 58, 59, 60] (251-A-G]

#8. It is true that a word has to be construed in the E context in which it is used in a statute. By making a reference in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act to 'issue' in Section 35 of the Forest Act, it is clear that the word is dressed in borrowed robes. Once that is appreciated (and it was unfortunately overlooked in F Chintamani) then it is quite clear that 'issued' in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act must include service of the show cause notice as postulated in Section 35 of the Forest Act. Under these circumstances, to this extent, Chintamani was incorrectly decided and it is overruled to G this extent. Assuming that the word 'issued' as occurring in Section 2(f)(iii) of the Private Forests Act must be literally and strictly construed, the question would arise whether it also has reference to a show cause notice issued under Section 35(3) of the Forest Act at any given H time (say in 1927 or in 1957) or would it be more GODREJ & BOYCE MFG. CO. LTD. v. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. 213 reasonable to hold that it has reference to a show cause A notice issued in somewhat closer proximity to the coming into force of the Private Forests Act, or a 'pipeline notice'. In the absence of any time period having been specified for deciding a show cause notice issued under Section 35 of the Forest Act, it must be presumed that it B must be decided within a reasonable time. According to the State, a show cause notice was issued to Petitioner- G in 1957 (and assuming it was served) but no decision was taken thereon till 1975 that is for about 18 years. This is an unusually long period and undoubtedly much more C than a reasonable time had elapsed for enabling the State to take a decision on the show cause notice. Therefore, the show cause notice must, for all intents and purposes be treated as having become a dead letter and the seed planted by the State yielded nothing. [paras 61, 65, 67] o [252-B-G; 253-A-C; 254-A-C]