MRS. SARAH MATHEW v. THE INSTITUTE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES BY ITS DIRECTOR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN & Ors.

12 S.C.R. 674 MRS. SARAH MATHEW v. THE INSTITUTE OF CARDIOVASCULAR DISEASES BY ITS DIRECTOR - DR. K.M. CHERIAN & ORS. (Criminal Appeal No. 829 of 2005) NOVEMBER 26, 2013 [P. SATHASIVAM, CJI, DR. B.S. CHAUHAN, RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, RANJAN GOGOi AND S.A. BOBDE, JJ.] A B c Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss. 468 and 469 rlw s. 473 - Bar to take cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - Commencement of period D of limitation and extension thereof - Held: For the purpose of computing the period of limitation u/s 468, the relevant date is the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution and not the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance - In view of s. 469, period of limitation in relation E to an offence shall commence either from the date of offence If the or from the date when the offence is detected - complaint is filed after the period of limitation, complainant can make an application for condonation of delay u/s 473 - Court will have to issue notice to accused and after hearing the · accused, and the complainant, decide whether to condone the If the complaint is filed within the period of limitation and court takes cognizance after the period of limitation then complainant cannot be expected to make an application for condonation of such delay - s.473 postulates condonation of delay caused by the complainant in filing the It is the date of filing of the complaint which is F delay or not - G complaint - material - ss.

468 and 469 will have to be read with s. 473 - Interpretation of statutes - Legislative intent - Limitation. Chapter XXXVI - s.468 r!w ss. 469 and 473 - Bar to take H 674 SARAH MATHEW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 675 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN cognizance after lapse of the period of limitation - Taking of A 'cognizance' - Connotation of - Held: 'Cognizance' is entirely an act of the court - Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said to have been committed - This is the special B connotation acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter XXXVI - The only harmonious construction which can be placed on ss. 468, 469 and 470 is that Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if the complaint in respect of it c is filed within the prescribed limitation period - He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as is legally excludable - Besides, Cr.P.C. is a procedural law to be construed liberally to serve justice - There is no scope for application of doctrine of casus omissus - statutes - Harmonious construction - Liberal construction - Doctrine of casus omissus.

Interpretation of 0 Interpretation of Statutes: Purposive construction - Held: There is no ambiguity in E the provisions of Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. - But, the word 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. The rule of purposive construction can be applied in such a situation - A purposive construction of an enactment is one which gives effect to the legislative purpose by following the literal F meaning of the enactment where that meaning is in accordance with the legislative purpose or by applying a strained meaning where the literal meaning is not in accordance with legislative purpose - If in a case literal interpretation appears to be in any way in conflict with the G legislative intent or is leading to absurdity, purposive interpretation will ..have to be adopted - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Chapter XXXVI. Doctrine of reasonable construction - Court would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity H 676 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A of Jaw by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution.

Heading of Chapter - Held: 'Heading' or 'title' prefixed to sections or group of sections have a limited role to play in construction of statutes - They may be taken as very broad and general indicators or the nature of the subject matter dealt with thereunder but they do not control the meaning of sections if the meaning is otherwise ascertainable by reading the section in proper perspective along with other provisions. 8 c Maxims: Relevance of legal maxims in interpreting a provision - Held: Though legal maxims are not mandatory rules, but they 0 seNe as guiding principles - Maxims - (i) 'nu/furn tempus aut locus occurrit regi', (ii) 'vigilantibus et non dormientibus, jura subveniunt', (iii) 'actus curiae neminem gravabit' - Applicability of. There being conflict in the views taken in two-Judge E Bench decisions in Bharat Kale' and Japani Sahoo2 on the one hand, and a three-Judge Bench decision in Krishna Pillai3, on the other, on the question whether for the purpose of computing the period of limitation u/s 468 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC), the relevant date would be the date of filing of the complaint or the date of institution of prosecution or whether the relevant date would be the date on which the Magistrate took cognizance of the offence, the mater was ultimately referred to the Constitution Bench. F G Answering the reference, the Court

Bharat Damodar Kale & Anr. v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2003) 8 SCC 559.

Japani Sahoo v. Chandra Sekhar Mohanty 2007 (8) SCR 582. H 3. Krishna Pillai v. T.A. Rajendran & Anr. (1990) supp. SCC 121. SARAH MATHEW v. INST. OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 677 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN HELD: 1.1 The Limitation Act, 1963 does not apply A to criminal proceedings except for appeals or revisions for which express provision is made in Articles 114, 115, 131 and 132 thereof. The Criminal Procedure Code, 1898 contained no general provision for limitation. Though under certain special laws there are provisions B prescribing period of limitation for prosecution of offences, there was no general law of limitation for prosecution of other offences. This position underwent a change to some extent when Chapter XXXVI was introduced in the Cr.P.C. [para 15-16] [709-C-E; 708-F-G] c The Assistant Collector of Customs, Bombay & Anr. v. L.R. Melwani & Anr. 1969 SCR 438 =AIR 1970 SC 962 - referred to

1.2 The object of Chapter XXXVI was to quicken the D prosecutions of complaints and to .rid the criminal justice system of inconsequential cases displaying extreme lethargy, inertia or indolence. The effort was to make the criminal justice system more orderly, efficient and just by providing period of limitation for certain offences. E However, the law makers did not want cause of justice to suffer in genuine cases. Therefore, in Chapter XXXVI, provisions have been made out for exclusion of time in certain cases [s. 470], for exclusion of date on which the court is closed [s.471], for continuing offences [s.472] and F for extension of period of limitation in certain cases [s. 473]. Section 473 is crucial. It is an overriding provision which enables courts to condone delay where such delay has been properly explained or where the interest of justice demands extension of period of limitation. It G empowers the court to take cognizance of an offence after the expiry of the period of limitation, if it is satisfied on the facts and in the circumstances of the case that the delay has been properly explained or that it is necessary to do so in the interest of justice. Therefore, Chapter H 678 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 S.C.R. A XXXVI is not loaded against the complainant. [Para 18 and 19] [715-G-H; 716-A, E-G] State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh AIR 1981 SC 1054 - referred to. B

1.3 It is true that the accused has a right to have a speedy trial and this right is a facet of Art. 21 of the Constitution. Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. does not undermine this right of the accused. While it encourages diligence by providing for limitation it does not want all C prosecutions to be thrown overboard on the ground of delay. It strikes a balance between the interest of the complainant and the interest of the accused. It is significant to notice that where the legislature wanted to treat certain offences differently, it provided for limitation D in the section itself [e.g. ss.198(6) and 199(5)]. However, it chose to make general provisions for limitation for certain types of offences for the first time and incorporated them in Chapter XXXVI of the Cr.P.C. [para 19] [716-G-H; 717-A-C] E

1.4 Section 467 defines the phrase 'period of limitation' to mean the period specified in s.468 for taking cognizance of certain offences. Section 468 stipulates the bar of limitation. Sub-s. (1) of s.468 makes it clear that a fetter is put on the court's power to take cognizance of F an offence of the category mentioned in sub-s. (2) after the expiry of period of limitation. Sub-s. (2) lays down the period of limitation for certain offences. Section 469 states when the period of limitation commences. It is dexterously drafted so as to prevent advantage of bar of G limitation being taken by the accused. It states that period of limitation in relation to an offence shall commence either from the date of offence or from the date when the offence is detected. [para 21] [719-A-D] H Rashmi Kumar (Smt.) v. Mahesh Kumar Bhada, 1996 SARAH MATH!OW v. INST OF CARDIOVASCULAR OISE. BY ITS 679 DIR. - DR. K.M. CHERIAN (10) Suppl. SCR 347 = (1997) 2 SCC 397 - referred to. A

1.5 Thus, Chapter XXXVI is a code by itself so far as limitation is concerned. All the provisions of this Chapter will have to be read cumulatively. Sections 468 and 469 will have to be read with s.473. [para 21] [719-G] B

2.1 'Cognizance' is entirely an act of the court. The term 'cognizance' has not been defined in the Cr.P.C. A Magistrate takes cognizance when he applies his mind or takes judicial notice of an offence with a view to initiating proceedings in respect of offence which is said C to have been committed. This is the special connotation acquired by the term 'cognizance' and it has to be given the same meaning wherever it appears in Chapter 36. Taking cognizance may be delayed because of several reasons. It may be delayed because of systemic reasons. D It may be delayed because of the Magistrate's personal reasons. [para 22 and 25] [719-H; 721-H; 722-A-B] S.K. Sinha, Chief Enforcement Officer v. Videocon International Ltd.& Ors. 2008 (2) SCR 36 = (2008) 2 SCC 492; E Jamuna Singh & Ors. v. Bhadai Shah 1964 SCR 37 =AIR 1964 SC 1541, Gopal Das Sindhi & Ors. v. State of Assam & Anr. 1961 AIR 986; State of Maharashtra v. Sharadchandra Vinayak Dongre & Ors. 1994 Suppl. (4) SCR 378 = (1995) 1 SCC 42-Referred to. F

2.2 There has to be some amount of certainty or definiteness in matters of limitation relating to criminal offences. Therefore, the date on which complaint is filed has to be taken as material for computing the limitation. If the complaint is filed after the period of limitation, the G complainant can make an application for condonation of delay u/s 473 of the Cr.P.C. The court will have to issue notice to the accused and after hearing the accused, and the complainant, decide whether to condone the delay or not. If the court takes cognizance after the period of H 680 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2013] 12 s.c.q. A limitation then, the complainant cannot be expected to make an application for condonation of such delay. Therefore, the only harmonious construction which can be placed on ss. 468, 469 and 470 of the Cr.P.C. is that the Magistrate can take cognizance of an offence only if B the complaint in respect of it is filed within the prescribed limitation period. He would, however, be entitled to exclude such time as is legally excludable. Examined in light of legislative intent and meaning ascribed to the term 'cognizance' by this Court, it is clear that s.473 of the C Cr.P.C. postulates condonation of delay caused by the complainant in filing the complaint. It is the date of filing of the complaint which is material. In taking cognizance subjective element comes in. Therefore, it cannot be held that relevant point for computing limitation would be the date on which the Magistrate takes cognizance. A court of law would interpret a provision which would help sustaining the validity of the law by applying the doctrine of reasonable construction rather than applying a doctrine which would make the provision unsustainable and ultra vires the Constitution. [para 26-28] [722-E-H; 0 E 723-E-F; 724-C-E, H; 725-A]