LEE KUN HEE & Ors. v. STATE OF U.P & Ors.

obligation(s) which they were obliged to perform A thereunder. The words "anything which has been done", would extend to anything which has been done in furtherance of the execution of the agreement. The facts constituting the performance of obligations by the complainant, actually constitute the foundational basis B for the criminal accusation levelled against the accused (in refusing to honour the corresponding obligation). The instant foundational basis for establishing the commission of the offence, would fall within the ambit of the words "anything which has been done" used in the c said provision. In the absence of the instant affirmation of the factual position, the culpability of the accused cannot be established. In the complaint it is asserted, that the contracted goods/product were/was supplied by JCE Consultancy (seller) from Ghaziabad in India. The factum of having supplied the goods/product to 'S' Company in Dubai (the ultimate beneficiary) through 'SI' Company (intermediary buyer), is sought to be established not only through a delivery receipt dated 28.1.2002 (issued by the intermediary buyer-'SI' Company, but also, on the basis E of the bill of exchange executed by 'S' Company in Dubai (the ultimate beneficiary), constituting the payment for the goods/product purchased. The factum of supply of goods from Ghaziabad (in India) to Dubai (in the United Arab Emirates), as an essential component of the offence(s) allegedly committed by the accused, is relatable to the F words "anything which has been done" used in Section 179. This factual position, is sufficient to vest jurisdiction under Section 179 Cr.P.C.; with a competent Court at Ghaziabad. [Para 12] [312-G-H; 313-A-G] 0

1.2. Under Section 179 Cr.P.C., even the place(s) wherein the consequence (of the criminal act) "ensues", would i;~ relevant to determine the court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, even the courts within whose local jurisdiction, the repercus~ion/effect of the criminal act H G 292 SUPREME COURT REPORTS (2012] 4 S.C.R. A occurs, would have jurisdiction in the matter. The reciprocal consideration, flowing out of the agreement, is comprised of a monetary payback. The said monetary payback was allegedly transmitted by the recipient of goods ('S' Company in Dubai) to the intermediary buyer B ('SI' Limited), by way of a bill of exchange valued at US$ 14,32,745, on 1.2.2002. The said bill of exchange was then endorsed by 'SI' Limited to the complainant-JCE Consultancy. JCE Consultancy maintains that it holds the said bill of exchange at Ghaziabad in India. The execution c of the bill of exchange by 'S' Company in Dubai and its endorsement by 'SI' Limited is in consonance with the terms and conditions of the agreement. Upon alleged denial of payment to JCE Consultancy (under the bill of exchange), a legal notice was issued demanding 0 payment. In its response, 'S' Company in Dubai, allegedly dishonestly/fraudulently/falsely denied liability/ responsibility. Since the complainant is allegedly holding the bill of exchange at Ghaziabad in India, the consequence emerging out of the said denial of E encashment of the bill of exchange, would be deemed to "ensue" at Ghaziabad in India. Thus, the competent Court at Ghaziabad in India, would have jurisdiction in the matter under Section 179 Cr.P.C. [Para 13) [313-H; 314- A-F] F

1.3. A perusal of Section 181 Cr.P .C. leaves no room for any doubt that in offences of the nature as are subject matter of consideration, the court within whose local jurisdiction, the whole or a part of the consideration " ... were required to be returned or accounted for ... " G would have jurisdiction in the matter. In the instant case, a bill of exchange dated 1.2.2002 was issued on behalf of 'S' Company in Dubai, to 'SI' Company Limited; 'SI' Company, in terms of the agreement, endors.'::ld the said bill of exchange in favour of tb.ie complainant-'JCE' H Company; JCE Company cl.eim1s to be holding the said LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 293 bill of exchange at Ghaziabad in India. Being holder of A the bill of exchange, JCE Company demanded the right of payment thereunder, which is being denied by the accused. Since the bill of exchange issued by 'S' Company in Dubai for US$14,32,745 was received, and is allegedly being held by 'JCE"Company at Ghaizabad B in India; the said bill of exchange, according to the complainant, has to be honoured/realized at the place where it is held (i.e. at Ghaziabad, in India). In the instant alleged factual background of the matter, the competent court at Ghaziabad in India, would have jurisdiction to c hold the trial of the complaint under Section 181 (4) Cr.P.C. (Para 14] (315-D-H]

1.4. A perusal of Section 182 Cr.P.C. reveals that the said provision can be invoked to determine jurisdiction in respect of a number of offences which include D cheating as a component. When acts of fraud/dishonesty/ deception, relatable to the offence(s), contemplated u/s. 182 emerge from communications/messages/letters etc., the place(s) from where the communications/messages/ letters etc. were sent, as also, the places at which the E same were received, would be relevant to determine the court of competent jurisdiction. The allegations contained in the complaint reveal, that the complainant-JCE Company addressed a legal notice to 'S' Company in Dubai, calling upon 'S' Company in Dubai, to honour its F reciprocal commitment of the monetary payback contemplated under the agreement. In its response, 'S' Company in Dubai, denied liability, by asserting that 'S' Company in Dubai, had no commitment/responsibility towards JCE Company under the bill of exchange dated G 1.2.2002. The said denial according to the complainant, constitutes the basis of the criminal complaint filed against the accused. The place at which the said response on behalf of 'S' Company in Dubai, was received, would be relevant to determine the court of H 294 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R. A competent jurisdiction, under Section 182 Cr.P.C. Even if the response was received by the counsel for JCE Consultancy in a place other than Ghaziabad (though in India), still the competent court at Ghaziabad in India, would be vested with jurisdiction, as under Section 178 (d) Cr.P.C., in cases where an offence consists of several acts carried out under different jurisdictions, a court having jurisdiction where any one of such acts was committed, would be competent to try the same. [Para 15] (316-F-H; 317-A-D] B c

1.5. In view of the said deliberations, it is not legitimate for the appellants to contend, that the actions attributed by JCE Consultancy to the accused, have no connectivity to territorial jurisdiction in India. Section 179 Cr.P.C. vests jurisdiction for inquiry and trial in a court, D within whose jurisdiction anything has been done with reference to an alleged crime, and also, where the consequence of the criminal action ensues. Section 181(4) Cr.P.C. leaves no room for any doubt, that culpability is relatable even to the place at which E consideration is required to be returned or accounted for. Finally, Section 182 Cr.P.C. postulates that for offences of which cheating is a component, if the alleged act of deception is shown to have been committed, through communications/letters/messages, the court within F whose jurisdiction the said communications/letters/ messages were sent (were received), would be competent to inquire into and try the same. Thus, viewed, it is not justified for the appellants to contend, that the allegations levelled by the complainant against the accused, specially in respect of the five appellants, are not relatable to territorial jurisdiction in India, under the provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure. [Para 16) (317-E-H; 318-A] G

1.6. All components of the submissions advanced by the appellants, more particularly their foreign nationality, their residence outside India, and the fact that they were H ' I LEE KUN H~E & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 295 not present in India when the offence(s) was/were A allegedly committed, are of no consequence. They would not be protected u/s. 2 IPC. There is no merit in the first contention that the Magistrate could not have entertained the complaint filed by JCE Consultancy against the appellants. [Para 17] [324-F-H; 325-A] B Mobarik Ali Ahmed vs. The State of Bombay (1958) SCR 328 - relied on.

#2. It was submitted that that the complaint lodged by JCE Consultancy was based on an agreement between C JCE Consultancy and 'SI" Company; that the appellants were not privy to the said contract/agreement, and as such the grievance of the complainant, if any could have been raised only as against 'SI' Company; and that the appellants having no role to play under the contract/ o agreement were wrongfully involved in the controversy by the complainant. In the complaint filed by JCE Consultancy, it was expressly averred that all the appellants were involved in "each and every act done by the company" ('S' Company in Dubai). In the statement E recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., the complainant deposed that the appellants were individually and jointly liable for the commission of offences emerging from the complaint. How they were liable (if at all), is a question of evidence, which would emerge only after evidence is F recorded by the trial court But what is interesting is, that 'SI' Company though an accused in the complaint filed by JCE Company totally supported the accusation(s) levelled by the complainant against the appellants. In a detailed response to the culpability of the appellants 'SI' G Company adopted a firm stance. Even the pleadings, prima facie demonstrate the connectivity of the appellants, with the foundational basis expressed in the complaint. It is undesirable to exculpate the appellants from the proceedings initiated by 'JCE' Company before the Magistrate, Ghaziabad. The issue under reference H 296 SUPREME COURT REPORTS [2012] 4 S.C.R. A may be re-agitated, after evidence has been produced by the rival parties before the trial court. [Paras 20, 21] [326- C-D, E-G; 327-A-D; 329-G-H; 330-A]

#3. Through the complaint, as also, in the statement 8 of the complainant recorded under Section 200 Cr.P.C., JCE Consultancy categorically asserted that the appellants were jointly or severally liable to honour the bill of exchange, which had been endorsed in its (JCE Consultancy's) favour. In order to demonstrate the C appellant's liability, a series of documents were also placed before the trial court. The Magistrate having considered the said material, issued the summoning order. The culpability of the appellants would obviously depend upon the evidence produced before the jurisdictional court. It can definitely be stated from the D pleadings before this Court, that one of the accused, namely, 'SI' Company totally supported the cause of the complainant-JCE Consultancy, through its written reply. The factual details emerging from the evidence to be produced by the rival parties, would be necessary to E project a clear picture. It is only thereafter, that a rightful decision on this issue canvassed would be possible. The factual foundation/background of the acts of omission and commission presented by the complainant is specific levelled by the and categoric. The allegations F complainant, fully incorporate all the basic facts which are necessary to make out the offences whereunder the impugned summoning order was passed. The instant case does not suffer from any impairments referred in lridum India Telecom Limited Case. It is left open to the G appellants to canvass the legal issues, before the trial court. After the rival parties have led their evidence, the trial court would return its finding thereon, in accordance with law, without being influenced by any observations made on the merits of the controversy. [Para 23] [336-H; H 337-A-H] LEE KUN HEE & ORS. v. STATE OF U.P. & ORS. 297 Iridium India Telecom Limited vs. Motorola Incorporated A